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ON THE RELATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS*

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That politics and economic life have much to do with each other is a remark matched in self-evidence only by the parallel observation that political science and economics are of mutual interest. All the more striking then is the difficulty one meets in attempting to state with precision how politics and economic life, or how political science and economics are related.

I

Consider for example the view that politics is the ceaseless competition of interested groups. Except under very rare conditions, as for instance the absence of division of labor, economic circumstances will preoccupy the waking hours of most men at most times. Their preoccupations will express themselves in the formation of organizations, or at least interested groups, with economic foundations. Politics, so far as "interest" means "economic interest" (which it does largely, but not exclusively), is the mutual adjustment of economic positions; and to that extent, the relation between politics and economic life seems to be that political activity grows out of economic activity. But the competition of the interests is, after all, an organized affair, carried out in accordance with rules called laws and constitutions. So perhaps the legal framework, the construction of which surely deserves to be called political, supervenes over the clashing of mere interests and even prescribes which interests may present themselves at the contest. Thus politics appears to be primary in its own right. But we are compelled to go a step further: Is not the legal framework itself a direct consequence of the rivalries of self-seekers, so that even the fundamental law or laws merely give expression to still more fundamental facts of life? We find ourselves at last asking whether politics is simply the extension of economic activity, as war was once said to be the extension of diplomacy; or whether, on the other hand, economic life is determined in its most important respects by acts of legislation irreducible to anything but a judgment of the general welfare.

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But perhaps we have strayed in our reasoning, and the question whether political or economic activity is primary is not the right question. Perhaps instead we ought to begin by observing that there is political life and there is economic life. They are related in that they both occupy the same space, in a manner of speaking, a space loosely called society. There is a political aspect of society and there is an economic aspect. Questions of power are settled under the one, questions of wealth are settled under the other. Certainly, wealth may confer power and power may occasion wealth, but this does not diminish the difference between the two objects or between the activities by which they are sought and gained. If we pay attention for a moment to the social sciences that investigate these matters, namely political science and economics, we notice how little inclined each is to assert its "primacy" over the other. One studies society in its capacity as "state"; the other studies the identical society considered in its capacity as "economy." Society might also be studied as "culture," and perhaps in other capacities. The truth seems to be that men occupy themselves with numerous activities or kinds of behavior, in each of which the actors pursue something that appears to them worth while or necessary. The peaceful coexistence of the activities is reflected in the disinclination of the corresponding social sciences to invade each other with claims of precedence. Political and economic activity are related to each other, indeed, but in the sense that they are autonomous principalities, neither subject to the other, both contributory to society.

We could wish to be content with this explanation, if we were satisfied that the use it makes of the term "society" did not introduce a new difficulty. Society does not mean the universal concourse of all mankind. Invariably if means only some men, ordinarily those who live within a frontier fixed by conventions and under a common set of laws and institutions. If there were not laws and conventions, there would be no societies, or at any rate no societies in which the relation of politics and economics would be perceived as a problem. And how then is one to account for those legislative and political activities, or proto-political activities, which are the source of the law upon which society rests? Is such political activity in principle not merely a sophisticated device for securing life and property? We observe that the attempt to dispose of the problem of politics and economics by making use of "society" and "behavior" as primary only shows us more clearly how difficult it is to escape treating the relation of politics and economics as itself primary, in order to explain society.

When we think of the ground or foundation of society, we are reminded of the classic treatments of the theme, and of the differences that have existed among the ablest men who have applied themselves to the problem. Some, like Aristotle, have thought that the cultivation of property ("equipment") is the condition for the support of a good constitution. Others, like Locke, have taught that a good constitution is one that supports a sound system of property. And many men, before Aristotle and after Abraham Lincoln, have known that the very question of what may be held as property is decided by the law which gives its character to civil society—the very law which, some say, is framed by hands that hold or reach out toward property in every form. Again we are led to the problem of the relation between the political and the economic as a question of primacy or order.

II

Let us make a new beginning, restating the problem and its conditions. We should like to know, as exactly as we can, what relation exists between political science and economics. In order to proceed, we must have an idea of what is meant by a relation between sciences. In one respect, sciences can scarcely be said to be capable of having a relation with each other except in the trivial sense that, as bodies of knowledge, they may be lodged in the same mind, or in different minds. But sciences are not simply knowledge, for there is no such thing. Knowledge must be of something, and a science must have an object, which is the thing known or studied. Now it occasionally happens that one object is contributory or auxiliary to another in a simple and manifest way; as, for example, systems of waste and sewage disposal are contributory to comprehensive arrangements for safeguarding public health. In that case, the science of sanitary engineering would be contributory to the larger science of public health. It is generally true that sciences are related to each other as their respective objects are related, the sciences being, so to speak, the rarefied forms of their objects. If, then, we wish to investigate the relation of political science and economics, we ought to begin with their respective objects—what each one is about—and if possible determine the relation of those objects.

Political science is the science of government, or the science that has government as its object. As the object of political science, government is not the simple substantive which means *the* government; rather it is the transitive verbal noun which has "governing" as a near equivalent.

Government must be by people and of people; some govern and many are governed. The instrument, by which those who are licensed to govern do their office, is law. The positive law, expressed, clarified, and executed by officers of government is the ligament between authority and citizenry, binding them together. Such law is in fact omnicompetent, and reaches or can reach, as history amply demonstrates, to every imaginable human act—with what right or what success we need not stop here to inquire. It is not to the purpose to enumerate the many human acts of which reckless or humane regimes take no cognizance; every act of non-intervention by the law is, as the words themselves say, an act of the law—a tacit or explicit act of abnegation. Thus it is by an act of the law, by which we mean an act of the lawmakers, that law is forbidden to interfere with worship and other things in this country. In brief, the distinction between public and private matters is itself a public matter, expressed in law by the makers of the law.[1] It is clear that the force of this observation is in no way diminished by the fact that, under the best circumstances, the governed consent to the acts of government, and may themselves be said to hold in their hands the ultimate authority that gives its sanction to the law. On these grounds it may be said that political science has as its object government, meaning by that the relation of governors and citizens, expressed in law, and comprehending, in principle if not in practice, all the deeds of all the men.

When we attempt next to understand what the object of economics is, we must begin by ignoring the fact that there is no such thing as economics in general, but rather socialist economics, free enterprise economics, the economics of slave systems, and so on. We may ignore these distinctions here for the reason that, in one important respect, the various kinds of economics overlap, since they all have their origin in the same circumstance, namely, human need. A certain exchange or transfer of matter must take place between men and their natural surroundings, and it must be effected by the use of objects which exceed the hands in hardness and other merely material qualities. In one sense there is no more fundamental fact about men: first of all, their nature demands matter, and the nature of what surrounds them also compels them to collect and utilize matter in order to stay alive.

It is a commonplace that a gap exists between matter as such and property. Matter is not automatically made property either by occupation or possession or prescription; for property is an extension of its owner, something physically external which is assimilated to him although it is not inseparable from his body. His appropriation to himself of what is external must therefore be recognized by others, or he will be parted from it by them at their convenience. Therefore the transformation of matter into property depends upon an act of convention or agreement by which each recognizes, and abstains from, the extended as well as the natural person of every other. We appear compelled to infer that the object of economics, namely, man's use of indispensable matter for the satisfying of his needs, is prior in principle to civil life and is indeed the root of law and civilization. This is what is implied by some of those who assert that the purpose of government is to guarantee property. In fact, however, the meaning of this reasoning is quite different. Although it appears to say that man's requirement of matter generates law, in fact it says that the transformation of matter into property requires law, or has law as its condition; and more precisely, it has not law simply as its condition, but law of a certain content and intention. For law that made each man the precarious beneficiary of the sovereign at the mere pleasure of the sovereign, as a child or servant is the beneficiary of the head of the household, would be undoubted law, but it would not be law that culminated in property.

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[1] The general truth of this proposition is the ground for our ignoring here the otherwise important differences among regimes.

We may notice now more exactly why there is not such a thing as economics simply, but rather as many varieties of economics as there are legal systems. The reason is that, what objects a man may hold as his property, saying of them that he needs them to live, is altogether a public or legal matter. The demand of self-preservation does not lead naturally to any particular institution of ownership, as a comparison of medieval natural law doctrine with capitalism amply demonstrates. It leads to a system of ownership only through certain acts of government. We know positively that the sense of the community, expressed in law, may permit the owning of a man or forbid the owning of the soil, permit the owning of engines of war or forbid the owning of a brocade cloak. Property, tangible as well as intangible, is the creature of the law, is subordinate to the law. What it is and who may have of it and what he may do with it is settled by acts of government.

But this does not quite conclusively establish the proposition that the object of economics is subordinate to the object of political science. For it has been known, since Plato's time at the least, that the rules with respect to property that come into force at the foundation of the community, or thereafter, have much to do with the subsequent development of the community as a political society. The truth of this follows from the meaning of property: property is an artificial elaboration of the man, the collection of objects which, when added to the man, form as a sum the civil person, a subject or citizen of a certain kind. He may be a formidable citizen if his person is greatly extended with objects, a negligible citizen if his person is destitute of every increment and he confronts his governors in his congenital nakedness, so to speak, or in his minimum scope, without addition.

That a man's powers may be expanded in other ways than by the increase of his "size" is obvious. But it must be said that the man wholly unexpanded in every way lacks the ground for that self-regard which distinguishes the citizen from the mere subject. To create a civil society of self-regarding men, which is to say men who confront government with a strong consciousness of their rights, the statesman should endow the people with those rights of self-enlargement which are the ground of larger rights. Liberal constitutions seem, according to the nature of things, to rest easily upon a base of economic freedom because of the ease with which political rights arise out of access to property. Conversely, authoritarian constitutions must circumscribe the acquisitiveness of subjects, or the subjects will grow beyond the power of the laws to hem them in. Regimes seem thus to derive their characters from the economic foundations that support them. There appears to be a strong reason for affirming the subordination of rule to property: rule is for the good of the governed, and the enlargement of property is equivalent to the enlargement of the man—the ground of his development as a human being and as a citizen.

We seem to have discovered that the economic arrangements are means contributory to political ends in a way so fundamental that it would be misleading to describe them as merely contributory; the means and the end seem in fact to lose their order and to disappear in each other. We have reached the point at which it is necessary to begin once again, for without a deeper principle than any to which we have thus far had recourse, we seem unable to break out of the endless alternation of the political and economic at what appear to be the foundations, each incontrovertibly determining the other and dependent on the other.

III

The clue to the solution of our problem is indicated by the history of the two sciences of political philosophy and economics. For twenty centuries there was but one social science, namely, political philosophy, and it had as its purpose to understand the nature of those who are to rule and of those who are to be ruled, and the nature or constitution of political society in the light of that understanding. The thinkers of classical antiquity, who impelled political philosophy in the direction in which it persisted for two millenia, understood the relation of rulers and ruled to be a natural relation in the literal sense that it arose directly out of observable and irreducible inequalities of human beings—inequalities in strength, to begin with, and other inequalities which became important in time. As Aristotle indicates in Book I of the *Politics*, prepolitical society reflects the brute natural inequalities among human beings, while political society does or may reflect other inequalities. Under the best circumstances, the conventional or political order would reflect or incorporate or do justice to appropriate natural differences among human beings—including such differences as those between men and women, parents and children, and the aged and youthful, as well as between the exceptionally competent and those of meaner capacity. Political society is necessarily an articulation of unequals, and those concerned in it will be well off if their constructed or constitutional inequality harmonizes in the right way with the natural. The sovereign question is how that harmony may be achieved or approximated.

It is abundantly clear that Plato and Aristotle, who believed that the order of human inequality is natural, did not believe that nature was an engine for translating the appropriate natural order into the conventional order of human societies. In some respects, indeed, their teaching points to the urgent need of de-emphasizing the natural order of inequality in order to render political society possible or tolerable: the rule of the naturally strongest, the physically ablest, would or could be a rule of brutal barbarism. In other respects their doctrine implies indeed the friendliness of nature to civil society: nature furnishes the great quarry of matter out of which men may and can equip themselves for a social existence, and it furnishes them, if unequally, with that understanding of the meaning of inequality which men can translate into the description of an excellent political association. Only so far does the providence of nature extend. Nature provides the materials of political life, and it implies the form or outline of a proper political life, but it is not itself the efficient cause of the most desirable of political organizations, nor does it produce a general, much less an irresistible inclination toward them. On the contrary, the conventional or political order resists with a deep intransigence all efforts at converting it into the simply or naturally best order.

It is true that the political philosophy of classical Greece gives the impression of being dominated by the idea that nature is unqualifiedly or even providentially good for man, the direct source of the model of human perfection, private and political. From this famous ostensive teleology, it is easy to proceed to the conclusion that the ancients were fantastic optimists, nourishing a blind faith in a nature which appears plainly to us to be itself blind to man and his happiness. Yet it is quite clear, for example from Book I of Aristotle's *Politics*, that classical philosophy understood that nature is as much identified with the beginning as with the end, or that nature shows itself in the barbaric pre-political state as it does in the artificial condition of civil life. The bridge that connects the pre-political with the political condition is the activity of satisfying the needs that accompany man in all his states, *i.e.*, the economic activity. An emphatically natural acquisitive activity is hunting, which Aristotle subsumes under war and connects with the seizing of men to make of them a property. The civil activity that has an "affinity" with hunting is exchange, which necessarily occasions commerce. The "growth" of civil peace, or civilization, or political life, is the transformation of the predation of war into the salutary predation of peace, the mercenary quest for increase and gain.

Aristotle saw at the same time that acquisitiveness was "natural," that it was deplorable, and that it was indispensable to civil peace. What is most conspicuous in his discussion is that he conceived it to be deplorable. Aristotle deplored retail trade, usury, and "acquisitiveness" in the name of virtue, a quality of man which is perpetually threatened by his nature as that shows itself in his necessitousness. And yet his virtue and all his manifest possibilities are unintelligible except in the light of his nature. The public or political function of political philosophy is to turn attention toward the meaning of nature as end and to divert attention from nature as the beginning; or to turn attention toward nature as provident and friendly to human excellence, and away from nature as polemic and divisive, which it is. The classics seem to have believed that excessive emphasis upon man's neediness would blind him to the reason for not becoming a self-regarding atom. But the self-regarding man is, as such, the opposite of the citizen, whose peculiar virtue is patriotism or regard for country and countrymen first and foremost—say institutionalized altruism. Without that quality, men cannot take their proper place among the ruled and assume their proper posture with respect to the rulers.

It is on this basis that the classical writers could simply comprehend the economic activity within or under the political, and discussion of the economic activities within the discussion of political life more generally. Successful political life depends upon a proper public emphasis upon those irenic elements of nature which are friendly to virtue and hence to political life, and the suppression or warding off of those polemic elements which are neutral or hostile toward the perfection of civil community. The instrument of that prudent emphasis is law, or convention, and its fruit is political society, which is an artifact, the product of provident men who are the great benefactors of their kind. They may be said to rise above nature through the breadth of their understanding of nature: perceiving that nature is in some ways friendly and in some ways indifferent to the perfection of political society, the classical writers declined to deduce political life from the simple laws of nature. Law must proceed from well-disposed intelligence, or from the wisdom of superior men. Law is a phenomenon of the relation between governing men and governed men, the political relation, the improved ectype of primary inequality. Political philosophy is the comprehensive social, not to say human, science, because it comprehends all the aspects of nature, the friendly, the indifferent, and even the hostile, under law that emanates from human discretion. It is based upon a narrow-eyed scrutiny of nature by discreet men who understood the precariousness with which political life is balanced upon its natural base.

It is a commonplace that the modern authors who found fault with classical doctrines did so because they conceived them to be founded upon a hopelessly sanguine estimate of the moral possibilities inherent in the natural order. Each thinker had his own way of articulating this belief, but we shall take up the view of Locke only, for Locke's formulation of the question was the one that brought property and economics most visibly into the foreground, and thus displayed most clearly the relation of political science and economics that is characteristic of the last few centuries.

IV

Locke's political teaching is famous for the great emphasis that it places on the historical progress of men out of the state of nature into civil society. Mankind are "but in an ill condition while they remain in [the state of nature], [and] are quickly driven into society."[2] It is noteworthy, however, that the state of nature, which men find intolerable, is said by Locke to be pervaded by the law of nature, and "the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men," a law the obligations of which "cease not in society but only in many cases are drawn closer."[3] The law of nature is indeed the law of the state of nature, but, as eternal and unchanging, like nature itself, it does not lose its force in the state of civil society; rather the opposite. The constant authority of the law of nature thus tends to diminish very much the difference in principle between the state of nature and the state of civil society: both states are utterly dominated by that "fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation for which [men] entered into society."[4] Men obey that law because it is an expression of, or inference from that "first and strongest desire God planted in men, and wrought into the very principles of their nature."[5] Obedience to the law of nature is indistinguishable from "pursuing that natural inclination [man has] to preserve his being,"[6] and, so doing, to avail himself of the means of comfortable living by a right which is discerned by natural reason. But unfortunately for the peace of mankind, obedience to the law of desire for preservation is not *eo ipso* obedience to a moral law;[7] on the contrary, a moral law, *i.e.*, a law to which certain punishment is annexed, must be enacted in order to permit the law of desire for preservation to become a law of preservation proper.[8] The transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society is brought about in order to render the obligations of the law of nature operative for peace and comfort by having "known penalties annexed to them to enforce their observation."[9] More concretely, what is purposed by entering society is the preservation of property—life, liberty, and estate. But "property . . . is for the benefit and sole advantage of the proprietor . . . ," and it is to guarantee every man in the right to seek his particular good in the light of that maxim that the law of nature is made contributory to the *salus populi* by the laws of civil society.[10]

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[2] *Second Treatise,* IX, 127.

[3] *Ibid.,* XI, 135.

[4] *Ibid.,* XIII, 149.

[5] *First Treatise,* IX, 88.

The immutable law of preservation is the sole ground of man's right to appropriate from nature what he needs to live comfortably. Men may appropriate directly from nature during those first ages when "want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land,"[11] but thereafter they are compelled to obtain their goods from other owners. Government exists in order to insure that no man will have to give up his goods except by his own consent, *i.e.*, through sale or exchange, or lawful taxation. Government exists to preside over the orderly occupation and transfer of property, and thus to bring to its highest efficacy the sacred law of nature, the fundamental law of preservation. It exists for no other purpose.

In his remarkable papers on money and the rate of interest, Locke illustrates the orderly working of nature in civil society. The questions to which he addresses himself are the advisability of attempting to control the interest rate by positive legislation, and of attempting to halt an outflow of bullion by devaluing the coin—*i.e.*, raising the nominal value of a given weight of silver. Locke concludes that it is not only inadvisable but impossible to produce the desired effects by the means proposed, because there are such things as "natural value" (we would say price) and "natural interest" which are determined by what he himself calls "laws of value." His application of those laws of value—essentially the law of supply and demand—shows them to be similar in their operation to that "settled law of nature," the law of gravitation.[12] Beginning with the natural motive—literally the source of motion—in the *amor habendi*, and adding to it the "right to make as much of [his] money as it is worth,"[13] the operation of the natural mechanism to which positive legislation must defer may then be deduced.

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[6] *Ibid.*, 86.

[7] *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, I, iii, 13.

[8] *Ibid.*, II, xxviii, 6.

[9] *Second Treatise*, XI, 135.

[10] *First Treatise*, IX, 92.

[11] *Second Treatise*, VIII, 108.

The science which is elaborated to deduce that operation is economics. Economics arose out of political philosophy as an autonomous social science, not in order to describe an "aspect" of society, but with the intention of clarifying the very ground of society as that ground is conceived by the modern doctrine of natural law, of which Locke's teaching is representative. Legislation, or the act of government, which is the object of political science, is decisively in the service of property, which is the object of economics. The autonomy of economics is in effect indistinguishable from the primacy of economics. According to the political science which culminates in this understanding, if the studiers of the law of nature succeed in their construction of the principle of nature, then nature can be viewed as providing the adequate efficient cause of civil society and therewith the effective guide for positive legislation. It appears that there is an optimism with respect to the efficient cause in modern natural law theory which is at least as great as the optimism about the final cause attributed to the classical political teaching. The optimism of Lockean doctrine is based upon the view that nature contains no end which is of higher standing than, or which is radically different in quality from, the beginning. He wrote, "The end of a commonwealth constituted can be supposed no other than what men in the constitution of, and entering into it proposed; and that could be nothing but protection from such injuries from other men, which they desiring to avoid, nothing but force could prevent or remedy. . . . "[14]

The political benefits that have flowed from the acceptance of modern natural law principles have been so enormous that, at a time when they are threatened, we must reexamine their foundations in order to perpetuate them by strengthening those foundations wherever possible. The equating of the end with the beginning or with the primitive is a point at which there is a fault in the foundation, which might be divined from a wide range of human experiences. A ready illustration is the community of husband and wife. Men and women are drawn towards each other in their youth by a strong motive which may be called the efficient cause or beginning of their union. Human experience would not bear out the proposition that their community has no other end than that which might have been most manifest at the beginning. The beginning, by effecting the union, makes possible through that union a progress or maturing which raises their community to a different level from that on which it began, and gives it other reasons for growing than those which brought it into being. Connubial society can be but imperfectly understood in the sole light of the effective cause or motive of its coming into being. The attempt to understand political society primarily by that same light does not succeed better.

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[12] *Elements of Natural Philosophy*, ch. I.

[13] *Some Considerations of the Lowering of Interest*, 11th paragraph.

[14] *A Third Letter for Toleration*, ch. II.

V

When we inquire into the relation of political science and economics, we are led back to the origin of economics in a certain act of political philosophy. By that act, political philosophy revised its understanding of its object and its content. So doing, it revised the view that it took of itself, for sciences are constituted by their content, and they define themselves in defining their content. Political philosophy chose at a certain point to account for political society as a mere mutation of the status of pre-political man. The self-limitation of political philosophy to the task of elaborating the primeval human purpose found expression in the modern doctrine of natural law. In confining itself to making explicit what is implicit in man's primitive state, political philosophy caused itself to be supplanted primarily by economics, the discipline that systematically enlarges upon the self-preserving motive of pre-civil man. Political science inherited as its content the ministerial questions pertaining to the support of the essentially economic order of society. In this way, and in the indicated order of rank, economics and political science arose out of the self-limitation of political philosophy.

The autonomy of economics rests upon an act of abdication by political philosophy. There is a question whether political philosophy did not, in that act of abdication, attempt to alienate what is unalienable. For what political philosophy in the seventeenth century proposed was to create a horizon for civil man by reconstructing the horizon of pre-civil man. But pre-civil man could have only the most imperfect grasp of the possibilities of political society; and he could have no grasp of the place occupied by political philosophy in political society. Yet our own political situation teaches us, if reflection would not, the need to inquire philosophically concerning economic and political things. Our circumstances strongly suggest the insufficiency of the horizon of pre-civil man by compelling us to recur to political philosophy. When we wish to understand the relation of political science and economics, we are compelled to undertake an act, however humble, of political philosophy. Our inquiry into the autonomy of economics leads us to discover the unalienable hegemony of political philosophy.

SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL THEORY: OBSERVATIONS ON THE GROUP APPROACH

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> The great task in the study of any form of social life is the analysis of these groups. When the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated. When I say everything I mean everything. The complete description will mean the complete science, in the study of social phenomena, as in any other field.—ARTHUR BENTLEY[1]

Of the spate of articles on interest group behavior and interest group theory which have appeared since the "rediscovery" of Bentley, only a few have been mildly critical. Two American commentators have criticized the vagueness of certain terms and a British observer has noted that, somehow, empirical research on group behavior rarely makes use of the theoretical schemes which have been devised.[2]

But surely if we are to accept the claim of the group theorists that this is indeed the key to a science of politics, it is legitimate to ask that they submit their propositions to the tests imposed by science as a method. Perhaps the gap between research and theory stems less from a lack of data than from some limitations inherent in the group approach itself? This, in fact, is the argument of the present essay. The failure of group theory to serve as an adequate guide to research is the result both of the logical inconsistencies of its propositions and of its inability to explain what it purports to explain. The two weaknesses are related, for in their empirical work group theorists are constantly forced into inconsistencies as a result of the inability of the theory to deal with certain dimensions of experience. The ability of those who use the approach to ignore these consequences stems both from a certain looseness of vocabulary and a tendency, not limited to American scholars, to universalize their own political experience.

This will sound like a rather harsh indictment, but it is not meant to deny the value of studying interest groups and attempting to develop propositions concerning regularities in their behavior. My argument, rather, is that if group theory is to be useful, group theorists must give up their claim to have developed a comprehensive system and limit their scope to a more narrow, though still important, range of phenomena.

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[1] *The Process of Government* (Bloomington, 1908), pp. 208–209.

[2] The critics are H. W. Ehrmann in his (ed.), *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh, 1958); Peter H. Odegard, "A Group Basis of Politics: A New Name for an Old Myth," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (September, 1958), pp. 689–702; and W. J. M. MacKenzie, "Pressure Groups: The Conceptual Framework," *Political Studies*, Vol. 3 (October, 1955), pp. 247–255. Among the more notable "group" studies are: Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (Baltimore, 1920); E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York, 1935); Peter Odegard, *Pressure Politics* (New York, 1928); Donald C. Blaisdell, *American Democracy Under Pressure* (New York, 1957); Bertram D. Gross, *The Legislative Struggle* (New York, 1953); E. Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca, 1952); S. Finer, *Anonymous Empire* (London, 1958); "Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 319 (September, 1958); Jean Meynaud, *Les Groupes de pression en France* (Paris, 1958); Charles B. Hagan, "The Group in Political Science," in Roland Young (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston, 1958).

Since David Truman's *The Governmental Process*[3] remains the most comprehensive and sophisticated contemporary statement of group theory, the essay will concentrate its fire on his analysis, although the criticisms are, as will be seen, more generally applicable. Following an exposition and critique some attempt will be made to indicate more fruitful lines of approach and the proper role of group theory within the discipline.

I

To Truman, as to many others, the scientific study of politics is the study of power relationships.[4] It is the study of who gets what, when, how. Since government is that institution in any community through which are made the most authoritative allocations of resources, those who seek these resources seek access to this key focus of decisions. An understanding of the power relationships within any community, however, requires adequate conceptual tools. The human actors behave in a wide variety of ways to gain their ends. Scientific analysis requires an apparatus which will enable us to reduce this chaos to some kind of order so that we may be in a position to handle it intelligently. The relationships between men, ideas and institutions must be structured in such a way as to permit predictions of the outcome of interactions and hence permit us to exercise some control over events.[5]

Group theory, as Truman presents it, is basically a theoretical system consisting of three theoretical concepts and three highest level, or "supernumerary," propositions.[6] The concepts are "group," "potential group," and "equilibrium." The propositions will be stated after these concepts are examined.

The Concepts. A *group* is a plurality of individuals interacting with some frequency.[7] Truman is careful to distinguish this technical definition of a group from mere aggregations of individuals and, more importantly, from statistical compilations of individuals who simply share any of a wide variety of common characteristics, *e.g.*, soldiers, men, blondes, alcoholics, Jews, *et cetera.* These statistical compilations he calls categoric groups.[8] Interaction is the key word in the definition of group, for without interaction one has merely aggregations of individuals.

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[3] New York, 1951.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 507 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[6] The term supernumerary is from R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation* (Cambridge, 1953). It is only fair to note that Truman would probably deny that he ever meant to establish as closely defined a system as I am attributing to him. However, one test of the ability of any theoretical approach is to see what happens when one does attempt to systematize it, and to make implicit assumptions explicit. Again, the argument is that the seeming explanatory power of group theory is based on the *sub rosa* introduction of propositions which stand in contradiction to the major assumptions of the theory itself, and that any attempt to systematize these major assumptions reveals serious weaknesses in the approach.

[7] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

Truman offers none of the traditional analytic distinctions between primary and secondary groups,[9] (face-to-face groups, such as the family, versus large formal groups) or between what might be called involuntary and voluntary groups. He does differentiate between groups and what he calls associations, but the distinction appears to be relatively unimportant for purposes of analysis, and the words will be used interchangeably.[10] Somewhat more significant is his distinction between groups and a sub-class called "interest groups." Each group has an interest which is nothing more nor less than the shared attitudes of its members. An interest group, however, is a group which on the basis of one or more of these attitudes "makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes."[11]

A *potential group* is essentially a conglomeration of individuals with certain shared attitudes, who are not yet interacting, but who will form an actual group if other groups already organized act in ways which they regard as detrimental to their common interest.

> We know of these factors [interests] only from the behavior and the habitual interactions of men. If they exist in this fashion, they are interests. We can account for their operation . . . by recognizing such interests as representing "potential" interest groups in the "becoming" state of activity. It makes no difference that we cannot find the home office and the executive secretary of such a group. Organization in this formal sense . . . represents merely a stage or degree of interaction.[12]

Potential groups are of many different kinds. On one level they may represent quite narrow interests which would "become" if they were violated, and, as such, existing groups must take them into account in their actions. Truman mentions the example of white planters on the Mississippi Delta who must take into account the "interests" of their Negro workers to a certain extent if these workers are not to organize.[13] Of more significance to the analyst of group theory are certain broader kinds of potential groups. These consist of the very widely held attitudes [interests] of the society which represent the "moral code of a people."[14] In the United States these interests include beliefs in democracy, civil liberties,[15] and a host of other moral imperatives. These potential groups set the rules of the game within which the various existing groups must act, as well as the type of organization which these groups must develop, for they insist that internal organization must be democratic:[16]

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[9] The distinction has its origins in Charles H. Cooley's *Social Organization* (New York, 1909).

[10] Truman does distinguish between them on p. 43, but fails to do so throughout most of the remainder of his book.

[11] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 511.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 512, 513, 159 and *passim*.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

> These widely held but unorganized interests are what we have previously called the "rules of the game." Others have described these attitudes in such terms as "systems of belief," as a general ideological consensus. . . . In any case the "rules of the game" are interests, the serious disturbance of which will result in organized interaction and the assertion of fairly explicit claims for conformity.[17]

Equilibrium is a state which is reached when patterns of interaction are characterized by a relatively high degree of stability.[18] The concept may be applied to three levels of social analysis. An individual's interactions may be said to be in a state of equilibrium. A group's interactions may be said to be in equilibrium when both its internal and external interactions exhibit stability, and finally a society may be said to have reached a state of equilibrium when the interactions among the various groups which compose it are relatively stable.[19]

The Propositions. Of the three supernumerary propositions one is "socio-political," one is "psychological" and the third applies equally to both dimensions. While the three are logically independent they are interrelated in that all are equally basic to the system.

A. The "socio-political" proposition states that society should be conceived of simply as a plurality of groups interacting with each other, and that the political process is essentially a process of group competition for power over the allocation of resources.[20] While these groups operate through political institutions, the institutional patterns of any society are the reflection of group competition and, hence, are dependent variables.[21]

B. The "psychological" proposition states that group interaction is the primary source of individual attitudes. That is, while *some* people may derive *some* of their attitudes from other sources, we can, *for purposes of analysis,* ignore this fact. Thus, with one exception to be dealt with below, the argument is that the political scientist has effectively located the sources of individual political attitudes when he has uncovered the group affiliations of the individual.[22]

Basically, the group can impose its norms upon the individual because the very categories in which he thinks, including his language, are determined by his interaction with other individuals. More particularly, however, his adaptation to group norms stems from a conscious or even unconscious desire to belong.[23] To give illustrations of the impact of group norms upon the individual, Truman cites, among others, the Western Electric Company, the Erie County, and the Bennington studies.[24]

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 512.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 27. Truman never defines the term. This definition and the later propositions (see p. 20 below) have been constructed from his use of it.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–31, 58–60.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–65 and *passim.*

[21] *E.g.:* "The Constitution . . . was not only a compromise product of the efforts of a collection of able men; it was . . . more significantly the reflection of many demands and expectations concerning government. . . . That many of the stipulations in that document are fully operative nearly two centuries later speaks for the skill with which they reflected certain of the strong and lasting interests in the society." *Ibid.*, p. 448.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 165; see also p. 505. Truman is careful to note that present affiliations will not give a complete picture of the individual's norms. Rather they are the result of a genetic process "that includes the whole of [his] life experiences." *Ibid.*, p. 22.

The exception is the use of the dual concept "status-role."[25] In one sentence on page 16 of *The Governmental Process* Truman mentions the word "status." Later, on page 346, in trying to explain the behavior of American Congressmen, he notes that their status or role may play a significant part in molding their attitudes, and he continues:

> Looking more closely at statuses, we can conceive of a whole society as a system of inter-related positions that people occupy. . . . For each recognized status in a society there are norms that prescribe more or less definitely how the occupant is to behave toward persons in related statuses.[26]

Elsewhere he uses the concept again, primarily to account for the influence of office.[27] The dual concepts of role and status, of course, have become an integral part of modern sociology and social psychology since their formulation by Linton.[28] In these fields the concept is of basic importance not only in explaining the structure of individual attitudes within any society but also in explaining the patterns of values characteristic of any society. It is, first of all, on a different analytic level than the concept of group, for it represents an abstraction from action rather than a type of actor; and, secondly, its traditional definition calls for (1) its application throughout any social system, and (2) its use as a variable which is at least as important if not more important than group membership for explaining individual attitudes.

Truman can, if he wishes, use the term, as defined by the sources he cites, as part of a general theory; in that case, of course, he would not be developing a "group" theory of politics. Or, he can redefine the term to suit his purposes. What he cannot logically do, however, and what he does attempt to do, is to bring it in *ad hoc* to explain a dimension of experience which cannot be handled by his own analysis.

The scientific reasons for a prohibition on this type of endeavor are obvious.

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

[24] The studies are to be found in: F. J. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale* (Cambridge, 1941); P. F. Lazarsfeld, *et al.*, *The People's Choice* (2d ed., New York, 1958); and Theodore M. Newcomb and Eugene L. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1947). For recent summaries of the literature see: Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Rossi, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure," pp. 225–280; R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (rev. ed., Glencoe, 1957), pp. 281–386; M. and C. Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology* (rev. ed., New York, 1956); and E. Katz and P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, 1955).

[25] In his theoretical analysis Truman also introduces the variable of biological make-up. Some behavioral differences result, he argues, from the fact that no two human organisms are identical in biological functioning and endowment. *Op. cit.*, p. 22. However, he never uses the concept for explanatory purposes. I think it safe to assume, therefore, that he feels it can be ignored for purposes of macro-societal analysis.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 23, and 505.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 346–350, and *passim*.

[28] In his *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936).

Theories are tested by testing the explanatory power of their supernumerary propositions through propositions of lesser generality which are deduced from them. One may criticize a system because it cannot explain an important dimension of experience which it purports to explain; because, in fact, other propositions, not an integral part of its theoretical scheme, are required to explain these phenomena. However, if an author can introduce new propositions where he will, it becomes impossible to test the system, for then the author can prove anything he wishes to prove.[29] The fact that Truman is forced to rely upon the *ad hoc* use of the concept of role to explain an important dimension of political action is evidence of a serious weakness in his system.

C. The final supernumerary proposition states that interaction tends toward equilibrium, *i.e.*, toward stability. This applies on the individual, the group, and the societal level. The process is as follows. Some disturbance occurs which disrupts previous patterns of interaction. The reaction of the group may be random or disorganized. More likely, however, the members of the group will engage in increased activity designed either to restore the old equilibrium (their primary desire), or to create a new one.[30] This activity will disrupt the patterns of other individuals and groups in a wave-like effect until a new balance on all three levels develops. For illustration:

> Perhaps the most instructive examples of the growth of associations . . . are to be seen in the labor movement. Labor organizations . . . embody one of a variety of responses to the innovations (disturbances) that for more than a century have been at the vortex of a rapidly changing society, namely the disturbances in economic institutions. [He then speaks of the shift from a pre-industrial to an industrial society and the differentiation between capitalist and employee.] . . . varying disturbances inevitably increased intertion among workers, and the emergence of associations to stabilize these relationships followed. These disturbances, it should be noted . . . [are] not narrowly economic. Wage demands have usually been symptoms of an unacknowledged need for achieving equilibrium in the lives of workers both within and outside of the factory.[31]

But trade unions, as Truman himself admits, are uniquely the product of an industrial society and the patterns produced by it. In other words, propositions formed by using the concepts of group and equilibrium alone can not explain the rise of trade unions. Implicit in this paragraph are assumptions about the relationship between changes in economic structure, the pattern of group activity, and the formation of attitudes, which are not logically consistent with the basic concepts of the theory.

Just as significant is the assumption, repeated elsewhere in the book, that the normal reaction of workers to "disturbances" of this kind is the formation of "business" unions. But, of course, one of the problems social scientists have wrestled with for some time has to do with why trade unionism takes such different forms in different countries. The concepts of the theory cannot handle this problem, as we shall see in more detail later on.

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[29] Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[30] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–31, 59, and *passim.*

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 66–7.

For another illustration, Truman deals with the position of the Negro in the United States:

> Similar disturbances of equal or greater intensity are part of the continuing experience of racial minorities, especially the Negro . . . it is worth noting that largely in compensation for the disturbances consequent upon discrimination, there are relatively more "voluntary" associations among Negroes than among whites . . . political activity for the Negro is primarily a means of securing legal justice—justice in the courts . . . police protection, and protection against the persecution of the police; ability to get administrative jobs through civil service; and a fair share in . . . public facilities.[32]

Actually at least some existing evidence indicates less participation in associations among Negroes than among whites, though according to Truman's definition of equilibrium, there should be more.[33] But this is a minor point. According to the quoted passage the Negro engages in associational activity because his equilibrium has been shattered. Theoretically he should want to restore it or create a new one. But what was the equilibrium that he might wish to restore? Certainly not a return to increased discrimination, slavery, or African tribal life. These, however, were his previous conditions. In fact, of course, the aim of the Negro is, as Truman actually states, to achieve the same treatment which is accorded to Americans of white skin. His aim could be different. He could wish to form a separate social group with participating privileges, such as has been the wish, in the past, of so many European ethnic groups. Neither the concept of equilibrium nor any of the other concepts of Truman's scheme enable us to explain why he should not so desire.[34] This is not to deny the value of equilibrium as a concept, for, as we shall see, it can be useful if integrated with a more adequate theoretical system.

II

Truman's system contains one middle range proposition which is worth examining because of the light it throws upon the inherent explanatory weaknesses and logical inconsistencies of the system. The relative stability of American democracy, he argues, is the result of two factors: multiple membership, and certain kinds of potential groups.

1. Americans are joiners.[35] All of them belong to many groups. The result is that group membership is overlapping, and no group can command the total loyalty of any individual.[36] Individual opinions are moderated by this fact, and the leadership of an organization, usually somewhat more committed to its goals than the rank and file, is limited in how far it can go. Should group leader-

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[32] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[33] See C. R. Wright and H. H. Hyman, "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23 (June, 1958), p. 287. There is every reason, furthermore, to conclude that the amount of associational activity has increased as discrimination has decreased.

[34] For an interesting discussion of this issue see Joseph Margolis, "The American Negro and the Issue of Segregation," *The American Scholar*, Vol. 28 (Winter, 1958–59), pp. 73–80.

[35] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 157, 508–10.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 156–167.

ship attempt to push too far, members will feel conflicts, will balk, will refuse to support the leaders, and may even drop out of the group. Leaders, then, anxious to remain in power and to preserve the group, will retrench. The conflict which members feel

> . . . may be clear and recognized, as when a man who belongs to a local improvement association that is demanding the repavement of a neighborhood street is also a member of a taxpayers' group that is opposing an appropriation for this purpose. At the other extreme it may be a scarcely conscious feeling of incongruity between the moral standards of a family or church and the drive of a trade association for preferred treatment at the hands of public officials.[37]

But, in fact, Americans are not notably joiners of voluntary associations. Very few join more than one or two associations and their attendance is sporadic. There is very little evidence that these associations have an appreciable effect upon the attitudes of their membership.[38] But even assuming that Americans were joiners and that membership did overlap we should still have to explain why it did. In France a left wing trade unionist will join a left wing veterans' group, and a militant anti-clerical organization of some kind.[39] Why should it be different in the United States? There is some truth in Truman's statement for, with the exception of the Negro and of immigrant groups when they first arrived, there does seem to be overlapping among *primary* groups in this country.[40] Children of various religious backgrounds go to the same schools, and friendship groups tend to cross class lines. Whether this overlapping is more significant than that in France is a question for empirical research. There has certainly been more overlap here than in England, where, until very recently, workers and middle-class Englishmen engaged in different sports, went to different schools, and even spoke different languages. But English politics has been amazingly peaceful. How does group theory explain this?

Furthermore, a good deal of what limited evidence we have indicates that often it is not the rank and file which moderates demands, but rather a prudent leadership which seems to have a better conception of what political and social realities permit.[41] In sum, the concept of overlapping membership would seem of very little help as part of an explanation of the relatively peaceful character of American politics.

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[38] See Wright and Hyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 284–294; J. C. Scott, Jr., "Membership and Participation in Voluntary Associations," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 22 (June, 1957), pp. 315–326; Scott Greer, "Individual Participation in Mass Society;" Young (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 329–343; Lazarsfeld and Katz, *op. cit.*, and the extensive literature cited by them.

[39] See, for example, Réne Rémond, "Les anciens combattants et la politique," *Revue Francaise de Science Politique*, Vol. 5 (April–June, 1944), pp. 267–290.

[40] And, again, it is these which seem to have the really important influence upon attitude developments. See Lazarsfeld and Katz, *op. cit.*, and the literature cited therein.

[41] And this means more than merely what is politically possible. For example, in England, trade union leaders have sometimes been more willing than the rank and file to accept a policy of wage restraints, because of an awareness of objective economic problems. For some evidence of this from England, see John D. Stewart, *British Pressure Groups* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 35, 176; and G. B. Baldwin, "Nationalization in Great Britain: A Sobering Decade," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 310 (March,

2. It is the membership of Americans in potential groups setting the rules of the game which produces consensus and stability. And even more importantly:

> It is multiple memberships in potential groups based on widely held and accepted interests that serve as a balance wheel in a going political system like that of the United States.[42]

But what exactly does this statement mean? In our discussion of Truman's second supernumerary proposition we noted that, to him, interacting groups were the source of all attitudes, in other words, that attitudes emerged from groups.[43] But potential groups are essentially attitudes which may crystalize into groups.[44] Now the formation of attitudes precedes the formation of groups. Truman can not have it both ways. The concept and the proposition both stand in fundamental contradiction to everything else Truman has said, despite his notion of "becoming." In fact the whole concept of potential groups acts as a sort of *deus ex machina* which can be brought in for any purpose. Why are British trade unions Socialist? Strong Socialist potential group. Why did the Germans prefer a strong authoritarian regime? Strong authoritarian potential group. It can explain everything, but fundamentally it explains nothing. What Truman is saying here is that we have consensus and believe in civil liberties because we have consensus and believe in civil liberties. By all the canons of logical coherence the proposition has no place in his system.[45]

And in the end the system completely breaks down, for Truman is forced to

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1957), pp. 39–54; and from France, P. Williams, *Politics in Post-War France* (London, 1954), p. 340.

[42] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

[43] See above, pp. 18.

[44] See above, pp. 17. Note also the striking contradiction in these two quotations taken from succeeding pages of Truman's essay:

" . . . From interaction in groups arise certain common habits of response, which may be called norms or shared attitudes. . . . In this respect all groups are interest groups because they are shared-attitude groups." (p. 33).

" . . . It is possible to examine interests that are not at a particular point in time the basis of interactions, but that may become such." (p. 34).

[45] We find here an interesting paradox. Truman has firmly denied that one can speak of a national interest. After all, the nation is not a group and only groups have interests. (Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52) But if interests and groups and attitudes are different ways of speaking about the same things, as he often asserts, and the nation as a whole shares the widespread attitudes that he lists as a potential group, then these attitudes would constitute the national interest. Part of his confusion here, aside from the whole problem of the potential group, is the identification of interests with attitudes or values. One can, of course, define interests in any way one wishes. But if they are attitudes it becomes difficult to discuss changes in the attitudes of group members as to what constitute their interests, and one cannot distinguish between the group's attitudes on the relative merits of Bach and Beethoven as against their attitudes on the effect of a new tax law on the state of the country or on the group. All in all, it would seem wiser to retain the traditional distinction and regard interests as ends or goals about which people have attitudes. See R. M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society* (New York, 1949), pp. 23–40.

use the concept over and over again to deal with crucial aspects of American life. Its use is the strongest evidence of the weakness of the system as it stands.

In his effort to cram all of social reality into a relatively narrow framework Truman has committed an error of fact and an error of method. Taking a truth which is as old as Plato (*i.e.*, that one cannot speak of men in isolation from other men), he makes the unwarranted deduction that all attitudes stem from group membership. He then compounds this error by refusing to distinguish between the more important primary (from the point of view of attitude formation) and much less important secondary groups. Little of the work being done in social psychology[46] or sociology lends credence to either of these positions. At one time, reference group theory might have been cited in support of the first, but, as Merton has pointed out, reference group theory is not group theory, for a reference group can be an individual or a social stratum or any of a wide variety of what Truman has called categoric groups.[47]

The refusal to distinguish between primary and secondary groups, incidentally, is what gives group theory its superficial appearance of utility as an approach, and, at the same time, enables its partisans to protect themselves from criticism. The whole thrust of the analysis is that political action can be examined in terms of conflicts among interest groups. The acceptance of this proposition entails the proposition that attitudes are primarily derived from group sources (see footnote 51 below), and the utility of this tool for research purposes requires that the significant groups be the major institutionalized groups of a society, *i.e.*, medical associations, business organizations, trade unions, etc. If, however, one points out to group theorists that one cannot fully analyse the behavior of Congressmen, say, in these terms, their response is, "Oh, this doesn't really destroy the group hypothesis, for what we mean is that individual attitudes are really the result of the whole life pattern of an individual's group membership, starting with childhood."[48] If this is so, however, then to understand a Congressional decision one would be forced to examine at least the history of the group membership of *each* Congressman from infancy on, including all the various friendship groups of childhood. Thus even if the propositions of the theory were adequate it would be at best a very blunt tool of analysis.

The methodological error is equally significant. Taking the psychological proposition that most attitudes derive from groups, Truman has attempted to build a socio-political theory on it. But psychology and sociology, while dealing ultimately with the same phenomena, must be kept analytically separate. Pointing out that the individual derives a goodly portion of his attitudes from the society of which he is a part tells us nothing about the structure of attitudes which will characterize that society.[49] We have known for a very long time that the family and other childhood groups are specially important as determiners of individual attitudes. What we want to know, and where Truman does not help us at all, is why the content of the political culture that these groups transmit assumes certain forms at certain times and not others. This is not to say that one cannot attempt to build a system which relates the psychological and sociological dimensions. Indeed, such a system is necessary if one is to understand society.[50] The building, however, must follow an awareness of the analytic differences.

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[46] See Lazarsfeld and Katz, *op. cit.*

[47] See Merton, "Continuities in the Theory of Reference Groups and Social Structure," *op. cit.*

[48] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 22, and *passim.*

[49] The point is made by M. S. Olmsted in *The Small Group* (New York, 1959).

III

A close examination of *The Governmental Process* quickly reveals a difference between what the author says he is going to do and what he actually does in the empirical sections of his book. For in these latter sections he actually relies implicitly upon a quasi-group theory of politics which is somewhat removed from the one he had announced. This is by no means an accident, for Truman's explicit theory really has no explanatory power whatsoever. If group purposes are determined by the interaction of the members of groups, then these purposes can only be random; *i.e.*, not capable of being analyzed scientifically. The fact that a businessman joins with other businessmen becomes purely fortuitous, as does the fact that group interaction leads to the development of one set of shared attitudes rather than another. To take just one example: Truman can not really explain why southern planters take the possible actions of Negro workers into account on the basis of group action, since, by definition, the attitudes of the group are formed not by the perception of an external threat, but rather by the process of interaction itself. Nor does that "brooding omnipresence," the potential group, satisfactorily handle the problem, for even if the concept could be used Truman still could not explain why different groups have different attitudes on issues not covered by the national potential group.[51]

In his empirical analysis, then, Truman implicitly recognizes, as he must, that groups are made up of purposively acting individuals, and the essay contains a whole variety of implicit non-group explanations of both individual attitudes and the pattern of group attitudes within any society. The implicit theory (or theories) is worth examining on its own, for the assumptions which underlie it serve to give group theory its superficial plausibility, especially when it is applied to the American scene. Examining it and evaluating it will lead us to some tentative attempts to define the proper role of the study of groups within the discipline.

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[50] See T. Parsons and E. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, 1951).

[51] Truman could conceivably retort by pointing to his remark (pp. 23–4) that individuals generally begin to interact on the basis of some characteristic, and hence common interest, which they share. But this proposition stands in direct contradiction to the rest of his system. What constitutes a common characteristic is defined by attitudes. Thus, in our own society, blondes do not form groups while businessmen do.

To admit that individuals join together on the basis of perceived interests (attitudes) is to admit that groups are not the only or even necessarily the primary determiners of attitudes and hence of actions. Such an admission completely destroys the scientific status of group theory as *the* theory of politics. For if groups are not the determiners of attitudes there is no obvious reason to concentrate on their behavior as against the behavior of individuals. Groups become just one of two possible kinds of political actors. And if groups do not structure all attitudes then the question of the sources of attitudes and hence action is once again open. The ideas which men accept as guides to action may stem from the writings of a political philosopher, from the internalization of certain conceptions of what is right, from the socio-economic structure of the society, from the universality of the oedipus complex, etc. Most so-called group theorists (see Latham, *op. cit.*) usually make just such an admission.

Quite early in *The Governmental Process* Truman asks why group patterns vary from society to society and over time. He answers his question as follows:

> Why this variation occurs has been only incompletely ascertained, since comparative analyses of complex cultures are virtually non-existent. The most satisfactory hypothesis, however, indicates that the relative complexity of such interactions depends upon the degree of diversity in everyday life.[52]

This ends his systematic effort to deal with this problem, and, indeed, he can not deal with it systematically within his own explicit framework. However, scattered through the book are statements which indicate that he actually believes much more can be said. On page 53, to take just one, he tells us that as

> . . . the Tanala of Madagascar shifted from a dry-land method of rice growing to a method based on irrigation, a series of consequent changes in the culture gradually took place.

And when discussing the rise of modern trade unionism he notes that the industrial revolution and consequent shift in the productive process led to the growth of a capitalist class and a working class, and that the ". . .functional differentiation of employer and employee permitted the development of attitudes (interests) peculiar to each."[53]

Both statements represent a quasi-Marxist interpretation of shifts in attitudes and interests, and an abandonment of his supernumerary socio-political proposition. Changes in the mode of production yield different attitudes, and position in the system of productive relationships does the same. A similar abandonment of his supernumerary psychological proposition occurs when he gives an actual example of group determination of norms and other attitudes:

> A young person's aspirations and values, even his skills, will be quite different depending on the character of his early group experience. If he has spent the early years of his life on a family farm in the Middle West, some distance from any urban community, in a large family, the demands of whose daily existence limit the household's recreational facilities to the radio and the Bible, he will be quite unlike his contemporary whose parents move from one section of the country to another with changes in the social season.[54]

Without analyzing the statement in full or judging its explanatory adequacy, we can see that Truman is arguing for an explanation of the genesis of individual attitudes in terms of total life experience. Middle western farmers, Bible reading families, *et cetera*, are if anything "categoric" groups,[55] and "the demands of daily existence" are a feature of the objective (non-social) environment.

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[52] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 67.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

Similar examples are characteristic of the entire book. As we go through the text we find that only in a very few instances does Truman actually use the concept of group interaction by itself to explain behavior. When he does, it is primarily in terms of a sort of vested stake which the group has in survival or which leaders have in power for its own sake. Thus, in describing the difficulties faced by federated structures (such as the former American Federation of Labor), he argues that when local units are established first and the federated national organization has been granted only limited powers, the latter will find it difficult to subject local units to national policy. This fact stems in large measure from the vested interest of the local unit in maintaining its own power.[56] What, then, are the underlying assumptions of Truman's analysis? The following is, I think, a fair summary.

Individuals, Truman seems to assume, develop certain attitudes as to their needs and desires as the result of their interaction with reality.[57] It is the nature of this contact which determines what kinds of attitudes will develop. In dealing with this problem Truman emphasizes primarily position in the mode of production, the technological level of society, and, in general, the material conditions of the environment. The framework within which individuals form their evaluations is determined partially by the groups of which they are members, especially the primary groups, although, again, the norms of the groups to which they belong are a complex resultant of the experiences of their members.

By and large, individuals are striving to maximize their economic position as they see it, and the way they see their economic position is dependent upon their experience. Their goals and aspirations, as they define them, constitute their interests. People with similar interests may combine into interest groups to pursue these interests. Membership in these secondary groups will further crystallize, and even slightly shift the direction of, conceptions of interest or other attitudes held by members.

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[55] While individual families are groups, any similarities one finds among Bible-reading families of the type described, are likely to be the function of similar experiences rather than interaction.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 69. The explanation, incidentally, is not sufficient to clarify the reasons for the A.F. of L.'s difficulty in securing agreement on national policies. In England local trade unions were established before the T.U.C., which has always had very limited formal power, and, in Germany, a federal system like that of the United States, the same development occurred. Yet in both countries the sense of national trade union discipline has been much higher than that of American trade unions. The literature is extensive, but see: Francis Williams, *Magnificent Journey* (London, 1954); B. C. Roberts, *Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain* (Cambridge, 1956); G. D. H. Cole, *An Introduction to Trade Unionism;* P. Taft, "Germany," in Walter Galenson (ed.), *Comparative Labor Movements* (New York, 1952); and Evelyn Anderson, *Hammer or Anvil: The Story of the German Working Class Movement* (London, 1954).

[57] Both social and non-social objects, to use Parsons' terminology.

Superficially *The Governmental Process* would seem to rest on a combination of sociological relativism (with a strong Marxist or Mannheimian tinge), and logical positivism. However, we must be cautious, for the author's positivism is not quite so free of value judgments as it might seem. His own commitments emerge in his discussion of trade union history as well as in other places. In describing the failure of the old Knights of Labor, for example, he notes:

> The American Federation of Labor, before which the Knights of Labor declined, was in tune with reality in that it was based on a firmer foundation of common interest. Individualism was de-emphasized by being harnessed firmly to the objective of controlling skilled jobs.[58]

Why was the Knights of Labor less in tune with reality? Instead of concentrating on wage increases, the Knights, Truman tells us, wished to bring about a new society in which the artificial disharmonies between workers and employers would disappear. They hoped to change the kind of capitalism which was inevitably developing. Thus, the organization was utopian.[59] The author seems to be arguing that the clash of interests in society is permanent. A group's "real" interest therefore lies in striving rationally to attain limited ends within the confines of the system.[60] Thus, underlying Truman's positivism and sociological relativism, we find the world he has so explicitly disowned: the world of Hobbes, Bentham and James Mill and, in general, of classical Liberal Utilitarianism. While Truman talks of groups rather than individuals, the norm is still rational groups pursuing rational self-interest. And Truman is not alone in this orientation. It stands out even more clearly in the writings of other American "group" analysts of the American scene.[61] These assumptions are not limited to group analysis; rather, they stem from a general parochialism on the part of American scholars.[62] However, group theorists have contributed to this parochialism, for insofar as they attempt to explain the patterns of a social system in terms of the concrete units of which it is composed, they can easily blind themselves to many of the most basic problems of social analysis. The observation is not a new one; Durkheim, Weber, and Pareto, to cite just three European analysts, were aware of the dilemma of this "utilitarian" analysis at the turn of the century, and the whole problem was the subject of a lengthy essay by Talcott Parsons in 1937.[63]

The basic reason for the continued blindness of American political scientists to the issues involved lies, I think, in the fact that on the surface American politics seems to fit the model nicely. When we examine Truman's analysis of operative groups we discover an interesting fact, characteristic of other group studies. Despite his call for the study of all types of groups, almost all his efforts are expended in dealing with economic interest groups as they pursue their rational self-interest within certain well defined parameters. And, in fact, the analysis seems quite capable of handling the behavior of these groups until we ask why, indeed, they limit themselves to these parameters. For example, why do American workers accept the system? Why don't they vote for a Communist Party or join Communist trade unions, as French workers have done? And why is American business generally committed to democracy? Business groups in other countries have not always revealed the same attachment.[64] Examples could be multiplied. In many European countries an officer corps constituted a group with attitudes relatively hostile to bourgeois democracy when bourgeois democratic states were finally established.[65] The Catholic Church, too, was hostile to democratic capitalism and for a long time represented a cohesive group which actively fought it.[66] Further, various ethnic groups in many European countries saw ethnic survival and power as more important than economic self-interest, and so forth.

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[58] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[60] Thus interests are not merely attitudes, nor even attitudes about interests. (See above, p. 18.)

[61] For example Bertram D. Gross, *op. cit.*, and Earl Latham, *op. cit.* Latham goes back to the beginning of the tradition and sounds almost like a Hobbist.

[62] See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955).

[63] *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937).

Groups of these types are almost never dealt with in any detail by American writers on interest groups. The reason is plain. Despite some tensions, the individuals who compose them have been integrated into a common way of life and the groups do not reflect a substantially different basic outlook than other groups. Most Americans accept the utilitarian parameter. But to generalize from this fact to a theory of society is to confuse Americans with man in general.[67]

IV

The pattern of interest group politics, not to speak of the general pattern of social life, in any country, can not be understood either in terms of the explicit propositions of group theorists or in terms of the assumptions which underlie their political analysis. Actually, it is these assumptions (a dash of Marx, mixed with a good deal of Locke) which, as Louis Hartz points out,[68] have helped create the particular kind of polity in which we live and which give group theory a superficial plausibility. For providing the framework of social action in this country they seem so natural that they can be ignored or assumed when one begins to structure a theory which is in reality based upon them.

If, then, we are to increase our understanding, we must recognize that these assumptions represent just one set of normative guides to action. But implicit in this recognition is the further awareness that the comprehension of any society, whatever the terms used, will always require an examination of its culture and the structure of values and beliefs which are held by the individuals who compose it.

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[64] See, for example, H. W. Ehrmann, *Organized Business in France* (Princeton, 1957), and Robert Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley, 1953).

[65] For Germany, see Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945* (London, 1955).

[66] For France, see Adrien Dansetts, *Histoire religieuse de la contemporaine,* 3 vol. (Paris, 1948, 1951, 1957).

[67] To paraphrase Marx's criticism of Bentham. It also, incidentally, distorts our analysis of American politics, although not quite so seriously.

[68] In *The Liberal Tradition in America.*

The most fruitful contemporary approach, stemming from the work of Durkheim, Pareto and Weber, would seem to be an analysis which approaches social systems in terms of patterns of action and attempts to relate these to each other. As developed by Parsons and others, such an approach recognizes that action is goal-oriented and that values must be treated as one among many analytic variables.[69]

What is the place of group theory within the framework of a theoretical system of this kind? First, groups are systems of action and, thus, one may legitimately attempt to develop propositions dealing with regularities in the behavior of interest groups which are part of the logic of group action in a wide variety of socio-political systems. This is an area which is analytically independent of, although related to, a study of the impact of groups on the formation of political attitudes. Second, a social system must be examined in the last analysis in terms of patterns of action, but it consists of both individuals and groups as actors. It is thus perfectly legitimate for certain purposes to describe the behavior of these actors (*i.e.*, both groups and individuals) in analyzing political decisions, and to relate behavior to the patterns of action of a given system.[70]

But the study of groups is only one part of the study of politics and not the whole of it. And such studies can only yield intelligible results when related to other variables. The pattern of French interest group behavior, to take just one example, is characterized by the violent hostility (and willingness to resort to violence) of most of the groups involved. As one political scientist has noted:

> The difficulties of France, the rancour left by the war, the bitterness caused by the indecision of the political teams which have succeeded one another in power, and the more apparent defects of our political system have made the political struggles very bitter. People quickly accuse one another of the worst offenses, they customarily resort to exaggerations.
>
> The result is a frenzy which soon reaches its climax in the declarations and positions of the different interest groups and even of the most harmless ones. . . . All confidence in discussion and the impartiality of the state seems lost. Everyone seems to think that only a demonstration of strength will attract attention to his claims and to his point of view.[71]

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[69] In addition to the works of Parsons previously cited, see D. Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, Vol. 3 (April, 1957), pp. 383–401; S. H. Beer and A. Ulam (eds.) *Patterns of Government* (New York, 1958), pp. 3–15; G. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (August, 1956), pp. 391–410; and W. C. Mitchell, "The Polity and Society," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (November, 1958), pp. 403–420. All of them rely on the action frame of reference, and all would appear to agree with my statement on the role of values.

[70] See the Report of the First Research Planning Session of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," this Review, Vol. 52 (March, 1958), pp. 270–283.

[71] G. E. Lavau, "Political Pressures in France," in Ehrmann (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 89–90.

But this is not the only feature which strikes our interest. Many others are significant and they all seem related to each other. Historically, the continued bitterness of the political struggle has been related to the "economic Malthusianism" of French business, which has, in turn, contributed to the bitterness. And the emphasis on the virtues of peasant life and of the "little man" has abetted both the continued existence of marginal enterprises and also economic Malthusianism.[72] Historically, too, both the fear of Caesarism and French "individualism" have contributed to the weakness of political institutions. These attitudes are also related to the fragmentation of interest group life itself, as is the political system.[73]

Contrast this with England where interest groups, by and large, behave with a peculiar kind of British reasonableness and responsibility.[74] Or, contrast this pattern with both England and Germany where interest groups are reasonably well organized and disciplined and where bigness and combination are not nearly so suspect.[75] And finally contrast this with the United States and the relative optimism and dynamism of American businessmen.[76]

To understand the differences in the pattern of interest group behavior in France, in contrast with other countries, one must examine them, then, in their relationships to other patterns in an ongoing social system, including patterns of values and beliefs. In this task one can make fruitful use of a concept like equilibrium. A state of equilibrium is one in which the pattern of social relationships of any system are integrated; that is, when they are compatible with each other. The system is in a state of disequilibrium when patterns of action develop which are incompatible with other patterns in the system. Again, these patterns of action can not be understood without a consideration of ideas and values, and the incompatibility must ultimately be related to psychological variables.[77] However, Truman's attempt to reduce human behavior to patterns of group interaction and their disturbance blinds him to all sorts of dimensions of human experience. His discussion of the American Negro, for example, would certainly be more convincing if he dealt with the problem in terms of an incompatibility between the actual position of the Negro in American society and certain patterns of beliefs and values regarding equality in the society.[78]

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[72] See Ehrmann, *op. cit.*; J. H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, 1951); and D. Landes, "Observations on France: Economy, Society, and Polity," *World Politics*, Vol. 9 (April, 1957), pp. 329–351; and the essays by Landes and Sawyer in E. M. Earle (ed.), *Modern France* (Princeton, 1951).

[73] Jean Maynaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–228, and *passim*.

[74] S. E. Finer, *op. cit.;* J. D. Stewart, *op. cit.;* and S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Political Parties in Britain," this REVIEW (March, 1956), pp. 1–24.

[75] Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, "Some Remarks on Interest Groups in the German Federal Republic," in Ehrmann (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 96–117; S. E. Finer, "The Federation of British Industries," *Political Studies*, Vol. 4 (February, 1956), p. 71; and Beer, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[76] Frances X. Sutton *et al.*, *The American Business Creed* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 326–346, and *passim*.

[77] Parsons and Shils, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–109, and *passim*. The authors also use the term "equilibrium" to refer to the tendency of the system to maintain itself within certain boundaries relative to an environment. I am not prepared to deal with this second definition. For a discussion of some of the issues see Walter Buckley, "Structural-Functional Analysis in Modern Sociology," pp. 236–259, in Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), *Modern Sociological Theory* (New York, 1957).

V

Certain concluding remarks are in order. As has been shown, the basic weakness of Truman's system lies not in the propositions of the system but in the conceptual framework itself. An analysis of political behavior in terms of groups gives little information as to the pattern of group politics in a given society. Thus it cannot tell us why and how individuals will or do behave politically. The superficial plausibility of the group approach rests upon a certain partial reading of American politics which enables group theorists to ignore the real premises from which they operate. If this is so, there is no warrant to assume that the study of politics is the study of groups. Rather groups are reduced to the status of one kind of political actor.

Given this, the study of politics must not only involve the study of groups and individuals; it must also involve (and more importantly) the study of the patterns of normatively oriented political action which characterize a given social system. However, to recognize this is to recognize, too, that the sources of these patterns are once again an open question. Changing conceptions of reality, the ideas of political theorists, changes in socio-economic structure may all be found to play a role in determining these patterns if one examines a society historically. And, without citing the evidence, there is every reason to believe that insofar as political institutional patterns become internalized these too structure action and play an important role in determining the future orientations of action.[79] Actually, Truman sometimes admits all of this in the course of his empirical analysis; and Madison, whom group theorists often cite as among their founding fathers, explicitly affirms it.[80]

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[78] This is essentially G. Myrdal's analysis in *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944)

[79] At least, the burden of proof is upon those who would eliminate any or all of these factors from consideration.

[80] On p. 530, *op. cit.*, Truman states: "For better or for worse . . . the Constitution has acquired the quality of a sacred writ that renders it immune to examination *de novo*." But compare this statement with footnote 21. And he goes even further. At a later point he implies that a proper understanding of "reality" can result in a change in values:

"Since such advantages derive from the structure and values of the society, elite groups change with changes in the society. The values that give such groups their power provide a frame of reference by which most members of the society interpret experience. . . . When experience can no longer be understood in such a frame of reference . . . the values change . . " (p. 250).

Madison explicitly stated that both leadershp and ideas played an autonomous role in the political process, in addition to arguing explicitly that a knowledge of reality could influence the making of public policy under certain circumstances. Two quotations from *The Federalist*, No. 10, should suffice:

"A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders am-

For all these reasons, then, there is much to be said for the continued study, with, we hope, ever-increasing sophistication, of those areas which political scientists have traditionally studied. And there is certainly room for studies of the kind which rely upon the mature judgment of their authors, rather than being bound by conceptual schemes which appear to be simple keys to reality, but which only serve to blind students to obvious facts of politics.

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bitiously contending for pre-eminence and power . . . have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity."

"The effect of the first difference is . . . to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country. . . . "

TOWARD AN INVENTORY OF BASIC TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*

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Recent decades have seen a vast increase of research in international relations, as in all fields of political and social science. We have more facts and many more expressions of opinion, and we are facing increasingly serious problems of reorientation. We know that much in the world of relations among nations has changed and is still changing, but what is the nature of this change? Is the world becoming more international? Is it turning into one world in which even the United States and the Soviet Union are influencing each other ever more, or at least into two worlds of two rival and ever more tightly integrated Communist and non-Communist blocs? Is the nation-state being superseded by the rise of new continent-wide or ocean-wide treaty organizations or federations?

And what is happening within most of the old and new nation-states, as they enter upon these new arrangements? Are their governments becoming more stable or less? Are their political and administrative capabilities rising or declining? Are power and prestige within these states shifting toward the elites or toward the masses of their populations? Are political controls of economic life in the long run growing or receding? Are we moving toward a world of "garrison states" or toward a world of "open societies," or is the world moving in uncharted directions for which not even images have yet been found?

Surely, these seem sweeping questions. Scholars and men of affairs might be tempted to put them aside, and to turn their attention to the immediate business at hand. They may prefer the study of some particular conflict between two countries, or of the interests of this or that state, or of the merits of this or that policy at some particular moment. All serious questions, it has been argued, are particular and perhaps unique, and any broader and more general answers might be neither warranted nor wanted.

Such a retreat into the exclusive study of small-scale and short-range problems is based upon a fallacy. We cannot think about particular problems without making assumptions about the general context of the world in which they occur. Usually these assumptions are intuitive and vague. We form some indefinite conception of how states of a particular size and type of government and culture are expected to behave at particular times and places, and we feel surprised when some particular country departs strikingly from these half-formed expectations.

Clearly our analysis could gain a great deal if we tried to lift these vague types and models of political behavior into the light of consciousness, and if we used broad surveys of actual data in order to know what has been or is now the "usual" or expectable behavior of states of some particular type under a typical set of circumstances. To do this implies, however, that we also form a more explicit notion as to what constitutes a particular type of state, and what constitutes a typical set of circumstances or a type of situation.

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We are thus trying to form three sets of types: types of states (such as small Scandinavian democracies, or middle-sized Asian traditionalistic authoritarian regimes); types of situations (such as a severe business depression or a rapid growth of towns and industries); and a typical behavior when a typical state and a typical situation meet (such as increasing government intervention under constitutional auspices in Scandinavian countries during depression years, or increasing political instability in traditionalistic authoritarian governments under the impact of rapid industrialization). Some of the typical states, situations, and behavior patterns form part of the folklore of political science, or indeed of common sense. Some of our common sense images, however, may not in fact be true, and there may be characteristic responses which folklore and common sense have overlooked. Moreover, common sense images may well be mutually contradictory; and it might be worthwhile to know the degree to which a particular common sense image applies in fact.

If we are willing, however, to go beyond political intuition and historical narrative, then we may soon risk a split within the community of students of political science. Some of our colleagues may think of themselves primarily as social scientists, studying political behavior by quantitative and experimental methods; others see themselves rooted most deeply in the humanistic literary and historical tradition of scholarship and judgment. These two groups are in danger of losing communication with each other.

It seems vitally important at this time to maintain and restore the unity of the study of politics—to strengthen and revive communication between the bearers of its historical and descriptive scholarship and those practitioners engaged in the more analytic, behavioral and quantitative aspects of political research.

This paper is an attempt to contribute to the process of mutual communication. Its first part will discuss some problems of method in the use of quantitative data. Parts of it may seem familiar to those who have long been engaged in this type of research, although they may perhaps note some shifts in emphasis; but the same discussion of method may seem unfamiliar or inappropriate to scholars who have been approaching the study of international politics from a different tradition. The indulgence of readers from both these groups is asked. The brief discussion of method in the following section seems needed to indicate the setting for the appraisal of the possible usefulness of the data discussed in the rest of this paper.

I. THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND DATA

In order to do better than common sense, we must try to do several things. We must know what we *want* to know about the politics of states. We must formulate criteria of interest: what aspects of domestic or foreign politics have the most interest to us? In the second place we must form some tentative judgments as to what we *need* to know in order to get the knowledge that we want. We must thus formulate criteria of relevance: what kinds of facts do we think have the greatest influence on the political outcomes in which we are interested?

After having formed some general criteria of interest and some general surmises about relevance, we are likely to proceed to the formulation of some tentative hypotheses. By what supposed connections or operations are the supposedly relevant data linked to supposedly interesting outcomes? In other words, what are the interesting but tentative "if—then" relations, the existence of which we suspect?

Given an interesting tentative hypothesis, what data, if found, would confirm or disconfirm it? (If no conceivable data could do either, it is not a hypothesis in any scientific sense.) What kinds of data would be more persuasive in disconfirming it, and exactly at what point would we consider the hypothesis disconfirmed? In other words, what are our criteria of evidence and its relevance, and what are our criteria of verification?

To state even these preliminary questions for a tentative hypothesis may force us to take a careful second look at it. Our original surmise may not have been specific enough to permit a statement of the precise kind of evidence in the light of which it should be judged, and of the precise findings that would confirm or disconfirm it. It may therefore be necessary to reformulate the original surmise or hypothesis in order to bring it to a point where it can be tested: what changes in the original hypothesis are needed to make it thus testable by evidence?

Once we have a sufficiently specific tentative hypothesis—one that still has the relevance and interest for us that it had in the first place—we will ask: Where can existing data be found that will meet our standards for evidence? What are the probable limits of error in these data, and how seriously will they interfere, if at all, with the use to which we are proposing to put them?

How can these data be processed for further analysis? Usually, political scientists and historians still labor heavily under the heritage of the literary tradition. They spend a great deal of time and ingenuity in order to get the data, but very little time and effort in processing them. There are many mathematical techniques available today by which data can be correlated, trends can be found, or patterns of interaction among many actors can be brought out more clearly through analysis of matrices. The whole field of data processing is just in its beginnings so far as political science and analysis of international relations is concerned; and more careful attention in this step in the analysis may well pay dividends.

If not enough existing data are available to test the hypothesis in which we are interested, where and by what procedures can relevant new data be obtained? Are there survey methods or experiments that are feasible for us, within the range of our means available, and that would fill some of the gaps in the existing material available from government statistics and elsewhere in our libraries? And how can these new data be further processed for analysis, either by themselves, or in conjunction with existing data obtained from earlier publications by scholars or public or private agencies?

Once we have obtained the minimum of data needed, we can test our tentative hypotheses against them. Which of these hypotheses have been confirmed or disconfirmed, and to what degree?

Here we come to a final and important step. It is quite possible that the data we thought would confirm or disconfirm our original hypothesis will in fact do neither, and we may find that our original hypothesis was less adequately formulated than we thought. Our last step may, therefore, have to be a reformulation of some of our original hypotheses in order to make them more effectively testable—and still relevant—in the light of the evidence we now have found.

Finally, once we have come to some sort of result in relation to the hypotheses with which we started, we will end up not with the closure of the inquiry but with the opening up of a new search. What further important questions seem to have been suggested by the inquiry carried out thus far? How fruitful has our inquiry been in generating further significant questions?

Here, of course, we are closing a cycle, or rather we have rounded the feedback loop in the process of inquiry that we call science. We began with a tentative assessment of a situation and some tentative hypotheses about it. We ended with more definite evidence and with more judgments about these hypotheses. We used the results to formulate new hypotheses which will send us in search for more evidence. Much of our search consists of going through this cycle over and over again; but if carried through effectively, the sequence of operations does not constitute a vicious cycle of frustration. On the contrary, it should constitute each time a production cycle of new knowledge.

II. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF HUMANISTIC INSIGHTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE MEASUREMENTS

This production cycle has its qualitative and its quantitative stages. It starts with the problem of recognition—with the tentative and often intuitive identification of important qualities or aspects of the situation which we are trying to understand. It thus begins with a basic qualitative operation—the matching of aspects of politics and of types of states and institutions. Without such a preceding qualitative matching no quantitative work is possible. Nothing can be counted that has not been recognized first; counting is repeated recognition.

Out of the quantitative stages of our inquiry, however, should come the recognition of new trends and new patterns. We ask what these data add up to. What is the pattern of behavior which we infer from the quantitative data that we count? And once we are engaged in trying to recognize new patterns that seem suggested by our quantitative work, we are back in the field of recognition and qualitative thinking.

What I have called qualitative and quantitative thinking is often embodied in old and well-known divisions within the fields of political and social science. The student of literature or the humanities, and those practitioners of political and social science who approach the subject matter primarily in literary or humanistic terms, are most often the persons who make major contributions in the realm of qualitative analysis. They recognize new patterns that are just barely beginning to be dimly visible against the dark and chaotic background of miscellaneous, distracting and often trivial detail. Moreover, they may have an excellent intuitive sense for singling out significant details from among the merely trivial. On the other hand, we have the "short-haired" social scientists, the counters and the verifiers, who are too often and too thoughtlessly identified with the behavioral approach to social science. In fact, of course, the study of human behavior in national and international politics requires ineluctably the use of both approaches. We need to combine the insight of the literary and historical traditions of political scholarship as well as the quantitative skills of analysis and verification, if our understanding of international politics is to become less inadequate than it has been in the past.

It is time now to give a few examples of the role which particular quantitative data and studies can play toward this end. As should be clear from what has already been said, this manner of presentation will slight, of necessity, the equally important and indispensable contribution of intuitive, qualitative, and humanistic thinking, and readers must be urged, therefore, to make the appropriate supplements and corrections in reading the discussion of quantitative operations that follows.

III. BACKGROUND DATA ON THE STABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF GOVERNMENTS

Two problem areas of obvious concern to the student of international relations lend themselves particularly well to the application of quantitative methods. One deals with questions of stability. How stable is the existence of a state *vis-à-vis* other states, or *vis-à-vis* the possibly disruptive pressures of some sectional interests or nationality groups within it? And how stable is the government of a state—how probable or improbable appears its overthrow—within its national boundaries?

The second problem area deals with the capabilities of a state *vis-à-vis* other states, and with the capabilities of the government within each state *vis-à-vis* the rest of the population. How capable is a country, and its government, to keep international commitments of some given kind (*e.g.*, to pay debts, to supply troops, to furnish legal protection, etc.)? What are its capabilities for inflicting economic, political or military damage upon other countries (*e.g.*, its economic, military or propaganda potential)? What are the capabilities of its government to carry through specific domestic policies or reforms (*e.g.*, to balance the budget, to limit inflation, to maintain full employment, to redistribute land, to slow down population growth, to strengthen the armed forces, to promote education, to accelerate economic development, etc.)? Finally, what are the capabilities of a government or country for co-operating or merging, wholly or in part, with one or several other countries?

Stability and capabilities are doubly interdependent. Without stability a government's capabilities are drastically reduced, in extreme cases to zero; and without adequate capabilities a government may find it difficult to remain stable in the face of foreign or domestic challenges. But any major increase in the capabilities of a country *vis-à-vis* other countries, or in the capabilities of a government *vis-à-vis* its own population, may require changes that may upset stability.

Generally, increases in capabilities require increasing social mobilization of the people, such as increasing participation in national markets for goods and labor, increasing use of money, industrialization, urbanization, social communication, literacy, participation as audiences of mass media, contacts with the government, interest and participation in politics. Such mobilization, however, is usually accompanied by rising needs and expectations, which must not be frustrated if stability is to be preserved.

To preserve stability, this increase in social mobilization needs to be accompanied by two things: first, by an adequate increase in per capita income for the country as a whole, or at least for its politically relevant strata—which are themselves broadening in the process of social mobilization; second, by an adequate increase in capabilities of the central government in regard to its rapidly growing domestic and foreign commitments and responsibilities.

In principle, the background conditions for stability—though not stability itself—could be predicted from a ratio of two numbers: one indicating the rising burdens upon a government and upon popular habits of compliance or loyalty toward it; the other indicating the resources available to the government for coping with these burdens. An indicator of rising burdens could be found in the percentages of literacy, L, and of political participation, *pol*, together with data about the extent of inequality in the distribution of incomes, such as the percentage of total national income, Y, in the hands of the top 10 per cent of income receivers, written as y_{10}. A rough indication of the resources of the government could be found in the per capita national income, y, and perhaps—though this would have to be investigated—in the ratio, g, of the government sector—sometimes approximated by the national budget—to the total national income. Briefly put, the background conditions for stability would thus be indicated by some such ratio as

$$St = \frac{g}{L\,\mathrm{pol}} \times \frac{y}{y_{10}}$$

Where enfranchisement is wide (*i.e.*, the percentage of enfranchised voters, v_e, is close to 100 for men above 20), voting participation, v, may be taken as approximately equal to *pol*.

Capabilities, on the other hand, may be expected to increase with most of these indicators, so that C may rise with y, g, L, *pol* and y_{10}; that is, with the increases in per capita income, literacy and political participation, as well as with the concentration of resources in the hands of the government and perhaps in the hands of an elite, represented by the top 10 per cent of income receivers. This is at most a tentative surmise, however, and much research is still needed.

Needless to say, no single over-all ratio could furnish anything but the roughest kind of indication of some of the background conditions favoring stability. The actual stability or instability of a government—that is, the probability of its overthrow—will depend to a large extent, of course, on its skill in using its resources, and on its opponents' skill in taking advantage of its difficulties. Governmental skill includes both the skill of political leadership and the administrative competence of the bureaucracy.

The background conditions, against which these political skills are exercised, can be described more adequately by data about some 75 categories, and by about two dozen ratios between them. A tentative list of such data and ratios is given in Table I in the Appendix. A very crude typology, based on only two of these sets of data—size and per capita income—is given there in Table II.

Let it be repeated again that these data are proposed as aids to political judgment, not as substitutes for it. (Similarly, blood counts and readings of body temperature aid the diagnosis of the physician, but do not supplant it.) Nevertheless, the help we could get from the measurement, comparison and simultaneous exhibition of a larger number of such background data should not be neglected.

IV. COUNTRY PROFILES: A CODE NUMBER TECHNIQUE FOR SIMULTANEOUS INSPECTION OF MANY VARIABLES

A simple technique for surveying further the inventory of variables and countries by means of "country profiles" would be as follows: (1) List in a fixed sequence a number of variables—say, ten—of presumed interest. (2) Assign a ten-place number to each country, with one digit corresponding to each variable. (3) Obtain the distribution for each variable, and divide all countries by rank for this particular variable into five classes, according to some suitably chosen intervals. (4) Assign a number to each class, beginning with 0 for the lowest, and ending with 4 for the highest class. (5) Write the class number for each variable into the appropriate digit of the "country profile" number. (6) Match the country profiles for two or more countries which you wish to compare for some purpose of political analysis. (7) Observe the distribution of all country profiles, or of all such profiles for a particular group of countries. Many possible profiles will have no countries in them; a few profiles may correspond to several countries.

A possible set of such variables and coding classes might be the following:

1. Gross national product (GNP): Code: 0. under $1 billion
   1. $1–4.9 billion
   2. $5–24.9 billion
   3. $25–124.9 billion
   4. $125 billion and above

2. Per capita gross national product (gnp):
   Code: 0. under $100
   1. $100–299
   2. $300–599
   3. $600–899
   4. $900+

3. Population (P):
   Code: 0. under 1 million
   1. 1–9.9 million
   2. 10–39.9 million
   3. 40–99.9 million
   4. 100+

4. Population increase (P') av. p. a.:
   Code: 0. zero or decline
   1. 0.1–0.9%
   2. 1.0–1.9
   3. 2.0–2.9
   4. 3+

5. Work force in non-agricultural occupations (P_{na}), % (from United Nations, *World Social Survey*, 1957, [henceforth cited as WSS], p. 92):
   Code: 0. 0–9%
   1. 10–29 (*e.g.*, Thailand, Turkey, India)
   2. 30–49 (*e.g.*, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico)
   3. 50–74 (*e.g.*, Spain, Japan, USSR, Italy, Argentina)
   4. 75+ (*e.g.*, France, Germany, Australia, US, UK)

6. Share of population in towns of 20,000 or more (P_{u20}), % (WSS, p. 115):
   Code: 0. 0–9% (*e.g.*, Haiti, Pakistan)
   1. 10–19 (*e.g.*, Guatemala, India, Yugoslavia)
   2. 20–29 (*e.g.*, Iran, Brazil, Mexico, Finland, Egypt, 1947)
   3. 30–39 (*e.g.*, Venezuela, Cuba, France, Canada)
   4. 40+ (*e.g.*, Japan, US, Germany, Argentina, UK)

7. Literacy: % literate in population 15 and above (lit):
   Code: 0. 1–9% (*e.g.*, Ethiopia)
   1. 10–19 (*e.g.*, Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan, India)
   2. 20–39 (*e.g.*, Turkey, South Korea)
   3. 40–59 (*e.g.*, Portugal, Malta, Burma, Brazil)
   4. 60+ (*e.g.*, Ceylon, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Hungary, US, UK)

8. Daily newspaper circulation per 1000 population (n) (WSS, p. 86 ff.):
   Code: 0. 1–9 (*e.g.*, Burma, India, Pakistan, Indonesia)
   1. 10–49 (*e.g.*, Egypt, Tunisia, Bolivia, Ghana, Philippines)
   2. 50–99 (*e.g.*, Lebanon, Spain, Brazil, Venezuela, Greece)

3. 100–199 (*e.g.*, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Argentina, Cuba)
4. 200+ (*e.g.*, Japan, USSR, France, Germany, US, UK)

9. Voting participation of population 20 and above (V_a), %:
   Code: 0. 1–4 %
   1. 5–9
   2. 10–29
   3. 30–49
   4. 50+

10. Calory intake above or below estimated requirements (cal), % + or −:
    Code: 0. below −10% (*e.g.*, Ceylon, India, Philippines, Peru)
    1. −3 to −10% (*e.g.*, Japan, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico)
    2. −2 to +2% (*e.g.*, Cyprus, Egypt)
    3. +3 to +10% (*e.g.*, Argentina, Uruguay)
    4. above +10% (*e.g.*, Italy, France, USSR, US, UK)

11. Crude death rates per 1000 population (p_d) (UN *Demographic Year Book*, 1957, Table 8, 1956 data, or nearest year, pp. 186–199):
    Code: 0. 25 and above (*e.g.*, India, No. Rhodesia native population)
    1. 20–24.9 (*e.g.*, Ghana, Brazil)
    2. 15–19.9 (*e.g.*, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Guatemala, Ecuador)
    3. 10–14.9 (*e.g.*, France, Germany, Indonesia, Mexico, Ceylon, UK)
    4. Below 10 (*e.g.*, Japan, Australia, Argentina, USSR, US)

In addition to the "measurement profile" just discussed, we might obtain "rating profiles", based on combined data and judgments as to partly qualitative characteristics relevant for the political performance of governments in national and international affairs.[1] Some such characteristics might be coded as follows:

1. Sovereignty:
   Code: 0. Dependent
   1. Sovereign only after 1945
   2. Sovereign only after 1930
   3. Sovereign only after 1890
   4. Sovereign before 1890

2. Western impact:
   Code: 0. No major Western impact (*e.g.*, Nepal)
   1. Some impact, but sovereign (*e.g.*, Japan)

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[1] *Cf.* Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March, 1959), pp. 69–105, and Lyle W. Shannon, ed., *Underdeveloped Areas* (New York, 1957), and his article, "Is Level of Government Related to Capacity for Self-Government?" *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 17 (1958), pp. 367–382. *Cf.* also Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1958), and Lerner, "Communication Systems and Social Systems," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (October, 1957), pp. 266–275.

	2. Western colonial relationship after 1900 (*e.g.*, India) 3. Western colonial relationship only before 1900 (*e.g.*, Brazil) 4. Western (*e.g.*, Sweden)
3. Constitutional stability:	Code: 0. No current constitution, neither formal nor effective 1. Current formal constitution but not effective 2. Current effective constitution (written or unwritten), but only after 1945 3. Current effective constitution (written or unwritten), but only after 1890 4. Current effective constitution (written or unwritten) older than 1890
4. Political homogeneity:	Code: 0. Extreme opposition (*i.e.*, secessionist or revolutionary) has 50% or more of vote, or of politically active population 1. Extreme opposition has 30–49% 2. Extreme opposition has 10–29 3. Extreme opposition has 5–9 4. Extreme opposition has less than 5%
5. Ethnic and racial homogeneity:	Code for same percentages as 4, above.
6. Linguistic homogeneity:	Code for same percentages as 4, above.
7. Religious homogeneity:	Code for same percentages as 4, above.
8. Sectional homogeneity (% population in politically self-conscious geographic sections, *e.g.*, US South):	Code for same percentages as 4, above.
9. Voting system:	Code: 0. No voting at all 1. Only plebiscite-type voting, with single party and no effective primary 2. Single party with effective primary 3. Multi-party system with ban on extreme parties (*e.g.*, Communists, nationalists, etc.) 4. Multi-party system without limitation on parties
10. Freedom of group opposition:	Code: 0. No autonomous groups tolerated ("totalitarianism") 1. Autonomous groups tolerated informally and outside politics 2. Informal autonomous groups effective in politics ("authoritarianism") 3. Autonomous groups free to organize in politics, but restricted in opposing government ("authoritarian constitutionalism") 4. Autonomous groups free to enter politics and to oppose government

An example for both the "measurement profile" and the "rating profile" for the United States might look like this:

MEASUREMENT PROFILE

A. Digit	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
B. Category	GNP	gnp	Pop	P′%	W_{na}%	P_{u20}%	lit%	n_n	V_a	cal%	pd
C. Data	387	2243	168	1.8	87	43	98	339	50+	+12	9.4
D. Code	4	4	4	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

This could be written more conveniently M 4442-44444-44. The first group of digits would indicate levels of income, population and population growth; the second group would indicate levels of social mobilization and voting participation; and the last two digits would suggest levels of nutrition and of health.

RATING PROFILE

A. Digit	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
B. Category	Sov.	West.	Constit. Stab.	Extreme Pol. Opp.	Racial Minor.	Ling. Min.	Relig. Min.	Sect. Min.	Voting System	Group Org.
C. Data	Before 1890	Itself West.	Before 1890	0–5%	10%+	0–5%	10–30%	10–30%	Free	Free
D. Code	4	4	4	4	2	4	2	2	4	4

This rating profile could be written conveniently as R 4444–2422–44. The first four digits identify the United States as an old independent and very stable Western nation; the second group of digits suggests its pluralistic rather than homogeneous character; and the last two digits identify its substantially free voting system and group politics. Measurement profiles for a number of countries are given in Table III.

It might be objected that this coding and exhibiting of so many key variables is unnecessary, since many of them are fairly highly correlated. Thus Daniel Lerner has found in an important and very suggestive study that, for a group of 73 countries around the world, literacy correlated with per capita income at .84, and at .87 with "industrialization, measured by proportion of gainfully employed males in non-agricultural occupations."[2] Even these high levels of correlations, however, would account only for about three-quarters of the observed variations. Moreover, for a more accurate assessment of political stability, as well as of political capabilities, we might be particularly interested in the deviant cases, such as Burma with an unusually high literacy rate for its low income level. Deviant cases, and possibly even some recurrent types of governments or countries under cross-pressure from unusually contradictory political or social conditions, could be more readily identified with the aid of the simple profile numbers just proposed.

V. DATA ABOUT CAPABILITIES AND BURDENS IN POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Estimates of stability and of general capabilities are not, of course, the only things of interest to us. As students of international relations we are interested in data about the conditions for political amalgamation or integration among different countries, or between different sections or ethnic groups within the same countries.

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[2] Daniel Lerner, "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (October, 1957), pp. 266–75, at p. 268, n. 6, with references.

The background for many of these integrative capabilities, as well as for the possible burden or strains upon them, could again be estimated with the aid of data of the kinds listed in Table I. In the case of integration or amalgamation between two countries, such data would have to be found for each of the two countries separately, and then, wherever possible, for the specific flow of transactions between them. This specific flow of transactions between the two countries would then have to be compared separately for each country with the total volume of comparable foreign transactions for this particular country, as well as with its volume of domestic transactions of the same kind. Changes in these ratios over time would then indicate whether each kind of transaction was growing faster between the two countries than within either or both of them, and than between either country and the rest of the world. Only in the event that growth of transactions between the two countries should be clearly greater than its alternatives, would there be *prima facie* evidence for a growth of conditions favoring integration or amalgamation—provided, furthermore, that this relative growth in transactions should be experienced by the participants as associated predominantly with rewards rather than frustrations.

What are some of the findings that result from investigations of such ratios of national to international transactions?

A study of the changing ratios of foreign trade to total national income in about fifteen countries suggests that British foreign trade grew faster than national income during the middle third of the 19th century; that the ratio between British foreign trade and national income then changed relatively little between 1870 and 1913; and that it declined thereafter, with some fluctuations, to one-third less than the 1913 level in 1956. Some other countries, such as Denmark and Japan, reached the peak of their foreign trade ratios somewhat later, in 1915 and 1915–19, respectively, but the development for almost all countries surveyed, as well as some data for the world as a whole, suggests that the relative weight of the international sectors of most national economies has been declining over the last 50 years. For the United States, in particular, the ratio of foreign trade to national income declined from 23 per cent in the days of George Washington to 9 per cent in 1956.[3]

Studies of mail flows, references in scientific journals, and similar data confirm the impression that in terms of the relative proportions of actual transactions the international character of the world may have declined rather than increased during the last half-century.[4] At the same time, however, the strategic, political and financial involvement of governments, and the symbolic and vicarious involvement of large numbers of individuals in international affairs, may have increased. If so, we are facing here a problem of cross-pressures on many individuals in terms of their own allocations of attention and support to international as against national and local issues; and we are facing a similar problem of cross-pressures on governments and legislatures, all of which must respond to an increasing and partly competitive flow of domestic and foreign messages and pressures.

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[3] *Cf.* K. W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Relative Decline of Foreign Trade, 1890–1957," forthcoming, in *World Politics* (1960).

[4] *Cf.* K. W. Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of International Communication Flows," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (Spring, 1956), pp. 143–160, with further references.

One point seems to emerge clearly, however, from these considerations. There is no single, simple and clear-cut process making the world—even the non-communist world alone—more international, or producing automatically a steady increase in integration or cooperation even among the major democratic countries. What increase there has been in unity among the democratic countries, world-wide or regional, has been wrested by conscious effort and statesmanship from a welter of contradictory underlying trends.

The study of all such data and ratios thus can indicate at most the background for possible action. What actually happens, within fairly wide limits of probability, will depend on the political actors concerned, such as the governments, leaders, parties, interest groups and elites involved in the situation. Their aims and skills, their strategies, tactics and timing may do much to influence the outcome.

Here again, quantitative data can aid the judgment of the political analyst, but cannot replace it in the evaluation of historical cases or in the assessment of possible future developments. Some aids for qualitative judgments have been given in several studies by Harold Guetzkow, Ernst Haas, and others, including this author, and need not be repeated here.[5]

VI. THE MATRIX ANALYSIS OF TRANSACTION FLOWS

A final word might be said about the analysis of transaction flows among several countries with the help of a somewhat more elaborate mathematical technique than has been usual. In its essence, the method consists in constructing an "indifference model" or "null model" of the flow of transactions of some defined type between many actors, such as countries. The countries are written in matrix form, with the amount of transactions initiated by each country, say country i, written in the i-th row (which bears its name) and that portion of these transactions which ends up in country j written in the j-th column. The row totals thus show the total transactions initiated by each country, and the column totals show the total transactions terminating in each country. The total of the columns equals the total of the rows, and equals the total of transactions in the system of countries for the period under consideration.

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[5] *Cf.* Harold Guetzkow, *Multiple Loyalties; Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organizations*, Publication No. 4, Center for Research on World Political Institutions (Princeton University, 1955); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford University Press, 1958); "Persistent Themes in Atlantic and European Unity," *World Politics*, Vol. 10 (July, 1958), pp. 614–628; and "The Challenge of Regionalism," *International Organization*, Vol. 12 (Fall, 1958), pp. 440–458; K. W. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton University Press, 1957), chs. 1–3, and Appendix.

If all countries were totally indifferent to each other, with nothing influencing their behavior—neither proximity nor similarity of resources, nor anything else—except the mere amount of transactions among them, one can construct an "indifference model" or "null model" which would predict for each cell of the matrix (corresponding to each pair of countries) an "expected" amount of transactions *under the assumption of indifference.* The extent to which actual amounts of transactions deviate from these expected amounts or "indifference levels" will show, of course, in what direction and to what extent any two countries are not indifferent to each other.

Accordingly, three matrices are constructed. The first is a matrix of actual transaction data. The second is a matrix of "expected" amounts from the indifference model; and the third is a difference matrix, showing indicators of deviations of the first from the second matrix for each cell.

For the 106 countries for which suitable international trade data have been collected by the United Nations, this procedure yields three matrices of about 10,000 cells each for any one year. With the help of punched cards and a 650 IBM computer, data for such a world matrix for two different years, 1938 and 1954, could be put on a single deck of cards. The inclusion of 18 putative regions with presumably greater intra-regional ties brought the number of cards closer to 20,000.

A smaller matrix for fifteen North Atlantic countries was computed for five different years, covering a span of over two generations: 1890, 1913, 1928, 1938 and 1954.

The results of this international trade study cannot be presented in detail within the framework of this paper.[6] A few of the provisional findings, however, may be summarized, provided that their tentative character is kept in mind:

1. Indices of relative deviation are a sensitive and reliable instrument for measuring regionalism, clustering, and similar special relationships between states.

2. They permit numerical comparisons between different regions or clusters, as well as the measurement of changes within the same region over time.

3. Regions widely believed to be characterized by special regional ties are confirmed in this characteristic by the new data: of 18 putative regions or clusters of this kind, 16 appear to be so confirmed, including the European Coal and Steel Community, the Scandinavian countries, and the Arab League.

4. Efforts to increase regional integration may have had substantial success. The six countries of the European Coal and Steel Community appeared significantly closer to each other in 1954 in terms of our data than they had been in 1938. An even more outstanding case of strong and increasing ties appears to be that of the United States and Canada.

5. The data show the special relationship of particular countries to their regions, such as the persistent orientation of Finland toward Scandinavia, and the persistent separateness of Iraq from most of its Arab neighbors.

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[6] A fuller account, with the data, will appear in K. W. Deutsch and I. Richard Savage, *Regionalism, Trade and International Community,* forthcoming.

6. Geographic proximity has only limited effects on the distribution of international trade. Less than one-half of the pairs of countries with particularly high positive deviations from the indifference model are within 200 miles of each other; many pairs of countries with the highest positive deviations are over 1,000 miles apart.

7. Specialization of a country in specific commodities, and the complementarity of resources between two countries have likewise only limited effects. Of two sugar islands in the Caribbean, one—Haiti—has close trade ties to the United States but not to England; in another—Jamaica—the reverse holds true.

8. The most conspicuous correlation of high deviations from the indifference model seems to be with language, culture and, above all, financial and political association. Colonial empires and spheres of influence, present and to a lesser extent even past, stand out in the matrices. Trade, like credit, does follow the flag and often lingers after it.

9. The matrix analysis method permits a measurement of the trade-distorting effects of colonialism. These turn out to be strikingly high, turning colonial trade in 1954 away from the United States, Germany, Italy and Japan, and favoring very strongly France and the United Kingdom in their respective colonies.

10. Territories recently sovereign, and colonial territories near the point of independence—such as Nigeria, Ghana, Tunisia and Morocco—showed in 1954 markedly less trade distortion in favor of their present or former "mother countries" than did most of the other colonies. It is possible that this method may thus furnish some additional measures of progress toward the emancipation of particular colonial or quasi-colonial territories.[7]

11. For certain areas, the findings suggest the existence of significant cross-pressures on foreign policy. They show a sharp and continuing decline of relative trade levels between some countries which are linked otherwise by close political, cultural and military ties. Conspicuous among these cases of cross-pressure, or contradictory development, is the steady decline of relative trade levels between Britain and the United States. Other instances include the persistently low relative trade levels between Britain and the ECSC countries, particularly France and Germany, but also the Netherlands and Belgium, and the similarly low relative trade levels between the same countries and the United States. Findings in this respect, based on a more refined analysis of the data, supersede some of the earlier surmises published in 1957 in the Appendix to my *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.* The new data suggest that the task of reconciling contradictory trends and pressures within different ranges of transaction may offer particular challenges to NATO statesmanship.

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[7] *Cf.* data on German exports in 1938 and 1954 in Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford, University Press, 1959), pp. 228–231. See also Elliott J. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," this REVIEW, forthcoming June issue.

APPENDIX

TABLE I. A LIST OF DESIRABLE DATA AND RATIOS FOR CAPABILITY AND STABILITY ANALYSIS

1 Magnitude or Aggregate			2 Average Change per Year (1953–57, or nearest period) %		3 Ratio (per 100 units of denominator category, where appropriate)[1]	
Population Data						
1.	P	population	P'	population growth from all causes		
2.	P_{10+}	population 10 and above				
3.	P_{20+}	adult population (15–64)	p_d	crude death rate		
4.	P_W	population of working age	p_b	crude birth rate		
5.	P_D	dependent population ($P - P_W$)	p_n	natural rate of population growth	P_D/P	dependency burden
6.	P_M	men in armed forces	P'_W	growth of population of working age	P_M/P	gross military participation ratio
7.	P_{MW}	women in military forces				
8.	P_{MP}	total military personnel				
9.	P_{MA}	men of military age (20–50)			P_M/P_{MA}	net military participation ratio
10.	W	work force (persons working or seeking work, incl. self-employed and family-employed)				
11.	W_W	wage and salary earners, incl. job seekers				
12.	W_E	employed				
13.	W_{EG}	employed by government (all levels)				
14.	W_{EGC}	employed by central government				
15.	W_{ag}	labor force in agriculture			W_{ag}/W	proportion of work force in agriculture

[1] Annual shifts can then be computed from the ratios in Column 3 according to the formula: $\frac{R_{t2} - R_{t1}}{t2 - t1}$.

APPENDIX (*Continued*)

	1 Magnitude or Aggregate	2 Average Change per Year (1953–57, or nearest period) %		3 Ratio (per 100 units of denominator category, where appropriate)[1]	
16. W_{na}	labor force outside agriculture			W_{na}/W	% share of non-agricultural labor force
17. U	unemployed			U/W	unemployment
18. P_u	urban population			$ur = P_u/P$	urbanization ratio
19. P_{u20+}	population in towns of 20,000 and above			$ur_{20+} = P_{u20+}/P$	urbanization ratio for cities above 20,000
20. P_r	rural population				
21. P_{ag}	agricultural population	P'_{ag}	growth or decline of agricultural population	$ag = P_{ag}/P$	percentage of population in agriculture
22. P_{na}	non-agricultural population				
23. P_{ind}	industrial population (incl. mining and transport)			$ind = P_{ind}/P$	industrialization ratio
24. P_{lit}	number of literate population			$lit = P_{lit}/P_{10+}$	literacy
25. P_s	population in the subsistence sector of the economy				
26. P_{Mo}	population in the monetized sector of the economy				
27. P_{em}	number of emigrants in last 30 years				
28. P_{im}	number of immigrants in last 30 years				
29. P_{for}	number of foreign born population			P_{for}/P	ratio of foreign born
30. Mar	number of marriages per year			Mar/P	ratio of marriages
				Mar_{for}/Mar	ratio of marriages with foreign partner to total marriages
31. P_{min}	number of members of ethnic or racial minorities of political significance			P_{min}/P	ratio of ethnic or racial minorities

32. P_{lang}	speakers of minority languages			P_{lang}/P	ratio of speakers of minority language
33. P_{bil}	speakers of both the dominant and at least one minority language				

Area Data

34. A	area (mi²)			P/A	population density
35. A_{ar}	arable land				
36. A_c	cultivated land				
37. A_i	irrigated land				

Income Data

38. Y	national income	Y'	income growth	$y = Y/P$	per capita income
				Y/W	income per work force member
39. GNP	gross national product	GNP′	average change per year	$gnp = GNP/P$	gross national product per capita
40. E	exports			$e = E/Y$	export ratio
41. M	imports			$m = M/Y$	import ratio
42. T	total foreign trade $(E+M)$	T'	change in foreign trade	$t = T/Y$	foreign trade ratio
43. B_T	foreign trade balance $(E-M)$				
44. B_P	balance of payments				
45. Y_{5t}	income of top 5% of receivers			$y_{5t} = Y_5/Y$	% of national income going to top 5%
46. Y_{10t}	income of top 10% of receivers			$y_{10t} = Y_{10}/Y$	% of national income going to top 10%
47. Y_{20t}	income of top 20% of receivers			$y_{20t} = Y_{20}/Y$	% of national income going to top 20%
48. Y_{50B}	income of bottom 50% of receivers			Y_{50B}/Y	% of national income going to bottom 50%
49. Y_{30B}	income of bottom 30% of receivers			Y_{30B}/Y	% of national income going to bottom 30%
50. Y_G	income of government sector of economy (budget+social security+nationalized and municipal industries)				

APPENDIX (*Continued*)

	1 Magnitude or Aggregate		2 Average Change per Year (1953–57, or nearest period) %	3 Ratio (per 100 units of denominator category, where appropriate)[1]	
51.	Y_{Gc}	income of central government sector (usually national budget)		$g = Y_{Gc}/Y$	political centralization ratio of national economy
52.	Y_s	income of subsistence sector of economy			
53.	Y_{Mo}	income of monetized sector of economy		$mo = Y_{MO}/Y$	monetization ratio
54.	Y_{Mil}	defense budget		$mil = Y_{mil}/Y$	military expenditure ratio
Mail Flow Data					
55.	L	number of letters (1st class) per year $(L = D + F)$		$le = L/P$	letters per capita
56.	D	number of letters in domestic mail			
57.	F	number of letters sent or received from abroad		$f = F/L$ D/F	ratio of foreign mail domestic-foreign mail ratio
58.	F_S	letters sent abroad			
59.	F_r	letters received from abroad $(F = F_S + F_r)$		F_r/F_S	received-sent ratio of mail
Mass Media Data					
60.	N	newspaper circulation (daily average)		$n = N/P$	newspaper circulation ratio (daily)
61.	Mv	motion picture theater seats		Mv/P	movie seat ratio
62.	Mv_A	motion picture audience (weekly average)		Mv_A/P	movie audience ratio
63.	R	radio receivers		R/P	radio set ratio
64.	R_A	radio audience (estimated total)		R_A/R R_A/P	listeners per radio set radio audience ratio

65. Tv	television sets	Tv_A/Tv	viewers per set
66. Tv_A	television audience (estimated total)	Tv/P	TV set ratio to pop.
67. N_{pol}	newspaper circulation under direct political control (*i.e.*, by party or government)	tv_A/P	television audience ratio
Attention Data			
	News ratios (from content analyses if available; to be compiled separately for each kind of medium)		
68. N_F	foreign news[2]	N_F/N	ratio of foreign news to total newspaper space, inc. advertising
69. N_D	domestic news ($N_F + N_D =$ total news)	N_D/N	ratio of domestic news ($N_F/N + N_D/N = 1$)
70. Ed_F	editorials on foreign topics (only those clearly referring to foreign topics or items)	N_D/N_F	ratio of domestic to foreign news[3]
71. Ed_D	editorials on domestic topics	Ed_F/Ed	percentage of editorials devoted to foreign affairs
	($Ed_F + Ed_D =$ total editorials)	Ed_D/Ed	percentage of editorials devoted to domestic affairs
	Attention ratios (from readership surveys of foreign editorials, if available)		

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[2] N_F and N_D can be compiled on various bases, such as column inches of news space or number of news items. The news ratio N_F/N is likely to be similar in each case so long as the same measurement is used. For further details, see Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Prestige Papers* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952), and Pool, *Symbols of Internationalism* (Stanford, 1951); see also International Press Institute, *The Flow of News* (Zurich, 1953); Jacques Kaiser, *One Week's News* (Paris, UNESCO, 1951); and Wilbur Schramm, ed., *One Day in the World's Press* (Stanford, 1959).

[3] This ratio follows from the preceding ones but is convenient to list for purposes of comparisons with similar ratios for trade and mail flow data. *Cf.* K. W. Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of Communication Flows," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (Spring 1956), pp. 143–160, and "The Propensity to International Transactions," a paper presented to the American Sociological Society, Chicago, September 1959, multigraphed.

APPENDIX (*Continued*)

	1 Magnitude or Aggregate	2 Average Change per Year (1953–57, or nearest period) %	3 Ratio (per 100 units of denominator category, where appropriate)[1]	
72. N_{Att}	average reader attention paid to all news			
73. N_{FAtt}	attention paid to foreign news			
74. N_{DAtt}	attention paid to domestic news			
75. N_{Fav}	favorable news (*e.g.*, about a certain country)			
76. $N_{non-Fav}$	unfavorable news		$\frac{N_{Fav} - N_{nonFav}}{N_{neut}}$	bias index
77. N_{neut}	neutral news			
Voting Data				
78. V	number of votes cast in elections		$v = V/P$	gross ratio of voting participation
79. V_E	number of eligible voters		$v_a = V/P_{20+}$	adult ratio of voting participation
			$v_e = V_E/P_{20+}$	ratio of enfranchisement
80. P_{pol}	number of persons loosely involved in political activities (strikes, meetings, riots, civil wars, etc.)		$pol = P_{pol}/P_{20+}$	ratio of general political involvement (Hyp.: where v_e is high, $v = pol$)
81. P_{ac}	number of persons more intensely involved in political activity (members of parties, trade unions, farm or business organizations, etc.)		$ac = P_{ac}/P_{20+}$	ratio of intense political involvement. (Since people under 20 years may be in politics, ac could be larger than one.)
82. V_{com}	number of communist votes		V_{com}/V	ratio of communist votes
83. V_{soc}	number of socialist votes		V_{soc}/V	ratio of socialist votes
84. V_{rel}	number of votes for religious parties		V_{rel}/V	ratio of religious votes

85. V_{sec}	number of votes for secular parties	V_{sec}/V	ratio of secular votes
Value Orientation Data			
86. n_{ach}	index of achievement motivation, acc. to McClelland[4]		
87. auth	index of authoritarianism, acc. to Adorno[5]		
88. sat	index of satisfaction, acc. to Inkeles[6]		
89. sec	security index, acc. to Buchanan and Cantril (p. 26)[7]		
90. ster	stereotype score (towards a given country), acc. to Buchanan and Cantril (p. 53)		
91. friend	friendliness score (towards a given country), acc. to Buchanan and Cantril (p. 54)		
92. fut	index of future orientation, acc. to Florence Kluckhohn, if data should become available[8]		
93. m_{nat}	index of value of mastery over nature, acc. to Florence Kluckhohn, if data should become available		
94. lin	index of value put on "lineal" relationships, acc. to Florence Kluckhohn, if data should become available		
95. Mor_{m-13}	indices of acceptance of different "paths of life" (*i.e.*, configurations of values), acc. to Charles Morris[9]		

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[4] Daniel C. McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in the Economic Development of Primitive and Modern Societies," multigraphed, Harvard University, 1959.

[5] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswick, D. H. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950).

[6] Alexander Inkeles, "Toward a Social Psychology of Industrial Society," multigraphed, Conference on Political Modernization, Social Science Research Council, June 1959.

[7] William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion* (Urbana, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1953).

[8] Florence Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Variant Value Orientations," multigraphed, Harvard University, n.d. (1957). This manuscript, a chapter in a larger forthcoming work, is a revised and substantially expanded version of two previously published papers: "Dominant and Substitute Profiles of Cultural Orientations: Their Significance for the Analysis of Social Stratification," *Social Forces*, Vol. 28, no. 4 (May 1950), pp. 276–293; "Dominant and Variant Value-Orientations," a paper read at the 78th Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Social Work and later published in part in the *Social Welfare Forum* (1951), pp. 97–113. Two slightly different versions of the complete paper have appeared in Hugh Cabot and Joseph A. Kahl, *Human Relations* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953), Vol. 1, pp. 88–98, and in the second edition of Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture* (New York, 1954), Part Two, Sec. IV, pp. 342–361.

[9] Charles Morris, *Varieties of Human Value* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956).

TABLE II. A PRIMITIVE TYPOLOGY: SOME COUNTRIES TYPED BY CLASSES OF SIZE AND WEALTH*

1955 GNP per cap.	Country	GNP $ billion	gnp $	P million	P′ %	P_{na} %	P_{u20} %	lit %	n %	cal %	p_d %
1956 Pop. (millions) A. Under 10											
$900+	Switzerland	6	1229	5	1.1		31	98–99	335	+11	10.2
	Australia	11	1215	9	2.3	86	57	98–99	396	+12	9.1
	New Zealand	2	1249	2	2.1			98–99	394	+12	9.1
	Sweden	8	1165	7	0.7	79	35	98–99	459	+11	9.6
	Belgium	9	1015	8	0.6	87	42	97	338	+11	12.1
	Norway	3	969	3	1.0			98–99	435	+11	8.5
	Finland	4	941	4	1.2		24	98–99	269	+11	9.0
	Denmark	4	913	4	0.7		40	98–99	378	+12	8.8
$300–900	Venezuela	4	762	6	3.1		31	52	71	− 7	9.9
	Israel	.9	540	2	3.5			94	195		6.6
	Austria	4	532	7	0.1	67	40	98–99	214		12.4
$100–300	Portugal	2	201	9	0.8			56	61		12.1
	Iraq	1	195	5				11	21		5.8
	Guatemala	.6	179	3	3.1		11	29	27		19.8
	Ghana	.6	135	5	1.6			20–25	18		20.8
Under $100	Jordan	.1	96	1	2.7			15–20	9		8.4
	Bolivia	.2	66	3	1.2			32	23		10.1
B. 10–30											
$900+	Canada	26	1667	16	2.7	81	35	97–98	242	+11	8.2
$300–900	Netherlands	8	708	11	1.2	80	56	98–99	259	+11	7.8
	Czechoslovakia			13	1.1			97–98	191		9.6
	Poland			26	2.0			90–95	159		9.0
	Argentina	7	374	19	1.9	73	48	86	154	+ 9	8.2
$100–300	Yugoslavia	5	297	18	1.6		13	73	46	+10	11.2
	Turkey	6	276	25	2.9	14	15	32	32	+ 9	
	Spain	7	254	29	0.8	50		83	85		9.9
	Philippines	4	201	22	1.9			60	19	−12	9.2
	Egypt	3	133	24	2.3	35	29	20	25	− 0.4	18.4
	Thailand	2	100	21	1.9	14		52	4		9.2
	Iran	2	100	19			21	10–15	6		6.8
Under $100	Ethiopia	.9	54	20				1– 5	.5		
	Burma	1	52	20	1.4			45–50	8		21.8
C. 30–90											
$900+	France	45	1046	43	0.8	72	33	96	246	+11	12.5
	UK	51	998	51	0.4	95	69	98–99	570	+12	11.7
$300–900	Germ. Fed. Rep.	38	762	51	1.1	79	45	98–99	243	+11	11.2
	Italy	21	442	48	0.5	58		85–90	107	+11	10.3
$100–300	Brazil	15	262	60	2.4	39	20	49	51	− 4	20.6
	Mexico	5	187	30	2.9			57	48	− 9	13.6
	Indonesia	11	127	84	1.8			15–20	7		13.2
Under $100	Nigeria	2	70	32	1.9			12	5		11.9
	Pakistan	5	56	83	1.5	20	8	14	9	− 5	11.9
D. 90+											
$900+	United States	387	2343	168	1.8	87	43	98	339	+12	9.4
$300–900	USSR	150	682			57	32	98	247	+11	7.7
$100–300	Japan	21	240	90	1.3	55	42	98	397	− 7	8.0
Under $100	India	27	72	387	1.3	26	12	19	7	−18	27.4
	China	35	56	621	2.2			45–50			17.0

* *Categories:*

GNP	gross national product (billions)
gnp	per capita gross national product
P	population (millions)
P′	population increase (av. p.a.) %
P_{na}	work force in non-agricultural occupations %
P_{u20}	share of population in towns of 20,000 or more %
lit	% literate in population 15 yrs. and above
n	daily newspaper circulation per 1000 population
cal	calory intake above or below estimated requirements %
p_d	crude death rates per 1000 population

TABLE III. A PRIMITIVE TYPOLOGY: SOME COUNTRY PROFILES TYPED BY CLASSES OF SIZE AND WEALTH

1955 GNP per cap.	*1956 Pop. (millions)*								
	Under 1	*1–10*		*10–40*		*40–100*		*100+*	
$900+		Switz.	2412-x344-43	Canada	3423-4344-44	*Fr.	3431-3344-43	US	4442-4444-44
		N.Z.	1413-xx44-44			UK	3431-4444-43		
		Aust.	2413-4444-44						
		Swed.	2411-4344-44						
		Belg.	2411-4444-43						
		Norway	1412-xx44-44						
		Finl.	1412-x244-44						
		Denm.	1411-x444-44						
$600–900		Venez.	1314-x332-14	Neth.	2322-4444-44	Ger.F.R.	3332-4444-43	USSR	43xx-3344-44
				*Czech.	xx22-xx43-x4				
				*Poland	xx23-xx43-x4				
$300–600		*Israel	0214-xx43-x4	Argen.	2222-3443-34	Italy	2231-3x43-43		
		Austria	1211-3444-x3						
$100–300		Port.	1111-xx32-x3	Yugo.	2122-x141-33	Brazil	2133-2232-11		
		*Iraq	111x-xx11-x1	Mex.	2123-xx31-13	*Indon.	2132-xx10-x3		
		*Guat.	0114-x121-x2	Turk.	2123-1121-3x	Japan	2132-3444-14		
		*Ghana	0112-xx21-x1	Spain	2121-3x42-x4				
				Phil.	1122-xx41-04				
				*Egypt	1123-2211-22				
				*Thail.	1122-1x30-x4				
				*Iran	112x-x210-x4				
under $100		*Jordan	0013-xx10-x4	Ethio.	002x-xx00-xx	*Pakistan	1032-1010-13	India	3042-111000
		*Bolivia	0012-xx21-x3	*Burma	1022-xx30-x1			*China	3043-xx3x-x2
				*Niger.	1022-xx10-x3				

Categories: Same as in Table II, coded in profiles as explained in the text, above p. 44. Note that statistics of voting participation have been omitted.

* Drastic change of regime since December 31, 1945.

x = Data not available.

Sources

GNP, gnp	Senate Document No. 52, *Foreign Aid Program:* Compilation of Studies and Surveys prepared under the direction of the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, United States Senate, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C., G.P.O., July 1957), pp. 239–240.
P, P'	United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1957,* New York, United Nations, 1957, Table 1, p. 106 ff.
P_{na}	United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation,* New York, United Nations, 1957, p. 92.
P_{u20}	*Ibid.*, p. 115.
lit	*Ibid.*, p. 79 ff., col. VI.
n	*Ibid.*, p. 86 ff., col. 2.
cal	*Ibid.*, p. 61, last col.
pd	United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1957,* Table 8, p. 186 ff.

POST-TOTALITARIAN LEADERSHIP: ELITES IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC*

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A good deal has been heard in recent years concerning the "liberation" of peoples living under totalitarian rule, but the question of who are the men who succeed to the leadership of a state after the fall of its totalitarian rulers has received relatively little attention. Such observations as have been made on the subject, whether by political opponents of a totalitarian regime or by professional social scientists, have tended to follow implicitly—if not explicitly—the theory of alternating elites. There is assumed to be, on the one hand, a more or less homogeneous totalitarian elite, and, on the other, an actual or potential counter-elite, representing the political antithesis to the totalitarian elite. The stability of the rule of the former is said to vary inversely with the degree of organization of the latter.[1] The totalitarian elite is variously identified with the holders of high positions in the totalitarian system, with the "responsible leaders," with an entire ruling class, or simply with those individuals who are said to be influential in the determination of national policy. The counter-elite is identified with the active overt and covert opponents of the totalitarian elite—resistance leaders, the "vanguard of the proletariat," prominent exiles, and "men on whose backs in concentration camps the lash has written the new gospel in blood and tears."[2] Both elite and counter-elite are thus seen as directly, actively involved in the totalitarian system, either as its leaders or as its opponents.

Revolution, in this schema, is identified with the destruction of the totalitarian elite and its replacement by the counter-elite. Or, conversely, the destruction of the totalitarian elite is an act of revolution and will result in the emergence of the counter-elite to power. It is an attractively simple thesis, and it warrants investigation.

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* This study represents part of a larger investigation into post-totalitarian leadership, particularly in Germany, which will examine the macrocosm of the elite structures as well as the role of specific leaders in a post-totalitarian setting. A comparative analysis of the present West German elites and earlier elites in Germany will appear shortly. An intensive study of a specific post-totalitarian political leader, the late Social Democratic leader Kurt Schumacher, is now in progress. A study of the incumbents of elite positions in the German Democratic Republic will follow.

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[1] Lasswell, Harold D., and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press (1950), p. 267.

[2] Karl Lowenstein, *Political Reconstruction*, New York (1946), p. 233.

I. THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION LEADERSHIP IN POST-NAZI GERMANY

When, at the end of the Second World War, the victorious allies proposed to "denazify" Germany, their professed object was to remove the Nazi Era totalitarian revolutionary elite and to permit a "democratic" counter-elite gradually to succeed to power in Germany. As distinguished from the punishment of war criminals, the object of "denazification" was declared to be

> the removal from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings of all members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities, and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.[3]

Included in this proposed purge were to be all persons who had "held office or otherwise been active at any level from local to national in the [Nazi] Party and its subordinate organizations or in organizations which further military doctrines," together with all persons who had "voluntarily given moral or material support or political assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders." All such persons were to be excluded from policy and decision-making positions in government, political parties, trade unions and other public organizations, in civic, economic and labor organizations, in important industrial, commercial and financial institutions, and in the fields of communication and education.[4]

In short, as John D. Montgomery has recently pointed out, the object of the denazification program was an "artificial revolution" in which a totalitarian elite was to be replaced by an anti-totalitarian counter-elite. It was to be an exercise in the application of the political theory of controlled revolutionary change, at least in so far as Western, and particularly American, planners were concerned.[5] Not only the occupants of clearly political positions in the fallen totalitarian elite (*i.e.*, Nazi leaders) were to be barred from the succession elite but civil and military officials, business and industrial leaders, journalists and educators, who had held non-political positions of authority in the totalitarian state, were also to be excluded.

The Soviet leaders, in their zone of occupation, interpreted and applied the "denazification" program to replace one totalitarian elite with another—some of whose most prominent members were imported from the Soviet Union. The Western leaders were less active in sponsoring a counter-elite. On the whole, they appeared to expect that the removal of the members of the totalitarian elite would result more or less automatically in the emergence of democratic leaders to take their place in "public and semi-public office and. . .positions of responsibility."

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[3] Allied Control Council Directive No. 24 (January 12, 1946), as excerpted in U. S. Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945–1946*, Publication 2783. European Series 23, Washington: G. P. O. (1947), p. 113.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[5] John D. Montgomery, *Forced to be Free*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1957), pp. 4ff, 16ff, 184 and passim. The data for Germany in this first-class study are based on an earlier study prepared under Montgomery's direction by a team of German scholars for the Operations Research Office, The John Hopkins University. See also Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany 1944–1955*, Princeton: Van Nostrand (1957), pp. 150–168.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the theoretical assumptions concerning post-totalitarian leadership implied in the denazification directives by analyzing the occupational and political background and recruitment pattern of the elites in the German Federal Republic a decade later. According to these assumptions, the "artificial revolution" may be considered to have been successful if the policy and decision-making positions subject to the denazification purge were in 1956 held mostly by former opponents of the totalitarian regime; it may be considered a failure if the incumbents of these positions in 1956 were former members of either the political or non-political totalitarian elites. To state that the answer is "self-evident" would beg the question. The data presented here may not be conclusive, but they may provoke reconsideration of certain "self-evident" assumptions underlying hypotheses currently popular in the study of political leadership.

II. THE ELITE SAMPLE

The term elite needs to be used with caution, for its usage has unfortunately caused as much confusion as enlightenment. On the one hand, it has been employed in what might be termed the ascriptive-qualitative sense to identify groups who are said to be entitled to rule by virtue of racial, moral, intellectual or some other type of superiority. On the other hand, it has also been used in what might be called the descriptive-functional sense to identify the most powerful and influential groups in a community. The latter rather than the former definition seems implicit in the denazification directives of 1945–1946. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, the various elites in the contemporary pluralistic society of the German Federal Republic are said to consist of the present incumbents of "public and semi-public" national offices and "positions of responsibility in important private undertakings." It is assumed, as it was in the denazification directives, that these formal positions of leadership endow the incumbents not only with actual decision-making authority within the politically important groups which they head, but with influence far out of proportion to their number in the making of policy and decisions in the various branches of the German Federal Government.

The analysis that follows is based on an inventory of the incumbents of key positions in the formal structure of the German Federal Republic and not on a random sample of members of an assumed power elite. This has the advantage of establishing clearly who is included and why. It has the disadvantage of equating formal position with actual influence and power. The purpose of the investigation, the nature of the available data, and the apparent shortcomings of random samples in studies of this type seem to justify the use of such a selection. Like Gabriel Almond, in his *The American People and Foreign Policy,* I distinguish four categories of elites in a pluralistic, democratic society: political, administrative, interest, and communications. However, I have varied slightly from Almond's subcategories—designed for an analysis of American foreign policy-making—by including the clergy in the interest elite, rather than in the communications elite. This appears warranted in view of the rather different role which the leaders of the major churches have played and continue to play in Germany.

As indicated in Table I, the sample consists of 529 individuals listed in four standard reference works as incumbents of leading public and semi-public positions in the German Federal Republic during the last quarter of 1956. The sample includes all the individuals listed who had volunteered at least some information for standard biographical works of the *Who's Who* type—84 per cent of the total number of incumbents listed.[6] These individuals occupied leading positions in the four basic elites, and in fourteen sub-elites, as follows:

1. *Political Elite* (35 per cent of sample):
   Federal Cabinet, Federal legislative leadership, the nine State Cabinets (the Saar not yet listed as a constituent state), the national leadership of the ruling Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian branch, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), (as represented by its Chairman, vice chairmen and its leading representatives in the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government), and the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, the chief opposition party.
2. *Administrative Elite* (31 per cent of sample):
   The Senior Civil Service of the Federal Government (defined as Division Chief, State Secretaries, and leading officers of the Federal Bank), the Senior Foreign Service (chiefs of missions abroad), and the leadership of the Armed Forces.
3. *Interest Group Elite* (20 per cent of sample):
   Principal officers of the leading national employers' associations, principal officers of the three major trade unions, the Fulda Bishops Conference of the Roman Catholic Church (which includes all bishops and archbishops), and the leaders of the German Evangelical Church.
4. *Communications Elite* (15 per cent of sample):
   The press and radio elite, including the editors or publishers of leading dailies, of weeklies and politico-cultural periodicals, the directors of the various radio and television networks, and the educational elite, which in Germany consists of the *Rektors* of the institutions of higher learning.

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[6] The following biographical reference works were used: General: Habel, Walter (ed.), *Wer ist Wer?* (Berlin: Arani, 1955); Kliemann, Horst G. and Stephen S. Taylor (eds.), *Who's Who in Germany* (Munich: International Book and Publishing Company, 1956); *International Who's Who* (London: Europa Publications, 1956); British Ministry for Economic Warfare, *Who's Who in Germany and Austria* (London, 1945); *World Biography* (Institute for Research in Biography, 1954). For the political elite in particular: Political Activities Branch, Civil Administration Division, Military Government for Germany (U. S.), *Political Parties in Western Germany* (1949); Bundestagsverwaltung, *Amtliches Handbuch des deutschen Bundestages 2, Wahlperiode 1953* (Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1954); Sänger, Fritz (ed.), *Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages* (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1954); Trossmann, Hans, *Der Zweite Deutsche Bundestag* (Bonn: Verlag Bonner Universitäts-Buchdruckerei Gebr. Scheur, 1954). For military leaders: Podzun, Hans-Henning (ed.), *Das Wehrarchiv; Handbuch des Wehrwesens der Gegenwart* (Bad Nauheim: Podzun, 1956–1957). For business leaders in particular: Spezial Archiv der Deutschen Wirtschaft, *Leitende Männer der Wirtschaft 1955* (Berlin-Darmstadt-Essen: Hoppenstedt: 1955). For educational leaders: de Montessus de Ballore, R. (ed.), *Index Generalis* (Paris: Dunod, annual); Oestreich, Gerhard (ed.), *Kürschners Deutscher Gelehrten Kalender 1954* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1954).

TABLE I. INVENTORY OF ELITES

Elite	Incumbents listed*	Incumbents analyzed	Percent analyzed	Percent of sample
Political Elite				
Federal Cabinet	*17*	*17*	100	3
Federal Legisl. Leadership	*44*	*44*	100	8
Officers of Bundestag		5		
Chairmen of all Committees		39		
State Cabinets	*85*	*74*	88	14
Baden-Wurttemberg	12	12		
Bavaria	8	8		
Bremen	12	11		
Hamburg	13	13		
Hessen	6	4		
Lower Saxony	10	5		
North Rhine-Westphalia	10	7		
Rhineland-Palatinate	6	6		
Schleswig-Holstein	8	8		
CDU-CSU Leadership	*23*	*23*	100	4
Party Chairman and Chancellor		1		
Federal Ministers		10		
Federal Legisl. Leaders of CDU/CSU Fraktion in *Bundestag*		8		
Vice Chairmen of CDU		4		
SPD Executive Committee	*30*	*29*	97	6
Total Political Elite	198	187	95	35
Administrative Elite				
Senior Civil Service	*107*	*66*	62	13
State Secretaries		15		
Division Chiefs		48		
Directors, Bank deutscher Länder		3		
Senior Foreign Service	*58*	*42*	73	8
Military Leaders (as listed in Wehrarchiv).	*54*	*54*	100	10
Admiral and General rank		15		
Colonels		27		
Lt. Cols. and Majors		12		
Total Administrative Elite	219	162	74	31
Interest Group Elite				
Big Business Elite	*50*	*47*	94	9
Pres., Diet of Ger. Chamber of Industry and Commerce (D.I.H.T.)	1	1		
Pres., Federation of Ger. Employers' Assoc.	1	1		
Chairmen, Constituent Assoc., Fed. of Ger. Indus. (one vacancy)	37	34		

* Incumbents of elite positions as listed in the following standard reference works: *Taschenbuch des Oeffentlichen Lebens 1957;* Podzun, *Das Wehrarchiv 1956–57; Die Deutsche Presse,* 1956; Stamm, Willi, *Der Leitfaden für Presse und Werbung 1956.* Italicized numbers are category subtotals.

TABLE I (*continued*)

Elite	Incumbents listed*	Incumbents analyzed	Percent analyzed	Percent of sample
Chairmen or Pres. of other major employers' groups†	11	11		
Trade Union Leadership	*22*	*16*	73	3
Fed. of German Trade Unions (DGB), Chairman, Vice Chairman	2	2		
Chairmen of component Feds.	16	10		
Association of German Employees (DAG), Chairman, 2 vice chairmen	3	3		
Association of German Civ. Serv. (DBB), Chairman	1	1		
Religious Leaders				
Roman Catholic Hierarchy	*20*	*19*	95	4
Archbishops	6	6		
Bishops	13	12		
Chief, Bonn Liaison Office	1	1		
Evangelical Church Leaders	*23*	*19*	83	4
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD)	4	3		
Verein. Evangelische-Luth. Kirche Deutschl. (VELKD)	7	7		
Indep. Lutheran Churches	3	3		
Evang. Kirche d. Union	3	2		
"Unierte Kirchen"	5	4		
Bund, Ev-Reform. Kirchen	1	1		
Total Interest Group Elite	115	101	87	20
Communications Elite				
Press and Radio Elite	*57*	*41*	72	8
Editors or Publ. of dailies, 1955 circ. 100,000 and over	34	25		
Editors or Publ. of weeklies with 1955 circ. of 48,000 or more	6	4		
Editors or publ. of leading politico-cultural periodicals	8	5		
Directors of West German Broadcasting and Television Networks	9	7		
Educational Elite				
Rektors of all Universities and "Hochschulen"	*39*	*38*	98	7
Total Communications Elite	96	79	82	15
Total All Elites	628	529	84	100

† Gesamtverband d. dt. Gross- und Aussenhandels; Zentralausschuss d. dt. Binnenschiffahrt; Zentralverein d. dt. Handelsvertreter; Bundesverband d. privaten Bankgewerbes; Gesamtverband d. dt. Versicherungswirtschaft; Verein. Industrie und Kraftwirtschaft; Hauptgemeinschaft d. dt. Einzelhandels; Verband dt. Reeder; Zentralausschuss d. Werbewirtschaft; Deutsche Lufthansa.

III. THE POST-WAR RECRUITMENT PATTERN FOR ELITE MEMBERS

The emergence of the post-Nazi German elites in Western Germany may be thought of as following several more or less distinct phases. The first of these was the denazification phase and extended roughly from 1946 through 1948. It was characterized by Western allied efforts—applied with varying vigor—to purge the country of the Nazi elite and to encourage—but not push—the emergence of a democratic counter-elite. The second lasted roughly from 1949 through 1952 and coincided with the establishment of the Federal Republic and the first years of its consolidation. The third phase began with the election of the second *Bundestag* and the formation of the second Adenauer cabinet in 1953 and extended through 1956. It witnessed the emergence of Germany as a major world power, the achievement of full sovereignty and the inclusion of the Federal Republic in NATO. As shown in Table II, most of the occupants of 1956 elite positions did not enter these until the second or third phases.

In 1946 the denazification screening of the Western military government barred from public and semi-public policy-making offices all but (1) proven anti-Nazis and (2) Germans who could show beyond doubt that they had no more than nominally been involved in, or supported, the totalitarian state and its leaders. The former were more or less encouraged to assume public office, the leadership of slowly emerging political parties, and the new press. The latter were not so much to be encouraged to assume elite positions as to be "reeducated." Members of the 1956 elites who were either in the same occupations in 1946 or occupied other offices subject to the application of the allied denazification directives, consequently, either had a clear anti-Nazi record, and were in that sense members of a counter-elite, or could readily prove that they had been either non-Nazis or merely "nominal" supporters of the totalitarian regime. So some elite careers were temporarily interrupted by the collapse of the Nazi regime, but others were launched or resumed after the long interruption of fourteen years of totalitarian rule. For instance, all of the senior diplomats and military leaders of 1956 and a majority of the senior civil servants were displaced temporarily, while most members of the political elite and many of the press and radio leadership resumed or started careers which were to lead to elite positions.

Almost three-fourths of the 1956 S.P.D. leadership—the group with the strongest claim to be a counter-elite—listed politics as their principal occupation for 1946. Most of these Social Democrats were former Nazi prisoners, exiles, and pre-Nazi party functionaries forced into political inactivity by the totalitarian regime. Better than half of the members of the Christian Democratic leadership, the Federal Cabinet, and the legislative leadership also entered or reentered political careers in 1946 and clearly were found acceptable as democratic succession leaders by the Western military governments. Most of those who were not already in politics either held non-political positions in local governments (11 per cent) or academic and professional jobs (11 per cent). About one-third of the Cabinet ministers and the CDU leaders and over one-half of the S.P.D. leaders of 1956 were prominent politically as early as 1946.

On the other hand, many members of the administrative elite had their occupational careers interrupted during the interregnum between 1945 and 1949. Even so, almost one-half (45 per cent) of the senior civil servants were evidently acceptable to allied authorities for administrative positions in local governments. Such positions provided a haven for many temporarily displaced members of the national administrative service; 12 of the senior diplomats (29 per cent) were similarly employed. Four of the later senior civil servants and five of the diplomats were in politics; several others held various academic and professional jobs. However, a large number in both groups did not list any occupation for the immediate post-totalitarian period. As for the military leaders, 27, just half, were prisoners of war, five were employed by the allied occupation forces, and ten (21 per cent) were employed in business and industry.

The greatest evidence of occupational continuity between the totalitarian and post-totalitarian period, as might be expected, is to be found among the religious elites. Protestant ministers who had been imprisoned by the Nazi regime—almost all adherents of the so-called *Bekenntniskirche*—rapidly rose to prominence, apparently on the strength of their resistance record. Some 37 per cent of the Roman Catholic bishops were already members of the hierarchy at the end of the war. Two-thirds of the business and industrial leaders failed to provide information about their occupational activities in 1946; the rest were in the same occupations as before and after the denazification period.

1948 was the last year of a denazification program under Western allied supervision. Presumably, anyone holding a public or semi-public office in Western Germany at that time had been found innocent of any major involvement in the totalitarian system, as defined in the Allied Directive of 1946. Though it was frequently charged that some of the major Nazis had escaped denazification, certainly no major Nazi figure held an important public or private position in Western Germany.

Individuals who were engaged in politics, trade union activities, or the communications field in 1948 had not only passed the denazification muster, but were the beneficiaries of Allied endeavors to encourage the development of a democratic order in Germany. Most members of the 1956 political elites were in politics in 1948, as were most of the trade union and communications leaders of 1956. Ninety per cent of the Social Democratic executive committee of 1956 were working full-time for their party (41 per cent already in the party leadership), as were 83 per cent of the CDU/CSU leadership of 1956 and 82 per cent of the legislative leadership of the 1956 Bundestag.

At least 34 per cent of the business and industrial leaders of 1956 were in the same occupation in 1948, as were probably many among the 62 per cent in this group who failed to indicate their occupation for the period. While there was as yet no federal or national government, 36 (54 per cent) of the senior civil servants of 1956 held non-political positions in local, state or regional (zonal, bizonal, tri-zonal) governments. Five of the senior civil servants were active in politics (right-wing or center parties) and another five were university in-

TABLE II. OCCUPATIONAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF 1956 ELITES

(Comparative Data in Percentages*)

Elites	Political					Administrative			Interest Group				Communications		Total
	Fed. Cab.	Fed. Leg.	State Cab.	CDU/CSU Leaders	SPD Leaders	Senior CivServ	Senior ForServ	Milit. Leaders	BigBus Leaders	T.U. Leaders	RCC Leaders	Evang. Leaders	Press/ Radio	Educ. Leaders	
N	17	44	74	23	29	66	42	54	47	16	19	19	41	38	529
Mean Age	57	57	55	57	53	56	57	50	59	57	61	60	56	56	56
Year of Entry into Elite Position															
Pre-Nazi Era	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	2	0	1
Nazi Era (1933–44)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	5	0	2	1
Denazif. Era (1945–48)	0	2	12	9	41	4	0	0	4	6	11	47	61	8	13
Est. Fed. Rep. (1949–52)	35	75	20	52	21	51	64	26	6	50	42	16	17	21	35
Consolid. of Fed. Rep. (1953–56)	65	18	50	30	38	18	36	72	13	19	11	16	7	50	33
Not Indicated	0	4	18	9	0	27	0	2	77	25	0	16	12	18	17
Total	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	99	99	100
Occupational Careers (1933–52)															
Same 1952	94	93	64	96	97	76	67	26	64	88	100	100	81	74	80
Same 1948	76	82	39	83	90	54	0	0	34	75	100	100	73	68	63
Same 1946	59	57	32	57	72	45	0	0	33	63	100	100	56	63	53
Same 1940–44	0	2	1	0	17	53	55	100	37	0	95	84	29	42	38
Same 1933–40	0	7	1	0	35	60	71	100	41	0	95	100	34	58	44
Same Pre-1933	30	18	15	27	38	48	62	62	36	50	84	74	56	40	43
Pre-Nazi Era Occupations															
Same Occup.	30	18	15	27	38	48	62	69	36	50	84	74	56	40	43
Diff. Occup.	30	52	40	36	35	20	19	7	6	38	0	0	14	21	23
Student	41	30	22	36	24	23	17	24	9	6	11	26	24	26	23
Not Indicated	0	0	22	0	3	9	2	0	49	6	5	0	6	13	11
Total	101	100	99	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Nazi Era Occupation (1933–40)															
Same Occup.	0	7	1	0	35	60	71	100	41	0	95	100	34	58	44
Diff. Occup.	82	70	60	83	40	20	26	0	2	57	0	0	27	13	31
Students	6	7	4	9	3	5	0	0	2	6	5	0	5	2	4
No gainful employment (incl. forced retirement and imprisonment)	0	2	3	4	3	2	2	0	0	12	0	0	7	0	2
Not Indicated	12	13	32	4	17	14	0	0	55	25	0	0	27	27	17
Total	100	99	100	99	98	101	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	98
War-Time Occupation (1940–44)															
Same Occup.	0	2	1	0	17	53	55	100	37	0	95	84	29	42	38
Diff. Occup.	64	55	46	64	48	23	31	0	2	50	0	0	24	21	28
Military Service	24	20	16	23	17	9	2	0	2	19	0	5	12	0	10
No gainful employment (incl. forced retirement and imprisonment)	0	4	4	4	4	3	2	0	0	0	0	10	12	0	3
Not Indicated	12	18	32	9	14	12	10	0	60	31	5	0	22	37	21
Total	100	99	99	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	99	99	100	100
Active Opposition Claimed, 1933–44															
Major Opposition (Membership in anti-Nazi org., overt acts)	12	18	8	22	62	1	7	2	2	18	0	16	24	0	11
Minor Opposition	6	7	9	18	8	10	14	4	0	13	5	21	17	0	8
No Opp. Indicated	82	75	83	60	30	87	79	94	98	69	95	63	59	0	80
Total	100	100	100	100	100	98	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	99
Record of Political Persecution, 1933–44															
Major (Extended imprisonment and/or exile)	12	18	6	18	58	0	9	0	2	18	0	21	27	0	11
Minor (Brief arrests, professional, etc.)	24	11	9	27	10	12	9	6	2	13	5	26	16	0	12
No persecution indicated	64	71	84	55	31	87	81	94	96	69	95	53	56	0	76
Total	100	100	99	100	99	99	99	100	100	100	100	100	99	0	99

* Figures rounded off to nearest percentage point.

structors. Five more were in various other occupations, one was a prisoner of war, while 14 (23 per cent) failed to show their occupational activities for 1948.

Career members of two of the 1956 sub-elites were still entirely displaced in 1948: there was as yet neither a new German foreign office nor a new military establishment. Twelve (29 per cent) of the senior foreign service officers of 1956 were employed by local, state, or regional governments and seven (17 per cent) were in politics—six of them in leading positions—in center or right-wing parties. Twelve others (28 per cent) were active in various other fields, such as teaching and business; eleven (26 per cent) failed to indicate in 1956 what they were doing. Most of the military leaders had been released by 1948. By far the largest number—25 individuals (46 per cent)—were engaged in business or industry, though not in policy-making positions. Six were still prisoners of war, three worked for Western allied military auxiliary organizations, four were university students, and three worked in various government offices. Only five were silent in 1956 about their 1948 activities. However, in contrast to a comparable post-war period—the year 1921—not one of the military leaders was at least overtly in politics. Of all the 1956 elites, the military leaders were furthest removed from their elite occupations in 1948, with the senior foreign service in second place.

By 1952, eighty per cent or more of the occupants of 1956 elite positions were employed in their 1956 occupations. Many had already achieved elite positions. In this, the fourth year of the Federal Republic, almost all of the political leaders of 1956 were in politics—with the possible exception of a considerable minority among the members of the state cabinets for whom no information was available—most of them as legislators in the *Bundestag* or various state diets. At least 76 per cent of the senior civil servants were employed in the federal administration, and better than half in elite positions. This massive return of the national civil service was also in evidence among the more specialized foreign service group. Twenty-eight (67 per cent) of the 42 senior diplomats of 1956 had already achieved elite positions in the but recently reestablished foreign service, three more were employed in the senior civil service, and six were in politics as legislative representatives of center or right-wing parties. The so-called "Office Blank" was just beginning to gather the senior cadres for a new military elite and, therefore, most of the military leaders of 1956 were still displaced in 1952. Only 14 (26 per cent) out of 54 were employed by the future defense ministry; but four more were working for Western military organizations and five held other government positions. Fifteen out of 34 military leaders indicating a different occupation in 1952 were employed in business and industry, while four were attending university.

The recruitment of the new German elites from 1946 to 1956 thus followed three distinct patterns. One exhibited continuity between totalitarian and post-totalitarian occupation—and even elite status—as in the case of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and, to a lesser extent, the Protestant bishops and educational leaders. Another was typical for the political elite and trade union leadership of 1956. Here, some who had been displaced by Hitler in 1933 resumed their earlier political careers. More, however, initiated new careers made possible only by the fall of the totalitarian system. Lastly, there was the pattern typical for the bureaucracy—particularly the foreign service and military officers—and probably for a number of the big business and industrial elite as well. For them, the common experience was temporary occupational displacement, the result of denazification, demilitarization, and, in general, the disappearance of a German state and national institutions. With the restoration of these institutions, the new elite positions in the Federal civil service, foreign service, military establishment, and in the business community were largely filled by men who had followed the same or very similar occupations in the totalitarian state.

IV. OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF ELITE MEMBERS

All the incumbents of elite positions in the Federal Republic in 1956 had experienced the totalitarian regime as adults and most were already mature men when Hitler came to power in 1933. Their average age was 56 years, somewhat higher than that for the incumbents of the same or similar elite positions in the Hohenzollern Empire, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich.[7] Almost half, possibly more, had already entered their 1956 occupations in the pre-totalitarian era prior to 1933.[8] This was particularly true for the members of the administrative elite, the clerical elite, the trade union leadership, and the press-radio sub-elite. However, few of the political leaders claimed politics as their principal occupation before 1933 and less than ten per cent had been prominent political leaders in the Weimar Republic. This seems to contradict the common assumption that the political leadership of the Federal Republic represents a restoration of the Weimar politicians.

About the same proportion of 1956 elite members followed their elite occupations during the first seven, peace-time, years of totalitarian rule as before 1933. However, the distribution of individuals in the same occupations before and after 1933 was entirely different. With the outstanding exception of slightly over one-third of the Social Democratic leaders—all of them exiles abroad at the time—none of the political leaders of 1956 were in politics in those years.[9]

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[7] Some of these averages may be slightly misleading because of the unusually wide age-spread between the youngest and the oldest members of an elite group—as in the case of the Federal Cabinet. A detailed comparison between incumbents of the same elite positions in 1906, 1926, 1936 and 1956 is being prepared by this writer.

[8] For this period, as for most other years, we lack adequate information for one important group—the business and industrial leaders of 1956. Almost half the 47 men analyzed failed to indicate any pre-Nazi occupations; in view of their average age it may be assumed that many of these individuals were already engaged in business and industry. Of the 17 (36 per cent) business and industrial leaders of 1956 who indicated the same occupation before 1933, 15 had even then held prominent positions.

[9] The three legislative leaders and the one member of the 1956 state cabinets who indicated politics as their chief occupation for the period were also members of the S.P.D. executive committee and thus were counted twice. Of fifteen—out of seventeen—members of the Federal Cabinet listing their occupations in the years 1933–1940, none was in

On the other hand, most of the religious, educational, administrative and business leaders of 1956 followed their elite occupation after 1933.[10]

For the war years 1940–1944 the number listing their elite occupation, as well as the number indicating a different occupation, was somewhat smaller than in the preceding period. The difference is largely accounted for by those who claimed military service for the period, as well as others who may have served but failed to include such military service in their biographies.[11] Academic and other professional occupations appear more distinctly as the recruitment base for the future political elite, as they have traditionally been for German parliamentarians and other politically accountable government leaders.[12] University positions, private law practice, social welfare work for the Churches, and free-lance research and writing appear to have harbored what was later to be called "The Inner Emigration", Germans who were anti-Nazi in attitude, but not in overt behavior.[13] Among the future interest group and ad-

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politics, four were teachers, six were employed in business and industry, two worked for the Nazi government, one was in private law practice, and one a student. The occupational activities of the Christian Democratic leadership of 1956—many of whose members were in the Federal Cabinet—were very similar. Two worked for the government, three practiced law, and nine were in business and industry. Among the 35 legislative leaders who listed a different occupation for this period, eight worked for the Nazi government, six practiced private law, and 13 were engaged in business and industry. Nine of the 48 members of the state cabinets of 1956 listed their occupation 1933–1940 as government employees, six practiced law, and 21 were employed in business and industry. The rest were in various occupations, such as farming (3) and teaching (2). Almost one-third of the trade union leaders of 1956 were employed in business and industry—mostly as clerks or craftsmen—while one-quarter did not list any occupation. Apart from the 10 members of the S.P.D. leadership who were in anti-Nazi politics abroad, one was in a Nazi prison, one a student and 12 followed various other occupations; *e.g.*, four practiced law.

[10] More than 74 per cent of the senior civil servants were members of the totalitarian bureaucracy, if we include the additional 14 per cent who failed to indicate their occupation. The business and industrial leaders were even less informative about their occupational activities in this period than before 1933. Of the 19 (41 per cent) who listed themselves in the same occupation, 17 held leading positions. The extraordinarily large proportion who failed to indicate their occupation, yet did not claim to have been occupationally displaced by Nazi persecution, (55 per cent) suggests that in fact far more, possibly as many as 96 per cent, were in the same occupation as in 1956. Among the educational leaders, the proportion of the same occupation was probably also larger than indicated, for none claimed to have been persecuted. However, among the press-radio leaders of 1956 probably only a minority did indeed follow the same occupation; quite a few were victims and opponents of the totalitarian regime.

[11] However, a decrease of 18 per cent among the Social Democratic leaders listing politics as their occupation was not entirely due to the 17 per cent in this group who served in the German armed forces. A good many of the exiles were interned abroad as "enemy aliens" or otherwise forced to interrupt their political work with the outbreak of the war. See Lewis J. Edinger, *German Exile Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), pp. 225–236.

[12] See Günther Franz, "Der Parlamentarismus," in *Führungsschicht und Eliteproblem* (Frankfurt, Berlin, Bonn: Moritz Diesterweg, 1957), pp. 88–96.

[13] Thus, of the 21 of 23 CDU/CSU leaders listing their occupation for the war years, three were in private law practice, three were working for religious organizations, and two

ministrative elite incumbents, career patterns for the war-time period of totalitarian rule were about the same as in the pre-war period. A decline in the proportion of diplomats in the same occupation seems largely accounted for by one man in military service, six who went into industry, and four not indicating their occupations. As for the earlier period, members of the 1956 big business leadership were mostly silent regarding their occupational activities during the war years. Eighteen indicated that they held prominent positions in the economic life of war-time Nazi Germany. But there seems little doubt that most, if not all, of the 27 who kept silent were active in their elite occupations. As many as 97 per cent of the future big business leaders may well have already been following their elite occupations.

Clearly, most of the members of the 1956 elites of the German Federal Republic had followed their elite occupation in the Nazi era and had thoroughly acquired the skills required for their future elite positions. However, according to the denazification plans of 1945–46, far more important than skill was to be the political record of a man in qualifying him for a position in the post-totalitarian leadership of his country.

V. DENAZIFICATION REASSESSED: THE IMAGE AND THE REALITY

The Allied denazification plans at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, and the Control Council directives spelling out these plans in detail, proposed to impose a revolution on Germany. In particular, it was proposed to effect a genuine "revolutionary" change in the composition of the elite in contrast to what was generally believed to have been a counterfeit German revolution after the First World War, in the sense of no sufficient transformation in the composition of the elite. This time it was proposed to make drastic changes.

The new elites were to be recruited primarily from members of the anti-Nazi counter-elite. It was recognized that minor Nazis and Nazi collaborators, as well as others who had been ambivalent or neutral toward the totalitarian regime would have to be employed in certain elite positions requiring special skills. However, as far as possible, they were to be excluded from policy-making positions in the new Germany.

How did the reality of 1956 compare with the image of 1946? There were no major Nazi leaders in an elite position in 1956. Most of them were dead, imprisoned, or living in obscurity.[14] About 7 per cent of the 1956 elites had held positions in the Nazi era non-political elite. That is, they had occupied posi-

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others were engaged in research and writing. Of the 25 future members of the 1956 Social Democratic leadership three practiced law, two worked for religious organizations, two were journalists, and two others were otherwise engaged in professional-academic type work. Of 15 future members of the Federal Cabinet, five were in various academic and professional occupations; among the 36 future legislative leaders listing their occupation, ten held various academic or professional jobs.

[14] Only seven of the former Gauleiters were known to be alive in 1955; all of them were living in obscurity and in no sense could be considered members of the contemporary German elites. See John D. Montgomery, unpublished manuscript on Denazification, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chapter II, p. 61.

tions of authority in its administration, armed forces, business organizations and communications media which, according to the denazification directives, implied major involvement in the operation of the totalitarian state. Fifteen members of the 1956 military elite had been senior officers of admiral or general rank. At least 12 of the senior civil servants and three of the senior diplomats of 1956 had held similar positions in the administrative elite of the Nazi era and three of the business leaders and one or more of the press-radio leaders of 1956 were also incumbents of elite positions in their respective occupations in the totalitarian era.[15]

No more than about 11 per cent of the members of the 1956 elites could be classified as having belonged to an anti-Nazi counter-elite, in the sense of the denazification directives. They were concentrated mostly in the groups with the least influence over national policy-making, such as the Social Democratic, the Protestant and the trade union leadership.[16] At least half of them Social Democrats, these individuals had been major opponents of the totalitarian regime as members of resistance groups in Germany and abroad; many of them had spent long periods in Nazi prisons and concentration camps or as exiles in foreign lands. Another 8 per cent, while they may also be considered former opponents of the regime, laid no claim to active and sustained participation in the anti-Nazi resistance movement, nor to the more serious forms of political persecution. At best, their involvement with the active opposition and its members was peripheral and not sustained. Many of them had been placed in opposition by the actions of the Nazi regime, rather than by their own acts, and had been victims of relatively mild forms of persecution, such as brief arrests, loss of jobs, police harassment, loss of pensions, denial of promotions, and punitive transfers. (See Figure 1 and Table III.)[17]

Most members of the 1956 elites were recruited from the ranks of those Germans who had belonged neither to the Nazi elite nor to the counter-elite, who had neither been strong opponents nor strong supporters of the totalitarian regime, neither strongly involved in running that regime nor in fighting it. Perhaps one-quarter had been supporters, but only in relatively minor capacities. Former Nazi party members and minor Nazi leaders—like three of the Federal Ministers—and loyal members of the higher civil and foreign service, these men, in the words of the denazification directive, may be said to have "voluntarily given moral and material support or political assistance to the

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[15] See biographical sources cited under Note 6.

[16] On the relative influence of different elites in the making of contemporary German foreign policy, see Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers: A Study of Mass Opinion, Interest Groups and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

[17] While the S.P.D. leaders could claim to include among them by far the largest proportion of major anti-Nazis, it should be noted that this was in a large part due to the fact that 10 out of 29 members of the executive committee had been exiles. Nonetheless (as shown in Table III) with the exception of the press and radio elite—which included many Social Democrats—more members of the S.P.D. leadership suffered imprisonment than any other group.



FIG. 1. Overt opposition and political persecution scale

TABLE III. SPECIFIC POLITICAL PERSECUTION, 1933–44

(In absolute numbers)

Elites	Political					Administrative			Interest Group				Communications		Total
	Fed. Cab.	Fed. Leg.	State Cab.	CDU/CSU Leaders	SPD Leaders	Senior Civ. Serv.	Senior For. Serv.	Milit. Leaders	Big Bus. Leaders	T.U. Leaders	RCC Leaders	Evang. Leaders	Press/ Radio	Educ. Leaders	
N	17	44	74	23	29	66	42	54	47	16	19	19	41	38	529
Minor Harassment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3
Occupational Discrimination	2	5	4	2	0	7	3	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	28
Arrest	2	1	3	4	4	2	1	2	1	2	0	2	4	0	28
Total Minor	4	6	7	6	4	9	4	3	1	2	1	5	7	0	59
Major Imprisonment	2	3	4	4	7	0	1	0	1	2	0	4	8	0	36
Exile	0	3	1	0	9	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	
Exile and Prison	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Exile and Arrest	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Total Major	2	7	5	4	17	0	4	0	1	3	0	4	11	0	58
Total Persecution	6	13	12	10	21	9	8	3	2	5	1	9	18	0	117

Nazi regime." However, unlike the former members of the non-political elite of the Nazi system, they were involved in the direction of that system in only a minor way. Not quite a tenth, as indicated above, had been minor anti-Nazis, in the same sense that members of the former group had been minor Nazis and collaborators. About half the incumbents of 1956 elite positions belonged to that large group of civil servants, professional men, military officers, educators, technicians, and clergy whose contemporary attitude toward the totalitarian regime could be called ambivalent and even neutral, in so far as that was possible. For some this meant an oscillating position between latent support and latent opposition, for others a conscious aloofness or studied indifference toward the regime, for still others a retreat into an "Inner Emigration."[18]

In short, we find that only about 18 per cent of the contemporary German elite members were in any major way involved in the totalitarian regime, most of them as its opponents and victims. The other 82 per cent were involved in only a minor way or not at all, in so far as the totalitarian system permitted this. Or, looking at the elite members in terms of their known or conjectured attitudes toward the totalitarian regime (for example, loyal Nazi party members and military officers), we find that about 24 per cent may be considered to have been supporters of the regime, 57 per cent to have been ambivalent, neutral, or oscillating during the 12 years of Nazi rule, and no more than 19 per cent to have been more or less consistently opposed. Either way, the bulk of the post-totalitarian elite membership was recruited from the ranks of the Germans who, while old enough to care, were ambivalent or neutral toward the regime and were neither among its leaders nor among its major opponents. Most members of the 1956 elites belonged to that large number of Germans who had wavered in their attitude and behavior toward the totalitarian system in accordance with its fortunes and their own. They were neither rabid Nazis in the pre-war days when most Germans applauded Hitler's foreign policy successes, nor major anti-Nazis when the tide turned against Nazi Germany.

Obviously the image of 1946 and the reality of 1956 vary considerably. No anti-Nazi counter-elite is ruling today in the Federal Republic. However, neither can it be maintained that the Nazi elite has returned. Nor can we entirely agree with John Montgomery that what took place between 1946 and 1956 was a restoration of the pre-totalitarian elites, which "resembled more a delayed counterrevolution to nazism than either a natural or a permanent revolution pointing in new directions."[19] Our data do not bear out the theory implied in the denazification thesis and still current in much of the literature on post-totalitarian leadership. In the German Federal Republic the totalitarian elite was not succeeded by a counter-elite, but rather by a coalition of elites whose members were drawn largely from the ranks of those individuals who had been neither strong and consistent proponents nor opponents of the totalitarian regime.

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[18] An attempt has been made by German writers to make a case for a large "Inner Emigration" of Germans opposed in attitude, though not in behavior, to the Nazi regime. As we can not determine empirically an individual's contemporary attitude toward the regime, but only his occupational status and record of overt opposition, we can only conjecture on the basis of such behavioral evidence what his attitude may have been. Unless an individual evidently was permitted to serve the Nazi regime in an office subject to close scrutiny with regard to his loyalty, we have not classed him as a supporter of the regime. Unless there was some evidence of opposition, we have not counted him as an opponent.

[19] Montgomery, *Forced to be Free*, p. 188.

Criticism of the denazification program of 1945–46 is not new. Many German critics have labeled it both morally and legally unjust. They claim that it deprived individuals innocent of any crimes of their jobs, income, and property without due process of law. Other critics have approved the principles of the program, but charge that it was improperly executed, or even sabotaged. While little fish were punished, the big fish escaped, it is said, and many a Nazi era "big shot" was permitted to retain his ill-gotten gains.

A third group also approves the program and its elitist assumptions in principle, but argues that it failed because it was at the same time too ambitious and not thorough enough. Thus, according to Montgomery, a "realistic . . . purge should be limited in dimensions and time," for "only a small number of leaders can be successfully purged and punished in the limited time available in a military occupation."[20] On the other hand, Montgomery claims, the denazification purge was not sufficiently thorough in the removal of military and civilian officials of the Nazi era, as distinguished from the political leaders. Thus, for example, "the political purge had little effect against technical and economic elites," because the political potential of the bureaucracy was not adequately recognized.[21]

A rather different reason for criticizing the denazification program is suggested by our data: the fallacious assumption that the purge of an elite, arbitrarily defined in terms of positions in the totalitarian regime, would result more or less automatically in the emergence of a counter-elite to fill the places vacated. At least in the case of Western Germany, this thesis of the counter-elite proved to be a myth.

VI. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The concept elite, as used in this article and implied in the denazification directives, designates "the holders of high positions in a given society."[22] The drafters of the allied denazification directives assumed that Nazi Germany had been ruled by a coalition of elites. The political elite, the Nazi party leaders, had been dominant, but by no means in exclusive control of the state. The leaders of large industrial enterprises, the principal administrative officials, diplomats, and military men were believed to have participated, directly or indirectly, in the decisions of the totalitarian state to a far greater extent than in the Soviet Union, though far less than in the pluralistic political communities of the Western democratic states. The professed object of denazification was to banish all such from positions of influence.

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[20] *Op. cit.* note 14, ch. 1, p. 80.

[21] *Forced to be Free*, p. 186.

[22] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Elite Concept," in Lasswell and others, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 6.

Theoretically, an extensive purge, such as was proposed for Germany, could be sought by several methods, singly or in combination.

The most drastic method was the physical extermination of the native elites, such as the Italian Fascist Government reportedly pursued in Ethiopia. However, none of the occupation powers in Germany sought the systematic annihilation of the Nazis *per se*, though war crime trials in the Western zones, executions, and deportations in the Soviet zone of occupation tended to give this impression. On the whole, members of the former totalitarian elites escaped physical destruction.

Secondly, a radical transformation of the socio-economic base of German society might in principle have deprived elite members of the positions which gave them their status. The so-called "Morgenthau Plan" proposed drastic economic changes which might have had that result. Allied proposals to break up the "Junker" estates and the large industrial and banking combines and cartels, and to decentralize and "demilitarize" Germany also were aimed at destroying key elite positions. German anti-Nazis, proposing to correct the so-called "omissions" of the Revolution of 1918–19, suggested that land reform and the socialization of key industries would accomplish these objectives. All these schemes involved further extensive socio-economic dislocations in a country already thoroughly disorganized in the wake of the collapse of its totalitarian order. The Western occupation powers rejected the price of such drastic changes when they resolved that economic recovery had to take precedence over "political reconstruction." The Soviet Union ostensibly was prepared to make the Germans shoulder the cost for a radical transformation of their social structure. In fact, the measures taken proved to be steps aimed not so much at transforming the socio-economic structure as at first despoiling and, eventually, annexing the Soviet zone.

A third method was to replace the old totalitarian elites with new elites, whether the socio-economic base was altered or left intact. Such replacement might be provided by non-Germans, either in the form of military government rule or through outright annexation. The former method was initially employed by all the occupation powers when the members of military government detachments assumed the positions and functions of the former totalitarian elites. Natives—the allusion is deliberate—or, in OMGUS terminology "indigenous personnel," were denied any role in the decision-making process in practically all areas and at all levels of German society.[23] There were some in the United States—as there were in Britain and France—who argued at the time that the only way to assure the permanent elimination of the old totalitarian regime and its supporters was to maintain military government controls under the direction of foreign elites for "at least 25 years." American educators in particular insisted that it would take a quarter of a century to develop a new generation of Germans who could be entrusted with positions of authority in their country.[24] However, all the occupation powers sooner or later replaced their military government personnel with Germans, first at the local level, then at regional and state levels. At this point, however, developments in the Western and in the Soviet zones radically diverged.

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[23] The oustanding exceptions to this rule were the religious elites, in which Germans retained all positions.

In the Soviet zone, Russian military government officials were replaced by Germans, but elite positions remained in Russian hands through the *de facto* annexation of the zone to the Soviet Union. In effect, the problem of post-totalitarian succession leadership was solved by permanently replacing the old totalitarian elites of Nazi Germany with Russian decision-makers in Moscow. In so far as native German Communists, some of them Russian citizens, participated in decisions, they did so as members of the Russian totalitarian political elite, not as an anti-Nazi counter-elite. Positions which had endowed their incumbents with elite status in Nazi Germany, according to the denazification directives, ceased to be positions of effective influence in the eastern portions of Germany, for authority emanated from Moscow.[25]

Western plans for the post-totalitarian German leadership—and particularly American plans, which established the pattern—also involved the wholesale replacement of Nazis and collaborators from elite positions. However, they were to be replaced by German, rather than non-German leaders. In particular, proven anti-Nazis, such as survivors of Hitler's prisons and concentration camps, former members of the resistance and exile movement, and prisoners-of-war especially selected and trained for the task, were to fill the positions of authority from which former supporters of the totalitarian system were to be barred. These plans proved unrealizable.

Initially, it was planned to concentrate on political rather than economic reconstruction. The commander of the American occupation forces was directed in the famous document JCS 1067 "to take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy."[26] However, as soon as it was decided to modify, and, eventually, reverse this policy, at the same time withdrawing foreign military government personnel from all but supervisory positions, the contemplated circulation of German elites by means of a denazification purge became manifestly impossible. The evidence does not support the contention that the drafters of the denazification directives had not appreciated the political potential of top economic and technical positions in the public and private sectors of a modern, pluralistic, and industrial society. However, while Nazi political leaders could be replaced by a new political elite which met the criteria of the purge directives, it was a different matter when it came to finding replacements for skilled administrators and technical experts who had served the totalitarian state, let alone the leaders of religious groups.

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[24] See Zink, *The United States in Germany*, p. 353.

[25] The divergent developments in the two parts of the former totalitarian state suggest some interesting comparisons between the incumbents of positions which provide elite status in the Federal Republic, but not in the Democratic Republic. For example, what difference, if any, exists today in the professional and political background of the holders of top administrative, military, and educational positions in the two German political communities? Did Russian rule over the Democratic Republic lead to a more thorough purge of these positions or did it, on the contrary, permit former Nazis and collaborators to retain positions which no longer were elite positions?

[26] Department of State, *The Axis in Defeat*, Publication 2423, Washington, n.d., p. 50.

Once the Western powers had decided to push the rapid recovery of German governmental and economic institutions and to let the Germans themselves do the job, the denazification directives were found to be "the most serious" obstacles to such a course, according to Harold Zink:

> Many mayors, county managers, department heads and other officials and employees had to be fired, despite the good work which they seemed to be doing, because their Nazi records were regarded as disqualifying. Efforts to obtain replacements brought forth few who could meet the denazification tests and these tended to be too old, too infirm, or too embittered as a result of their sojourn in concentration camps to be very satisfactory in the arduous job of reconstructing. . . .[27]

As more and more authority for promoting rapid economic and political recovery was turned over to Germans by the occupying powers—culminating in the reestablishment of a central government, a diplomatic service, military establishment, and large industrial and banking combines—the demand for skilled experts was paced by the rapidity of recovery. There simply was no counter-elite source of qualified people to assume these tasks. Western plans to use "reeducated" and anti-Nazi former prisoners-of-war apparently came to naught.[28] Only a few proven anti-Nazis had some of the required skills and most of these were indeed either too old or infirm or politically unacceptable to the Western powers. They soon died or retired, worn out by their jobs, or were dismissed for political reasons. The groups with the strongest claim to membership in an anti-Nazi counter-elite consisted mostly of intellectuals, professional party functionaries, and resistance fighters who lacked the qualities required for reconstruction of the Federal Republic. Some of the anti-Nazi political leaders initially proposed a more monolithic organization of German society than the occupation powers were willing to sanction. Only thus, they argued, would the political leadership in post-Nazi Germany be able to dominate the non-political positions of authority. These ideas found favor neither with the occupation powers nor with most Germans. In the pluralist society which was preferred, major anti-Nazis proved to be in a minority even in the political elite.[29]

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[27] Zink, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[28] Both the Soviet Union and the Western powers trained selected POWs during the war to assume positions of authority in post-war Germany. The former, as in the case of Hungary and Rumania, apparently made considerable use of these men, particularly in the organization of the People's Police and People's Army. The story of apparent failure of the Western plans to utilize "reeducated" POWs in the administration and political life of Germany remains to be written.

[29] Only 18 per cent of the deputies in the Federal Parliament (*Bundestag*) 1953–57 had been imprisoned, according to data by Martin Virchow, with collaboration of Rudolf

Intensive and extensive socio-economic dislocation or intensive and extensive military occupation—or both—was a price which the Western powers were unwilling or unable to pay to "denazify" all the German elites.[29a] Realistic political flexibility or opportunism enabled minor Nazis and collaborators to overcome such denazification obstacles as remained on the road to non-political elite positions. The more extensive the training, skill, and technical "know-how" demanded by such a position, the more difficult it was to find an incumbent uncompromised by Nazi associations. Or, to put it another way, the more sharply defined an elite occupation in terms of skill and career qualifications, the less susceptible it was to a literal application of the denazification criteria. Thus, politics was a career occupation which demanded relatively little technical training, experience, or "know-how" in post-war Germany. The large number of newcomers to politics who achieved elite positions within a few years contrasts sharply with the even larger number of old-timers in non-political elite positions that called for extensive training and skill. Most administrative, diplomatic, military, and big business leaders were individuals who had acquired the skills required by their elite occupations over many years. Their career backgrounds extended well back into the totalitarian era—and frequently beyond.[30]

It therefore seems that the assumptions underlying the denazification program are invalid for a complex and pluralistic society such as post-war Western Germany. Influence and high position are largely the reward of managerial and technical "know-how" in occupations required for the effective functioning of such a society. It follows that to carry through a post-totalitarian political purge demands either the replacement of the native elites by foreigners or extensive socio-economic dislocation. The more extensive the purge the more it will cost, one way or another. On the other hand, the less the victor is willing to pay one or the other price, the more difficult it will be to carry through

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Holzgräber, in the volume by Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schultz, *Wähler und Gewählte* (Berlin, 1956), pp. 353–392. In contrast, 56 per cent of the members of the Austrian National Assembly in the same period had been imprisoned for political reasons. Included in the latter group were the foreign minister and the defense minister. See M. S. Handler, "Previous Regimes Imprisoned 92 of 165 Austrian Deputies," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1959, p. 3:5.

[29a] Recent developments in Cuba illustrate once again the dilemma. "Possibly one of the greatest handicaps of the Revolutionary Government is the insistence that every official and employee of the Government be members or closely connected with the 26th of July Movement," wrote the correspondent of *The New York Times* in Havana on May 23, 1959. "Some of the best talent and skill of the nation is being disregarded because anyone outstanding in public life during Gen. Fulgencio Batista's regime is considered tinged with the guilt of collaboration." See R. Hart Phillips, "Cuban Land Reform Adds Uncertainty," *ibid.*, May 24, 1959, p. 4E:5–6.

[30] The religious and communication elites may be thought of as lying somewhere between the low-skill politicians and the high-skill elite occupations. While a certain amount of skill and training is obviously necessary to be a bishop, a journalist, or a *Rektor*, it would seem easier to find qualified replacements for elite positions in these occupations than in the high-skill occupations.

such a purge. Simplistic assumptions concerning the circulation of elites, in any case, are out of place.[31]

A single-case analysis is insufficient evidence to substantiate the more general theoretical validity of these statements about succession leadership. This study might merely be the exception that proves the rule—or, in Lipset's words, "the deviant case" which may actually strengthen the basic hypothesis,"[32]—further evidence drawn from similar cases is obviously needed.

Unhappily, systematic studies of succession leadership are all too few and those of post-totalitarian succession elites are just beginning. Most of the former deal with the leadership of totalitarian succession to non-totalitarian regimes. The evidence here seems to indicate that while there is a radical circulation of the dominant political elites at the time of the totalitarian take-over, the non-political elite positions that demand a high degree of skill and training are abolished or purged more slowly. But, in so far as pre-totalitarian elite incumbents retain their old positions every attempt is made to deprive them of their elite status, to subjugate them to the political elite—foreign or native—and to replace them as quickly as possible at minimum cost to the regime in terms of efficiency. For substitutes, the totalitarian political elite tends to recruit junior officials and officers of the old regime, uncommitted or minor or nominal supporters of the old regime. However, as quickly as they can be trained—and faster where trained replacements are available—younger career men and other more ardent supporters of the totalitarian political elite are moved into these positions. The rate of replacement appears to be conditioned by ideological-political considerations on the one hand and by the cost in efficiency on the other. Thus, ideological-political considerations caused Hitler to remove Jews and political opponents from the German civil service as soon as he came to power. Reluctance to pay the price in terms of the totalitarian state's military efficiency, on the other hand, apparently induced the Bolshevists to retain highly-trained pre-revolutionary general officers for years.[33]

[31] Rather than argue in terms of circulation of elite personnel, one might consider the circulation of elite values. That is, elite offices may not circulate between an elite and a counter-elite and the denazification purge may not have been particularly effective in placing counter-elite personnel in all positions of influence and authority in Western Germany, but the post-totalitarian elites may differ from the totalitarian elites in that the values of the office holders may have changed as a result of altered conditions.

[32] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March, 1959), p. 70.

[33] In the satellite states, the old military leaders were removed as rapidly as either Russian or Communist officers could be found to replace them. In Rumania, reeducated POWs were a major source for replacements, in Poland it was Russian officers; in China a new military elite drawn from the Communist armies immediately replaced all Kuomintang generals. See Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), *passim;* Daniel Lerner, "The Role of Brains in the Total State," *Commentary*, August 1953, pp. 167–173; Gerhart Ritter, *Carl Goerdler and the German Resistance* (New York, Prager, 1958); J. W. Wheeler-Bennet, *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945* (London, 1954); Paul Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1954). I

Studies of post-totalitarian succession leadership in a non-totalitarian society are sadly wanting. Several appear to be under way on special elites in post-war Germany and Italy. In the case of the present Italian foreign service, it seems that practically all the ambassadors, all the director-generals, and all the division chiefs are men who entered the diplomatic service under Mussolini. The vast majority appear to fall into the categories of one-time minor Fascists, collaborators, or uncommitted. Only very few have a major anti-Fascist record.[34]

Additional research might not only provide comparative data upon which to base more definite hypotheses, but throw new light on seemingly well-trodden areas of investigation. And finally, it may suggest some operational procedures for the maintenance of supremacy by a democratic political elite in a post-totalitarian setting, procedures which will be more effective for being unencumbered by fallacious assumptions.

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also wish to thank my colleague Frank Houn for providing me with data on the distribution of pre-1949 Communists and non-Communists in the present government of Communist China, which lack of space prevents me from presenting here. See his "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: A Study of an Elite," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (March 1957), p. 392.

[34] I am most grateful to Norman Kogan of the University of Connecticut for providing me with this information from his forthcoming study on the Italian foreign office.

AMERICAN DENAZIFICATION AND GERMAN LOCAL POLITICS, 1945–1949:

A CASE STUDY IN MARBURG

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Reviewing the accomplishments of three years of American occupation in Hessen the military governor wrote in 1948 that "the time is not yet ripe for a final appraisal of the effects of Denazification. There can be no doubt, however, that. . .it was not as effective in its ultimate objective—weeding out anti-democratic elements—as it should have been."[1] Although the quotation implies a basically negative purpose for denazification, American military government had a positive purpose as well: to provide conditions under which a more democratic life could grow and flourish. To achieve the positive aim, political parties, trade unions, and other democratic institutions were encouraged to develop, with the enforced condition that they be, and stay, purged of Nazis. To achieve the negative goal, military government liquidated the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations; arrested and detained influential Nazis and "other dangerous persons"; removed and excluded Nazi Party members "of more than nominal importance" from schools, public offices and private enterprises; eradicated Nazi symbols from public places; seized and blocked Nazi property; eliminated Nazi teaching materials from the schools; and punished those Nazis who had taken an active part in the organizations declared to have been criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Both a transfer of power and a transformation of the political climate were intended; each seemed a necessary condition for the other.

Studies of the American program of denazification that have so far appeared are devoted chiefly to top-level analyses of the policy and its administration.[2] The present study complements these by examining its impact at the lowest level in the military government's administrative hierarchy, in a single locality.

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[1] Office of Military Government for Land Hessen (OMGH), Historical Report, 1948, I, Narrative, p. 53 (mimeographed). The Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) records are presently in the Kansas City Records Center, and are hereafter referred to as OMGUS Papers.

[2] See especially William E. Griffith, "The Denazification Program in the United States Zone of Germany," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1950; John H. Herz, "The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 62 (December, 1948), pp. 569–94; Joseph F. Napoli, "Denazification from an American's Viewpoint," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 264 (July, 1949), pp. 115–23; Elmer Plischke, "Denazification Law and Procedure," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 41 (October, 1947), pp. 807–27; Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944–1955* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1957), ch. 11; see also his earlier "The American Denazification Program in Germany," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 6 (October, 1946), pp. 227–40; and Lewis J. Edinger, "Post-Totalitarian Leadership" in this issue of this Review, above, pp. 58–82.

Such a case study has the advantage of enabling direct observation of some individual victims and beneficiaries who were not so much in the public eye as to attract outside attention to their cases, and of how their fates were determined. I have used available records and interviewed individuals affected.[3]

Stadtkreis and *Landkreis* Marburg, the political sub-divisions considered in this case study, are located in what is now *Land* Hessen, and were occupied by one of many medium-sized American military government detachments, each designed to govern one of the smaller political units of Germany. The detachment prepared itself specifically for its task and location. Marburg is mainly an agricultural community, except for the city itself; this is dominated by the University, but also serves the surrounding agricultural area as an administrative, commercial and cultural center. Socially and politically Marburg reflects the interests of its predominantly middle-class, protestant, agricultural population which has been influenced little by the working class. Politically it had had a conservative, nationalist history before 1945. The Nazi Party made marked gains there after 1928. The community suffered relatively little war damage, but was deluged with refugees and expellees after war's end. Its make-up prior to 1945 was not such as to have nurtured any strong indigenous group which might have seen gains in pursuing denazification further than the occupying forces required.[3a]

The present study reinforces the conclusion that denazification failed to achieve both its negative and positive goals. In part this may be laid to the general shifts in policy as American objectives turned from vengeance and safety to reconstruction and support. In part it reflected the helplessness of strangers, even conquerors, in a foreign land, unfamiliar with the particular people committed to their charge, and the subtler relationships subsisting among them. But it is attributable also to a number of reasons best revealed by local observation, reasons manifest in the paradoxes that denazification produced in application. Officials removed early in the occupation, asserting that they had committed no crimes, felt no serious social effects. Opportunists among them enjoyed privileged positions in the barter economy of postwar Germany. The threat of permanent exclusion was temporary, even momentary, and soon forgotten because non-Nazi officials promised early reinstatement. Important Nazi officials, whose cases were delayed because they required long and painstaking research, often escaped with light penalties or no penalties because of intervening policy changes. By the same token, less important Nazi Party members often received more severe penalties because their cases were tried at an earlier date. American officials, trying to denazify thoroughly, found that they received their most ardent support from Communists and political opportunists who wanted to promote change; while former social, economic and political leaders of the community withheld their support of denazification partly to promote stability and restore the *status quo ante* Nazi. The American program to revive political parties at the grass-roots level produced a further paradox when some of these parties—whose existence was justified to give Germans practical experience in democracy—vied with each other to win former Nazis as members and constituents. A final paradox was the use of the undemocratic denazification purge methods to gain a democratic positive end.

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[3] The research for this study was made possible by a Fulbright scholarship, a Carnegie Fellowship at the University of Oregon, and a grant-in-aid given jointly by the Board of Christian Education of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and Luther College, Decorah, Iowa.

[3a] Milton Mayer, *They Thought They Were Free* (Chicago, 1955), is a study of ten "little men" and their attitudes toward Nazism, the material for which was gathered in Marburg.

According to its administration, denazification in the American Zone of Germany falls roughly into two major stages: one administered by military government exclusively, the other by Germans under military government supervision and control. In Marburg the first began with the occupation of the city on 29 March 1945 and ended on 31 May 1946. The second began on 1 June 1946 and continued formally until 15 October 1949, when the Hessian denazification ministry closed the last denazification tribunal in Marburg.[4] For all practical purposes, however, the end came there a year earlier, when military government closed its special branch office and the German authorities dissolved all tribunals except one left to complete the remaining cases and hear appeals.[5]

I. AMERICAN ADMINISTERED DENAZIFICATION IN MARBURG, 1945–1946

The direct military government stage of denazification may be sub-divided roughly into three phases, each more comprehensive than the preceding.[6] The first, conditioned by the exigencies of war and the adverse publicity accorded to certain early denazification difficulties in Aachen, was governed by a Supreme Headquarters (SHAEF) directive of 9 November 1944, requiring removal from public office of all persons who had joined the Nazi Party before Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933.[7]

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[4] Landrat to Bürgermeisters, 4 Nov. 1949, Landkreis Marburg Papers, Marburg, Germany.

[5] R. A. Irving, comp., "Chronology, M.G. Det. E1A2 (E-5), Office of Military Government for Hesse and Office of Land Commissioner for Hesse, 1944–1950," (Wiesbaden: Office of the Land Commissioner for Hessen, n.d. typewritten), in the files of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), Mehlem, Germany. In September 1948 all Hessian Kreis special branch offices and tribunals were closed with the exception of eight *Spruch- und Berufungskammern* that were to complete the work.

[6] Except where otherwise cited, the sources I have used for the description of the denazification program are Griffith; Zink; Herz; C. J. Friedrich, "Denazification, 1944–1946," in Friedrich *et al.*, *American Experiences in Military Government* (New York, 1948), pp. 253–75; John G. Kormann, "U. S. Denazification Policy in Germany, 1944–1950," (Mehlem: Hist. Div., Office of the Exec. Sec., Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952, mimeographed); OMGUS, Monthly Report, No. 34, April 1948, Denazification (Cumulative Review), 1 April 1947–30-April 1948 (lithographed); J. K. Pollock, J. H. Meisel, and H. L. Bretton, *Germany Under Occupation, Illustrative Materials and Documents*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor, 1949); and U. S. Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, *Germany, 1947–1949: The Story in Documents*, Publication No. 3556, European and British Commonwealth Series 9 (Washington, 1950).

[7] Probably because they chose to err by doing too much rather than too little, cautious

The second and third phases began with a 7 July 1945 directive from Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), setting forth in detail the denazification program for the initial post-surrender period. It listed 136 mandatory removal and exclusion categories and stipulated that membership in the Nazi Party prior to 1 May 1937, or holding office in certain of its affiliated organizations, was cause for mandatory removal or exclusion from positions of "more than minor importance" in public offices and "positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises", as well as in commercial, agricultural, and financial institutions. A month later, on 15 August 1945, another USFET directive expanded the program by defining persons in "positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises" to include those in private business, the professions, and those "of wealth and importance" who were unemployed. On 26 September 1945 Military Government Law No. 8 extended denazification over the entire German economy except agriculture, and made Germans themselves criminally liable for failure, without express OMG authorization, to remove Nazis from positions other than ordinary labor.

Overt Impact. For the German affected by the directives, denazification began when military government or his employer required him to fill out a detailed *Fragebogen* (denazification questionnaire).[8] Military government "vetted" the questionnaires according to an elaborate—and ever-changing—evaluating process. In accordance with the 7 July directive it automatically and summarily removed or excluded from certain positions those people whose questionnaires clearly stated that they had been Nazi Party members prior to 1 May 1937, or whose answers indicated that they fitted into one of the many other exclusion categories. If the questionnaire exonerated the respondent or did not implicate him sufficiently to warrant his mandatory removal or exclusion, military government checked the information therein against its own extensive sources of information for possible falsification. The questionnaire was thus the primary basis for denazification proceedings, except for persons who had been placed in mandatory arrest categories. These were taken into custody immediately upon recognition.

American-administered denazification, through May 1946, affected chiefly those Germans employed, or seeking employment, with the Army and in public offices, and those who fell in the mandatory arrest categories. In its later phases it also affected people employed by private industry and in trades; but it is almost impossible to assess the effects of Military Government Law No. 8 be-

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military government officers in the field dismissed more public servants than the directive required. The first military governor of Marburg has written that he removed "fully seventy-five per cent of the officials above the rank of clerk or laborer" during the first week. Many of them had not been Nazi Party members as early as 1933. Letter, 27 Jan. 1955, in possession of the author.

[8] Military government detachments used such a questionnaire from the beginning of the occupation. As the directives changed, the questionnaire became longer. Because of its length when completely unfolded, Marburg's officials, in correspondence with each other, often referred to it as the *Ziehharmonika* (accordion).

cause it was soon replaced by the German-administered "Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism".[9] Even before that took effect in June 1946, local German employers and review boards withheld decisions under Law No. 8 in anticipation of the new law.

Reliable statistics showing the scope of military government denazification in Marburg are not available.[10] Published statistics for the entire American Zone show that six per cent of the total population was directly affected by denazification proceedings, and that military government removed or excluded from employment slightly over two per cent of the population.[11] Application of these percentages to Marburg's population figures for 1946 would indicate that approximately 7800 (of the total population of 130,000) were affected and that approximately 2700 were removed or excluded from employment.

Available figures indicate, however, that the Marburg detachment denazified more intensively than the average rate for the American Zone. In December 1945 the detachment reported that it had received 11,500 denazification questionnaires for processing.[12] After nine months of occupation the detachment had removed 71 officials and employees (56 per cent) and 120 Bürgermeisters (94 per cent) from the *Landkreis* administration; and 90 officials (30 per cent) from the *Stadtkreis* administration, the police, and the city savings bank.[13]

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[9] "In general . . . Law No. 8 threw the denazification program into a state of confusion, uncertainty and flooding with work from which it never really recovered." Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 105. When the Law for Liberation was made public in Marburg the number of questionnaires received by the military government detachment dropped off eighty-five per cent. OMG, Marburg, to OMGUS, Director of Intelligence, Subject: Weekly Intelligence Report, 23 March 1946, HICOG Papers, Mehlem, Germany.

[10] I have been unable to collect completely reliable statistics, partly because denazification records are not open to private researchers. It is doubtful, however, that such statistics could be assembled, because local military government records have been partly destroyed, and because of the methods of denazification. Many persons in Marburg were denazified by higher headquarters. The Land military government detachment directed denazification of the railway, the post, telephone, and telegraph agencies, the university, and the churches. The Information Control Division denazified the press and the publishers. In individual cases, Land headquarters also denazified public officials in the Landkreis and the Stadtkreis.

[11] OMGUS, Monthly Report, No. 9, 20 April 1946, Denazification and Public Safety, table 1, p. 8 (lithographed).

[12] OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Subject: Weekly Denazification Report, 7 December 1945, OMGUS Papers. The figure is approximately 8.8 per cent of the total population (1946). And see note 7, above. The discrepancy between the Marburg figure and the zonal average may be due to the fact that Marburg had an unusually large number of Army employees to process and also to the fact that many questionnaires were duplicates. The available statistics for the zone refer to individuals and not to questionnaires.

[13] OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Subject: Information Report No. 360—Political. Denazification or Renazification in LK-SK Marburg, 14 Dec. 1948, OMGUS Papers. When the Americans occupied Marburg the Landkreis employed 126 officials and employees and there were 127 Bürgermeisters. The city administration, including the police and the savings bank, had a staff of 266. The figures on removals do not show how many applicants were rejected for civil positions or for jobs with the American Army. Nor do they include the number denazified under Law No. 8 or those who were mandatory arrests.

These were a small fraction of the total population. Furthermore, the immediate impact of denazification was primarily personal, unique, and particular to the individual concerned. However, since it applied almost exclusively to persons in prominent social, political, and economic positions, its effects were widely felt and observed.

Mitigations. Although citizens of Marburg agreed (in 1953 and 1954) almost universally that removal or exclusion from office caused serious economic hardship, a study of the actual conditions at the time suggests other conclusions. The social and economic impact was, in fact, as unexpected and unusual as the times were abnormal and unstable. One mitigating technique was a cooperative evasion of the regulations.

For instance, the most evident initial effect of removal for the individual Marburger was that he no longer held a position for which he had spent a lifetime in preparation and which he expected to continue to hold until retirement.[14] The psychological shock of that separation from traditional and legal rights and privileges was apparently very real to the individual public servant.[15] Yet for many Marburgers this first shock was soon dispelled by the attitude and action of military government's German appointees. Civil officials and political party leaders seem to have encouraged removed officials to ask frequently at the city and county personnel offices about their future reinstatement.[16] The *Landrat* (county administrator) wrote to his civilian superior, in June 1945, that he merely suspended his "denazified" civil servants and gave their replacements only temporary appointments.[17] He dismissed civil servants most reluctantly, if at all. In one instance he obeyed the direct order of military government to dismiss his *Kassenbeamter* (treasury official), but with the consent and advice of a voluntary political committee for the *Landkreis,* whose members were approved by military government, he assigned the official to a back-room office from which he continued to direct the affairs of the treasury, while a clerk acceptable to military government served as a front.[18]

Evasions of denazification were as common in the city hall as in the *Landrat's* office. There a specialist in the municipal personnel office still managed his office after military government removed him early in 1946. The city transferred his wife to the office as a clerk. She took the files and official correspondence home at night and brought them back in the morning. On occasion the newly appointed personnel administrator, who was inexperienced, called at the specialist's home to discuss his work. At one time he brought the specialist back into the office as an employee. The arrangement continued until the approved personnel administrator died in office, whereupon military government ordered the specialist dismissed again. Nevertheless, the city council voted him six month's retroactive pay for his continued service.[19]

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[14] Although there were many exceptions—*e.g.,* Nazis who got their jobs through Party connections, businessmen and others—it is generally true that OMG denazification most often affected persons holding public office with civil service tenure. See Arnold Brecht, "Personnel Management," in E. H. Litchfield and Associates, *Governing Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, 1953), pp. 263–93, for a discussion of the "vested rights" German civil servants enjoy and demand.

[15] A public opinion survey in the American Zone in 1948 revealed that 84 per cent of the Germans who prefer government work to private industry chose it because of its security and pensions. OMGUS, ICD, Bad Nauheim, AMZON Views its Civil Service, 3. Prestige Value of Government Work, Opinion Surveys Report No. 164, 2 April 1949, OMGUS Papers.

[16] Interviews with two such removed officials, Marburg, Germany, 4–5 June 1954 and 6 June 1954. One said he was in constant touch with his friends in the city hall. The other said he reported in about twice a month to see if he would be reinstated soon.

[17] Landrat to Oberpräsident, Kassel, 29 June 1945, Landkreis Marburg Papers.

[18] Interviews with two former Landkreis Political Committee members, Marbach, Germany, 15 June 1954 and Marburg, Germany, 21 May 1954; letter from former Political Committee member, 13 Sept., 1958, in possession of the author.

This case was not exceptional. Numerous examples testify to the fact that long friendships and loyalties among Marburg's officialdom were not broken up by military government directives which divided Germans into "Nazis" and "non-Nazis." In November 1945 the *Oberbürgermeister* wrote a memorandum for his files in which he wondered "whether such officials could be paid full wages for the period of their so-called honorary service."[20] At one time the city administration hired a group of removed persons to assist in the tax assessor's office. The *Bürgermeister* furnished them an office in one of the municipal buildings, where they apparently worked without recognition by the public or detection by military government investigators. Two of them have reported that the *Oberbürgermeister* assured them that they would be employed as emergency workers until they could be reinstated in their former positions. An ex-*Bürgermeister,* who had himself been in a Nazi concentration camp, reportedly came to visit them often, bringing tobacco he had received from American acquaintances. Some officials jokingly referred to the office as the "Nazi *Rathaus*."[21]

Socially the removed officials in Marburg suffered no ill effects. Those I interviewed reported that they continued to move in the same social circles as before. In fact, a few allowed that their prestige and respect in the community was somewhat enhanced because the occupying power summarily and "unjustly" removed them; they drew sympathy because seemingly they were the greatest losers after the war.[22]

Another mitigating factor was inherent in the other opportunities open to those who were purged and had time on their hands, and a little mobility. The economic consequences of removal and exclusion from office were negligible in the immediate postwar German economy.[23] "In Germany today [1945] . . . the historical role of price has been obliterated," reported military government. "The wages for which men work are far less important than their food rations . . . and men will seek the job which pays the better ration. . . . Those who have accumulated funds, and who cannot work in the better rationed jobs, need not work at all."[24]

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[19] Interview with subject, Marburg, Germany, 5 June 1954; letters, 16 Sept. and 13 Oct. 1958, in possession of the author.

[20] "Die Frage ist ob diesen Beamten für die Zeit ihrer sogenannten ehrenamtlichen Tätigkeit das volle Gehalt ausgezahlt werden darf." Oberbürgermeister, Aktenvermerk, 9 November 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers.

[21] Interviews with two of the removed officials who worked in the tax office, Marburg, Germany, 4 June and 6 June 1954; letters, 16 Sept. and 13 Oct. 1958, in possession of the author. Both men gave essentially the same account.

[22] Former Nazis and non-Nazis agreed on this point. The reasons they gave differed, however. Those who believed a social revolution would have been the only solution to Germany's problem naturally argued that the civil servants and the middle class were all Nazis—if not in fact, then at least in theory—and thus denazification provided no moral basis for social ostracism. Obviously, this view was expressed most consistently by Communists and leftist Social Democrats. Others, especially the conservatives, argued that Germans recognized that denazification was an unjust purge carried out by rogues (*Lumpen*) and opportunists.

Before the currency reform in 1948, when prices again began to perform an economic function, German employers were unable to prevent large-scale employee absenteeism. Early in 1946 military government observers estimated that between 20 and 25 per cent of all workers stayed away from their jobs each day,[25] to barter for scarce commodities and food. By 1947 "thousands of employers [had to] provide consumer goods incentives for faithful work and regular attendance." They provided noon-day meals in factory canteens; they secured housing and provided transportation for their employees; they sold at cost or gave away to steady workers a small portion of their own product (compensation wages); and they operated repair services for shoes, clothing, and household articles as incentives to keep workers on the job.[26] In Marburg, the *Landrat* reported in 1946, commuters found it impossible to board the morning trains at local stations, because people going into the country to barter for food had already filled the trains to capacity in the larger stations.[27]

In these circumstances the purged ex-Nazis had an ironical advantage in their enforced unemployment. Although some had neither the means nor the inclination to become full-time black marketeers, most admit readily that they secured goods over and above their rationed allowance by trading with farmers or with "the enemy." The man who had been involuntarily excluded from his position could spend as much time as he wished traveling to the farming communities near Marburg, bartering one thing for another until he had the desired food and other goods. As it often took several transactions to acquire, say, a pound of butter or a sausage, an unwitting premium went to the man who had the most time to devote. In addition, the ex-Nazi could, and sometimes did, serve Americans or negotiate illicitly with them for the most prized medium of exchange in all Germany: cigarettes. Marburgers point out that an unemployed person who spent one day at the railway station carrying bags and equipment for American soldiers could expect to earn the equivalent of several months' pay in cigarettes and candy.[28]

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[23] Most of the Germans I interviewed in 1953 and 1954 gave as their greatest hardship the fact that they lost their income. When I reminded them, however, that they could buy hardly anything with their money in 1945 and 1946—in contrast with 1953 and 1954—and that they could secure more food by going onto the black market for one day than they could buy with a month's salary, they readily agreed. They acknowledged also that they could go to nearby farms and trade clothing, jewelry or other articles for food they could not buy in normal trade channels at any price. Faced with their own admissions most of them then agreed that they did not suffer from loss of income. Nevertheless, this was the standard first answer I received when I asked how denazification affected them personally.

[24] OMGUS, Monthly Report, No. 3, 20 Oct. 1945, Trade and Commerce, p. 1 (lithographed).

[25] *Id.*, No. 7, 20 Feb. 1946, Manpower, Trade Unions and Working Conditions, p. 2 (lithographed).

[26] *Id.*, No. 20, 28 Feb. 1947, Manpower, Trade Unions and Working Conditions (Cumulative Review), 8 May 1945–28 Feb. 1947, p. 3 (lithographed).

[27] Landrat to CIC, Marburg, Subject: Weekly report . . . 12 to 18 May 1946 (trans. by Landrat's staff), 18 May 1946, Landkreis Marburg Papers.

Furthermore, as a second-class citizen—as he was under the denazification laws—with few rights and obligations, the ex-Nazi had little sense of moral responsibility to work for the reconstruction of Germany.[29] Indeed, if the return from foraging was so rewarding that a fully employed worker easily overcame his moral obligations to his employer and society every fourth or fifth day, how much greater was the return for a man who felt fewer obligations and had all his time to barter and forage?

In sum, the American-administered denazification program in Marburg scarcely affected German individuals socially or economically. It did not bring about the desired separation of Nazis from non-Nazis, and in fact inadvertently placed Nazis in a more advantageous economic position than non-Nazis. Prospects of reinstatement and the widespread German belief that "little Nazis" should not be punished severely, mitigated and soon dispelled the immediate psychological shock of dismissal. But politically the program produced a series of reactions that affected deeply the relationships between Marburgers and military government, and revealed the paradox of using undemocratic negative means to achieve democratic positive ends.

Political Consequences—The Political Committee (*SPA*). Objective tests—cut-off dates, party membership records, and the like—were necessary administrative standards in putting a large-scale program of denazification into operation quickly; without such guidelines the delegation of authority down the line to military government detachments would have been impractical. But strict adherence to mechanical tests was necessarily also a guarantee that in individual cases injustice—at the very least, injustice in German eyes—would be done, as rigid lines of distinction failed to take account of felt differences in particular situations. This is the ancient paradox of law and justice, where intent must be inferred from conduct. Here, if justice was to be discerning, military government needed locally informed and reliable advice, which could only come from knowledgeable Germans long resident in the community.

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[28] There were, of course, many other ways to acquire cigarettes and other items from American soldiers. Germans traded their cameras, their jewelry, alcohol, and other things directly to soldiers or to intermediaries for post-exchange commodities. Black market prices in 1945 ranged from RM 50 to 150 for twenty cigarettes, and RM 700 to 1200 for a pound of coffee. In 1947 they ranged from RM 90 to 120 for twenty cigarettes, RM 20,000 to 50,000 for a Leica camera, RM 30 to 35 for a bar of soap, and RM 150 to 300 for an American dollar bill. OMGUS, Monthly Report, No. 2, 20 Sept. 1945, Trade and Commerce, p. 6 (lith.); *id.*, No. 27, Sept. 1947, Trade and Commerce, Aug.–Sept. 1947, p. 10 (lith.). Monthly German government salaries on 1 April 1948 ranged for officials (*Beamten*), from RM 137.58 to 1164.92; and for employees (*Angestellte*), from RM 89.09 to 886.68. *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,* 1952, pp. 444–45.

[29] Arbeitsamt to Staatspolitischer Ausschuss (SPA), 12 June 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers; Paul Günther, interview, Marburg, Germany, 21 May 1954; Paul Günther, letter to author, 30 Sept. 1958, also said: "Important and influential officials during the Nazi regime who were dismissed by the occupation forces and then ordered to work in minor positions or to do physical labor obtained statements from reputable doctors that they were incapable of this form of labor." Günther was a military government employee from 1945 to 1949.

Soon after the military government detachment arrived in Marburg a group of anti-Nazi and non-Nazi Germans proposed to form a voluntary *Staatspolitischer Ausschuss* (political committee) to advise and assist civilian and military officials and to act as a liaison between the population and the civil agencies.[30] After considerable negotiation between the group's spokesmen, the *Oberbürgermeister*, and military government a smaller committee of five and a secretary were chosen to serve as such a political committee. None of the six were affected by denazification laws. Politically they were a mixed group. Three later became Liberal Democrats (presently Free Democrats), one became a Christian Democrat, one was a Socialist and the sixth a Communist. Their professions are a key to their stake in social and economic stability. Two members were civil servants: one a school administrator and the other a teacher. A book dealer and a publisher represented the business interests on the committee. A master electrician and a gardener, both of whom were employers and merchants, were the other two members. The alternate members, some very active on the committee, had the same political preferences as the regular members; by profession two were civil servants of the higher ranks, two were owners of large business establishments, and one was a master electrician with a business of his own.[31]

Throughout the period of its existence this non-Nazi, relatively conservative political committee expressed to military government and in its minutes what it considered to be the viewpoint of Marburgers toward American denazification. In June 1945 the committee chairman reported to an American that "denazification proceeded without apparent rules or regulations," and that the anti-Nazi Germans who knew the affected people were given no opportunity to testify. "Denazification," he continued, "apparently classifies all Germans with the war criminals."[32] Two months later, Hermann Bauer, a committee member, wrote that he and his colleagues could not understand the implicit assumption of military government that all Germans were Nazis unless they could prove otherwise.[33] In November the whole committee submitted to the *Oberbürgermeister* a secret report which asserted that denazification was based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the Nazi regime, that denazification methods were wrong because they proceeded on the assumption of guilt rather than innocence, and that fixing a date for dividing Nazis from non-Nazis precluded individual consideration of each case.[34]

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[30] Staatspolitischer Ausschuss (SPA) to Mr. Knoll, Subject: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Arbeitsgebiete des Staatspolitischen Ausschusses der Stadt, Marburg a/Lahn, 10 August 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers; Hermann Bauer to Schulrat Tilgner, 30 March 1945; "Für Ordnung und Sauberkeit!" n.d. A ms. found in the Hermann Bauer Papers, Marburg (in Bauer's possession). The ms. bears 14 signatures. It was revised on 18 April and again on 20 April 1945; on the latter date it was printed for posting in public places.

[31] Ludwig Mütze to Oberbürgermeister, 24 May 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers.

[32] Ludwig Mütze to Mr. Bernard, 19 June 1945, Ludwig Mütze Papers, Marburg (in Mütze's possession).

The political committee's strongest criticism came late in 1945 when it endorsed twenty-three theses on denazification prepared by the local Roman Catholic priest, who was also a respected adviser on educational and religious affairs for several Marburg military government officers.[35] His theses included the usual German protests against denazification: the law was written after the crime, it was arbitrary, the people affected could not initiate an appeal, it violated fundamental laws which recognized the rights of the individual, its methods were those of totalitarian states, dividing the innocent from the guilty at a specific date was nonsense, and others. The political importance of his protest was, however, that it pointed up specifically eleven ways in which denazification was an outright violation of his understanding of, and Americans' profession of, democratic theory and practice.

Resulting Political Divisions. A further paradox ensued. The anti-Nazis and the non-Nazis who were the most active and vocal supporters of military government in Marburg early in the occupation were also its severest critics. While the Nazis apparently chose, for obvious reasons, to remain silent, the political committee, the *Oberbürgermeister*, the *Landrat*, the editor of the *Marburger Presse*, who was also on the political committee, and the founders of the new political parties—some also committee members—were almost the only vocal opponents of denazification. They denounced its theoretical basis and its practical effects. To their dismay Americans often interpreted this criticism as verification of the collective guilt of the Germans for the Nazi regime, a judgment which Marburgers rejected categorically.[36] Furthermore, it tended to arouse a not altogether unfounded suspicion on the part of military government officers that some of the critics had themselves failed to include everything of pertinence in their own denazification questionnaires.[37]

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[33] Hermann Bauer to Herrn Knoll, Subject: Wie man heute über die amerikanische Besatzung denkt, 10 Aug. 1945, Bauer Papers.

[34] SPA, Gründe des Anwachsens der Abneigung gegen die amerikanische Militär-Regierung (Streng Geheim), 7 Nov. 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers.

[35] Thesen zur "Entnazifizierung," 25 Oct. 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers. The political committee endorsed the theses on 9 Nov. and resolved to forward them to German and American higher authorities. SPA, Minutes, 9 Nov. 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers.

[36] Marburg's political committee members were not Nazis in disguise. None of them suffered seriously under the Nazi regime with the exception of one whose newspaper was suppressed, but none of them had actively supported the Nazis. Most of them voiced criticisms of the Nazi regime, but usually to friends whom they could trust. As conservatives, with a stake in the existing social-economic system, they never forgave the Nazis their destruction of law and justice. Nor did they approve of the "democratic implications of Nazism," which permitted the untrained, the uneducated, the lower classes (*niedrige Schichten*) to become important officials and social leaders because they were Party members. See Gabriel A. Almond and Wolfgang H. Kraus, "The Social Composition of the

On the other hand, the radicals—the Communists and the left-wing Socialists—apparently endeared themselves with military government officers by their stand in complete support of early military government denazification in Marburg. They had suffered under the Nazi regime as political parties and as individuals, but in many instances, no more than had some of the political committee members and other democrats and conservatives in the community. But they were apparently little troubled by the violations of individual rights, fundamental laws, and democratic principles that the political committee found so odious. The American-appointed police chief, a chiropractor by profession and a Communist in politics, appointed a political radical to head a special investigation section of the police department, instructing him to root out Nazis.[38] He also established a political division in the newly-organized department and appointed as its chief a radical who said, in 1954, that if he and his friends had had their way in 1945 there would be no more "Nazis" in Marburg in 1954 to be reinstated in their former positions.[39] Communist and Socialist investigators outnumbered all others at military government. Of the eleven investigators I found on the payroll lists of the Marburg military government detachment six were Communists and two were Socialists.[40] One of the latter described himself as a leftist-Socialist. Another investigator was obviously an opportunist, a man who later helped to found an extreme right-wing party in Marburg.[41]

German Resistance," in Gabriel A. Almond, ed., *The Struggle for Democracy in Germany* (Chapel Hill, 1949), pp. 64–107, for a discussion of the nature of conservative discontent with Hitler; also Gerhard Ritter, *Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954).

[37] The Oberbürgermeister's actions aroused just such suspicion and he was subsequently arrested for falsification of his questionnaire, even though inclusion of the item itself would not have disqualified him from the office of Oberbürgermeister. Other officials, on the other hand, also failed to include some items on their questionnaires—some allegedly with verbal permission from military government officers—but were never brought to trial, probably because they appeared docile and seemed to obey military government orders.

[38] Hans Frese to Erich Kroll, Subject: Tätigkeitsbericht No. 1 für die Zeit vom 23.4 bis 29.4.45, 30 April 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers. Frese admitted to me that he used "severe tactics" in gathering his information. He said the SPA finally had him removed from his position chiefly because he was too "active" (*rührig*). Hans Frese, interview, Marburg, 3 July 1954. Although Frese does not consider himself to be a radical (letter to author, 7 Oct. 1958) his independent political and social views place him considerably to the left on the Marburg political continuum.

[39] Interview with subject, Marburg, 12 June 1954.

[40] The lists I examined are found in the *Besatzungskostenamt* (Occupation Costs Office), Marburg.

[41] He was later arrested for car theft and eventually found guilty as a Nazi informer by the Marburg denazification tribunal. The other two investigators appear to have had no political connections, but one of them, military government later discovered, had a criminal record with 22 entries dating back to the early twenties.

So denazification divided Marburgers into two clearly marked political camps. The conservatives and the Liberal Democrats on the political committee believed that military-government denazification permitted—though perhaps not purposely—a small number of radicals to promote a social and political, and perhaps economic, revolution during the early phase of the occupation of Marburg. They believed that the leftists deliberately used denazification to infiltrate the city and county administrations so they could eventually seize power completely.[42] In opposing this preparation for revolution the political committee and other relatively conservative politicians found themselves defending the Nazis, the politically indifferent, and the opportunists of the past who had once accepted Nazism—or condoned it—for various reasons, one of which was that it purported to stand for order and security. Few Marburgers were surprised when the Liberal Democratic Party won the first election on the strength of the slogan that it would "de-Communize" the city administration if elected.

The American denazification program thus had wide political ramifications. It placed German anti-Nazi and non-Nazi democrats and conservatives under the necessity of either opposing military government or supporting practices that offended their political principles and their social and economic ideals. The political committee was deadly serious when it wrote, in November 1945, that it needed "a strong arm to lean upon" if it was to help to rebuild Germany into a democracy. It referred directly to military government's methods when it quoted the taunts of its opponents: "There are your democratic friends from America. What have they brought you?"[43]

Denazification also cast an unfavorable reflection upon military government policy and its local agents, the American officers. Marburgers suspected Americans of being leftists at worst, or, at best, of being politically too naive to discern the leftist strategy. Some Marburgers who had believed it all along strengthened their conviction that democracy is a fair-weather political system which changes its methods in the face of adversity. Others, who probably favored giving democracy a fair trial in Germany, report that they were shocked that military government officers and men apparently did not recognize the basic incompatibility of arbitrary means and democratic ends. Still others believed that Americans understood the conflict well enough, but used their power to promote American self-interests.[44]

[42] Marburg's police chief in 1954 told me that when he came to the city to take office in 1947 the force was infiltrated with Communists. Alfred Klevinghaus, interview, Marburg, 22 May 1954; he is a Social Democrat.

[43] It obviously referred to moral support rather than physical strength. SPA report cited above, note 34.

[44] It will be noted how easily Marburgers used their conclusions to rationalize their own positions under the Nazi regime: If democracy is a fair-weather political system, perhaps dictatorship alone can fight Communism or get a nation out of a severe economic depression. If military government officers and men did not understand the essentials of their own political system, were they any different from Germans who were led by Nazis, not knowing where they were being led, but enjoying the benefits of Nazism? If Americans did understand, why did they not object to denazification as they expected Germans to

II. DENAZIFICATION BY GERMAN TRIBUNALS, 1946–1949

The American-administered denazification program reportedly achieved the preliminary objective of removing Nazis from leading positions in government and business.[45] The German phase of denazification, commencing on 1 June 1946, was to be the comprehensive, long-range effort based upon the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, written by Americans and Germans together. The law was a criminal code on Nazism and militarism. It outlined procedures for judging every adult German according to his degree of responsibility for the wrongs committed by the Nazi regime. It provided that all Germans over eighteen must register, and upon the basis of the registered information be classified into one of five categories: Major Offenders (Class I), Offenders (Class II), Lesser Offenders (Class III), Followers or Nominal Nazis (Class IV), and Persons Exonerated (Class V). The class criteria included Nazi Party membership tenure, offices held, economic gains under the Nazi regime, and other specific factual data supplied on a questionnaire (*Meldebogen*). The law prescribed sanctions for major offenders and offenders and provided opportunities for rehabilitation through probation for lesser offenders. It removed disqualifications from followers and exonerated persons.

Local *Stadtkreis* and *Landkreis* denazification tribunals (*Spruchkammern*), directly responsible to the *Land* Minister for Political Liberation, carried out the law. Each *Kreis* had to have at least one such tribunal. In Marburg there were, at one time, two each in the *Stadtkreis* and the *Landkreis*. The permanent tribunal staff included a public prosecutor, several investigators, and clerical and statistical assistants. The tribunals consisted of a chairman and at least two assessors (*Beisitzer*) who, together with the public prosecutor, were appointed by the Minister for Political Liberation. In practice the political parties that had been approved by military government at *Land* level submitted lists from which the Minister made his appointments. The tribunal chairman selected the assessors for individual sessions in a pre-determined sequence.

Moderations in policy. Denazification by German tribunals developed in a markedly different way from the prior military government stage. Beginning in July 1946 OMGUS authorized a series of amendments to the Law for Liberation, each of which progressively narrowed the scope of denazification and simplified the process to some extent; previously, amendments had generally broadened the scope and complicated the administrative processes. The youth amnesty of 8 July 1946 exempted those born after 1 January 1919 unless they fell into major offender or offender categories. The Christmas amnesty of 1946 was extended to low income groups and to persons more than 50 per cent dis-

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have objected to Hitler? If Americans acted upon power-politics principles, using arbitrary means to achieve their ends, they took a page out of Hitler's book.

[45] OMGUS, Monthly Report, No. 6, 20 Jan. 1946, Denazification and Public Safety, 1 (lith.).

abled, again provided they fell outside the major offender or offender classes.[46] By January 1949 approximately 20 per cent of the registrants in the American Zone had been amnestied.[47] The most complete figures available for Marburg show that by March 1948 approximately 29 per cent had been pardoned.[48]

Additional revisions in procedure became effective on 3 October 1947 and 28 March 1948. The first of these permitted the public prosecutors to classify members of the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations, except those found to have been criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal, "strictly in accord with the evidence" instead of automatically as had been previously prescribed.[49] The March 1948 amendment was designed to speed denazification because it was "essential from the standpoint of Military Government objectives in Germany that this program be finished rapidly."[50] Essentially, it gave the public prosecutors complete discretion in filing charges against those who had not yet been tried.

By March 1948 approximately 29 per cent of Marburg's total population (1946) and approximately 38 per cent of all Marburgers above eighteen years of age had been affected (*betroffen*) under the Law for Liberation.[51] To be sure, many of these were later exonerated or placed in lower classifications.[52]

Local attitudes. Marburgers, and some students of denazification, believe that the Law for Liberation provided the basis for a social and political revolution by legal means even though military government had placed a specific limitation upon the fines that could be assessed against the guilty.[53] But Marburg proved to be no place to promote such a revolution with the help of Marburgers themselves.[54] The anti-Nazis and non-Nazis whom military government found there were not unanimously agreed upon the social, economic, and political changes that denazification seemed to make possible. Nor, as has been seen, did they agree upon denazification's methods. A few Liberal Democrats and the right-wing Social Democrats who might have supported a mild denazification program as a means to achieve military government's democratization program were offset by rightists on the one hand and leftists on the other. On the left the Communists and the left-wing Social Democrats wished to push denazification toward social, political, and perhaps, economic revolution. On the right a powerful majority of conservatives, found chiefly in the Liberal Democratic (presently Free Democratic) and Christian Democratic Parties, and radical nationalists, found mainly in the National Democratic Party, wished to preserve the socio-economic fabric of Marburg and denazify to restore the *status quo ante* Nazi.[55]

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[46] The low-income groups were those whose taxable income did not exceed RM 3,600 during either of the calendar years 1943 or 1945, and those whose taxable property in 1945 did not exceed RM 20,000 in value.

[47] Pollock *et al.*, *op. cit.* above, note 6, pp. 173–74. Of the 13,098,100 registrants 2,475,400 had been amnestied without trials and 310,900 had been amnestied as result of trials.

[48] OMGH, Public Safety, OMGUS Denazification Field Inspection Unit, to OMGH, Subject: OMGUS Field Inspection Report (revised), with enclosure: Status of Denazification in SK and LK Marburg, 24 March 1948, OMGUS Papers. The total number of registrants for Marburg was 99,259. Of these 20,005 (27 per cent) and 9,541 (30 per cent) came under amnesty in the Landkreis and the Stadtkreis, respectively. In all of Marburg 17,225 (18 per cent) and 12,321 (12 per cent) came under the youth amnesty and the Christmas amnesty, respectively.

[49] OMGUS, Monthy Report, No. 27, Sept. 1947, Denazification and Public Safety, Aug.–Sept. 1947, pp. 1–2 (lith.). The organizations found to have been criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal were the SD, the GESTAPO, the SS, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party.

[50] OMGUS, AG 383(CA), Subject: Expediting Completion of Denazification Trials in the U. S. Zone, 27 March 1948, OMGUS Papers.

[51] OMGH, *op. cit.* above, note 48. General Clay estimated that under the Law about one-fourth of the total population would be judged by the other three-fourths. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, 1950), p. 259. A Hessian State Secretary estimated, in 1947, that 28 per cent of the registrants (above 18 years of age) were affected by the Law. Karl H. Knappstein, "Die versäumte Revolution," *Die Wandlung* (Heidelberg), II (Nov. 1947), p. 666.

[52] A complete statistical breakdown is found in OMGH, *op. cit.* above, note 48.

The newly formed political parties, which Americans had licensed to provide experience in political democracy at the grass-roots level, proved to be the institutions that conditioned the outcome of the denazification program. In Marburg four parties, the Liberal Democrats, the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Communists, were permitted to participate in denazification by virtue of their state licenses from military government.[56] They nominated the tribunal personnel and even distributed tickets for particular hearings during the early days when denazification was more popular. In addition, the tribunals submitted questionnaires to the parties on which the parties supplied information about persons coming before the tribunals.[57]

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[53] Herz, p. 570, stated that "what Military Government was expected to achieve was a revolution by legal means." See also *Marburger Presse*, 27 Sept. 1947, p. 2 (guest editorial by Dr. Gumbel); Knappstein, pp. 663–77; Griffith, pp. 560–73; and Moses Moskowitz, "The Political Re-education of the Germans: The Emergence of Parties and Politics in Württemberg-Baden (May 1945–June 1946)," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 61 (Dec., 1946), p. 535, quoting a "middle-aged" German that denazification "if carried to its logical conclusion, will destroy a political, economic, social and cultural system much older than Nazism."

[54] I have already indicated the conservative character of the political leaders who formed the political committee early in the occupation. American representatives in Germany thought Marburg was an especially conservative, nationalistic community because of the influence of the university and because of its annexation to Prussia in 1866. One of the first military government representatives in the city wrote that the detachment entered Marburg believing that it was a "hotbed of Nazism." Letter, 8 November 1954, in possession of the author. See also James K. Pollock's review of *The Solution of the German Problem*, by Wilhelm Roepke, in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 19 (Sept., 1948), p. 276, for the statement that Marburg was a "nest of reactionary nationalism."

[55] A vast majority of Marburgers, including the Nazis, the "ohne mich" Germans, and the "kleine Leute" were, of course, closer in their sympathies to the latter.

[56] They were the only four parties licensed at Land level. The Law prohibited locally licensed parties, like the National Democratic Party, from participating.

[57] *Marburger Presse*, 23 July 1946, p. 7; Hermann Bauer to author, 14 Oct. 1958, in possession of the author.

But the different views on denazification did not follow party lines strictly. Conservatives and some nationalists were active in all three major parties in Marburg, whereas the democrats and radicals were found most often in the Social Democratic, Liberal Democratic, and the Communist parties. In all but the latter, however, they were a distinct—albeit vocal and active—minority. The strength of the conservative non-Nazis was already obvious in the early phase of the occupation when they dominated the political committee. The Marburg political committee was, in fact, a coalition of party leaders without benefit of election.

Strongly represented in all three major parties of Marburg, those who objected to the revolutionary nature of denazification easily dominated the whole program. At first, when it appeared that the Law for Liberation would be enforced literally at the insistence of military government, they subverted it. Later, as the law changed to include fewer and fewer people, their attitude toward the law itself changed. As early as October 1945, after Military Government Law No. 8 went into effect, the *Oberbürgermeister* told the party leaders to advise their members to secure adequate uncontestable attestations (*einwandfreie Gutachten*) for presentation to the proper German denazification authorities.[58] In the ceremonies at the opening of the new tribunal for *Landkreis* Marburg, the chairman, formerly a Center Party member and presently a Christian Democrat, informed the audience that the purpose of German denazification was to convict the guilty and to restore the "mere followers" as citizens with full rights and privileges.[59]

In practice the Marburg denazification tribunals reduced the classifications of guilt prescribed by the law for certain Nazi activities and membership tenure. The city tribunal exonerated a leading University official who had been a Nazi Party member since 1933. Further, it was content to instruct a University administrative officer to reform, although he too had a long Party record. It recommended that his atonement be to serve the University once again, but this time to prevent "old Prussianism and militarism" from gaining the upper hand.[60] In numerous other cases the tribunals placed defendants into Class IV or V when they were automatically chargeable as Class II offenders under the Law for Liberation, even though the law proscribed declassification by more than one degree.[61]

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[58] SPA, Minutes, 5 Oct. 1945, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers. The use of such attestations and recommendations, which Germans later called *Persilscheine* after a leading brand of laundry soap, became so widespread after 1946 that the Marburg public prosecutor, a radical Communist who wanted to enforce the Law to the limit, wrote to the *Marburger Presse* (Paul J. Pohnke, "Inflation der Gutachten und Reden," 18 June 1946, p. 4) that his office had been flooded with affidavits, letters of recommendation, and other evidence to assist the Nazis affected by the Law for Liberation. He pointed out that his task was made most difficult because those in higher social, economic, and political circles could present recommendations and references from respected persons, whereas the "kleine Mann" could not.

[59] *Marburger Presse*, 2 Aug. 1946, p. 7. He told me, in 1954, that he believed it his duty to exonerate those who had made a mistaken political choice under Hitler, because they should not have been included in any denazification process. He had been one of the early military government appointees in the Landkreis administration. He had a clear anti-Nazi record, but he is no democrat in his social and political views.

[60] *Marburger Presse*, 6 Aug. 1946, p. 5. The tribunal declared the administrative officer to have been non-political (ein unpolitischer Mensch).

As military government modified the denazification law by amnesties and amendments, the conservatives gradually gave more and more support to the law itself. The changes made it possible to do within its framework what they had formerly done by subverting it at the expense of apparently cooperating with ex-Nazis. During the early phase they interpreted the law leniently, and during the latter phase they embraced it; either way, many Nazis went unpunished. Their actions were continuously criticized by the active leftists and democrats of Marburg.

From the beginning these latter objected to the tribunals' indulgent decisions. Toward the end they opposed the law itself, believing it to be impossible to denazify thoroughly under the changed law. Early in 1946 the Communist public prosecutor and the Communist special branch chief of the military government detachment pushed for literal and thorough denazification.[62] They were joined by the democrat, Hermann Bauer, who thought the law provided a workable solution to the difficult task, even though it did seem to be somewhat hard upon the "little Nazis."[63]

But the few liberal democrats, the leftists, and the Communists soon found themselves outnumbered, overruled, and finally pushed to the sidelines completely. They were attacked by Nazis and conservatives alike, though for different reasons. The Communist public prosecutor of the city tribunal succumbed to the conservative attack after he publicly announced that he would bring charges to convict the *Oberbürgermeister* when his case came before the tribunal.[64] Although the latter was technically not chargeable under the law, the public prosecutor insisted that he had used his position during the Nazi period to improve his financial and economic status.[65] Shortly before the trial began the public prosecutor was suspended for alleged membership in the SS.[66] A new public prosecutor was appointed and the tribunal exonerated the *Oberbürgermeister* after hearing the testimony of several prominent witnesses, including a high official who was the *Oberbürgermeister's* personal friend.[67]

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[61] OMGH, ICD, to OMGH, Subject: A Summary of Spruchkammer Decisions in Marburg, 9 July 1946; OMGH, ICD, Intelligence Branch, to OMGH, Public Safety, Subject: Marburg Spruchkammer, with enclosures, 28 Sept. 1946, OMGUS Papers; *Marburger Presse*, 2 Aug. 1946, p. 7; 6 Aug. 1946, p. 5.

[62] *Marburger Presse*, 3 May 1946, p. 7.

[63] Hermann Bauer, interviews, Marburg, 14 and 16 June 1954; *Marburger Presse*, 1946–1948, *passim*, esp. "Vom Unmenschlichen zum Allzumenschlichen" (editorial), 3 May 1948, p. 2.

[64] In this particular case he had the support of at least two conservatives, one of whom wanted to succeed the Oberbürgermeister. Hermann Bauer to Regierungspräsident Dr. Hoch, Kassel, 19 Sept. 1946, Bauer Papers.

[65] OMG, L & S Marburg, to OMGH, Chief of Intelligence, Subject: Estimate of the Situation of SK & LK Marburg, 13 Dec. 1946, HICOG Papers.

[66] *Marburger Presse*, 17 Sept. 1946, p. 1. He was never officially charged with that crime.

Other Communists fared no better in their services with the denazification tribunals. Their efforts had been so completely frustrated by 1947 that all twenty assessors resigned.[68] In the meantime the Minister for Political Liberation had dismissed the Communist secretary of the *Stadtkreis* tribunal, ostensibly for listening to telephone conversations of non-Communist public prosecutors and other tribunal personnel.[69] The American detachment's German special branch chief, a Communist, whose duty it was to observe denazification and prepare "delinquency and error reports" for higher military government headquarters, complained that he fought a losing battle to uphold the law.[70] He asserted that the tribunals did not enforce the law, the investigators were inadequate, and cases were quashed by public prosecutors without proper evidence. When he objected strongly to the exoneration of a *Landkreis* official who had been a mandatory removal under the USFET July 7 directive, the *Land* military government office apparently failed to support him. He reported that Marburgers could evade the law without fear of American interference.[71]

Hermann Bauer, a left-wing Liberal Democrat, was undoubtedly the severest and most persistent critic of Marburg denazification tribunal decisions. He believed the law provided a means for eliminating the enemies of an infant German democracy. He thought that proper administration of the law should have resulted in punishment for real Nazis and exoneration for "little Nazis," whom he thought the law affected unjustly. He reported in his newspaper, which was licensed by military government, that in practice the important Nazis—those with high status—could bring evidence, affidavits, and witnesses that easily swayed the judgment of the tribunals. The "little Nazis," on the other hand, were at the mercy of the tribunals. He often editorialized on his belief that "if all the big Nazis are set free, there are only little ones left to hang."

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[67] OMG, Marburg, to Director of Intelligence, OMGUS, Subject: Weekly Intelligence Report, 20 Sept. 1946, HICOG Papers; Bauer Papers, *loc. cit.* above, note 64.

[68] OMGH, Marburg, to OMGH, Chief of Intelligence, Subject: Report No. 85, Denazification, 7 Aug. 1947, HICOG Papers.

[69] Interview with subject secretary, Marburg, 20 June 1954.

[70] Because American personnel changed so often, this special branch chief assumed complete responsibility for supervision at times. In 1947 the Liaison and Security Officer for Marburg told a field adviser that he had "no knowledge whatsoever of denazification" and consequently "the entire section [special branch] is being run by a German civilian chief." OMGH, Denazification Division, to OMGH, Subject: Field Adviser's Report of Special Branch Marburg, 21 March 1947, OMGUS Papers.

[71] OMGH, Inspector G. M. Gert, Subject: Annex to Denazification Field Inspection Report L & S Marburg, 6 March 1947, OMGUS Papers. For a provocative discussion of military government officers' private views on denazification see Carl Dreher, "Close-Up of Democracy," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Vol. 22 (Winter, 1947), pp. 89–107. Dreher argues that American officers were a good cross-section of middle-class America and as such felt much closer to their German counterparts, the professional and business classes, though many of these were Nazis, than to the former inmates of the concentration camps or to the politically organized workers who had opposed Hitler's regime.

Bauer, frustrated much earlier than the Communists, resigned as deputy chairman for the Marburg tribunal in October 1946, protesting the exoneration of several University officials and professors, the light sentence pronounced against a Marburg merchant, and the more severe judgments against several people he considered to have been only nominal Nazis.[72] Although his resignation eliminated him from further direct participation in denazification, he used the columns of the *Marburger Presse* to point out in detail case after case in which important Nazis—who apparently would have been extremely insulted had they been considered mere followers between 1933 and 1945—were exonerated, declared to have been mere followers, or placed in lower classifications than the law permitted.[73] But in 1948 Bauer's last means of protest was taken from him. The Marburg tribunal exonerated the former owner of the Marburg newspaper, who once again assumed control of the newspaper plant that military government had taken under property control and turned over to Bauer in trusteeship.[74] Eventually Bauer was ousted from the staff of the paper completely.

Bauer's campaign to push denazification according to the spirit of the law brought him bitter rewards. He lost the *Marburger Presse*, as he had lost his newspaper during the Nazi regime. The American military governor believed him to be a Communist. Bauer resigned from the executive committee of the Free Democratic Party and continued to have serious political differences with his close personal friend, Ludwig Mütze. By 1952 he had eliminated himself from all positions from which he might have influenced public opinion in the direction of a more democratic Germany, even though he still continues, as a private citizen, to promote democratic causes.

Impact on political parties. The impact of denazification was felt keenly by the newly formed political parties in Marburg, both in their organizational activities and in their campaigns. As noted above, the four major parties which had military government licenses to compaign at the *Land* level carried the burden of denazification. But they had to compete in local elections with other parties that military government had licensed to operate at the *Landkreis* and *Stadtkreis* level in accordance with its program to build German democracy at the grass-roots.

Several local political parties were organized and licensed in Marburg after 1946. The most important of these was the National Democratic Party, which began to campaign actively in Marburg early in 1947, but had already been licensed in several neighboring *Landkreise.* Its leaders claimed that it was the only right-wing party in postwar Germany. Reviving Admiral Doenitz's last stand maneuver, the party campaigned for a union of Germany and the Western Powers to fight communism.[75] It encouraged refugees and expellees to believe that they would eventually be returned to their homelands in the East. It attacked denazification violently: some of its Marburg leaders said denazification could be dismissed as a ridiculous affair (*eine lächerliche Einrichtung*), except that it tended to be more brutal than Nazi justice.[76] It appealed especially to the ex-Nazis.[77]

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[72] Military government rewarded him by classifying him as a Communist. OMG, Marburg, to OMGUS, Director of Intelligence, Subject: Weekly Intelligence Report, 11 Oct. 1946, HICOG Papers. It is evidence of something that the military governor did not even know the political preference of the editor of the only newspaper in the area. Bauer was one of the founders of the Liberal Democratic Party in Marburg, and as such signed the weekly party reports that were submitted to military government.

[73] *Marburger Presse*, 1946–1948, *passim*.

[74] OMGH, ICD, Marburg Outpost, to OMGH, ICD, Subject: The Denazification Trial of Dr. Hitzeroth, 19 Aug. 1948, OMGUS Papers.

Competition between the four established parties—especially the more conservative Liberal Democrats (later Free Democrats) and Christian Democrats—and the local splinter parties for members and votes added the final blow to the denazification law in Marburg. With four or five parties competing in every election, the one-third of the electorate that was affected directly by denazification represented the difference between victory and defeat at the polls.[78] All Marburg's political parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, toned down their emphasis on denazification and even helped prospective party members to gain full political rights once more. The Communists themselves were accused of denazifying with a view toward gaining political support while they still participated in denazification.[79]

Political party membership grew tremendously between 1946 and 1948. The secretary of the Marburg Social Democratic Party reported that new enlistments in his party and in other parties grew because "being a party member seemed to be insurance for the little Nazis."[80] Another Marburger gave it as common knowledge that the quickest way to be cleared by the tribunals was to join one of the political parties.[81] Significantly, in 1948, when denazification was coming to an end and the law itself permitted easy denazification, new enlistments decreased and established membership suffered a reduction of "landslide proportions."[82]

The competition among the parties for members was paralleled by the competition for votes. Marburg's local elections after 1946 are best characterized as campaigns which appealed to nationalist sentiment, denounced occupation policies, and directed attacks upon denazification. The major parties could not afford to ignore or oppose these appeals when made by the local parties. Even in 1946 a Christian Democrat was predicting that denazification prepared the way for "Bolshevising" Germany, and by allusion blamed former Jewish emigrants in allied uniforms.[83] In 1949 the Free Democratic candidate who won the *Bundestag* election told his party followers that "the unfortunate effects of denazification . . . had defamed and discriminated against millions of guiltless citizens."[84] Behind these expressions of hostility the parties continually worked for a denazification policy that would allow re-assimilation of ex-Nazis.[85]

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[75] *Marburger Presse,* 14 Feb. 1947, p. 3.

[76] OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Attention: Chief of Intelligence Division, 2 April 1948, HICOG Papers.

[77] LDP Ortsgemeinschaft, Nordeck, to Geschäftsstelle der LDP, Marburg, Subject: Bericht über eine öffentliche Versammlung der Nationaldemokratischen Partei in Nordeck am 21.11.47, 28 Nov. 1947, Free Democratic Party, Marburg Office, Papers, 1945–1948.

[78] The one-third figure is probably too low, because opposition to denazification, for various reasons, was much more widespread than among those directly affected.

[79] OMGH, Inspector G. M. Gert, Subject: Annex to Denazification Field Inspection Report L & S Marburg, 6 March 1947, OMGUS Papers.

[80] Gerhard Jahn, interview, Marburg, 12 May 1954.

[81] Hans Frese, interview, Marburg, 3 July 1954.

[82] Gerhard Jahn, interview, 12 May 1954, said "some Gemeinden lost fifty per cent of their membership in 1948." A few of the losses in membership may have been caused by the deflation that accompanied the currency reform in 1948, which made it difficult to pay the party dues.

Military government itself recognized the danger to the denazification program from party competition in 1948. The National Democratic Party participated in the 1948 election even though its temporary license had expired. After the election another local party protested and petitioned for a new election. The Office of Military Government for *Land* Hessen (OMGH) decided to issue a permanent, retroactive license to the National Democratic Party rather than permit a new election, lest a new election give that party an even higher vote, or force the other parties to stress nationalism and appeal to the ex-Nazis to keep from losing votes.[86]

The failure of denazification to achieve its negative objective in Marburg is manifest in the fact that in December 1948 28 per cent of the municipal employees were among those who had been incriminated under the Law for Liberation.[87] The *Landkreis* administration employed twenty-three such officials (18 per cent of the total), and the villages had elected 25 mayors (20 per cent) who were likewise incriminated.[88] Furthermore, the Denazification Division of OMGH estimated that in 1948 about half the Hessian high government employees were persons who had been affected by the Law for Liberation.[89]

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[83] "Die grössten Schwierigkeiten und Hemmnisse kommen uns jetzt von denen, die als Emigranten in alliierten Uniformen herumlaufen." OMGH, ICD, Marburg Outpost, to OMGH, Chief, ICD, Subject: Quotations from the Speech by Maria Sevenich, CDU, 1 July 1946, OMGUS Papers.

[84] *Marburger Presse*, 5 Aug. 1949, p. 2.

[85] *Marburger Presse*, 26 July 1948, p. 3; 30 April 1948, p. 2; OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Attention: Chief of Intelligence, Subject: Information Report No. 62—Political, 18 Feb. 1949; OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Attention: Chief of Intelligence Section, Subject: Information Report No. 85—Political, 9 March 1949, HICOG Papers.

[86] OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Attention: Chief of Intelligence, Subject: Monthly Political Activity Report, 3 June 1948; OMGH to Nationaldemokratische Partei, Marburg, Subject: Issuance of Permanent License, 23 July 1948, OMGUS Papers.

[87] OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division, Subject: Information Report No. 360—Political. Denazification or Renazification in LK-SK Marburg, 14 Dec. 1948, OMGUS Papers. The exact figures reported were 129 politically incriminated out of a total payroll of 462. The figures are for the city administration, the police department, the city savings bank, the school administration and the city power company. See also Oberbürgermeister Bleek to Militärregierung, Subject: Meldung aller Bediensteten, die Mitglied der NSDAP oder ihrer Gliederungen waren, with enclosures, 20 July 1948; Oberbürgermeister Bleek to Militärregierung, Subject: Bedienstete der Stadtverwaltung einschliesslich der nachgeordneten Dienststellen, die in Gruppe III oder IV des Befreiungsgesetzes eingereiht worden sind, 3 Dec. 1948, Stadtkreis Marburg Papers.

The positive objective of denazification, to provide conditions under which a more democratic life could grow and flourish, proved even harder of achievement in Marburg, in the short run. Among the many reasons for failure, in Marburg none seems more important than the mistaken American belief that if given a measure of freedom and local self-government, without Nazi interference, Germans at the grass-roots level would emulate the American self-image: they would demand individual rights and assume individual responsibilities, willingly eliminate Nazis and other anti-democratic elements, but not initiate radical economic changes. Most Marburgers instead chose an indifferent (*ohne mich*) attitude toward public affairs. They cast their ballots—diligently and religiously—while referring to themselves in conversations and letters to the editor as voting cattle (*Stimmvieh*), and otherwise left public affairs to the political experts. In Marburg those political experts were the conservative, middle-class, protestant political party leaders who were more interested in preserving a "political, economic, social and cultural system much older than Nazism" than in promoting a legal revolution of society and politics.

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[88] OMG, Marburg, to OMGH, Attention: Chief, Intelligence Division, Subject: Information Report No. 360—Political. Denazification or Renazification in LK-SK Marburg, 14 Dec. 1948, OMGUS Papers; Landrat to Militärregierung, 30 July 1948; 3 Aug. 1948, Landkreis Marburg Papers. The practice of dismissing incumbents to make room for previously dismissed officials became so widespread in Hessen that in October 1947 the detachments were ordered to report to higher headquarters each instance in which a capable, qualified person was dismissed to make room for a former removal. OMGH, Denazification Division, Subject: Dismissal of Politically Clear Individuals, 28 Oct. 1947, OMGUS Papers. Article 131 of the Bonn Constitution makes it legally possible to reinstate the former removals with full rights and privileges.

[89] OMGH, Denazification Division, to OMGH, Executive Officer, Subject: Office Memorandum, 27 April 1948, OMGUS Papers.

NATO: PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND COLLABORATION*

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The North Atlantic Treaty is unique among alliances in embodying a degree of peacetime military integration, strategic collaboration, and political cooperation that few wartime coalitions have achieved. This unprecedented degree of interdependence constitutes a great part of NATO's strength but also a great part of NATO's problems—especially those that spring from the dual task of combining the external security with the internal collaboration of its members. Certain military and political developments that were not foreseen when the alliance was created have seriously aggravated these problems. The prospect of several allies acquiring independent nuclear capabilities challenges the basic foundation of the alliance and calls for a reappraisal of its underlying assumptions.

I. THE MILITARY CORE

This paper discusses the military strategic sources of NATO's problems. It assumes that NATO is pre-eminently a defensive military alliance and that it must be judged strong or impotent by the extent to which it gives assurance of advancing the security of its members. To be sure, some of its serious problems are in the political realm—especially those that involve political differences among the allies outside Europe, different approaches among the allies to the political issues in the center of Europe, and competition for power and prestige within the alliance. But NATO's most crucial difficulties, whether they take a political or a military form, originate in the impact of military strategic problems upon the core of mutual security interests, the promotion of which is, after all, the main justification for the alliance.

It is true, as many have observed, that NATO has come to be "more than a purely military alliance." It is a center of coalition diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc and a multilateral framework for inter-allied diplomacy. Psychologically and politically, although not technically, it provides the underpinning of Western economic collaboration. But if NATO's inner core of mutual security interests loses its vitality, its non-military roles will suffer correspondingly; and no extension of political consultation or economic cooperation within the organization will bring about its regeneration. If NATO fails to perform its security function, its other functions will not matter.

II. THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL TASKS OF STRATEGY

The vitality of NATO's core of mutual security interests is a function, primarily, of allied collaboration in military strategy.[1] But strategic collaboration is a complex political as well as military task; therefore, neither national nor coalition strategy can reflect a purely strategic logic. National military strategy affects, and is therefore affected by, many pressing domestic political, economic, and institutional demands—especially where strategy impinges upon public expenditures, individual taxes, and the conscription of manpower. Coalition strategy adds to these domestic pressures the complications of foreign pressures, which spring from the requirement that a number of nations of various interests, foreign policies, and levels of power collaborate in a common plan. The extraordinarily speculative character of strategic calculations under present technological conditions—when nuclear weapons have not been tested on the battlefield, when their unrestricted use would destroy the rational relationship between force and policy, and when security depends so largely upon the imponderable psychology of nuclear deterrence—renders military strategy all the more responsive to domestic and foreign pressures not directly related to strategic requirements.

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[1] By "military strategy" I mean the over-all plan in accordance with which the alliance

Every viable defensive alliance must reconcile the requirements of external security with those of internal cohesion. Since allies, even under the pressure of war, seldom see the requirements of security in the same way, an alliance must permit concessions to the needs of cohesion in order to reap the benefits of collective security—but without, of course, undermining security in the process. This delicate military-political task is particularly significant in NATO, because NATO, unlike the simple bilateral guarantee pacts that are common in history, is a multilateral alliance exacting extensive commitments and contributions from its members in the absence of an overt or imminent military threat.

In order to maintain a balance of incentives over liabilities in the terms of strategic collaboration each ally can make concessions, such as increasing its commitments (political and military obligations) and contributions (manpower, money, and materiel); or it can apply sanctions, such as decreasing them. But, naturally, the task of maintaining a balance of incentives in NATO has fallen to the most powerful ally, the United States.

Since it is largely through the medium of strategic collaboration that the external and internal requirements of the alliance must be reconciled, it is not surprising that NATO's military strategy contains contradictions and ambiguities that reflect the complexities of this task. It contains disparities between stated strategic objectives and actual capabilites, apparent contradictions beween declaratory and operational strategy, and ambiguities in the declaratory pronouncements themselves. From one standpoint these contradictions and ambiguities can be regarded as the necessary price of cohesion, since they enable

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and its members utilize military resources to support security objectives. Logically, its components are the estimate of the nature of potential military threats and the kinds of contingencies in which armed force or the threat of armed force might have to be employed; the plans for responding to these contingencies with armed force and the methods of publicly declaring such plans; the determination of the military forces and capabilities required to support these plans; and the establishment of economic, material, and human contributions needed to support the forces and capabilities.

the allies to live with intractable dilemmas and conflicting interests, which might disrupt collaboration entirely if they were subjected to the exacting demands of sheer strategic logic. On the other hand, these contradictions and ambiguities may jeopardize cohesion by depriving the alliance of clear incentives for collaboration; and they may jeopardize external security by concealing crucial strategic deficiencies and rendering them tolerable.

The complexities of reconciling the external and internal requirements of the alliance through the medium of military strategy are also reflected in significant doubts and apprehensions that revolve around four central, closely related strategic issues which have arisen with radical developments in military technology and the distribution of military power: the deterrent effect of America's capacity for massive retaliation; the function of ground forces; the role of nuclear and conventional weapons; and the dispersion of nuclear weapons among the allies. These issues strike at the core of mutual security interests that bind NATO together as a working defensive alliance. They challenge its viability from the standpoint of both external security and internal cohesion.

III. NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT OF AMERICAN ENTANGLEMENT

In order to understand how these strategic issues impinge upon NATO's core of mutual security interests one must first understand the chief substance of those several interests; in other words, the chief purpose of the alliance in the eyes of its members. Primarily, the North Atlantic allies are bound together by their identical interest in preventing the extension of Soviet control and influence in Europe. But why should they support this interest with an elaborate instrument of interdependence like NATO? Considering the extensive commitments and contributions that NATO demands, what are the persuasive security advantages it offers its members?

Two particular advantages have been attributed to collective military planning and action within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance: (a) by binding several nations to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all it creates a more credible deterrent to aggression than if each nation depended upon its independent military capacity; (b) by combining and utilizing the power of several nations more efficiently it creates a more effective defense against aggression.

However, since the United States has held the great preponderance of power within the North Atlantic alliance, both of these alleged advantages have depended largely upon the extent to which a multilateral alliance renders American power more effective as a deterrent and a defense against aggression than alternative bilateral or unilateral American commitments. From the beginning, the fundamental strength of the North Atlantic Treaty has been conceived to lie in the commitment of the United States to come to the defense of Europe. The founders of the Treaty, conscious of America's history of isolation, believed that a truly entangling multilateral alliance, embodying explicit, binding obligations, was essential in order to make this commitment convincing to the nations of western Europe as well as to the Soviet Union.

It is precisely this basic rationale that is now called into question by strategic issues that were not anticipated at the beginning. Although the firm and effective entanglement of the United States in the defense of Europe remains the chief substance of NATO's core of mutual security interests, the strategic conditions for preserving the entanglement have radically changed.

IV. THE INITIAL PHASE

In the initial phase of the North Atlantic alliance, before the Korean War and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major nuclear power, the alliance reflected a clearly satisfactory distribution of benefits between the United States and Europe at a relatively low level of commitments and contributions for both. The Western European countries, economically enfeebled and politically unstable, realized that they could not recover their strength and at the same time withstand the kind of Soviet pressure displayed in the Czechoslovakian *coup* and the Berlin blockade without American material help and the assurance of American military support in a showdown. The United States, sharing an identical interest in European recovery and security, guaranteed the defense of Europe through a multilateral alliance and extended military as well as economic assistance. In return, Europe agreed to strengthen its forces for the defense of Europe on the ground, in accordance with a unified strategic plan. The United States backed up its guarantees, in effect, by extending the protective umbrella of the Strategic Air Command and the atomic bomb, of which it enjoyed a monopoly. In return, Europe provided the bases that were needed to enable SAC to strike effectively at the heart of Russia. Thus, despite growing favor in the United States toward the Pentagon's (or, at least, the Army's and Navy's) conception of a strong combined force-in-being, the alliance was, in effect, a guarantee pact designed to make America's commitment to come to the defense of Europe convincing.[2]

This guarantee pact was a suitable framework for the mutually satisfactory terms of collaboration at the outset. From the standpoint of European incentives it contained only one significant liability: if America's atomic deterrent should fail and Russia should launch an all-out assault upon Europe, western Europe would be overrun and occupied before it could be liberated on the wings of American bombers. To counter this liability, American spokesmen repeatedly declared that the alliance would protect every member from Soviet occupation and not merely liberate her with air-atomic power; and they explicitly acknowledged that this assurance was the necessary condition for European collaboration.[3]

On the other hand, this declared strategic objective was not supported with actual capabilities, because NATO governments, despite their combined superiority to the Soviet bloc in manpower, basic resources, and productive capacity, have never been willing to create and maintain the mobilized forces that would be required to prevent Russian occupation. Therefore, although the objective has been frequently reaffirmed, no NATO spokesman has ever been able to claim that it could be supported with existing forces. Indeed, the discrepancy between declaratory and operational strategy was obviously inherent in the strategic conditions that were openly recognized at the outset. The strategic conception for the "integrated defense of the North Atlantic area," which the North Atlantic Council endorsed in January, 1950, and which the military adopted, prescribed that "the hard core of the ground power in being" would come from Europe.[4] And yet, along the critical front from the Swiss Border to the mouth of the Elbe, the disparity between Russian and Western effective combat-ready divisions was on the order of 125 (including 25 Russian divisions on the forward line) to 14; and it was generally estimated that a Western force of about 35 mobilized divisions and another 50 in reserve would be needed to defend this front. The European allies said that they were economically incapable of increasing their forces without American aid; but the American military assistance program, in accordance with the European insistence that economic recovery should be the "first prime necessity," proposed only to bring existing European forces up to strength.[5] One of its most effective advocates, Senator Vandenberg, strenuously denied any implication that the program was tied to a strategy of creating forces-in-being designed to defend Europe in a massive land war.[6] He regarded the alliance as a guarantee pact. At the same time, everyone acknowledged that a German contribution to the defense of Europe was unfeasible for political reasons at that time.

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[2] On the early, rather ill-defined difference within the American government between these two conceptions of the alliance, see James Reston's sensitive report, *New York Times*, February 20, 1949, IV, p. 3.

[3] See statements by Secretary of State Acheson, President Truman, and General Bradley: Hearings, *North Atlantic Treaty*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 44; *Department of State Bulletin* (hereafter cited as *Bulletin*), XX (May 22, 1949), 645; XXI (August 9, 1949), 186–88; *New York Times*, April 6, 1949, p. 3.

By what strategic response were such limited allied ground forces expected to stop a Russian assault from running over Europe? The commonly stated view was that a relatively small European holding force—some newspaper reports put the figure at 36 mobilized divisions by 1955—would keep the Russians at bay until the Strategic Air Command and ground forces brought up from reserve could come to the rescue. As the economic and financial implications of defense began to worry the Europeans, and as Congress began to consider the Mutual Defense Assistance Program of 1950, Secretary of Defense Johnson and some other government spokesmen added the suggestion that Europe could be defended without creating large standing armies by utilizing tactical atomic weapons, as well as new anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.[7] However, Secretary of State Acheson, while endorsing the official view of the necessity and feasibility of defending Europe against an all-out assault, preferred to reconcile European security with a tolerable level of military contributions by stressing a different function of allied ground forces: deterring limited aggression. Thus he told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in August, 1949.

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[4] Testimony by General Bradley on July 29, 1949, Hearings, *Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949*, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p 71

[5] Hearings, *North Atlantic Treaty*, pp. 12–13, 22–24, 33.

[6] *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8894; *New York Times*, May 11, 1949, p. 1.

[7] Hearings, *Mutual Defense Assistance Program of 1950*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22; Hearings, *To Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949*, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 27; *New York Times*, June 6, 1950, p. 3; *ibid.*, June 8, 1950, p. 6.

> We do not believe that to discourage military aggression it is necessary to create western European defensive forces which are by virtue of their size capable of successfully resisting an all-out attack. What is required is, rather, sufficient strength to make it impossible for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy victory.[8]

This deterrent function of allied ground forces was, perhaps, a strategic response that could be reconciled with the level of economic and manpower contributions the allies were willing to make; but, certainly, these contributions fell far short of supporting the objective of defending Europe if the deterrent should fail. Yet the resulting contradiction between NATO's declaratory strategy and operational capabilities failed to jeopardize the cohesion of the alliance and probably promoted it, as long as the allies had confidence in two crucial strategic assumptions. One of these assumptions, based upon America's monopoly of the atomic bomb, was that the United States would retaliate against an attack upon Europe with its strategic airpower and that, therefore, America's capacity for massive retaliation would restrain Russia from pursuing its aims by direct military adventures. The other assumption was that, under the protection of America's air-atomic umbrella, Europe's major task was to build a situation of strength, based upon the priority of economic recovery over defense, in order to reduce its vulnerability to the most likely Soviet threat, namely, indirect aggression on the Czechoslovakian model.[9] But two developments combined to undermine confidence in these assumptions and challenge the adequacy of NATO's initial strategy: the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power and the outbreak of the Korean War.

V. THE IMPACT OF SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER

The growth of the Soviet capacity to strike at the United States and its bases with nuclear weapons has tended to undermine allied confidence in America's willingness to resort to massive retaliation in response to an attack upon Europe. Correspondingly, it has undermined confidence in the efficacy of America's capacity for massive retaliation as a deterrent against contingencies short of a direct attack upon the United States itself. At the same time, it has aroused fears that if the United States *did* resort to massive retaliation, this would lead to the obliteration of Europe. Therefore, to the extent that the European allies depend upon America's strategic deterrent for their security, they suffer the double fear that the United States may either leave them defenseless or drag them into a suicidal war. Both fears jeopardize the cohesion of the alliance by striking directly at the incentives for alliance: the first, because it undermines confidence in America's connection with Europe; the second, because it increases the liabilities of Europe's connection with the United States.

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[8] *Bulletin,* XXI (August 8, 1949), p. 193.

[9] See the recollections of George F. Kennan in *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (New York, 1957), pp. 88–91, and the contemporaneous impressions of Senator John Foster Dulles in the *Congressional Record,* 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13086.

The United States government learned that Russia had ended her atomic monopoly as early as August, 1949. However, the growth of doubts and apprehensions about NATO's dependence upon America's capacity for massive retaliation has been a gradual development, which has gained its chief impetus from dramatic events like the American and Soviet thermonuclear explosions in 1953, the contamination of the *Lucky Dragon* crew from the Pacific test explosion of 1954, and, most recently, the Soviet launching of space satellites. The implications of the growth of Soviet nuclear capacity for NATO strategy have emerged even more gradually, but by 1959 a number of them had gained notably widespread recognition in allied governments.

One awkward implication, which runs counter to an old axiom of NATO strategy, is that in terms of a strategy of massive retaliation there is no sense in trying to protect Europe against an all-out assault, since Europe would be obliterated in the resulting nuclear holocaust in any case. But although this implication may be accepted in practice, the psychological and political disadvantage of acknowledging that NATO does not intend to protect every ally from the dreaded cycle of occupation and liberation has precluded its official acknowledgement.

Another disturbing implication is that, as Soviet nuclear power tends to neutralize America's nuclear advantage, and as the huge Soviet ground forces exert correspondingly greater weight in the military balance, NATO needs considerably larger ground forces to offset new Soviet opportunities for limited aggression—not excluding Korean-sized aggression—and "nuclear blackmail." The State Department Policy Planning Staff reached this conclusion soon after Russia's atomic explosion, and the conclusion was embodied in the National Security Council document NSC 68, early in 1950; but budgetary restrictions have prevented the government's acting upon it, except during the Korean crisis.

A third strategic implication of the growth of Soviet nuclear power is that NATO forces need a capacity for intermediate responses against limited aggressions in order to save the alliance from having to choose between total war and passive acquiescence. NATO publicly adopted this conclusion in 1957, but it is doubtful that the conclusion has been translated into military capabilities.

A further implication, which has been translated into military reality, is that, in proportion to NATO's inability to meet aggression by means short of total war, the growth of Soviet nuclear power requires the United States to offset the declining credibility of her commitment to defend Europe by providing a visible hostage to her intentions. The five American divisions on the continent serve this purpose, although they were originally contributed for somewhat different reasons.

Finally, perhaps the most important implication of all, which has gained force with the advance and dissemination of nuclear technology, is that the European allies may need their own strategic nuclear capabilities, or else an equitable share in the control of a common strategic nuclear capability, in order to escape the mounting hazard of depending upon the United States' capability (which is not under NATO's authority).

These strategic implications, though necessarily speculative and debatable, are plausible conclusions, implicit in the spectacular growth of Soviet nuclear power. Together, they constitute a massive challenge to the external security and internal cohesion of the alliance. But, characteristically, their actual impact upon allied strategy has depended upon the stimuli of unanticipated crises, developments in military technology, and a variety of domestic and foreign pressures not directly connected with long-run strategic imperatives. Thus the Korean War had a more immediate impact upon the original assumptions of NATO strategy than the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power. The side-effects of that impact remain.

VI. THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

On the eve of the Korean War the North Atlantic powers were scarcely better prepared to resist aggression than when the alliance was formed. The North Korean invasion precipitated the first and last serious effort to create the kind of forces-in-being that might support a "forward strategy" capable of preventing Soviet troops from overrunning Europe.[10]

This effort reflected a radical change in allied estimates of the Russian threat. The North Korean attack seemed to discredit the prevailing assumption that America's massive retaliatory capacity would deter the Russians from undertaking direct military adventures. "The attack upon Korea," President Truman announced, "makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will use armed invasion and war."[11] In retrospect, one must doubt the wisdom of interpreting a satellite attack upon a peripheral strategic position, which the United States had excluded from her "defensive perimeter" and from which she had withdrawn her troops, as indicating an imminent Russian attack on Western Europe. But in the absence of any reliable test of a potential aggressor's intentions, estimates are bound to reflect hopeful assumptions in times of relatively low tension and pessimistic assumptions during overt crises, depending upon the margin of safety governments may tolerate in adjusting defense policies to competing domestic pressures.

In accordance with this revised estimate of the Russian threat, the United States undertook a "crash" rearmament program and urged its allies to do likewise. President Truman proclaimed that "the key element in the defense of Europe is the ability to hold on the ground."[12] Secretary of State Acheson echoed military opinion in declaring that defense policies should be based on Soviet capabilities rather than on what one might surmise about Soviet intentions; and by this measurement, he said, "it is evident that a forced draft on a very large scale is required" in order to translate the potential strength of the free nations into defense-in-being with the greatest speed.[13] Accordingly, the original priority of economic recovery over a military buildup in Europe was reversed. This severely tested the prevailing assumption that Europe could attain an adequate level of preparedness without sacrificing economic progress and standards of living. It was a decisive blow to the original balance of benefits and liabilities within allied strategy.

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[10] The North Atlantic Council, meeting in New York on September 15, 1950, agreed to adopt a "forward strategy" that would resist aggression as far eastward as possible. Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954* (Paris, 1954), p. 32. SHAPE planners developed the forward strategy after the Headquarters was established in 1951.

[11] Statement on June 27, 1950, *Bulletin*, XXIII (July 3, 1950), p. 5.

This blow was accompanied by major structural and political alterations in the alliance. In 1951 NATO was formally transformed from a guarantee pact to an integrated defensive force-in-being, with the creation of a central headquarters (SHAPE) and a supreme allied Commander (General Eisenhower), commanding national divisions of troops, air forces, and the supporting bases and logistics, or "infrastructure." The Korean crisis also precipitated America's decision to seek a West German contribution—a decision which, however disturbing to allied cohesion, was indispensable to the support of a forward strategy. In July, 1951, General Eisenhower, acting in his newly created capacity as Supreme Allied Commander, endorsed an integrated European army as the vehicle for making a German contribution politically acceptable. Prodded by American pressure, the six European members of NATO subsequently agreed to the integration of twelve German divisions within a European Defense Community. However, the failure of France to ratify this agreement postponed Germany's membership in NATO until October, 1954, under the less radical but no less unprecedented military integration embodied in the Paris Agreements. These structural and political alterations gave the alliance a greater military potential, but they also burdened it with a greater task of strategic collaboration.

To stimulate the rearmament of Europe, the United States was prepared to make concessions as well as to apply pressure. Thus she promised to increase the number of her continental divisions from two to about six, primarily as a token of her firm commitment and as a morale-booster, intended to encourage the European allies to rearm themselves.

Yet despite the new structural and political conditions of strategic collaboration and the radical increases in allied military contributions that were now considered essential, the declared strategic function of allied forces remained the same. Secretary Acheson, explaining allied strategy to Congress, again expounded the deterrent function of ground forces against minor attacks. But he also continued to justify ground forces in terms of preventing Europe, in the event of an attack, "from having to go through another occupation and liberation";[14] and American military testimony confirmed this as an essential and feasible goal.

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[12] *New York Times*, May 25, 1951, p. 4.

[13] Testimony on August 30, 1950, asking for additional Mutual Defense Assistance Program appropriations, the largest portion of which was intended for NATO countries. *Bulletin*, XXIII (September 11, 1950), p. 437.

However, as the immediate impact of the North Korean invasion wore off, there followed a rapid decline in allied incentives for strategic collaboration at the high level of commitments and contributions that Acheson's reaffirmation of NATO's strategic function stressed. Consequently, in European eyes the value of the alliance reverted primarily to that of a guarantee pact. But the United States, instead of remaining content with the original discrepancy between declaratory and operational strategy, now pressed for the fulfilment of high force goals in accordance with her conception of NATO as a large integrated force-in-being. This difference of emphasis between the United States and her European allies became a predominant feature of every strategic problem. Accordingly, as the fear of a Soviet attack on Europe declined, NATO strategy became more responsive to a combination of domestic political considerations and the assumed requirements of allied cohesion and less responsive to military estimates of the hard requirements of external security.

VII. THE AFTERMATH OF THE KOREAN WAR

The effort to build up allied ground forces reached its apparent zenith at Lisbon in February, 1952, when the NATO Council accepted the European Defense Community as the best means of securing a German defense contribution and fixed a goal of 50 divisions (about half of which would constitute a readily mobilized reserve) by the end of 1952 and a provisional goal of 96 divisions by the "year of maximum danger" in 1954.[15] (Neither goal included Greek and Turkish troops.) Official statements indicated that the strategic function of these projected forces remained unchanged.[16]

However, if it was not clear before the Lisbon conference that NATO was unwilling to rearm on a major scale, it soon became evident afterward, as all NATO governments, with Great Britain in the forefront, began to relax their defense efforts, pointing to the economic dislocations caused by rearmament, abandoning the year-of-maximum-danger formula in favor of the "long pull," undertaking economic retrenchment, stretching out force goals into the future, and reducing manpower or shortening the terms of conscription.

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[14] Hearings, *Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area,* Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 79, 80, 106–7.

[15] The concept of the "year of maximum danger," although never more than a guide line for rearmament, was based upon a calculation of the time by which Russia would acquire sufficient atomic capacity to be in a position to utilize her numerical superiority in mobilized manpower for exerting intensive political or even military pressure—a concept that had been reflected in NSC 68. See General Bradley's, General Vandenberg's, and General Twining's explanations in Hearings, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953,* Senate Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 332–34, 385.

[16] See General Gruenther's statement in Hearings, *Mutual Security Act of 1952,* Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d Congress, 2d Sess., p. 218; also, General Eisenhower's statement as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, *First Annual Report* (Paris: SHAPE, 1952), p. 27.

Only a perpetuation of the fears of imminent danger aroused by the North Korean attack could have provided sufficient incentive for the allies to have made anything like the level of contributions agreed to at the Lisbon conference. But with the stalemate in Korea and the beginning of truce talks in July, 1951, allied governments, notwithstanding official NATO insistence that the Soviet threat had not diminished, returned to their original low estimate of the likelihood of Soviet or satellite military attacks on Europe.[17] Insofar as the military threat to Europe was proclaimed, the United States—and especially its military leaders—carried the burden of the argument. Although allied governments continued anxiously to seek America's reaffirmations of her determination to protect Europe at the Elbe, they were far more concerned with internal economic and political problems—or, as in the case of French involvements in Indochina and Algeria, with their own security problems outside Europe—than with an hypothetical assault upon Europe. The death of Stalin and Russia's concentration upon a tactic of "peaceful coexistence" in Europe made the likelihood of such an assault seem even more remote and gave credence to the supposition that the main thrust of Communist power had shifted to the non-military realm and to areas outside Europe.

Moreover, it seemed that NATO might virtually have achieved a force that was sufficient to deter the only kind of direct aggression that European governments took seriously: a quick, limited *fait accompli.* By 1954 NATO's western European forces became stabilized at about 25 nominally combat-ready divisions (before France withdrew four divisions in 1956 to fight in Algeria and Great Britain withdrew 2½ divisions after her defense revision in 1957), backed by about the same number of under-strength reserve divisions. Although this force was incapable of defending Europe against a major Russian assault, as successive Supreme Commanders conceded, it did seem adequate to deter the kind of limited aggression that Acheson had envisaged.

As long as NATO forces seemed capable of deterring these lesser threats, the European allies were inclined to rely on the United States to deter any larger threats. As long as NATO strategy depended so overwhelmingly upon deterring a major Soviet aggression by a capacity for massive retaliation, which required fantastically destructive and expensive weapons that only the United States could afford, there seemed to be no compelling reason for the European allies to construct a larger ground force.

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[17] See, for example, statements by Prime Minister Churchill on December 6, 1951, *Parl. Deb.* (H.C.), vol. 494, p. 2592, and by the forthcoming Secretary of State, Dulles, on February 16, 1952, in the *Congressional Record,* 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1800–02, later repeated in office in a statement to the North Atlantic Council, *New York Times,* December 16, 1955, p. 1, and in Congressional testimony in May, 1956, Hearings, *Mutual Security Appropriations for 1957,* Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 4, 5, 13.

In these circumstances, a difference between the dominant European and American conceptions of the alliance, which had been developing even before the Korean war, became more apparent. From the American standpoint NATO was an instrument for building an integrated force-in-being that would redress the military balance with Russia; but from the standpoint of her European allies the alliance remained, primarily, a means of firmly committing the United States to their defense, while their military contributions were intended more to preserve the American commitment than to provide for the common defense.

Only extraordinary American concessions or sanctions, such as a massive increase in economic aid or the threat of withdrawing troops, might have induced the European allies to subordinate their domestic economic and social goals to the stated requirements of defense. America's continuation of economic and military assistance, although at a reduced level, may be considered a necessary concession to allied military collaboration. And Secretary Dulles's suggestion of an "agonizing reappraisal" of American policy if France failed to ratify the EDC treaty was certainly intended as a sanction. But the United States did not resort to more drastic incentives.

Furthermore, in its own defense policies the American government did not set an example calculated to inspire European defense efforts. Despite her greater stress upon NATO as an integrated military force, the United States, still regarding the defense of Europe on the ground as primarily a European responsibility, was no more inclined than her relatively hard-pressed allies to support the common defense at the sacrifice of her domestic standard of living. On the contrary, her own defense policies provided a persuasive example of the strategic formula for economic retrenchment. The new Republican administration promised to provide maximum security at minimum cost by reverting to the pre-Korean strategy of an overwhelming reliance upon the deterrent effect of America's capacity for massive retaliation. This formula was to prove increasingly popular in allied governments as the prospect of substituting nuclear firepower for manpower gleamed brighter. It received dramatic endorsement in 1957 when the British government, following a trend clearly foreshadowed in 1955—Churchill had then declared Britain's decision to acquire an independent nuclear retaliatory capacity—announced that it had decided, in response to economic imperatives, "to revise not merely the size, but the whole character of the defense plan" by depending primarily upon its own as well as America's strategic deterrent and by cutting back the British Army of the Rhine.[18]

The net result of these military and political developments was that NATO remained overwhelmingly dependent upon the deterrent effect of America's capacity for massive retaliation as the rapid growth of Soviet nuclear power undermined the credibility of America's commitment to defend Europe at the cost of total war. While the growth of Soviet nuclear power began to impress upon the allies the liabilities of a monistic strategy, the trend of military capabilities ran directly contrary to strategic pluralism.

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[18] *Statement on Defense, 1957*; see also, *Statement on Defense, 1955* and Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955, in *Parl. Deb* (H.C.), vol. 537, pp. 1894–1905. Churchill evidently made a fundamental strategic decision to bring military policies into balance with economic limitations by relying more heavily on strategic airpower and nuclear weapons in 1952, soon after coming to office. See Charles Murphy's articles in *Fortune:* January, 1953, pp. 80 ff., and December, 1953, pp. 77 ff.

In effect, the failure of the allies to create a larger and more diversified capacity for ground resistance left NATO forces in the position of a "trip-wire" against anything but the most limited military threat. That is, insofar as NATO forces were incapable of withstanding military assaults, they would serve chiefly as the device for touching off massive retaliation, although it was never clear why this device would be needed to indicate an all-out assault. In the aftermath of the Lisbon conference this "trip-wire" or "plate-glass" conception gained some favor unofficially, but its obvious defect from the standpoint of eliciting European collaboration precluded its official adoption and, in fact, required its repeated repudiation.

As the prospect of NATO's achieving an enlarged forward "shield" grew more remote, the burden upon the existing forces as a symbol and assurance of European-American interdependence became more pressing. Increasingly, the European allies regarded their contributions to these forces as primarily a concession to American collaboration, while the United States acknowledged the enhanced psychological significance of her contribution as a hostage to her NATO obligations. Thus the chief purpose of America's five continental divisions continued to be the maintenance of allied cohesion, but their specific function changed from starting a spiral of confidence that would lead Europe to build its own defenses to reversing a spiral of declining confidence by reassuring Europe that the United States would not abandon Europe and withdraw to Fortress America.

VIII. THE ADOPTION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

By 1954 the growth of Russia's air-nuclear capacity had aroused significant apprehensions in the United States over a strategic contradiction—the discrepancy between NATO's declaratory strategy of defending every member on the ground and NATO's actual military capabilities—which had been a perfectly satisfactory price of collaboration to everyone at the outset. Confronted with this discrepancy, American and NATO spokesmen reaffirmed that the defense of Europe without the devastation or occupation of any ally was an indispensable objective;[19] but now, under American leadership, NATO embraced tactical nuclear weapons as the means of supporting this objective at a level of economic and manpower contributions the allies were willing to pay. However, contrary to original hopes, this strategic expedient, rather than solving the problem of reconciling NATO's external and internal requirements, has compounded it by increasing NATO's dependence upon a nuclear response.

[19] See, for example, statements by President Eisenhower and Supreme Allied Commander General Norstad. *Bulletin*, XXX (April 26, 1954), p. 619; XXXVI (February 18, 1957), p. 254.

In the spring and summer of 1954 SHAPE military planners, echoing a decision already reached in American defense policies, announced that a SHAPE study showed that it was both necessary and feasible for NATO to base its strategy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to redress the imbalance between Soviet and Western ground forces and defend Europe against an all-out attack.[20] Field Marshal Montgomery declared that NATO had reached "the point of no return as regards the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war."[21] Subsequently, the North Atlantic Council agreed that NATO should plan on using nuclear weapons against conventional attacks; and, on this basis, it reduced the ground forces target from fifty to thirty divisions. Secretary of State Dulles hailed this decision as for the first time providing the means of supporting a forward strategy that could protect western Europe from invasion and throw the aggressor back "at the threshold."[22]

However, since 1954, tactical nuclear weapons have not lived up to their original promise as a solution to NATO's strategic problems. There is grave doubt that the relatively small NATO forces using tactical nuclear weapons could protect Europe from the larger Soviet forces using tactical nuclear weapons, or that there would be anything left of European civilization if they tried. There is less confidence than before that tactical nuclear weapons permit significant economies in mobilized manpower. Although government spokesmen in 1959 continued to justify reduction of ground forces with the argument that nuclear firepower substitutes for manpower, the United States Army concluded that nuclear warfare will require more manpower than conventional warfare.[23] Certainly, the development and production of these weapons have been anything but economical in monetary terms. They have, in fact, been so expensive as to arouse considerable military concern that concentration upon nuclear armament has virtually deprived NATO of an effective conventional capability. NATO's growing dependence upon a nuclear response, in turn, jeopardizes allied collaboration, especially when the United States retains exclusive control of the nuclear warheads. For even if a nuclear war could be limited from the American and Russian standpoint—a thesis which has won no more acceptance among allied or NATO officials than among Soviet spokesmen—it threatens to be a total disaster for the allies in the battle zone.

These second thoughts about tactical nuclear weapons have led NATO to emphasize their utility more as a deterrent than as a defense against aggression. But, at the same time, the growing consciousness of the penalties of nuclear war has depreciated the credibility of a tactical nuclear response to a conventional attack in Western eyes and, one may speculate, in Soviet eyes also. Of course, this depreciation has been expressed more openly in private discussions and independent publications than in official statements. Nevertheless, the British government has already gone quite far in explicitly qualifying the threat of nuclear response. It has acknowledged that neither strategic nor tactical nuclear weapons would necessarily be used against conventional aggressions in Europe that were not "major, full-scale attacks," although it has refused to define the contingencies between a major attack and a small border incident in which nuclear or conventional weapons might be used, lest this invite piecemeal conventional aggression.[24]

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[20] *New York Times*, April 25, 1954, p. 27; January 8, 1954, p. 2; July 25, 1954, p. 1; August 14, 1954, p. 3; *Bulletin*, XXXI (October 18, 1954), pp. 562–66.

[21] *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, XCIX (November, 1954), pp. 507–23.

[22] *New York Times*, December 22, 1954, p. 4.

[23] Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil and Secretary of Defense McElroy in Hearings, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959*, House Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 369, 378. *New York Times*, March 14, 1958, p. 1; October 27, 1958, p. 1. The chief factors supporting this conclusion were said to be the higher casualty rate, the greater depth of the battle line, and the more complex logistics required.

In 1959 the American government still professed to rely as heavily as ever upon the threat of nuclear warfare to deter a conventional attack in Europe, while it recognized no possibility of a limited nuclear war.[25] Thus in March, 1959, President Eisenhower, referring to the Berlin crisis, based his confidence in America's capacity to deter a local threat on the proposition that the West would not fight a ground war in Europe but might have to fight a nuclear war, even though it would be so disastrous as to be "self-defeating."[26] Indeed, the government refrained from discussing the possibility of war in Europe at all except in terms of a conflict involving direct Soviet intervention, which it declared would result in a general nuclear war.[27] On the other hand, Secretary of State Herter expressed a far more qualified view when he told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 21, 1959, that the West would not be justified in conducting a nuclear war in the initial stages of a Russian attack before making sure that the Russians were carrying it to the point of an all-out war, and that the President would not involve the United States in an all-out nuclear war "unless the facts showed that we were in danger of devastation ourselves."[28] And this tacit depreciation of NATO's nuclear threat is reinforced by the more extreme statement of Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown in October, 1958, before taking over command of Allied forces in southern Europe, that in the "not far future," when both the United States and Russia would have operational ICBM's, "I would not recommend the use of any atomic weapon no matter how small," since even small atomic weapons would bring on a nuclear holocaust.[29]

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[24] *Parl. Deb.* (H.C.), vol. 537 (1955), pp. 2182–83; vol. 549 (1956), p. 1035; vol. 564 (1957), pp. 1765, 1766; vol. 583 (1958), pp. 395, 410. It is significant that in 1958 even Field Marshal Montgomery was stating, albeit in retirement, that when both sides achieved "nuclear sufficiency" in due course, the West would not commit suicide by using its nuclear deterrent against a minor Russian aggression with conventional forces. *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute,* CIII (November 1958), pp. 468–87.

[25] Neither Secretary Dulles nor any other official spokesman followed up the hint, which Dulles introduced in an article in 1957, that nuclear weapons now "need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity" and that "in the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power." *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 36, (October 1957), p. 31.

[26] *New York Times,* March 12, 1959, p. 12.

[27] See Secretary of Defense McElroy's statement of this position in Hearings, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1959,* pp. 370, 378, 389. Both President Eisenhower's and Secretary McElroy's positions were in distinct contrast to the testimony of Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor in March, 1959. General Taylor saw "many situations short of general war" in Western Europe in which he could "visualize attack by satellites alone." In such situations, he said, the United States might engage in "rather prolonged operations of the conventional type." Hearings, *Major Defense Matters,* Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 50, 56–57.

Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that, even though tactical nuclear weapons may be a perfectly effective supplement to strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent against less-than-major aggressions in Europe, they do not relieve the alliance of legitimate doubts and apprehensions that spring from NATO's dependence upon an admittedly suicidal response, the credibility of which Western spokesmen themselves have called into question. Consequently, there has been increasing sentiment for remedying or, at least, ameliorating this predicament by enlarging and diversifying the capabilities of NATO's "Shield," or forward line.

IX. NEW EMPHASIS ON NATO'S SHIELD

Supreme Allied Commander General Norstad has made the most complete official statement of the case for NATO's shield. In appealing for forward ground forces of thirty divisions, he has described three functions of the shield.[30] Two of these functions have been recognized in official statements from the beginning, although the second is now assigned a relatively higher priority than before: (a) to protect all NATO territory against major aggression by holding an attack until the total weight of retaliatory power can be brought to bear; (b) to deter a border incident or a limited probing action by making it clear to the potential aggressor that "he would have to use substantial force to breach the shield, an act he knows would bring down upon him the full weight of the deterrent, including our heavy strategic power."

NATO's present shield—nominally twenty-one divisions—is probably adequate for the second function, but it is doubtful that thirty divisions would be sufficient to support the first. However, the third function that Norstad has described is more specifically designed to meet the requirements of external security and internal cohesion in the face of Russia's emergence as a full-fledged nuclear power; and it constitutes a rational justification for the minimum force envisioned. The shield, General Norstad has said, must provide new military and political flexibility, and it must relieve the allies of having to choose between total war and passive acquiescence, by enabling NATO to respond to "less than ultimate incidents with something other than massive retaliation"—with "some intermediate means." If NATO depends exclusively upon massive retaliation, Norstad has warned, the alliance will dissolve and we will be "piecemealed to death."

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[28] *New York Times*, April 21, 1959, p. 1. This view is in accordance with General Norstad's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 6, 1959, that NATO "would deal with any situation that could be dealt with, with conventional weapons, if possible." Hearings, *Mutual Security Act of 1959*, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 466.

[29] *New York Times*, October 8, 1958, p. 12.

[30] *Ibid.*, June 25, 1956, p. 22; *Bulletin*, XXXVI (February 18, 1957), 251–55; XXXVII (December 16, 1957), 952–55; "The Sword and the Shield of NATO," *Army*, VIII (December, 1957), 44–47; Hearings, *Mutual Security Act of 1958*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 185 ff.; *Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1959*, Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 564–65; Hearings, *Mutual Security Act of 1959*, pp. 445–47, 466.

Yet General Norstad has stopped far short of extending this third function to its full logic; for, like spokesmen of American defense policies, he has pointedly denied that a limited war is possible in the NATO area, and he has emphasized that the shield forces "can no longer be considered as 'conventional forces,' " although they retain a "residual conventional capacity." Therefore, he envisages military and political flexibility chiefly in terms of NATO's ability to hold a limited probing action—by conventional means, if possible—long enough to "force a conscious decision on the part of the Russians that they either will or will not go to war" and to compel them to weigh the costs of the total war that would result from an affirmative decision.

Thus, on the one hand, the Supreme Commander has recognized that NATO's dependence on America's threat of massive retaliation has become too dangerous from the standpoint of allied security and cohesion. But, on the other hand, he has conceded that, as a supplement to massive retaliation, NATO is compelled by the minimum number of troops it is willing to raise and support to rely primarily upon the deterrent effect of a nuclear ground force that is designed only to hold an attack until the full weight of retaliatory power is brought to bear. In order to relieve NATO of the choice between obliteration and occupation, still implicit in this reformulation of what remains essentially a deterrent strategy of massive retaliation, he recognizes the importance of an alternative intermediate response; but, lest he diminish the deterrent value of the nuclear forces upon which NATO primarily depends, he denies the possibility of a limited war or of a conventional response beyond a brief holding action.

This strategy has not succeeded in satisfying the conflicting demands for increased deterrence at less risk, as well as defense against limited and major aggressions if deterrence fails—all at no greater cost in money and men. No strategy can. But, perhaps, General Norstad's is the wisest strategic formula given the limited contributions that NATO can expect to receive from its members. Moreover, if Germany fulfilled its force-level goal of twelve divisions, if France returned her four divisions in Algeria, and if Great Britain restored the two it withdrew, NATO might finally have almost the thirty divisions that Norstad has called a minimum, instead of the present twenty-one undermanned divisions, which leave NATO's shield at a dangerous disparity of about four-to-one compared to the Soviet-and-satellite forward line.

Still one must doubt that the balance of incentives over liabilities conveyed in Norstad's formula is sufficient to obtain even this minimum ground force with an adequate conventional as well as nuclear capability. Perhaps an explicit statement of NATO's willingness to fight a limited conventional war in Europe would provide the missing rational incentive. But, aside from the questionable impact of such a statement on the deterrent effect of NATO's nuclear forces, an explicit formulation of an enlarged conventional-war function for NATO's shield would be unconvincing and dangerously misleading if it were not supported by actual capabilities. And, considering the demonstrated allied reluctance to increase military contributions except under the fear of imminent aggression, the prospect of a marginal increase in security against seemingly improbable limited aggressions in Europe, which would be admittedly difficult to resist on a limited basis or to confine to tolerable levels of local destruction, is not likely to inspire the allies to make the sacrifices in money and manpower that are needed to create and maintain a truly dual-capability force of thirty devisions. Perhaps, in these circumstances, an agreement on the limitation and control of an acceptable ratio of NATO and non-NATO forces in Central Europe is more promising than a buildup of NATO forces, which would probably be countered by a Communist buildup in any case. However, as of now, the fact remains that, while Russia's growing nuclear capacity has undermined confidence in the reliability and efficacy of America's capacity for massive retaliation to deter anything less than a direct attack upon the United States, NATO has not developed a convincing strategy for defending its members against either limited or major aggressions, without obliterating them, at a cost they are willing to pay.

General Norstad's formulation of NATO strategy recognizes that, militarily and psychologically, America's participation in the defense of Europe has become more important than ever, with the growth of Soviet nuclear power. It also recognizes that the strategic conditions for maintaining effective American-European collaboration have become vastly more demanding with the enlarged significance of NATO's forward shield. If Western Europe were so strong and so integrated as to be capable of performing the functions of both NATO's sword and shield by itself, there would be no need for American-European strategic collaboration, and NATO could be superseded. But this does not seem to be a practical prospect—politically, economically, or militarily—in the foreseeable future.

X. NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

Considering the perplexities of resolving conflicting and contradictory demands within a common military strategy requiring an unprecedented level of peacetime contributions and interdependence, it is not surprising that NATO strategy no longer conveys to its members the simple, compelling core of mutual security interests that it embodied at the outset. Consequently, some allies are increasingly receptive to political and military courses that promise to enhance their security by more radical means than delicate adjustments in the terms of strategic collaboration. Two courses are particularly attractive: (1) a political agreement with the Soviet Union, leading to military disengagement, and (2) acquisition of an independent nuclear capability. Neither course is, *per se,* an alternative to NATO; but both have crucial implications for NATO strategy, which impinge upon the basic military and political foundation of the alliance.

In order to appraise the implications for allied security and collaboration, of several allies seeking independent nuclear—and especially strategic nuclear—capabilities, one must first understand the reasons that may lead other allies to follow Great Britain's course in escaping exclusive reliance upon America's nuclear power. The decisive incentives would seem to be the following: (a) to obtain a more effective deterrent to military threats against which the United States cannot be relied upon to respond with its own nuclear power; (b) to gain greater protection against "nuclear blackmail"—that is, against various forms of Soviet political pressure backed by the threat of Soviet nuclear power; (c) to facilitate the pursuit of political positions that the United States is not willing to support at the risk of nuclear war; (d) to achieve greater bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the United States and other allies in diplomatic undertakings; (e) to enhance the general prestige and status of the nation; (f) to rationalize economies in other military expenditures, especially mobilized manpower, by offering the public more security at a tolerable cost. How strong are these incentives, and what is their rational justification?

Are there circumstances in which an ally's nuclear response would be more credible to the Soviet Union than America's response? One cannot know how the Kremlin might appraise the threat of such a response; but if its appraisal accurately gauged the calculations of allied powers, an ally would enhance its deterrent power only under circumstances in which it would be more willing than the United States to use that power, providing that it could convince the Soviet Union that she would receive unacceptable costs.[31] By this criterion it is not plausible that an independent nuclear capability would enhance an ally's deterrent power against military threats in Europe, except, perhaps, those that an ally would regard as virtually total but the United States would regard as limited. In this hypothetical contingency an ally with only a rudimentary nuclear capability might be able and willing to impose unacceptable costs upon the Soviet Union, especially if its response threatened to involve the United States in the war. Yet one must temper such hypothetical speculations with considerations of actual national psychology. In terms of the realities of national psychology there would seem to be few, if any, kinds of military incursions in Europe in response to which any ally would be more willing to incur the penalties of initiating strategic or tactical nuclear warfare than the United States. For the United States, while regarding the political stakes in Western Europe as second only to those in the North American continent itself, feels less vulnerable to nuclear devastation than her European allies, who have poignant memories of the destruction wrought by two world wars and who must calculate that they would virtually commit national suicide in a third world war involving them in a nuclear exchange with Russia. If it is doubtful that the United States will initiate nuclear war—especially strategic nuclear war—against conventional aggression in Europe, it is even more doubtful that any European ally will prefer obliteration to occupation or some lesser form of political acquiescence.

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[31] For the sake of this discussion let us assume that the ally in question has at least a dozen relatively invulnerable missiles, including mobile and massively-shielded solid-fuel or pre-packaged liquid-fuel missiles and, possibly, sea-launched missiles, for the present generation of soft-based liquid-fuel IRBM's would seem to be virtually useless as a second-strike capability.

If an ally will gain little, if any, additional deterrence by controlling its own nuclear weapons, it is not likely to gain any significant political leverage or protection against nuclear blackmail either. Nor is there any reason to suppose that it would gain any real bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the United States, except in acquiring more American nuclear information and weapons; for an ally does not become more valuable to the United States simply by possessing its own nuclear capability, and an attempt to coerce the United States with the threat of independent nuclear action could clearly backfire.

Nevertheless, in making strategic calculations about such a crucial yet speculative matter as the efficacy of nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence and diplomacy, governments naturally want to play safe by relying, as far as possible, on their own nuclear weapons rather than on the will and ability of others to use them in their behalf. Therefore, allied governments understandably discount the reliability of America's nuclear deterrent and look forward to relieving themselves of exclusive dependence upon it. In Great Britain and France this consideration, combined with more general considerations of domestic policy and national prestige, is already a demonstrably persuasive incentive for acquiring an independent nuclear capability. Furthermore, if the United States, in response to Soviet ICBM progress, continues to disperse IRBM's and their warheads (as well as tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear stockpiles) on allied territory,[32] the allies who permit this dispersion are likely to grow restive under an arrangement that renders them more vulnerable while Americans retain control of the nuclear warheads and stockpiles. Finally, the power of example and the desire not to be left out of an expanding nuclear club are likely to prove decisive. When France joins Great Britain in the club, Germany will not be far behind.

To be sure, these incentives for acquiring an independent nuclear capability must be weighed against certain disincentives: particularly, the expense or technical difficulty of developing a relatively invulnerable capability, American laws against the dissemination of atomic information and devices, the fear of increased vulnerability, and popular sentiment against testing, ownership, and production of nuclear weapons. The first factor, alone, may confine the achievement of anything beyond a few "nominal" atomic bombs to France and

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[32] In December, 1957, the United States secured the approval of the NATO heads of government to placing IRBM's and distributing nuclear stocks on allied territory, in accordance with the negotiation of bilateral agreements. However, the only agreements negotiated by 1960 were with Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey. See note 35.

Western Germany within the next five years.[33] But this will be sufficient to raise some serious questions for the future of NATO.

The political effects within the alliance of the pressure for nuclear diffusion may be of more immediate importance than the military effects. On the one hand, given the incentives for diffusion, the failure of the United States to facilitate this process may, as Secretary of State Dulles argued, drive allies toward neutralism without stopping diffusion in the end anyway.[34] Therefore, one might argue that helping allies gain full control of nuclear weapons will promote NATO cohesion by giving the allies a greater sense of security, participation, and responsibility and will promote a better-balanced strategy by enabling them to allocate more resources to NATO's ground forces. On the other hand, nuclear diffusion may have just the opposite effect. For to the extent that one ally regards its nuclear capability as a means of acting independently of other allies, the other allies will be less inclined to take military risks in its behalf. This could lead each ally to concentrate upon building its own nuclear capability, at the expense of contributing to the common shield. To the extent that all allies would thereby come to depend for their security primarily upon their willingness to commit nuclear suicide, each would become more reluctant to use any kind of military force except in response to aggressions that impinged directly and immediately upon its own survival; and each would concentrate upon pursuing exclusively national interests outside the alliance. By this course the mutual obligations of the alliance could soon wither away.

The corrosive impact of nuclear diffusion upon the American commitment would be especially serious. The diffusion of nuclear capabilities will probably increase American suspicion, if not the actual likelihood, of some ally committing, or threatening to commit, the United States to nuclear war under circumstances in which the United States would not be willing to bear the costs of nuclear war. Indeed, considering the relatively limited nuclear capabilities that allies are likely to achieve in the next decade or so, the ability to commit American nuclear power may appear to be the chief utility of independent nuclear capabilities. This situation could induce the United States to do exactly what her allies have always feared: to qualify or repudiate her obligations to come to the defense of Europe. And the United States will be in a better position to do this when she acquires enough and sufficiently invulnerable operational missiles to free her from dependence upon European bases.

Thus, whether or not the United States facilitates nuclear diffusion, the very prospect of several allies acquiring their own nuclear weapons will pose a serious threat to allied cohesion. One logical solution for this dilemma is joint control of nuclear weapons under NATO authority, a solution which would be especially desirable if strategic weapons were based on territories outside allied homelands and on the sea. However, any arrangements for joint control that could operate quickly and effectively—unlike the present arrangement, whereby the United States, according to domestic law, controls the nuclear warheads while the host country mans the bases but only exercises a veto over the decision to use the missiles—would involve a degree of interdependence that no nation seems willing to accept.[35] For effective joint control of nuclear weapons implies joint acceptance of a quick supranational decision by a central organ as to the circumstances in which the allies will collectively assume the fearful costs of nuclear war; and, except in the case of a Soviet nuclear assault, this implies an extraordinary coincidence of allied interests and policies.

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[33] On the technical and economic feasibility of other countries acquiring nuclear warheads by their independent efforts, see Klaus Knorr, "Nuclear Weapons: 'Haves' and 'Have-Nots,' " *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 36 (October 1957), pp. 167–69, and Howard Simons, "World-wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons," *Daedalus* (Summer, 1959), pp. 385–409.

[34] Hearings, *Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954*, Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 156, 446 ff., 525–27.

Nevertheless, there is an outside chance that the military logic of operating missiles effectively, the expense of nuclear duplication, and the mutual interest of all allies in limiting the multiplication of independent nuclear capabilities might lead to the organization of an effective centralized system of NATO control and ownership of nuclear weapons. The precondition for this arrangement might be America's delegation to NATO of a significant part of her strategic-nuclear capability; but it is not inconceivable that at some point, this delegation will seem like a reasonable price for allied security and collaboration. Given an American initiative in this direction, Great Britain might also find a net advantage in delegating NATO control over her nuclear capability, which has proved exceedingly expensive and of questionable military or political value, if this would dissuade France and Germany from following her original example.

In any case, whether effective joint control is feasible or not, America's facilitation of nuclear diffusion may be the necessary price for maintaining allied contributions to NATO's forward shield, which will otherwise suffer from the competing economic demands attending the development of independent nuclear capabilities. And the maintenance of the shield, in turn, will be an increasingly important element of cohesion as nuclear diffusion takes place. For only insofar as NATO has a strategy that provides its members with other options besides total war and ineffective resistance will they have sufficient incentive for relying on NATO rather than on their own nuclear power. Skillfully employed as an incentive and a bargaining lever, America's transitory supremacy within the alliance in nuclear technology and weapons might serve as the instrument for creating a larger and more diversified military capability that NATO otherwise seems destined to forfeit.

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[35] Under the Anglo-American agreement, signed on February 22, 1958, the British own and operate the missiles the United States places on British territory, the United States owns their nuclear warheads, and the decision to launch the missiles is joint. *Bulletin*, XXXVIII (March 17, 1958), pp. 418–19. However, the agreements that the United States negotiated with Italy in March, 1959, and with Turkey in October, 1959, were reported to provide that the decision to launch the missiles placed on foreign territory would require the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe as well as of both governments. *Manchester Guardian*, March 31, 1959. *New York Times*, October 11, 1959, p. 1. The United States has failed to obtain France's agreement to a similar scheme. At the end of October, 1959, the government announced that it would not establish any more Thor missile bases in Europe. *Ibid.*, October 31, 1959, p. 1.

XI. DISENGAGEMENT

The best strategy is not likely to satisfy NATO's external and internal requirements perfectly. At best, nuclear diffusion and its prospect will have a disruptive influence upon Western unity. Therefore, the appeal of disengagement is enhanced as a means of alleviating the military and political sources of tension that underlie NATO's strategic problems—principally by reducing the risks of nuclear war, halting the trend toward nuclear diffusion, and promoting political stability in the center of Europe.[36]

Without evaluating the objective justification for this appeal, one can nevertheless recognize the necessity of weighing the putative advantages of disengagement against its strategic consequences. The consequences of any scheme that Russia might conceivably accept would include (a) the withdrawal of West Germany from NATO, (b) a reduction in the effectiveness of the West's forward line in deterring and resisting limited military threats by means short of total war,[37] and (c) a withdrawal of American troops from the forward line and, probably, from the continent. These three consequences would run directly contrary to the strategic requirements which, according to the foregoing analysis, are essential to NATO's external security and internal cohesion under the conditions created by the growth of Russia's nuclear power and the prospect of nuclear diffusion. In effect, they would transmute NATO into its original form of a multilateral framework for extending America's guarantee to come to the aid of Europe with her air-nuclear power. But this transmuted NATO would operate under radically different conditions from those in the initial phase of the alliance.

George Kennan, in presenting his proposal for disengagement, appealed for a return to the limited conception of the organization of Western security that he held at the beginning of the alliance:

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[36] "Disengagement" refers to proposals containing the first and usually one or more of the following four elements: the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from the Germanies or beyond; arms limitation and control within a central European zone; a political settlement concerning the two Germanies; a guarantee of the agreement by the United States, the Soviet Union, and possibly other signatories. The following observations do not apply to the mere limitation and inspection of existing forces in central Europe.

[37] Conceivably, twelve to eighteen German divisions conventionally armed (assuming that the prohibition of German nuclear weapons would be part of any bargain acceptable to the Soviet Union) could perform some of the functions of NATO's present shield; but they would be greatly hampered by the absence of advance joint planning and integration with NATO, as well as by the adverse psychological effect of their political isolation. Only if armed forces in the area of Soviet and American withdrawal were strictly limited by reliable inspection, would this liability be somewhat mitigated, providing that Soviet troops had withdrawn at least to the eastern Polish border.

> We must get over this obsession that the Russians are yearning to attack and occupy Western Europe, and that this is the principal danger. . . . If the armed forces of the United States and Britain were not present on the Continent the problem of defense for the continental nations would be primarily one of the internal health and discipline of the respective national societies, and of the manner in which they were organized to prevent the conquest and subjugation of their national life by unscrupulous and foreign-inspired minorities in their midst.[38]

These words describe a conception of the alliance and its strategic imperatives that many considered adequate in the beginning. But is this conception adequate now? In an unconscious answer to this question, Kennan has also observed that "A defense posture built around a weapon suicidal in its implications can serve only in the long run to paralyze national policy, to undermine alliances, and to drive everyone deeper and deeper into the hopeless exertions of the weapons race."[39] Many saw that this was true even before Russia's atomic explosion in August, 1949. Surely, it is urgently true now. But now it remains for NATO, under American leadership, to achieve the essential strategic conditions of collaboration and security that will provide its members with effective alternatives to collective suicide.

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[38] *Russia, the Atom, and the West*, pp. 62–63.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

COSMOPOLITAN MAN AND THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY: AN INTERPRETATION OF *OTHELLO*

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In the world of today the existence of a common humanity has been established, negatively at least, by a common fear of a common extinction. Only rational beings fear thermonuclear annihilation; only rational beings can create such means of annihilation. An unprecedented danger supplies a new kind of evidence for the oldest thesis in political philosophy: man is by nature a rational and political animal. The roots of man's humanity, as of his inhumanity, are in the political community, and in the political community's capacity for making war or peace. As the growth from the roots reaches what were once the heavens, the problem of reconciling the origins with the ends attains an acute proportion. Can the new awareness of the commonness of our common humanity cause the fashioning of institutions and men equal to the problem that that very humanity has created? Can the particularity that characterizes individual races, nations, creeds—the particularity that has, from the known origins of political life until the present, provided the substance of political life both in its misery and in its glory—can that particularity transform itself into universality, as the finest and ultimate fruit of human reason? Or may the consummation of rationality, as it is given us to know it, be found in its own self-extinction?

In pondering these ever new questions we turn again to the oldest wisdom of our kind. We have too long neglected the understanding of Shakespeare, perhaps because the brilliance of his art has blinded us to his political genius. Shakespeare lived through a decisive period in the emergence of modern society and thought; and he presented in living *tableaux* the human problems created by the new world opening before him. That he does not offer solutions nor formulas does not justify ignoring him. Before political scientists can proceed to the suggestion of policies, they must perceive the problems in the fullness of their complexity. In Shakespeare's works is to be found as complete a range of human types as any man is likely to meet in his lifetime, and they are viewed with an eye that penetrates more deeply than that of any common observer. The art of the poet brings to consciousness psychological depths that have not been fathomed by any other method.

Shakespeare's explicit treatment of the possibility of an interracial, interfaith society is given its most detailed development in his two Venetian plays, two plays which may well be thought the profoundest recorded analysis of the relation of Jew and Christian, of white man and black man. Whether Shakespeare's apparent pessimism is the final word on this subject we need not here pronounce. Certainly no further apology is needed to introduce an attempt to comprehend, in human and political terms, the grounds for that pessimism.*

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* For a similar attempt see H. V. Jaffa, "The Limits of Politics: An Interpretation of *King Lear*, Act I, Scene i," this REVIEW, June, 1957, pp. 405–427.

I

The Earl of Shaftesbury, in the most penetrating criticism of *Othello* that I have read,[1] asserts that the marriage of Othello and Desdemona is a mismatch, a monstrous union founded on the lying pretentions of a charlatan and the unhealthy imagination of a misguided young girl. For him the tragedy is not the consequence of Iago's vile machinations but the natural fruit of seeds that are sown in the characters of the heroes and in their relationship. The simple, citizen's moral of the story is, according to Shaftesbury, that such marriages between foreigners who have nothing in common other than their desire for novelty are to be avoided and condemned. Only the sick taste of one not satisfied at home could have led Desdemona to her choice; only a moral education that did not move the phantasy and the sympathy of the girl could account for her blind search for the incredible and the exotic. And Shaftesbury, echoing the moral taste of the pre-romantic critics, sees the *dénouement* as the just punishment of faulty beings. However narrow this understanding of the play may be, it raises in a clear and honest fashion the fundamental question: what is the character of the relationship between Desdemona and Othello? The interpretation of *Othello* has tended to neglect the question and has concentrated on the psychological development of the jealousy. But this jealousy has no meaning except in relation to the kind of man who suffers it and the reasons why he is particularly susceptible to it. We are presented with the picture of a couple who have married in an unusual way but who are nonetheless very much in love and who are led to disaster through the external actions of a hostile world. We are asked to believe that a paragon of strength and confidence is transformed into a furious beast driven by suspicion only because he has been tempted by a devil. It is not enough to say that such is the nature of jealousy: we can easily imagine many men, exposed to the same temptations, who would never have succumbed to them. Even the most superficial reader is struck by the slightness of the proofs which convince Othello of Desdemona's infidelity. Is not Othello ripe for the doubt which comes to afflict him? Are we to believe that the jealousy which erupts so unexpectedly is not the fruit of a soil long prepared and cultivated, albeit unconsciously? Does not Shakespeare always incorporate in the life of each of his tragic heroes precisely those elements which make him the aptest vehicle for the emergence of that phenomenon which he, above all others, exhibits?

The latter alternative is clearly the correct one; for it alone is in conformity with what we known of Shakespeare's genius and of the nature of tragedy in general. In other Shakespearian tragedies, disaster develops directly from the character of the tragic hero and, even more, out of precisely those features of it that constitute his greatness. Macbeth's pride and ambition, which raise him above other men in daring and vision, are the direct cause of his murder of Duncan and his entry upon a tyrant's career. Macbeth's crimes are consequences of Macbeth's greatness of soul, and the enormous impact of the play comes from the impression of overpowering force conveyed by the hero, joined to our sense of the inevitability of his destiny. Or, consider Hamlet's responsibility for the deaths of all those he loved and the failure of his attempt to do justice. Is it not bound up with those traits that cause us to admire him—his conscience and his admirable sensitivity to his fellows? If this were not the case we should either regard these men simply as criminals, or as beings who may deserve our pity; but they would certainly not move our deepest emotions, nor call forth our respect. As it is, we see them as examples of human greatness; they move in areas of experience from which ordinary mortals are cut off. But this very superiority in human quality seems to lead to crime and disaster. It is this combination that constitutes the unique quality of tragedy. What virtues, then, make Othello's jealousy necessary and in some measure excuse it? Why must the great general with the sovereign self-control murder his innocent wife? Because Iago told him she was unfaithful? This is to degrade the work to the level of psychological "realism," a realism which contents itself with the analysis of passions, no matter by whom they are felt nor to what end. It is to deny that Shakespeare regarded his heroes' emotions as truly interesting only insofar as the one who experiences them is worthy of attention and his objects serious. In this perspective Othello appears a weak fool and Desdemona's death a senseless slaughter that can evoke only horror and disgust. Tragedy is founded on the notion that in the decisive respect human beings are free and responsible, that their fates are the consequences of their choices. All that is a result of external force or chance is dehumanizing in the tragic view. But *Othello* so interpreted is only the story of an easily inflamed man who has the unfortunate accident of meeting an Iago. This does not do justice to the sentiment we have in seeing the play and it is the task of interpretation to render articulate what is only felt, and to elaborate the larger significance of the characters and the action. Such an analysis requires more attention to the political setting of the drama than has been the habit since the beginning of romantic criticism in the nineteenth century.

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[1] *Characteristicks* (London, 1727), Vol. 1, pp. 347–350.

II

To this end we must go back behind the jealousy to the strange love that united Othello and Desdemona. It is in their love that the seeds of the ultimate disaster are sown; and it is not an easy union to analyze, this marriage between an old, black, foreign warrior and a young, beautiful, innocent Venetian noblewoman. In fact, the first act is devoted almost exclusively to a development of the character of the marriage and its ambiguity. The suggestions as to the source of the union include lust, profit and the purest admiration for virtue. In a sense the entire play is motivated by the beliefs of the actors about the nature of the love and it is these beliefs much more than any acts that are the moving causes of the tragedy. Indeed, one of the unique characterististics of *Othello* is that the final action of the play is so little the result of previous actions, and so much the consequence of changes in opinion wrought in the characters during the play. And perhaps the best way to see what these opinions are is through the activities of Iago. Iago is a villain, no doubt; but his villainy is not shallow; he has a clear grasp of what is most important to everyone (with the possible exception of Emilia), and he acts on all the persons only through their own opinions. In each case, the individual can be justly regarded as responsible for his own troubles; Iago only precipitates something that was already there. He works like a confidence man; only the quality intrinsic to the one he tempts enables him to succeed.[2] He is a faithful mirror of all around him; he adapts himself to those with whom he speaks. In a sense, we would not know the other characters in the play without Iago. We would see them only as they appear in ordinary life, without penetrating the masks that conceal their real natures. Iago alone lets us know from the outset those weaknesses in others that would otherwise stand unrevealed until the crises of their lives. Iago shows the hidden necessity in men, the things they care about most; he has a diabolic insight. He offers men what they hope for or are afraid of and, in so doing, he causes their characters to undergo the extreme test. For example, it is possible that Roderigo might have forgotten Desdemona and married someone else. But in appealing to Roderigo's defeated suit, in offering him hope, Iago makes him display his petty and absurd nature, full of spite and envy, capable of extreme folly and crime in a spirit of innocent stupidity. Roderigo is such a fool as thinks he can buy the favors of a queen. Iago is only the catalyst of Roderigo's folly. If Roderigo had not come to ruin, his salvation would have been sheer accident. Now, Iago proposes as his supreme task to encompass the downfall of Othello; and it is through Iago's actions and speech that we can see his catalytic agency upon Othello, and thereby see the necessity which shapes the tragic end.

The play begins in an atmosphere of conspiracy, and our first acquaintance with Othello is through the eyes of an enemy. The beginning is a sort of foretaste of Iago's skill, showing him expertly manipulating Roderigo. Iago is arranging the disclosure of the marriage to Brabantio; he wishes to present it in such a way that "though that his joy be joy,"[3] the union will appear to be an abomination. In the midst of a horrendous hue and cry, the love affair is made known to Brabantio as a species of robbery motivated by lust. The father of Desdemona is presented with the most obscene picture of his daughter's relations with Othello. Any chance that Brabantio might accept the marriage is destroyed by his first view of it. His mind is automatically closed to the possibility that it may be a special and fine sort of relationship. Of course, like all Iago's victims, he is predisposed towards the insinuated interpretation. He is a good Venetian, a solid man of importance and property.[4] For him, the best is at home, is Venetian. There is law and order in Venice and the Venetian ways are *the* standard of conduct. Any other way, anything foreign, may be tolerated, or even admired, but can never be fully equal. He is a model of good citizenship and, as does any father, he expects to find in his wonderful daughter what he believes is best in himself. His daughter is his fullest reality. Hence her defection from Venetian standards is a reflection on him and on Venice. He can only regard it as the effect of magic: she is his daughter, so there must be something wrong with her or with him, alternatives both of which are repugnant. Therefore the cause must be something supernatural. Brabantio is not a man particularly inclined to superstition; all to the contrary. He is a very sober and reasonable man. His reasonableness is that of a good bourgeois who cannot see much that goes beyond the local and the evident; to admit the possibility that there are important dimensions beyond these would destroy the very reasonableness which enables him to operate so effectively within his own little world. He refers to drugs, where his modern counterpart might lay the blame on "foreign philosophies." His speech to Othello is a masterpiece of common sense, revealing the virtues and defects of that faculty. He refers himself again and again to things of sense, to what is palpable.[5] He cannot conceive of a relationship based on spiritual communion alone, devoid of the ordinary attractions; or, to put it more favorably for him, he cannot imagine that a match of such alien beings could be purely spiritual. It is, as he says, a relation that braves nature, years, country, credit, everything.[6] He poses the question very clearly: what can possibly be the basis of their love?

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[2] For this reason Iago is never able to work directly on Desdemona: if she has vices they are not of the self-interested variety. He has no way of acting on her, no lever with which to move her. Iago can only influence those around Desdemona and hence accomplish her disaster.

[3] Act I, Scene i, 78. All references are to the Furness *Variorum* edition of *Othello* (Philadelphia, 1886).

[4] I, i, 118, *cf.* 86–88; I, ii, 13–19.

We are thus presented with two explicit choices and one that is implied: either the marriage is caused by brutal lust, occult practices, or—as the spectator might infer—something beautiful and fine not common to the commerce of the species. Every dramatic device has been employed by Shakespeare to give expression to the opposition between Othello and Desdemona and the shocking character of their marriage. To an Elizabethan audience the extraordinary nature of this relationship was doubly clear. For, although racial prejudice did not exist in the modern sense, nor as it does in America with its special political history, there was perhaps a livelier sense of the differences among nations, races and religions. The world was larger and less uniform, and there were still fundamental differences in belief, taste, and desire from people to people. There was less contact between the various nations and a strong sense of the barbarism of those who lay beyond one's own borders—a sense kept alive by the occasional presence of certain types of foreigners. Moreover, there was no liberal ideology which constrained intelligent citizens to suppress or alter their first feelings towards foreigners or those of another color in favor of an attitude based upon reflection or abstract conviction rather than emotion. And there were no compelling political reasons for the attempt to eradicate distinctions between races, creeds, and nations. Hence Othello's exotic qualities were sharpened for the audience for which the play was intended. Shakespeare chose the most visible and striking means to arouse the sentiments of the spectators: Othello's blackness.[7]

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[5] I, ii, 78–98; *cf.* I, iii, 75–79.

[6] I, iii, 115–117; *cf.* II, i, 229–31; III, iii, 259–263.

Othello's color not only provides a visual contrast but is meant to horrify the viewer. Whether Shakespeare personally felt that this was only an English prejudice is not here at issue. What is clear is that Othello is physically repulsive to the other figures in the play and that "black Othello" set next to "fair Desdemona" is meant to arouse those who see it. It is not that there would be any racist principle against their being married, or that Othello would be regarded as an inferior being because he is not white; it is rather that he would not be considered a normal or appropriate choice for a young beauty's romantic interest. Iago knows that it is the common opinion that Othello is ugly, and the working of his poison depends decisively upon his manipulation of this opinion. It is the necessary condition of Roderigo's foolish belief that Desdemona will grant his suit, of Othello's stinging doubts about his own attractiveness, of Brabantio's assumption that there has been an ugly seduction. Brabantio bases his whole appeal to the Duke upon the evident incredibility of Desdemona's being aroused physically by "a thing such as" Othello.[8] In the theatre, where the imagination is limited by the physical presence of the characters, there is a tendency, as in painting, to infer the moral worth of persons from the way they look; in such circumstances Othello's blackness must have an overwhelming effect and be a predisposing factor difficult to overcome. In *Titus Andronicus* the relation of Aaron the Moor with Tamara, queen of the Goths, is meant to strike one immediately as foul and appropriate only to barbarians. And Portia's reaction to the "complexion" of the Prince of the Moors certainly expressed what all Elizabethans felt. She is painted as having healthy tastes and with her Moorish suitor she was running the risk of being permanently coupled to something very unattractive.

The color difference is not all that is meant to move the audience to grave reservations about Othello. There is the fact that he is a Moor. The Moors were popularly considered barbarous, heathens naturally at war with Christians and Europeans. They were understood to be dangerous and unaware of the limitations set by civilized man. The villainous Aaron proves that this way of looking at Moors was not totally unknown to Shakespeare; he could present this scoundrel as plausible without the preparation that is necessary to convince us that Othello is noble. And the other Moor in Shakespeare, the Prince in the *Merchant of Venice*, is treated as a comic and absurd figure. He has many traits in common with Othello, especially his warlike nature and talk of his adventures; he is presented somewhat as Iago would like to present Othello.[9] In sophisticated European circles he appears ridiculous and "stuffed with epithets of war." To the untutored English audience, the Moor was a stranger bringing from his dark continent mysteries, dangers, and a new religion. Shakespeare in making a Moor his hero runs counter to an established pattern of thought. He must make special efforts to convince us of Othello's nobility and superior humanity. But in so doing he does not intend enlightenment, as Lessing does in "Nathan the Wise." For Shakespeare's Moor, after making all the detours of civilized man and manifesting an unexpected depth, returns at the end to the barbarism that the audience originally expected. The first, primitive prejudice against Othello seems to find justification in the conclusion.

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[7] *Cf.* A. C. Bradley, *Shakespearean Tragedy*, pp. 198–203 (London, 1929). In addition to Bradley's excellent reasonings it may be mentioned that Aaron the Moor in *Titus Adronicus* is black and that the Prince of Morocco in the *Merchant of Venice* is apparently so (II, i, 1–16; II, vii, 81). In *Othello* there are these references to his color: I, i, 72, 96–97, 116 (Barbary horses were black); ii, 87–88, iii, 320–321; II, ii, 48; III, iii, 308. Black clearly does not mean Moorish as we understand it, but simply black. Shakespeare had a definite dramatic purpose in making Othello as black as possible and could rely on the convention of the threatre and the inexperience of the audience to permit this alteration of reality.

[8] *Cf.* I, i, 105–153; I, ii, 78–98; I, iii, 75–79; II, i, 254–270.

In addition to the two major considerations which make the match so unsuitable, color and nation, there are age, wealth, and social station.[10] We should bear in mind the fact that marriage had a somewhat different status for the Elizabethans than for us in our day. As heirs of the romantic tradition, we believe that love is enough to justify all, and our sympathies go out to it. But formerly marriages were arranged. Fathers were thought apt to have a more balanced view of what a lifetime's living together would require than their inexperienced children in their passing fancies. The responsibilities of family and the continuance of great traditions had to be taken into consideration. The marriage of Othello and Desdemona neglected all of these things in violating the wishes of Brabantio. What predisposes us immediately in favor of Othello—that he is beloved of Desdemona despite his alien birth and color—must have given pause to Shakespeare's audience. If this is not taken into consideration, Othello seems the victim of merciless persecution and his greatness and weakness are lost to our eyes. It is against this background that Shakespeare tells his story.

Indeed the absence of the ordinary external accompaniments of marriage suggests that this is a marriage of true love. It differs from conventional marriages, supported by money, beauty, similarity of position and education. A love purified of all accidental and physical elements would certainly be a great human achievement, a transcendence of mundane attachments. It would be a love of the true rather than of the familiar. But can marriage exist in such a rarefied atmosphere? Once marriage is purged of conventional dross, what really remains? What is the cause of the love of Othello and Desdemona? It is certain Othello gave her no drugs and that Iago's lascivious description of their romance is false, designed to shock refined sentiment. Othello may well be entirely past the stage of caring for physical pleasures ("the young affects in me defunct"—"to be free and bounteous to her mind")[11] and if the marriage ever reached consummation, it was not before Cyprus. Not even Desdemona regards Othello as physically desirable.[12] Putting aside for a moment the notion that she was just a silly inexperienced child and Othello a fortune hunter,[13] their relation would appear to be an example of what has come to be known as a platonic love, a love not lacking in passion, rather one of the most intense passion, but completely beyond physical need, based on mutual admiration. This raises the question of what precisely was admired by each.

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[9] *Cf. Merchant of Venice*, II, ii and vii; *Othello*, I, i, 16–18; II, i, 255–256. The Prince of Morocco speaks of war and his own heroism; he has a high-flown and dramatic manner of speech different from that of the other characters; he speaks of his high birth and uses it as a justification for his suit; and he too seems sincerely attached to the beautiful Venetian.

[10] The fact that Othello mentions his own high lineage (I, ii, 22–27) can well mean that he feels he must do so. He protests the fact. It is probable that his royal birth was not recognized at Venice and, if it was, nevertheless was not considered to constitute equality with Venetian nobility. Even if Othello is himself really persuaded that he comes from stock as good as that into which he has married, Brabantio does not accept it as such.

Brabantio assumed that Venice would come to the aid of Venice outraged, in the shape of his daughter. But as Iago knew very well, *raison d'état* made Othello necessary and would overrule any claim made against him.[14] Now, who is this Othello who is so important to Venice that he can stand against the attacks of its most powerful and respected citizens, so eminent that he eclipses Brabantio himself—to the point that the Duke no longer notices the Senator when they enter together? Othello is the protector of Venice, a foreigner brought in to ward off the attacks of other foreigners, the Turks. The Turks are men of another religion; so was Othello, but he is a convert to Christianity and is most loyal to it; it provides much of his fervor for the cause of Venice. And as he is first represented to us, he appears well worthy of his reputation and of the trust reposed in him. He seems a man of simple decency who imposes on others by his quiet strength and evident competence. He is most impressive in his confidence in himself, an apparent sureness of his worth that nothing can shake. He bears up under abuse with a dignity that makes his attackers seem mean and small and gives the immediate impression that the right is on his side. He maintains all proportions, a respect for Brabantio's age and worth, while never losing the dignity of his conviction that he himself is just, a conviction so surely held that it needs no protest. He is sure that his real services are appreciated by the city and that he is esteemed. Moreover, his ancestry is royal, and he is hence of a dignity equal to that of any Venetian. He is apparently not the uprooted foreigner unsure of his status in the world. In a word, he is self-sufficient, according to his own belief. The most amazing fact of the play is that from this acme of assurance emerges the nadir of suspicion. There is an almost unbelievable transformation, and it is Shakespeare's analysis of this development that contains the deepest meaning of the play.

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[11] I, iii, 290–293; *cf.* Furness' excellent note, pp. 75–76; III, iii, 309–310.

[12] Desdemona's "I saw Othello's visage in his mind," I, iii, 280; *cf.* note 8.

[13] This is a possibility hinted at by both Iago and the Duke, and somewhat supported by Othello's judicious choice of the moment of marriage, when he was most needed: I, ii, 60–61, iii, 195, 252–254 ff.; *cf.* I, i, 162–168. Both charges, that Othello used drugs and that he was a fortune hunter, are in some measure justified by the event, although not in the vulgar way intended by their authors. He did bewitch Desdemona by his stories more powerful than any drug; and he was seeking a place in the world.

[14] I, i, 162–168.

And how then did the love affair come to pass? Surprisingly enough, not through the deeds of Othello but through his speeches. Although he protests himself to be only a man of action and lacking in eloquence, his influence over Desdemona has its source in the terrible tales of his past. Othello represents himself as a poor speaker and one who depreciates mere words. But he seems to influence others almost entirely through his speeches. He is impressive for what he is supposed to have done, but his own testimony is the only real source for our belief in those great actions. He gives witness to his own might and is believed.[15] In his great speech recounting the course of his wooing, he makes it seem that it was the gentle Desdemona who made the advances and that he was the wooed. Desdemona admired him for his incredible deeds and his great sufferings. He loved her because she pitied him; he loved her for her love of him, which is a sort of confirmation of his own worth. He is lovable for his sufferings, and pity is the source of her love. This presentation of the love affair is in harmony with Othello's self-sufficiency. He is admirable and needs little beyond himself. Desdemona is the crowning acquisition of a virtuous life. The relationship is a sound one because Othello is a man in possession of himself, of notable quality, and Desdemona cares for someone both solid and noble.

III

The course of the play, however, makes clear that Othello is not so firmly established as he may appear to be or as he believes himself to be. To understand why, we must reflect for a moment on the character of the political community, as it naturally is, always and everywhere. Civil society is a closed corporation; those who live in it have certain bonds that they do not share with those whom they call foreigners. The situation is similar to that of the family, and in fact the political community is often understood to be a sort of family. It may be a mere accident that a man is born in one place rather than another. But that accident may be decisive in forming him. Men of one nation have often seemed to men of another nation virtually to be animals of a different species. Each city has its manners and its gods; the very life of the city depends upon this particularism: to live, it must defend its ancestral way, which is a combination of human accidents and special institutions adapted to the here and now. Good citizenship implies a devotion to those ways; and a universality, a cosmopolitanism that devoted itself to the essence of man as he is eternally would destroy those roots of affection which are necessary to political life. Practical life requires adaptations to particular and imperfect circumstances and emphasizes considerations which are theoretically indifferent. To live as men, acting men, humankind must be divided, the distinction between friend and stranger must come into being; and men must care more for their fellow citizens and their city than they do for all others. Just as no one can become truly a member of a family into which he was not born, no one can set his roots deeply in a city that is not his own. In a sense, the brotherhood of man does not extend beyond the walls of the city; or, there are two brotherhoods of man, one as men are universally and the other as men are in their practical lives; and the two are incommensurable. A man can be fully at home only in his own city. His style of life and his goals are provided by it; from it he gets his sense of belonging and his knowledge of what he is in the world. Most, if not all, men know themselves from their place in the city; their notions of what is right and wrong and what is respectable are part of this whole. A being who was completely indifferent to such a world, who had no need of any particular place, would either be a beast living on unconscious passion or a super-man, a sort of deity, who could receive his laws and his aspirations from the silent vastness of the universe.[16]

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[15] This is precisely what Shaftesbury objects to. He sees Othello as a talker and not a doer. He impresses Desdemona with lies (*cf.* Iago, II, i, 255–257) and touches her naive phantasy. Such stories are a great danger, and even the Bible because of its strangeness is not, according to Shaftesbury, a suitable source for the stories of poets. The proper subjects with which to impress the young are those that are probable and within the compass of reason. Only pretenders who wish to overwhelm and cause suspension of the critical faculties behave as does Othello. Shaftesbury apparently believes that such stories as those of "men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders" were evident falsehoods and meant to be understood as such by Shakespeare.

Othello seems to feel at home in Venice; but how could this foreigner, who is also black, arrive at such a station? There seem to be several immediate possibilities. We can set aside the alternative that he did not care about the opinion of others. He insists on respect; his very killing of Desdemona, he says, he did for his honor. He feels it necessary to point out that his background is as good as that of any Venetian.[17] He is a proud man, and pride does not brook contempt. The truly proud man considers himself superior to others because he is above the petty concerns of private interest and can devote himself to the common good; his rewards are in the glory he reaps from other men. Reputation is the stuff of his being. Othello believes that he deserves admiration and that he has it, that Venice is truly grateful to him for his services.[18] His virtue outweighs the accident of his birth. Othello believes that he is universally valued and valuable, that he can go any place and be accepted; the walls of the city are not really boundaries to virtue. At the same time, he can only see himself in the opinions of the men about him; this is the contradiction in his situation—he is independent of particular national ways of life but he draws his being, like any citizen, from the honors accorded by the cities, honors which differ from city to city and which are generally reserved for citizens. Is it really possible to transcend the city on the level of the life of action lived in it, and become universal? Can a man who has no "natural" home be a statesman?[19]

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[16] That a city is not something that one can just choose is clearly Shakespeare's view; one need only consider the political settings of the various plays and especially those of the historical works. There are different national characters and the kind of action which is typical varies from place to place: the plays situated in ancient Rome are certainly very different in men and interest from those that take place in modern Venice or Verona. Long tradition, stock, climate, and laws change everything. There are very few plays of Shakespeare which could be imagined as taking the same course in another locale. *Titus Andronicus* is in a way a comedy concerning a man born out of his time, if not place; and much of the often remarked absurdity of the piece comes from the fact of Titus Andronicus's attempt to act like an old Roman gentleman among oriental barbarians. Not many heroes in Shakespeare could easily be transferred in time or place and still retain the decisive aspects of their characters, or still deal with the same problems; Prospero is perhaps one. But simple cosmopolitanism from a Shakespearean standpoint would rob men of all that is interesting in them, bringing about a unity at the lowest common denominator. Dramatically speaking, at least, most great men are great because they are devoted to the highest goals of a particular political entity which has chosen, willfully or no, to develop one aspect of the human possibility at the sacrifice of others; old Romans cannot live as modern Danes do; and, if one attempted to combine the two, the deepest features of both would be lost. And to participate in a particular political community depends upon birth and education, upon accidents.

[17] This to prove that he should be treated well by Venetians. *Cf.* note 10.

Othello's problem is best illustrated by the fact that he is a mercenary. Now mercenaries are traditionally regarded as a low form of humanity. They sell their courage to the highest bidder; what is noble in a citizen becomes in them a form of baseness. The citizen risks his being for the sake of the laws; the laws lend him their dignity and he is exalted in his devotion to something beyond his own life. A mercenary is indifferent to the very thing which gives meaning to the citizen's soldiering; he does not truly care for what he is defending. The glory that attaches to heroism is not given to those who are better able to kill men than others; to be above the animal or the perverse, the death of men must be understood as the sacrifice of life in the name of some cause greater than life. Even if a mercenary desired to fight nobly, he could not; for he cannot care as the citizen cares for what is his own. Nor is it in the nature of men to serve freely those who will not honor them. Hence it is that mercenaries are degraded men who make a travesty of the highest acts of citizenship.

But Othello is not such an insensitive being, lacking in the dignity which refuses to sell life for money. He is a man who identifies himself with his warring and who, as we have said, demands respect for his worth. How is he able to make himself so Venetian? It is surely, in part, his Christianity that is responsible. He is engaged in a war against the Turks, and he believes that the unity of true Christians is a kind of brotherhood, a brotherhood of such an overpowering influence that local differences pale into insignificance. He has something of the character of a Christian knight-errant, going from place to place, honored and worthwhile wherever men hold the faith. (It is important to remark that Othello is born a stranger to Christianity as well as to Venice. In respect to both religion and race he is by birth closer to the Turks.) The local, the political in the ancient sense, does not weigh so heavily on a man in the Christian context. This community of faith allows Othello to fight his war and care about its purposes without assuming the comic aspect of the outsider who interests himself in what is none of his business, or the vulgar one of the hired agent. The faith provides a cosmopolitanism which is not limited by the accident of birth or the peculiarity of education, or the difference in social position. The importance of Othello's Christianity, both for his own sense of dignity and purpose and for the possibility of his stepping over boundaries that would otherwise have been insuperable, cannot be overestimated. If Christianity is really the one most needful thing, then he who is its defender deserves honor and reverence and within its universal unity there are no strangers. Othello's last words recall again that he is one of the best of the faithful; and if he is attached to Venice it is because he can regard the city as an instrument of the faith.[20]

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[18] Precisely what he has done for Venice, we do not learn. But that he has a great repute as a leader is made clear enough: I, iii, 249–252; IV, i, 295–296.

[19] This question evidently preoccupied Shakespeare very much for he treats of it again, in another way, in *Coriolanus*. This is the case of a man very much at home in Rome but who resents his dependence on what he considers to be the vulgar mass; he wants to be free of what created him; and, in attempting to liberate himself, he loses his soul. The problem is again to what extent the hero is free of those who acclaim him. Coriolannus is very conscious of the problem, whereas Othello is not; this is why the former leaves Rome and the latter can stay in Venice.

But it is very questionable whether Othello is venerated as much as he thinks, or in the way that he thinks. He believes that he is cared for as a citizen is cared for, that there are not two standards of affection and justice, one for those who belong and one for those who are outside. Othello does not consider himself to be a means, a tool in the hands of Venice, but an end, a being worthwhile in himself. Yet we find him at the beginning of the play having been out of employment for nine months. Iago believes that Othello is used only because at the moment there is no one else to command.[21] And there is the overwhelming fact that as soon as the victory is achieved, Othello is cashiered. There is little question but that he is used sparingly and only for the pressing needs of Venice; he is not a citizen.[22] But further it is of the utmost importance to understand that he is not so much the best general, as reputed to be the best general. The Duke says this.[23] Othello is a man of great reputation and, as Iago makes clear, there is a decisive difference between reputation and true deserving.[24] Othello is trusted; but in the play we are given no examples of his prowess, unlike the men of action portrayed in other plays. His only military success is the result of chance, of a *tempest.* For it, he proclaims a victory and his reputation is thereby enhanced. But he is not actually responsible for the victory proclaimed. Desdemona loves him for his stories. He is, as Iago says, a great talker of war.

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[20] II, ii, 194–196; V, ii, 427–429; II, ii, 373–375; V, ii, 36–37. Brabantio calls him a pagan, I, ii, 121.

[21] I, i, 162–168. The Duke asks after a certain Marcus Luccicos, who, as it turns out, is not in Venice; he sends after Marcus in the same terms in which he sent after Othello: I, iii, 52–56; *cf.* I, ii, 43–45.

[22] Othello's victory over Brabantio in the hearing before the Duke is a good model of the strengths and weaknesses of his situation. The moment at which Brabantio must make his plea is a troubled and confused one, the state is endangered and foreign threats cause Othello to be needed. When they enter together, the confident Brabantio (I, ii, 115–121) is completely ignored by the suave Duke who looks to Othello immediately (I, iii, 60 ff.). The justice of the case is evidently not so much to be considered as the current crisis and the fact that Othello is indispensable in it. The ordinary order of respect and indulgence is temporarily abridged. The Duke is polite to Brabantio (it is questionable how much Brabantio's person, as opposed to his position, wealth and family, was actually respected in the city, for he had not been called to the council and he was to have been found at home); and when he hears Brabantio's complaint he promises all support before he finds out who is responsible. As soon as he hears Othello's name, he changes his tone and gives Othello every chance to defend himself. One can well wonder how the Duke would have behaved in other conditions, and if he would then have permitted such a marriage without the father's consent or allowed a foreigner such rights in the city. At all events he supports Othello while trying to assuage Brabantio. He moralizes with the embittered Brabantio who justly responds that it is easy for one who is unhurt to give sympathy. The Duke is a subtle statesman: he attempts to give the appearance of perfect morality while keeping his eye on the expedient. Shakespeare expresses this beautifully by putting the Duke's moralizing into rhyming verse. Afterwards he reverts to ordinary prose as soon as he is able to treat of the serious business at hand.

I do not suggest that Othello had never done anything to deserve his reputation; I only point out that we are never given any direct testimony or evidence of what he did, while we are given to see that he imposes himself on others by his reputation. He seems to be a case of men's need for a hero. Every city and every army needs leaders, and those leaders, in order to command, must be respected and even idolized. No matter what their merit, in order to feel the confidence that is necessary to the dangerous enterprise of war, they must be invested with authority. Around them spring up myths, not created by them but arising from the popular need. So that they can subordinate themselves to their leaders, the people endow them with superhuman merits. Othello is a man on whom "opinion throws a more safer voice"; and opinion is a "sovereign mistress of effects." He is known to the Duke to be valuable because he is generally well thought of. Othello is sure of himself because he is respected; he

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He gets over what is for him the very inconvenient and unpleasant affair of Desdemona's marriage with rhetoric to return to the important consideration, which has really determined his decision; and real business is prosaic (I, iii, 225–254). But Othello's advantage in a crisis disappears with his very success. In the first lines of the play, Iago irritates Roderigo's civic pride by presenting Othello as a foreigner lording it over the native nobility (I, i, 12–14). The prejudice is always lying in wait for the moment when no compelling reasons demand its repression. *Cf.* I, i, 138–139, 148–158. Brabantio remains in Venice and is still a force to be reckoned with; the anger of Brabantio can make the Duke uncomfortable, for Brabantio is always in Venice and is independent of any appointment or crisis; Othello can be sent away and forgotten with no inconvenience to anyone if there is no external danger to the state. Perhaps Othello's recall was Brabantio's doing? At least this is what Desdemona guesses that Othello suspects (IV, ii, 53–56).

[23] *Cf.* note 18.

[24] II, ii, 291–305. Iago can very well appreciate the ambiguous character of reputation for he enjoys a good one himself. But when Iago speaks to Othello, he does so as though there were nothing questionable in reputation (III, ii, 181–188). He knows his man. A noble man never does anything that is considered shameful and the opinion of his fellows is the guarantee of his own goodness. A man who cares about his reputation is likely to perform acts of a nature to gain it; while the man who consults only his private inclinations is likely to be base. But, if reputation is a fickle thing, then the whole orientation of the gentleman or the proud man is placed in doubt. The perfect disciple of Othello is Cassio; he believes completely in Othello; this is the source of his unquestioning devotion and makes him a perfect lieutenant. But, from what he suffers and the undeserving way he loses his reputation, the lesson would seem to be that it is folly to live for the sake of others who do not understand and are acting from their own passions. Cassio expresses what his faith in Othello means when he says that reputation is the immortal part of himself (II, ii, 291–292; *cf.* 117–135; *Romans* IX, 18; VIII, 24).

is respected so that others can be confident in danger. It is a circle which is not grounded in a reality free from opinion.

For Othello this means that, if the opinions change, he is lost; for he has no source of confidence outside of a city that is not his own city. His Christianity proves to be not enough to overcome the primeval and necessary prejudices of civil society. In some measure his very character depended on his ignorance of the source of his strength. He assumed his reputation was deserved and was secure. To the extent that he felt this, he could be at home in Venice. There was no tension between his foreignness, his universality, and his need for Venetian, and hence local, opinion in which to see himself as in a glass. To use his practical abilities as a warrior Othello needed a home, a place for which he could fight meaningfully, and this required a reputation. The argument of the play is that such reputations are only given grudgingly and conditionally to foreigners. Yet Othello could never accept this and still be able to fight in the citizen's or proud man's spirit. The massiveness of his self-assurance in the face of the tenuousness of his real position shows that his life is based upon a critical lack of self-knowledge.

Othello, although radically dependent, represents himself as completely independent; and the myth of his independence seems to be less for his own benefit than for the sake of those who made him. They could not trust him if they knew him to be their own creation. The very end of the creation requires that the knowledge that it was creation and not discovery be forgotten. This is a necessary self-deception without which the purposes of myth-making would be frustrated. All might have succeeded, there might have been no revelation of Othello's true situation, if he had not gone one step too far in the direction of his conquest of Venice. That step was his falling in love with Desdemona and marrying her. In Desdemona he had chosen the fairest flower of the best family in Venice. In marrying her he seemed to prove that he was fully lovable in Venice by Venetians, that he had fully naturalized himself. In the manner of his wooing he continues the masquerade that not he but Desdemona is the one who needs; she is the lover and he the beloved.[25] He is still the independent being to whom others come because of his qualities. But Iago knows this is not true. It is his awareness of Othello's absolute dependence on Desdemona, of which Othello is himself totally unaware, that allows Iago to bring about the destruction which he plots.

IV

Love, according to the classical analysis, means imperfection, need. The motion of one being toward another, the recognition of something admirable in another, implies the lack of something in the one admiring.[26] What a man desires to possess, he does not already possess. The desire to possess another human being implies that qualities belonging to the beloved object are lacking to the lover. Hence a perfect being would not love, because he would possess all that is admirable within himself; there would be no sufficient reason for him to go outside himself. He who pretends to love without needing is an impostor. The lover admits by his very love a dependence and in this sense an inferiority to his beloved. The beloved, as beloved, does not return love; the man who is loved for his learning does not love the lover for his ignorance. If he returns love at all, he does so for some other reason, because the lover has some other virtue which in his turn makes him an object of love. One who loves does not, for that reason, have any claim on the affections of the one he loves; on the contrary, he has, in loving, made an admission of imperfection which the beloved is under no obligation to reciprocate. The beloved has the privileged position and the lover, if his affection is not returned, must become conscious of unworthiness, and begin to lack confidence in himself. His value as a human being is called into question; but he has no right to complain, for love is not a question of duty.

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[25] I, iii, 190–191; III, iii, 218.

[26] Plato, *Symposium*, 189c–193e, 199d–204c; the *Lysis* (*in toto*) and Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, vii, 4; Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Part I, Ch. xiv. This is so even in the highest sort of love, the good man who admires another good man because he sees his own virtues mirrored in the other and can honor them as he could not his own. Such love is based on the need for mutual admiration and a completion of one's own imperfect virtues. *Cf.* Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* IX, ix.

Nonetheless, every lover desires to be loved in return. For only by the return of love can he possess the beloved; and, moreover, his self-esteem is at stake. He has, at the moment he committed himself, become dependent upon another for his self-esteem. At the same time he has made his situation doubly difficult by having to some extent admitted himself to be undeserving, by the fact of loving. Othello is unaware of his need for Desdemona; he believes that she loves him and he is secure in his estimate of himself. But he truly loves her love and requires it for his very existence. He says he is no more when he is unloved. Iago discerns this; Othello, says Iago, would renounce his baptism for her; "her appetite shall play the god with his weak function."[27] At Othello's first glimmerings of recognition of his situation he says, "when I love thee not, chaos is come again." The world in which he lives was created by his love and is dependent on the continuation of that love. Iago's success is based upon his making Othello realize both his attachment to Desdemona, and also that this attachment does not necessarily deserve a recompense. Othello now needs a proof of love to justify his own existence. The whole house of cards in which he has lived starts to tumble.[28]

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[27] II, ii, 376–379. Shakespeare vividly depicts Othello's first consciousness of the depth and intensity of his need when, after Iago's first tentative barbs, Desdemona arrives to plead for Cassio. He for the first time is a little vexed; all is not perfect as formerly but as she goes away he cannot help admiring her and says, "Excellent wretch!" (III, iii, 104–106). He sees, with a certain pleasure, that he needs her very much and that it is somewhat in spite of himself, that it has nothing to do with right or justice. A few moments later, when his suspicions become explicit, he denies this and says he would let her go if she were false; he soon realizes that whatever she be, he must possess her or kill her, that he cannot do without her.

[28] The importance of Desdemona to Othello as a tribute is clear when his rage against her reaches its height at the moment he is recalled by Venice. The crude impression which those who witness it have, that he is disturbed by losing his position, is not totally un-

When Othello begins to need the proof of love, he also begins to realize that proofs of love may be impossible to come by, especially for "great ones" towards whom those in inferior positions are likely to use all the wiles of persuasion and deception. Except by the omniscient, the motions of the human soul cannot be observed. Acts are never sure proof because they are ambiguous, especially in matters of love. One can never know for certain what another thinks of him, and when that knowledge is required the quest for certainty can be the cruellest of torments to which a human being can be subjected. Iago makes this clear to Othello in masterful fashion, first by refusing to tell him what he knows about Cassio and Desdemona, while claiming that even a slave is free as to his innermost thoughts.[29] As love can only be free, nature has so constructed man that his loves and hates can be hidden from observation, a concealment which is the precondition of freedom. Then Iago with prodigious obscenity, shocking the most revered beliefs and presenting him with pictures of the realization of his most dreaded fears, shows him that one can never tell what an act means.[30]

It is at this point that jealousy becomes dominant and triumphs. *Othello* is admittedly the story of a jealous man and it is in the analysis of the origin and the consequences of this terrible passion that the play fulfills itself. Jealousy is in itself a passion of the weak and the contemptible, or so it is generally felt to be. The other characters who suffer it in the play—Roderigo, Iago, and Bianca—are base figures. So it is that when the confident Othello becomes a victim of jealousy his tragedy is already complete; he has lost all that which he was or pretended to be. Nonetheless, in spite of its intrinsic pettiness, jealousy takes on a certain grandeur when it occurs in a man of Othello's proportions; the size and depth of his hopes lend themselves to his sense of loss and his furies are in proportion to the nobility of his deceived ambitions. And, moreover, jealousy as understood traditionally, was not always a contemptible and ridiculous passion. There was one great example of it which, if it could not stand as a model for others' imitation, gave a certain cosmic significance to the passion:

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justified, with the qualification that it be understood in the deep sense in which his position is meaningful to him. He is ambitious, but in no vulgar way (IV, i, 231–317).

[29] III, iii, 158–160.

[30] III, iii, 455–456, 471–486, 499–501. By the beginning of Act IV the discussion of the meaning of physical acts has turned into a gruesome and tantalizing game (IV, i, 1–26). The obscenity of Iago is founded on that which is revered by others. For both Brabantio and Othello, the purity of Desdemona is all in all. The shocking aspect of Iago's speech is not that he speaks freely about sensual matters, but that for others these things are sacred and Iago profanes what is holy for them. It is only in the context of reverence that Iago's speech is terrible; it is a sort of blasphemy. The relation between Othello and Desdemona, if there is any physical element to it at all, is largely a spiritual one. When he realizes that perhaps physical satisfactions are important for her and he sees his own insufficiency in this regard, her possible infidelity becomes all the more horrible for him. It is not only that she cares for another but that her being is so constituted that he could never satisfy her. He must insist not only on fidelity but chastity; he must change her nature and all men's natures, and all this not for the sake of morality but to preserve for himself that which he wants.

the God of the Old Testament who commands love and promises revenge unto the third and fourth generation for those who are not obedient.[31] Although God's jealousy cannot be an object of human imitation, and far transcends the disappointment of deceived husbands, it could not help but add significance to the jealousy of ordinary mortals. God's anger at those who transgress the commandment has a similarity to the anger of men who are deceived; to understand what God's jealousy is, men must begin from the only experience of jealousy they have, *i.e.*, human jealousy. And with the sanctity brought to marriage by Judaism and Christianity, even the motives take on a certain similarity; the jealous husband takes a just vengeance for the violation of a sacred commandment. The husband is made in the image of the Lord.

This is not to say that the Old Testament God justifies human jealousy; it is only that His jealousy gives jealousy in general a significance it would not have in a non-Biblical context. It would be difficult to imagine a Greek play whose hero is primarily characterized by the false suspicion of his wife's infidelity; this would be a subject of comedy. Shakespeare has succeeded in this *tour de force* because the enlarged sense of the word jealousy unconsciously affects our perception of those who suffer it. Shakespeare's Othello does act out on the human scene a god's role;[32] he is a universal stranger, a leader who can command and punish wherever he goes. He insists on honor and wreaks bloody vengeance on those who disobey. Shakespeare analyzes the sophistry of the heart of a man who tries thus to be divine.

This stranger from Africa comes to Venice, in a gentle guise, insisting on nothing from anyone. He takes the respect and affection given him as free gift and is himself a lover. But from his love emerges jealousy and an insistence more intense than could have previously been imagined. Jealousy, as Iago says, is doubt. It is the accompaniment of love that is unrequited or suspected of being so. Jealousy implies a lack of self-assurance; the man who knows he is worthy of love will not be jealous—if his wife is unfaithful, he will no longer deem her worthy of his love. He is himself the touchstone; this is precisely the attitude that Othello thinks he must take and says he will take.[33] He will forget Desdemona. Jealousy is contemptible because it bespeaks imperfection; he who suffers it must either think himself unlovable or the one he loves corrupt; but nevertheless he continues to love and think it right to love and be loved.

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[31] God's jealousy in relation to Israel in the Old Testament is interpreted in parable as the relation of a man to a faithless woman (Ezekiel 16, 38); and, in general, the action of God is understood in analogy to the conduct of husbands. Because of the sanctity of marriage, the husband's care gains greater justice, and because of the holiness of the husband's jealousy, the analogy of God's jealousy to that of man is not obnoxious. Jealousy, the emotion accompanying the *suspicion* of infidelity, is not an important theme outside the Biblical tradition. "Ein Beleg für die Bdtg. Eifersucht speziell im Verhältniss von Ehegatten ist mir im klass. Griech. nicht begegnet" (A. Stumpf in Kittel's *Theologische Wörterbuch Zum Neuen Testament,* Stuttgart, 1935, p. 879). No treatment of the subject can be found in Greek literature on the passions. At the least, it can be said that fidelity to, and love of, God take on a new and special sense when it is understood that God commands them because he is jealous. The magnitude of Othello's jealousy, both in its understanding of marriage and its *imitatio Dei,* is inconceivable without the Bible.

Shakespeare draws out the parallel in presenting the relationship between Othello and Desdemona as spiritual with the physical motivations appearing as the great sin. Immediately before declaring his jealousy, the God of the *Old Testament* specifies the meaning of infidelity: the worship of physical objects—all that paganism implied (Exodus xx, 4–6; *cf.* IV, i, 137).

[32] II, ii, 232–234; III, iii, 417–419; V, ii, 110, 57 (*cf.* Mark iv, 39), 165 (*cf.* Deut. xxii, 21), 167 (*cf.* Gen. xlix, 4). Othello's arrogation of god-like prerogatives is clearest in the assurance with which he judges, prior to his jealousy in a calm confidence in his superiority to others, later in the righteous intensity of his fury. When he learns he was in error, he is nothing—he is either perfection or nothingness.

Jealousy rarely, if ever, sees itself as jealousy. Rather is it reflected in the soul it possesses as justice. The revenge worked by jealousy is said to be the desert of the victim. She was unfaithful. But is being unfaithful necessarily a crime, if the one who insists on love does not deserve it? A man who passes sentence in his own interest, for the sake of preserving what is his own or punishing what refuses to be his, is not a judge but a tyrant. He insists that love be given; but only conformity, not love, can be gained by force; love is a free gift. A love which insists on return is violence. However that may be, the jealous man cannot admit that it is jealousy that motivates him, for he would then confess himself to be acting for himself and contrary to the interests of those he judges. He must pretend that he has been wronged, that he truly deserved love. And the proof of deserving love is being loved.

Othello appears as a judge. Indeed, his only actions in the play are judgments. We have two such examples, the comparison of which is instructive for our understanding of Othello's real claims. Those judgments are of Cassio and Desdemona. His judgment of Cassio is in a way a preparation for that of Desdemona. It gives us a hint of Othello's merits and limitations as judge.

Cassio, inveigled by Iago into drinking, causes a disturbance. Othello arrives on the scene. He is completely in command and assumes that all will bend to his least word or gesture; his jealousy has not yet risen.[34] He summarily dismisses Cassio. To do so is perfectly correct from the point of view of human justice. Cassio is a soldier and has been drinking before going on duty. The unfortunate circumstances that led him into trouble do not excuse him from the responsibilities of an officer. But Shakespeare has presented the scene in such a way that we know that from the point of view of complete justice this is a miscarriage. Cassio has been duped and has been made to appear fully responsible. The real culprit is Iago. Othello is a decent general doing justice on the basis of acts done. He does not try to pry into hidden motives. He judges by the surface. Every judge must believe that he knows the principles of justice, and that he is personally disinterested in those judged. He must have some source of knowledge which he believes to be certain, or he could not in conscience judge other men. Judges receive this knowledge from the law. Othello proceeds with Cassio according to the rules of military discipline. These rules are limited in scope. Yet they express what all would admit is a true form of justice, whose limits are due to the limited nature of their purpose—military discipline—and not to partiality or hypocrisy.

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[33] III, iii, 205–221.

[34] II, ii, 229–234, 288–292

The judgment of Desdemona is in sharp contrast with this. Here Othello judges not external actions, but intentions, the innermost movements of a soul. He does not need proof of acts.[35] He is led by his uncertainty to assume the guilty act. Rendered mad by this assumption, he wants only to prove that Desdemona is unfaithful. He still regards himself as the dispenser of justice. But now it is no longer the health of the military order that supports his authority, but his right to be loved. His need for her love has been converted into a duty for her to love, a duty which he takes it upon himself to judge. But a judge should have no interest in the one he judges. As his doubt has grown, his whole way of life and manner of understanding has changed. He is no longer free and open of manner nor trusting of disposition. He is suspicious. Acts no longer mean to Othello what they seem to mean. Decent appearances now conceal an underlying viciousness. And this viciousness can be said to be physical passion. Chastity has become a cult with him.[36] Desdemona's free offer of a chaste love, which was so unexpected and which he accepted as his due, he now insists upon. Now, however, he believes this offer to be unnatural; men are naturally lustful beasts; chastity without compulsion becomes unintelligible to him. Desdemona must be sequestered from society and compelled to spend her life in prayer if she is to be purged of the appetites that make her unworthy of Othello.[37] On the basis of his need he wishes to force men counter to their natures; what was supposed to be love now turns into a tyranny. With it comes a peculiarly low view of mankind. Iago becomes the high priest of this cult, leading Othello "by the nose." Iago converts all men into obscene beasts in Othello's eyes. He shows Othello that the love and honor due him is destroyed by physical passion; human beings are naturally led to care for things of the flesh. In order to be believed in, Othello must change this; his jealousy, under Iago's guidance, becomes a demand for inhuman purity, for a renunciation of the worship of the body. Iago has only to suggest obscene motivations and Othello is ready to wreak vengenance on any who are suspected. Iago makes use of an intense hate and fear of lust on Othello's part to further his own ends. Iago becomes a moralizer on the very bases of his lewd preoccupations. His moralizing reaches its almost comic peak when he comments on Cassio's fate, "This is the fruit of whoring."[38] He is a priest who makes use of Othello's new morality to conceal his private ends. I know of no play within which physical passion is believed to be so much the source of the action and, in reality, is so little the source of any important thing. More subtle vices of the soul are the roots of the action.

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[35] Othello does indeed begin by demanding deeds, ocular proof, as was his custom. He does not want to be led by simple sentiments; he wants to do justice. But Iago skillfully shows him that in such matters direct proof is impossible and Othello is satisfied with ritual proofs turned into "confirmations strong as proofs of holy writ" (III, iii, 375–377) by the mad assurance that all men are base and inclined to acts of treachery; jealousy presupposes guilt and seeks for substantiation (III, iii, 219–221, 415–514).

[36] III, iii, 312–314; III, iv. 46–52; IV, i, 9–12; ii, 24–27. At the end, even the stars are the signs of a cosmic chastity, V, ii, 4.

[37] III, iv, 43–56.

[38] Iago's use of morality is fully conscious and based on his observation of Othello. Actually, the attitude he takes is much nearer that of those who are attached to Othello

The new attempt to control souls leads of necessity to a new method of understanding men. Souls cannot be seen. Of course a justice which saw men's souls naked would be vastly superior to the old justice, in which judgment was rendered only on the basis of acts committed. But perhaps the old way was founded on a prudent reserve, or modesty, which recognized the limitations of human vision. The result of the new way is not truly to see the soul but rather to reject all the evidence of action and to turn to signs which in themselves have no meaning. Desdemona is judged by the handkerchief, that handkerchief on which the whole judgment turns. It is a magic charm, of superhuman quality, and only through it can she control Othello.[39] When she does not appear to show sufficient respect for this object, this mere thing, she is guilty and her soul is laid bare. Mere routine or ritual is the basis of the judgment of Desdemona. The attempt to do away with the superficiality of the old law leads to a mysticism which is even more distant from truth.

Othello commits his terrible crime for the sake of justice. The horror of the murder only reflects the fact that justice must be stern. If Othello is right about Desdemona's deed and is further correct in assuming that her only salvation would be in loving him, then his cruelty would be but terrible responsibility. He may justly say that "I who am cruel, am yet merciful."[40] Mercy can appear in this gruesome context because Othello's bloodiness is an integral part of the human scene in the new context created by him, and any attempt to soften the lot of those under his sovereignty can be regarded as mercy. On the basis of the new justice of love, a cruelty and passion that never before existed comes into being.

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than his own natural one. Cassio, when dismissed by Othello, speaks in terms worthy of the most severe moralist, "the devil wine, the devil anger," etc. In talking to him, Iago takes a reasonable and tolerant line (II, ii, 292–343). Cassio orients himself according to the pleasure and displeasure of Othello and in his fall from grace blames himself with extraordinary severity; rather than trying to reestablish himself, he falls into a state of repentance and self-castigation. Desdemona is much the same way. Both torment only themselves and Iago sees where this attitude can lead if made cynical use of. If those who love Othello are dependent on his opinion and he is jealous and frightened of losing their love, Iago, by playing on Othello's fear can cause him to make more and more demands on others and so further his own ends (*e.g.*, his suggestion that fear is the best way to control Desdemona, III, iii, 236–238). All he need do is present Othello with new dangers and his standards become ever higher and sterner. Othello's sick fears convert innocent human acts into crimes. The height of the morality comes only from Iago's low view of men. Cassio's harmless weakness at drink and his love for women can in this context be converted into mortal sins. It is interesting to note that Othello's tyranny is prefigured by Brabantio's reaction upon recognizing that he is deceived, I, iii, 221–224.

[39] III, iv, 68–81. Shakespeare has taken the handkerchief, a much less significant element in the source, Cinthio's *novella*, and rendered it a magic charm in which the whole proof of Othello's suspicions is centered and fulfilled. It is the sole and sufficient cause of Desdemona's death.

[40] V, ii, 110.

V

Othello sought to accomplish an extreme human feat; he attempted to be a hero without a home, without a city to sing his praises and write his epitaph. He did this under the guise of universality; only if a man is liberated from the influence of and need for the laws and ways of a particular nation can he go anywhere and be a hero. But this universality, Shakespeare seems to tell us, is a lie. If a man can liberate himself from a particular time and place it cannot be as a hero, statesman, or soldier. Such careers are by their nature bound to the fortunes of cities of men, all of which have special needs and traditions. Those who follow these pathways seek glory as their reward, and glory is dependent upon a public. The hero is perforce attached to the place whence his glory comes and he must believe somehow in the special importance and excellence of that place. This represents a denial of the universal standpoint; it is part of the necessary narrowing of the statesman's horizon. Othello's universality only conceals a desire to be limited and local; it is itself an inflated shadow of the ordinary man's limitations; it is his tool for entry into Venice. Man's eternal aspiration to be man and man alone is burlesqued and travestied; what should be truly an end in itself, and masquerades as such, is but a means in Othello's usage. He pretends to be lovable because he is good, but actually his goodness is only an appearance to enable him to be loved. As long as he believes his own myth he can be gentle, for he thinks that what he demands from men is natural. But when he comes to doubt, he believes that what he demands is against nature. His jealousy then becomes his weapon to bend men to his will. His barbaric nature now reveals itself; but it is barbarism transformed and intensified.

His final tragedy consists not so much in killing Desdemona, but in the discovery of his own injustice—that his justice is not justice at all. He discovers that what he thought was justice was but a way of gratifying his own appetite, an appetite whose existence it was of the essence of his being not to recognize. His jealousy arises when he realizes that he is a dependent being, that he needs. His tragedy is complete when it becomes clear that he does not deserve fulfillment but only desires it. He has done terrible deeds under the conviction of his own wisdom; but he is nothing. Othello is a figure of enormous proportions; no reader can fail to sense this. Yet he is curiously insubstantial. And this is Shakespeare's meaning; he is a name without a substance. He lives in men's minds and needs more than in any reality. Both for his own sake and for that of the Venetians, he had to be thought a perfect being, but he was only a being afflicted with human passion. The intensity of the ending comes from the loud bursting of an enormous bubble which vanishes into nothingness.[41] His last words protest his everlasting loyalty to Venice.

Shakespeare appears to tell us that it is not good to introduce influences that are too foreign, regardless of the guise under which they may come. The benevolence of foreign influences is always ambiguous. What is not native will at some point go against the grain of what is native; it must then tyrannize or succumb. Venice did not suffer from it but Desdemona did; Venice knew when to "cast him." Universality on the purely political level does not conduce to the city's good.

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[41] V, ii, 304–307; *cf.* III, iii, 403–413.

VI

Let us turn now to Desdemona. Her selfless devotion to Othello and her sweetness make her a peculiarly undeserving subject for tragic suffering. Her death seems deeply offensive. It must be asked if there is anything in her nature that makes her fate in any way appropriate. Is she senselessly destroyed, a harmless bystander caught in the backlash of the unreeling of Othello's life?

The answer to this question is dependent on an understanding of her love. What was the source of her involvement in this strange romance? The absolute source was Othello's speeches. But this is not enough in itself; we must discover to what these speeches appealed. We learn from her father that she was ordinarily a very quiet and shy girl, a soft and gentle character. But at the same time we know that she was independent, that she knew her own wishes. She had "shunned the wealthy curled darlings" of Venice; she was not satisfied with the best of Venice.[42] She wanted to love something beyond the Venetian. And this Othello provided. His stories of strange lands and great adventures seemed to give evidence of an experience and knowledge beyond the conventional. She felt that her limited life was not sufficient; we see in her an embryonic passion for the universal, a desire not to be duped by life. But she is undirected. What is merely different and strange impresses her as more significant and real. Whether Othello believes them or not, his stories contain much that could not possibly be true; they are, as Iago says, fantastic.[43] They appeal to Desdemona's imagination which was watered with loneliness and shyness. She is exactly as her name describes her: superstitious.[44] Her devotion to

[42] I, iii, 113–115; I, ii, 83.

[43] I, iii, 166–168; II, i, 255–257.

[44] In this etymology of the name I follow Shaftesbury in considering it to be derived from the Greek *δεισιδαίμων*, while the later interpreters have unanimously understood it as stemming from *δυσδαίμων*, meaning ill-starred or ill-fated. One cannot of course lean too heavily on the supposed etymology of a name in the interpretation of a play, especially when that etymology is itself disputable. But it seems certain that Shakespeare often chose names which had an overtone of their bearer's character (*cf.* Ruskin, *Munera Pulveris* in *Works*, London, 1905, p. 257); and in this case both meanings would apply extremely well. My preference for the meaning *superstitious* is grounded on a general observation of her nature and the suitability of applying such a term to her. As far as I am able to see there are no philological grounds for the preference of the one interpretation over the other, so that one must rely on one's interpretation of the play to justify the sense of the name. If the interpretation is convincing, the name gives a certain added weight. The other interpreters who have treated this problem have based their choice almost exclusively on a belief that Desdemona was unlucky and that this constitutes her essence; the meaning of her name is only an expression of this. The burden of this essay has been to prove that it is not simply ill fortune that constitutes the core of her tragedy. The reader must himself judge of the plausibility of the two etymologies because scholarship can go no further. As is frequent in scholarly matters, an assumption as to the certitude of a questionable

Othello exalts her, and her choice to seek for meaning beyond accepted belief lends her a dignity which the ordinary citizen cannot have. But it was a choice conceived in error; Othello was a creation of her mind. She believed his speeches about his deeds. And, paradoxically, her love sought in Othello something independent and free, while that very love made him dependent, and bound his seeming universality to something particular. They passed each other by, as it were, on the path of love. Most paradoxical of all, in order to free herself from Venice she loves a creation of Venice. Instead of winning her freedom she became all the more enfettered to the thing she was trying to escape: Othello existed only in the mind of Venice. Desdemona gave herself completely and with passion to something beyond the physical, but to a something conceived in error. In giving up all for the sake of cosmopolitanism she was a follower of the most characteristic expression of the political community: its myths about its leaders. Desdemona, the only figure in the play who is indifferent to popular opinion, becomes a prisoner of the opinion about Othello.

Desdemona's superstition is not the only cause of her death. Her fidelity is also a necessary condition. She was not only attracted by Othello's stories, but she believed and insisted on keeping faith with him no matter what he did. The appearance of his actions is unimportant; he must be followed and loved regardless of his deeds, for his ends are inscrutable. She believes in him so completely that she must deny the validity of common sense in order to justify him. What appears like injustice from an ordinary point of view must appear to Desdemona as justice punishing some supposed vice or sin in herself or others. If he is to be believed in, although he acts contrary to ordinary human standards, then she must say that those standards are meaningless or are mis-

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interpretation seems to provide scientific proof of issues really contingent on that interpretation. Only if a Shaftesbury is certainly wrong in his understanding of *Othello* can it be definitely decided that *ill-starred* is what was meant by Shakespeare.

Whatever confirming evidence there is, is ambiguous. Shakespeare's source, Cinthio, contained only this one name which was taken over by Shakespeare. In Cinthio, the name almost certainly means *ill-starred;* but this does not prove that Shakespeare could not have altered this just as he re-interprets the entire character and gives it a new significance. One relevant fact is that Shakespeare alters Cinthio's spelling of the name; in the *novella* it is *Dis*demona. The i or y are the conventional transliterations of the Greek υ which would clearly seem to mean that the etymology is δυσδαίμων. Shakespeare's substitution of e for i, if it is not for inevident reasons of euphony, would render the name closer to δεισιδαίμων. From Theophrastus, if not earlier, on down, the δεισιδαίμων or superstitious man is one of the conventional human types, a character that is painted in literature for the sake of instructing audiences about common and dangerous errors. Plutarch wrote a treatise about it which could easily have been read by Shakespeare. In Plutarch's work, the superstitious man is contrasted with the atheist—presented as having contrary false opinions about the nature of the gods. The two characters, as outlined by Plutarch, have striking similarities to Desdemona and Iago respectively.

Finally, the two derivatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, see below, p. 154. *Cf.* John Upton, *Critical Observations on Shakespeare* (London, 1746), p. 288; John Wesley Hales, *Notes and Essays on Shakespeare*, London, 1884, p. 111; Albert Tesch, "Zum Namen Desdemona," *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, XVII (1929), pp. 587–588.

conceived in this higher context. She accepts that new way of judging souls that resulted from Othello's jealousy; the clear appearance of things is rejected and some mysterious standard dependent on Othello's whim becomes the rule. Of course the real source of this standard is Othello's need to make himself loved absolutely and uncontingently. But that true source is transformed and represented as a hidden meaning to life, one that can be revealed only through Othello. And in Desdemona there begins a sort of self-examination; no longer does she look to the surface meaning of words and deeds, but her conscience bids her to search out faults which her reason does not see. Cassio did much the same thing when dismissed by Othello; all moral value comes from Othello and what he does not approve is bad. Othello does not depend on nature but nature on Othello. This leads to new habits of mind, new virtues.

Desdemona, in her conversation with Emilia, states her principle clearly: fidelity and only fidelity—everything subordinated to it. It is noble, without doubt, but it certainly is not so reasonable as the statement of Emilia, who makes fidelity dependent on the deeds of the husband. Her morality is an easy-going one that does not attach so much significance to chastity. In herself she is not so fine a person as Desdemona, but perhaps true and untragic nobility cannot be reached by the sanctification of marital fidelity. And Emilia, for all her inferiority, may yet serve to point this out. For Emilia, the simple world of common-sense meanings and the evident justice of acts must dictate to fidelity: fidelity cannot be unconditional. For Desdemona, everything must be interpreted in such a way as to preserve her faith.[45]

Desdemona's faith in Othello leads her to a certain disregard for the truth which has not often enough been observed. We see her practicing deception three times in the play, and each time with great significance for her fate. In the first place she hides her relationship with Othello from her father, and presents him with the *fait accompli*. However indulgently we may look upon her love for Othello, there is no question but that she is guilty of disobedience; and her love comes into conflict with most sacred duties. The love of Othello leads the best of the city's children to a contempt for it and a willingness to break the law for his sake. In any case of conflict of loyalties, Desdemona chooses without hesitation in favor of Othello; it seems that this shy girl gained so much strength and confidence, or such fanaticism, from her love that she is capable of doing things in a cool spirit that others would be unable to do. And it must be remembered that the consequence of this deception was the death of her father.[46] In the second case, she lied to Othello about the handkerchief. Here is perhaps the clearest indication of her superstitious nature: she was so frightened by the significance Othello attached to the handkerchief and the tale he told her about it that she did not dare to let him know that she had lost it. This untruth led directly to her own death.[47] And finally, she seems to tell a lie even after death. She says that Othello did not kill her.

[45] IV, iii, 66–116, 24–26, ii, 81, 131–145, 177–193; III, iii, 89–96, 103, iv, 162–176.
[46] V, ii, 255–261.
[47] III, iv, 95–104.

She still tries to preserve his reputation; for she would die in vain if he were evil. His reputation lives in her and not in him. To the end, she must see things as she wants them to be rather than as they are. Believing is seeing.[48]

Desdemona's death is in large measure due to her own errors. They were noble errors, errors which elevated her above the level of ordinary humanity, but they deserved punishment. From the point of view of everyday life, Desdemona sins in deceiving her father. We take her side because she does so in the name of something higher. But perhaps from a third and highest standpoint we must come to the defense of civil society and see her defection as a result of a monstrous misconception. Perhaps the true cosmopolitanism can be attained only by renouncing the dearest hopes of practical life. Marriage is a part of political life, of civil society. One cannot purify it of its political element without depriving it of its substance.

Desdemona has been compared to Cordelia and Miranda, and with much justice. She is independent, courageous, and gentle, as is the former, and she has a sweet ingenuousness like the latter (in the spirit of "oh, brave new world"). But Desdemona lacks Cordelia's love of the truth which causes her to understand her situation so well. Desdemona never recognizes her error and, using the other possible meaning of her name, she says "It is my wretched fortune."[49] Shakespeare, in the fullness of his meaning, says that her "wretched fortune" is a result of her "superstition." And, unlike Miranda, she has no Prospero to guide her imagination and set her in the right course. Her untutored understanding spawns monsters. Shakespeare in this bleak play shows us no way around Desdemona's problem. She leads a noble life but one that is against law and also against reason.

VII

Finally, let us consider the last member of the play's trinity, Iago. Iago is clearly the devil. He says so himself and is often so called.[50] But in the case where god is not perfect the devil's negativity may be a source of liberation, an aid to the discovery of the truth. Iago has always been condemned and hated, and certainly what he does is most terrible; but a defense can and must be made for him.[51] Shakespeare plays upon a human softness and sentimentality in this work. We so like to flatter our own goodness and warmheartedness that we are unwilling to recognize hard truths. Our natural partisanship with love and lovers causes us to see only Iago's wickedness in destroying the love of Othello and Desdemona; we like to believe that without his intervention all would have been well. But the very terribleness which so moves us teaches us, albeit unconsciously, that this is not just another love story, that there is here an inevitability we wish not to face, one we hide in our condemnation of Iago.

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[48] V, ii, 147–156. Othello has smothered Desdemona at line 105 and is persuaded she is dead by line 116. Whether Shakespeare meant that she return to life, or Othello was mistaken and she was not yet quite dead, Desdemona's words, coherent sentences uttered after strangulation, constitute a remarkable occurrence, outside the natural order of things. This difficulty has often been noted. I suggest that this last supreme effort of the poor creature was intended to give a supernatural impression to the audience, and that attempts to rationalize it, by changing the manner of her death or otherwise, miss the meaning. Precisely because of the improbability of what she does, do we know of the intensity of Desdemona's devotion and faith; she gives it a significance beyond the human in a play distinguished by its merely human context, one in which the cosmic reverberations characterizing Shakespeare's other great tragedies are absent. In the theatre, especially that of Shakespeare, improbabilities are the devices for the expression of greater but unutterable probabilities.

[49] IV, ii, 150.

[50] I, i, 169, 121–122, iii, 427; II, ii, 310–312, 323–325, 381–382; III, iv, 50; V, ii, 351–352.

Iago, as I have said, is only a mirror or an agent that causes the unseen to become visible. Lived over and over again, the love of Desdemona and Othello would end the same way. Yet no matter how often it happened, each time we would be as shocked and surprised as we were the first time; for the result runs counter to our wish and our wishes cause us to bury the truth. Shakespeare is, in the final accounting, very hard. Iago's speeches, read dispassionately, show that he is the clearest thinker in the play. Honest Iago is not merely a tragically misplaced epithet. Iago does tell more of the truth than any other character. It is difficult to understand his motivation; no villain in Shakespeare seems to act without some plausible end in view, an end the value of which all men would recognize, although they might perhaps not be willing to commit the crimes necessary to arrive at it. But Iago, as does the devil, seems to act from pure negativity. I am not what I am.[52] Whatever Othello wants, Iago wants the opposite. He is sub- or super-human. But in opposing Othello he shows that the world dominated by Othello is a world of fancy. He speaks out for a freedom which none of the others recognize. Iago wishes to live his own life free from the domination of other men, and especially of other men's thoughts. He realizes that true tyranny is not imposed by force but imposes itself on the minds of men. For Iago, man can free himself only by thought. He has thought through the emptiness of most beliefs and will not live in subordination to them. He cannot found his life on self-deception, as Othello does.[53]

His analysis of things generally esteemed leads to several conclusions. He is in the first place a materialist. The solidity of money as a means for living freely is clear, so he does not share the noble man's contempt for it. (The noble man usually has money already, so is not forced to the salutary reflection on its necessity.) The word "purse" is found in his mouth very often. In the second place, he knows that reputation is often ill gained and worse lost. He not only knows it but demonstrates it in his manipulations of Othello and Cassio, and by his own very good repute. A man must be independent of reputation or he is the slave of public whim. He tells this beautifully to Cassio, and to show how opposite Othello's view is, Iago tells him that reputation is everything and the purse trash. For Iago reputation is trash and he who follows it lives for others. Since reputation is no real sign of true virtue, it follows that straightforward honesty is undesirable. A man must appear to be what the public wants, and freedom to live well depends upon cultivating deception. Iago reveals the strange fact that freedom to pursue the truth requires deception, for the truth runs counter to much necessary prejudice; and he who wants to be open must either be a martyr or deceive himself for the sake of popularity. Moreover, Iago is the only character who has comic lines in an unusually humorless play. The serious things, so piously considered by the others, are subjects of his wit. Part of his freedom comes from being able to laugh at mankind, to see that much of its pretension is comic. Connected with this is his contempt for romantic love. He sees nothing in it beyond physical passion. Love cannot take on such grand significance for him, and the attempt to make it sacred is ridiculous.[54]

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[51] Macaulay made an able one, cited in the Furness *Variorum*, pp. 412–413.

[52] I, i, 71; *cf.* Exodus, iii, 14; *cf.* III, iii, 103.

[53] I, iii, 350–390.

All the bonds that link humanity and make living together possible have been dissolved in Iago. Trust is impossible for him because to trust implies respect for other human beings, a respect in which he is completely deficient.[55] When a man believes that public opinion, or his own sense of shame, are merely devices of the herd to make men live for others rather than themselves, all the monsters of passion are released within him. Iago is jealous, lecherous, and ambitious; his reason and reasonableness allow him to divest himself of all the clogs of convention but give him no stable goals for action. Only his emancipated passions supply him with objects of desire. Iago himself has no idea of what he wants. He is eminently a private man; he can care for no one but himself and his views justify this selfishness, for there is no reason to serve a morality created in the interest of others.[56] He is an example of what is often asserted will happen when men no longer believe in God; he is an atheist.

Now, if such a private view of life and man is grafted on to the thought of a political man, a man who is interested in public life, the result is the development of a severe and punishing morality. A political man knows of the necessity of civil society, that the common good can only be served if there is a habit of obedience to law and a deference to custom. If he is convinced that men are by nature bad, then he must believe in the use of force, deceit and terror to make them conform. Iago succeeds in convincing Othello of his own view of mankind yet this does not alter Othello's way of life; he does not renounce public life and vow to pursue his own passions, as would seem reasonable for a man with such an opinion. He decides instead to force men to be what he formerly thought they naturally were. Othello was peculiarly susceptible to this persuasion, for he was not a member of a city where men through long habit have learned to live together, and where they do not indulge themselves in questioning whether it is good or not that they do so. Even if they raised the question, the force of habit would be likely to keep them in their civil ways. Othello, on the other hand, cannot rest content with obedience grounded on unconscious repetition; he is universal and a stranger and requires that man deliberately choose the good. And it is perhaps true that the majority of men, outside of the particular training which has broken them to their city's laws, would not be so just, and would be more likely to consult their private interests. Othello is gentle and loving as long as he believes in man's goodness; he becomes a tyrant when he doubts. To fit the cosmopolis of which he dreams men must be transformed, and what was once innocuous in them now becomes a great danger. Iago wants and needs the change he produces in Othello. He does not believe in the common good. But when he can control Othello and use Othello's fears to punish others, he will be in a perfect position to do as he lists. His apparently unmotivated vengeance expresses his freedom. A morality based on ritual and suspicion fits the needs of this hypocrite, informer, and false accuser. Tartuffes can always stand for morality. The devil can quote scripture, especially when he has written it. Iago makes use of Othello's good but misguided intentions, and Othello's tragedy comes when he realizes that his life has been used to destroy others for the sake of an Iago. Iago is Othello's ensign, or standard bearer, in something more than name.

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[54] II, i, 119–191. In this scene all of Iago's little rhymes reflect Desdemona's situation in one way or another, especially the central one.

[55] Othello, on the contrary, believed that men are fundamentally what they seem to be (III, iii, 139–151; *cf.* I, iii, 422–425). Iago has made the distinction between seeming and being, and everything he does is based on it. One must live for the real which is radically different from the apparent while seeming to be what one is not. He can use Othello because Othello cares so much about appearance; and because, once he too has begun to distrust appearance, he believes in the possible reality of anything. Iago's, "I never found a man who knew how to love himself" (I, iii, 344–345), is the expression of the moral attitude that is the result of his views.

[56] I, i, 45–70.

Iago is also a stranger in Venice, but he does not need to practice self-deception, since he does not care for honor. For him his profession is simply a job. He has no need to try to add dignity to it, hence he is not compelled to try to make Venice's beliefs his own. Of course the result of this is that he cannot participate in the heroic character of an Othello. However revealing his existence may be, and the truth is not an unimportant thing, his is not a life that men would wish to imitate. His critique of ordinary beliefs leaves him in the end with no real purpose in life at all. He opposes established custom in the name of freedom, but this freedom is compatible with the basest and most arbitrary ends. He can trust no one and is full of fear that he himself will be deceived because men are base. His negativity leads only to the breakdown of order and turns his life into a chaos.

Othello appears then to leave us with this choice: a mean life based on a clear perception of reality, or a noble life based on falsehood and ending in tragedy. Othello is open and loving but deceived. Iago knows well the defects of Othello's life, but certainly offers no alternative worthy of choice. Yet Iago, in the end, is himself destroyed, but not by the baseness he understands and fears. Iago, otherwise so clear-sighted, fails to see one thing. He cannot foresee that Emilia would be willing to die for the truth. The possibility of a simple unadorned passion for nothing but truth is not within his ken. But would not a life expressing such a passion be both noble and, by its very nature, free from deception?

ENGLISH BARDS AND *APSR* REVIEWERS

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Recently the REVIEW has extended its hospitality to studies which are not, technically, within the discipline it serves. A new school of Shakespeare criticism may be in the making; and since everyone deplores departmentalization, one should like to welcome, without misgivings, *APSR* publication of two Shakespeare interpretations.[1] But I, for one, do have misgivings. It may be that the views of the authors are useful and needful for political theory; of that I am no judge. But I am sure that to present these views as Shakespeare's can serve neither political theory nor Shakespeare criticism. The study of Shakespeare can profit from a knowledge of the history of political theory; and we on the belletristic side of the quad like to think that we are not the sole beneficiaries of the exchange. But the two articles in question go beyond this simple form of barter; they are interpretations of dramatic poetry. They do not accept and retail what Shakespeare criticism has concluded about the poet's political philosophy; they are ambitious attempts to discover this philosophy by taking a direct and novel look at some Shakespearean texts. That is a praiseworthy ambition; but it demands something the authors do not have nor even know they lack: an adequate concept of the specificity of literature as a mode of discourse different from other modes. They have a worthy aim: to give a great poet a voice in the great concerns of practical life. But they have not yet learned to distinguish between the poet's voice and their own—so that, though I greet the aim, I must withhold the applause.

I

Here are three statements, admittedly out of context, from Bloom's article:

> He believes that the unity of true Christians is a kind of brotherhood of such overpowering influence that local differences pass into insignificance.
>
> In giving up all for the sake of cosmopolitanism, she was a follower of the most characteristic expression of the political community, its myths about its leaders.
>
> [He] is gentle and loving as long as he believes in man's goodness; he becomes a tyrant when he doubts. To fit the cosmopolis of which he dreams, men must be transformed.

I propose a test. Choose a jury of widely read, intelligent men; show them these statements (with the information that they are meant to describe two main characters in a play known to all of them), and then ask them to guess who is being talked about. I think I am safe in claiming that there will not be a single correct identification. Now let these jurors guess the rough date of the play; I should be surprised if any date were given earlier than the eighteenth century. And I rather expect that if the jurors were then told the correct answers (Othello and Desdemona), they would be indignant for having been made the butts of a pointless and incomprehensible joke.

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[1] Allan W. Bloom, "Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community: An Interpretation of *Othello*," this issue, pp. 130–157, above; Harry V. Jaffa, "The Limits of Politics: An Interpretation of *King Lear*, Act I, scene i," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (June 1957), pp. 405–427.

As I said, the quotes are out of context, and Bloom devotes many pages and much ingenuity to making them plausible. But they are from the heart of his general argument, and no amount of reasoning *can* make them plausible. It may be objected that the imaginary jurors were bound to be misled by words like cosmopolis—words which, in the context of the article, receive a sharper definition. But it is, in one sense, not merely a matter of words, and in another it is precisely a matter of words.

To quote Othello: "It is not words that shakes me thus. Pish! Noses, ears and lips." There is, in Bloom's statements, a fatal remoteness from the play's realities. Where does Othello express or evince any such faith in the supra-national fellowship of Christians as Bloom attributes to him? What we have here is, at best, an inference from an inference from an inference, happily and progressively divesting itself of hard textual substance and floating off into unballasted speculation. Again, where does Othello, like a premature Rousseau, speak of man's goodness or seek, a Robespierre before his time, tyrannically to transform men in order to fit them for his dream cosmopolis? Nothing in the text will answer to this question; in fact, Othello shows no discernible interest in the more general questions of man's nature, the nature of the state, or their relation to each other. He was, regrettably perhaps, not a political philosopher, but merely a soldier. Desdemona, we are told, gives up all for cosmopolitanism, where we had innocently thought she gave up all for Othello. Worse yet, in doing so she falls victim to a communal leader myth (for Othello, it turns out, is nothing in himself; he is a myth, believed in by himself, which Venice created). Thus abstraction succeeds abstraction, and we rise with the currents of the argument until "noses, ears and lips" are utterly lost sight of. An interpretation which issues in descriptions so unrecognizable would seem to stand self-disproved.

I say "would seem," because a case can sometimes be made for very abstract and remote interpretations. Who would suspect that the equations of modern physics describe the "realities" of our sense experience? I admit the analogy, but only on the proper conditions. Physicists find themselves driven to abstractions by the need to make sense of certain apparent inconsistencies which less abstract formulations leave unresolved. And physicists also justify their theories by specifying what observable phenomena will verify them. Had Bloom shown that a critical problem, hitherto insoluble, could be solved by his theory and that this theory then illuminated other obscure passages, I should have no objection in principle, though I might still look for a better theory.

But perhaps I have not been quite fair; Bloom does address himself to a problem—one which, he says, criticism "has tended to forget." The problem is: What makes Othello fall so readily into Iago's snares? And here, I am afraid, I must be schoolmasterly. If I am not mistaken, Bloom cites no *Othello* or general Shakespeare criticism later than about 1900 (the only exceptions are Jaffa's *Lear* interpretation and a presumably philological article on the derivation of the name "Desdemona"). Had he consulted—to name only one—Robert Heilman's full-length study of *Othello* (*Magic in the Web*, Lexington, 1956), he would have discovered a very careful, highly intelligent and, if not final, at least challenging treatment of his problem. Indeed, *Othello* criticism has lately been almost obsessed with the question of the hero's fault, or sin, or *hamartia*. Bloom does not claim to be a professional Shakespearean and is speaking to a lay audience; it would be very ill-natured to be severe with him for not having gone through the vast bibliography of *Fachliteratur*. But some awareness of what has happened in *Othello* criticism since 1900 one may reasonably expect; and if there is an implied claim that a problem hitherto neglected will be solved, the expectation assumes the force of a demand.

It is, then, not merely a matter of words; but again, it is just that. Critics have learned to be wary of employing, in their interpretations, terms—at least key terms—not within the vocabulary of the writer. Almost inevitably, a word like "cosmopolitan" is a valise which smuggles in a burden of implied meanings and attitudes. Bloom argues that Othello, being a Moor, a mercenary and generally an outsider, must have felt compelled to win the admiration of the Venetians and at the same time must have embraced values which transcend those of the *polis*. We are shown, *a priori* and from the nature of civil society, Moors and mercenaries, that it could not have been otherwise; it is in this demonstration that, startlingly, Othello turns into a devout Christian. Desdemona, who by her father's description is "tender, fair and happy" and "of spirit so still and quiet," under Bloom's hands turns into a girl whose "imagination was watered with loneliness and shyness," who feels cosmopolitan yearnings and, to satisfy them, rashly breaks the most sacred bonds. Having done so, she must be not merely obedient, but abjectly subservient to Othello; "the clear appearance of things is rejected and some mysterious standard dependent on Othello's whim becomes the rule." Such are the distortions, sometimes manifest and sometimes more subtle, that wrong words are likely to impose on the interpreter.

Bloom is inclined to be strict with the hero and heroine, while he makes quite an eloquent plea for Iago. This may, of course, be a healthy and needful thing to do; critics *have* been blinded by easy sentimentality. But, for one thing, criticism has of late been a good deal "harder" than Bloom seems aware of; and more important, such rectifications should not do violence to our direct moral apprehension. Who could guess that the following quote has Iago for its subject?

> However revealing his existence may be, and truth is not an unimportant thing, his is not a life that men would wish to imitate. His critique of ordinary beliefs leaves him with no real purpose in life.

Surely this is praising with faint damnation! And whatever Iago's purpose "in life" may be, in the play he has more than all the other characters together; there has not been so purposeful a character since Richard III. Someone who can write in this *tone* about Iago has let theory blunt his moral perception.

What Bloom does not know—and as a political theorist cannot fairly be expected to know—is that a poem, even a dramatic poem, is first of all a structure of words rather than ideas. The interpreter's first question is not: What does Shakespeare think?, but rather: What does Shakespeare say? An almost mindless surrender to the poem's verbal substance must precede, and will then control, the interpreter's analysis. If he finds himself tempted to write something like: "Desdemona felt that her limited life was not sufficient; we see in her an embryonic passion for the universal, a desire not to be duped by life"—if he finds himself writing in this strain, an automatic governor should go into action.

Or to take "love." Understandably, Bloom has a good deal to say about it, and what he says is backed by Plato and Aristotle, both venerable men. He argues that Othello, being completely dependent on Desdemona's love, comes to feel that he may punish her for not loving him; and "love which insists on return is violence." Othello's sense of justice, it appears, becomes "mystical," based not on what Desdemona does, but on what she is presumed to feel, or not to feel. (Bloom's concern here, as throughout, is to show the danger of elevating yourself above the *donnees* of a specific society, the hubris of thinking that you can live in a disembodied ideal one; Othello's legal "mysticism" is one more manifestation of this.) But this is not at all the basis of Othello's savage judgment. The issue is not Desdemona's love, but her "truth," her fidelity, and there is nothing mystical about that. Adultery is a clear matter of fact. True, the circumstantial evidence on which Othello convicts her is tragically fraudulent and insufficient; but the point is that it is evidence—eye-witness evidence at that—in support of a very concrete act—shockingly, obscenely concrete for the distraught Moor. "She was unfaithful," Bloom writes. "But is unfaithfulness necessarily a crime, if the one who insists on love does not deserve it?" How can he, as an interpreter of *Othello*, possibly have any doubt in the matter? Even in these enlightened times there are still appeals to the unwritten law, though Bloom may justly regard them as atavisms. But marriage is not merely a matter of giving and deserving love; it is, or used to be, a solemn sacrament, and adultery used to be not only a sin but a crime. If anything should be clear from a reading of *Othello*, it is that Bloom's question is ludicrously incongruous to the play's substance, and that something has gone radically wrong when it is even asked.

It would have been disingenuous of me to follow the polite practice of first saying what I found praiseworthy in the article and then, my reputation for fair dealing established, launching the attack. I confess to a certain admiration of the way in which Bloom argues his case, of his fine sense for what he needs to make it, and of the ingenuity with which he interprets the evidence to suit it. And I found his discussion of jealousy in the light of the Old Testament illuminating. But all this adds up to little more than that I think Bloom ingeniously wrong. It may be true that cosmopolitanism is a noble but dangerous delusion (and there *is* a play to show that it is: H. v. Kleist's *Die Hermannsschlacht*), but neither this position nor *Othello* will profit from being thus coupled.

II

Jaffa's interpretation of *King Lear*, *I.i*, has a force all its own. He chooses the path of rigorous deduction; accept his premises, and the conclusions will follow, most of the time, with the inexorability of a syllogism. The reasoning is so well sustained that a real mental effort is demanded to break through the web of argument; if we don't make this effort, we find ourselves, in the end, rubbing our eyes in disbelief at what we have been made to agree to. For finally the web is bound to tear; *King Lear*, being the legitimate king, will come into his own again.

The opening section of Jaffa's article gives us fair warning of what is to follow:

> If Lear is Shakespeare's greatest king, and if it is true that to perpetuate such a rule is an even greater task than to establish it . . . the action whereby he provides for the succession . . . would be the greatest action of the greatest king. . . . If Shakespeare, as a Renaissance classicist, regarded man as a political animal, it is possible that he regarded the fulfillment of man's highest political function as identical with his highest human function. It is not improbable then that the stage is set, at the opening of *King Lear*, for Shakespeare's representation of the ultimate in human existence.

This mode of argument may be reassuring to a philosopher or mathematician; to me, as an interpreter, it is disquieting. I feel myself transplanted into an unfamiliar intellectual climate, somewhat as though I were reading an astronomer who began his description of the solar system by saying: "If it is true that the circle is the perfect figure, and if nature, from the attributes of its Creator, must be perfect, then it is not improbable that the planetary orbits are circular." There is a strongly scholastic flavor about the opening, and it pervades all that follows. Concepts like friendship and love, justice and truth, for instance, are handled confidently, like counters of fixed and recognized value, as thus: "For the daughter who loves him most will in all likelihood be the most meritorious, since she will most resemble her father." The authority cited for this (in, I think, the medieval spirit of citing "authorities") is Plato's *Gorgias*. Or take Jaffa's comments on friendship: friendship, he says, is a form of self-love; what we love in our friends is really the traits we have, and love, in ourselves. (This by way of proving that, since Cordelia and Kent were Lear's favorites before the action starts, and since manifestly they are incapable of flattery, it is absurd to believe that Lear could have been susceptible to flattery and deceived by Goneril and Regan.) This maxim he enforces by references to Plato and Aristotle. Now I may be a degenerate modern; but when maxims of this sort are proposed for my consent, I consult what little experience of life I have, try to remember, perhaps, what La Rochefoucauld or Montaigne had to say on the matter, and take Plato's and Aristotle's opinions under advisement. And if these maxims are presented to me as part of a Shakespeare interpretation, I'll consult Shakespeare. I do not find that what Mercutio loved in Romeo, Cassius in Brutus, or Hamlet in Horatio, were the virtues they themselves possessed; rather the contrary. The citing of "authorities" (and I don't care whether it is Plato or Freud) is irrelevant.

Throughout his article, Jaffa implies that there are immutable principles of reason, to which Shakespeare, great poet that he was, "must have" acceded. It is this "must have" that provides the basis for Jaffa's imposing structure; it is this "must have" which gives him the courage to set aside common-sense apprehension and the consensus of two centuries of Shakespeare criticism and to create for us a Lear and a first scene radically, indeed defiantly, novel.

The decisive event in the scene is, of course, the love-test, and it is also the most formidable obstacle in the path of Jaffa's argument. But for him, obstacles are challenges rather than warnings, and his response is vigorous. He constructs a prehistory of Lear—on the assumption that Lear is "the greatest king." He constructs a British foreign and domestic policy and infers policies likewise for Burgundy and France. For this no quotations from the text are needed, "must have" being a far more reliable source. And he concludes that, all this being so, the love-test cannot have been what it always has seemed to be, but must have been a vastly clever pretense to elicit from Lear's two older (and, as he well knows, untrustworthy) daughters professions of love and loyalty so public and solemn that they would find it very awkward later to repudiate the settlement. The scheme fails because Cordelia fails to play her part, puts Truth above Justice, and so upsets this greatest of monarchs that he tears apart the fabric he has so carefully woven and plunges himself and his realm into tragic disorders. (It fails also, we find, because only by making it fail could Shakespeare show its almost perfect wisdom and justice, as the tensile strength of a rope can be shown only by stretching it beyond the breaking point. This is brinkmanship with a vengeance; let us pray that our statesmen never discover that the ultimate demonstration of their skill comes only when they finally tumble over the brink.)

Jaffa's reasoning is not always airtight, even on his own terms. It is important for him to prove that Lear had already chosen the Duke of Burgundy to be Cordelia's husband; the textual evidence for this being non-existent, he makes what he can of the fact that, after Cordelia's disgrace, Burgundy is the first to be asked if he will still marry her. The reason why Burgundy is the preferred suitor is that he is a relatively weak prince; the king of France, as Cordelia's husband, would be a threat to British independence. For this, Jaffa offers in evidence the fact that France is *not* the first to be asked if he still wants Cordelia; Lear is afraid of insulting him by offering him his disinherited daughter. The same fact—the sequence of asking—is thus used to buttress two hypotheses in such a way that one use invalidates the other; for if the offer of Cordelia's hand has now become an insult (as indeed it has), what are we to conclude from her being offered to Burgundy first? Except for the error, it would have been a brilliant double play.

But it would be unfair to consider this little lapse as characteristic of Jaffa's mode of argument. On the contrary, for the most part his argument *is* airtight—inaccessible to a mass of textual fact which clamors vainly for admission into his too-too-solid logical structure. There is, for instance, abundant and weighty testimony that Lear was very far from being above flattery—and some of it comes from himself:

> They flatter'd me like a dog, and told me I had the white hairs in my beard ere the black ones were there . . . When the rain came to wet me once and . . . the thunder would not peace at my bidding; there I found 'em, there I smelt 'em out. Go to, they are not men of their words: they told me I was everything; 'tis a lie, I am not ague-proof.

There is every reason to accept as coldly realistic Goneril's and Regan's description of Lear as a man who "hath ever but slenderly known himself" and "the best of whose time hath been but rash." And for that matter, if he pretty much knew his older daughters for what they were and intended the love-test merely as a device to trick them into professions of loyalty, why is he so shaken to the roots when he discovers their perfidy? What else did he expect?

But even if such evidence were not there or could be explained away (it is a mark of Jaffa's sense of the sovereignty of logic over textual fact that he rarely stoops to explaining away; he simply and loftily ignores), there are much weightier grounds for rejecting his exegesis. *King Lear* is unique among Shakespearean tragedies in having a fully developed sub-plot. This plot, in its basic features, obviously parallels and counterpoints the main plot: a deceived father is led to cast out the loving and loyal child and to embrace the false one, and he suffers cruelly for this error. Significantly, Shakespeare points up both parallel and counterplay through the thematic use of the word "nothing": Lear's "Nothing will come of nothing" is echoed by Gloucester's "The quality of nothing hath no such need to hide itself . . . If it be nothing, I shall not need spectacles" (I.*ii*). On the first of these, Jaffa comments: "When Lear, responding to Cordelia's 'Nothing,' tells her that nothing comes of nothing, he expresses the axiom upon which all understanding of causality is founded." It does not occur to him that perhaps that judgment is premature, that there may be a patterned use of this word, and that its final meaning will lie in this pattern. And similarly it does not occur to him that his whole elaborate edifice is undermined by no more than the simple fact that it renders the patterned interweaving of the two plots meaningless.

It is this unawareness that is at the heart of my objections to Jaffa's approach. It would be dishonest to pretend that even the greatest *Lear* critics have been able to accommodate *all* the evidence, have not had, here and there, silently to pass over, or to explain away, some awkward line or other. But they *have* felt it their duty to demonstrate their sense of the play's greatness and meaning by showing how the vast number of strands of incident, imagery and verbal recurrence are woven into richly coherent figures and ultimately into a master figure. Jaffa misconceives the very nature of the thing, the play, he is dealing with, and consequently misconceives his own task. The first and most obvious objection to his interpretation—that it destroys a carefully wrought pattern—is so far from his mind that he doesn't even try to deal with it.

Not even the most rabid Shakespearean can complain that Jaffa is lacking in reverence for his poet; his whole argument rests on the premise that Shakespeare is "our greatest poet." But it is a wrong, fruitless kind of reverence; in fact, in a deeper sense, not reverence at all. For what follows from it is a set of prescriptions of what Shakespeare, being this, must have or could not have done. It is like that reverence for God which, having made Him into the image of *human* perfection, then proclaims this perfection—the reverence, that is, of Job's friends. But that is something very different from the reverence Job himself learns, painfully, to feel. True reverence presupposes a surrender to the uniqueness and incommensurability of the *novum*, the creation, and a humble searching for the laws by which the creator has seen fit to order what he has lifted from chaos.

Jaffa, and also Bloom, have very definite ideas of what kind of a person a tragic hero must be to be worthy of his grand role and of our tragic response. These ideas are sound enough; as an aesthetician I would have no qualms about accepting them. But as an interpreter I reject them, not because they are false in themselves, but because they prescribe to the poet. As an aesthetician I may say that these ideas are so sound that the poet who ignores them does so at his peril; but as an interpreter I take the creation as I find it and try to discover its meaning. Why is Lear great? Because Shakespeare, in the course of the play and through his poetry, manages to *make* him so. What would Jaffa do with Anthony and Cleopatra, whose shiftiness and shiftlessness, coquetry and lack of manliness Shakespeare impresses on us for four acts, only to persuade us in the fifth of their triumphant greatness? To a lesser degree, the same thing happens in *King Lear:* a "foolish, fond old man" achieves mythical grandeur because of what Shakespeare, *in the play,* makes him say and suffer. And what we learn thereby is something more profound, I think, than what Jaffa would have us learn: an awed pity for Lear's naked humanity, a pity untainted by condescension and an awe uncompelled by eminence of wisdom or authority. Shakespeare's greatest king—and I agree that he *is* that—is great not because he is an immensely subtle and responsible ruler and statesman; he is no such thing nor, as far as we can tell, has he ever been. He is great because he does not cheaply and feebly strike bargains with his disillusionment, because he wills and lives his terrifying fall into truth so uncompromisingly and vastly that he is transfigured.

Having said all this, I must in justice add that where his thesis does not interfere, Jaffa's natural sensitivity for his material often serves him well. He may be wrong-headed, but he never sounds ludicrous. And especially in the later parts of his essay he has some fine and suggestive things to say, *e.g.:* "Lear's alienation from Cordelia involved his alienation from the basis of such self-knowledge as he believed himself to possess . . . and from the world within which he had seen himself in his own mind's eye." Or: "Cordelia, responding to Lear's unconscious demand for truth . . . , compels him to act in the most unjust manner possible in order to discover that truth." Jaffa believes, I think, that he has come by these insights through strict deduction, though I do not see it. But then I do not care much how he comes by them, as long as he has them. And I could not more heartily agree with him when he speaks of Shakespeare's "impressive intellectual precision." To be sure, he has a notion of that precision very different from mine, and very different, I believe, from what it actually consists in. But it is good to see it stressed all the same; and to be precisely wrong is better than to be foggily inoffensive.

To sum up: The *APSR* school of Shakespeare criticism, if there is to be one, has a good deal yet to learn about the interpreter's trade. It is a humble, indeed a slavish trade, tied to the text and with no footing outside it. There is, of course, a kind of native receptivity for the force and purport of poetry, and the man who has it may read poetry with profit from whatever outside footing he happens to have. But that will be, as it were, despite his "system," or at least because he preserves, within it, his human flexibility. Poems are in their nature unique and have a way of making the classificatory instinct within us look foolish. To assume that they illustrate "higher" principles—political, philosophical, psychological or whatnot—is to court error. Of course they may do so, and very often will; but they will do so in strange and unsuspected ways. Finding these principles demands delicate hearing and a humble suspension of belief (which is far more difficult than the suspension of disbelief). It is in these qualities that I find the two *APSR* critics lacking; there is in them a pronounced rigor, an unwillingness to surrender themselves (and rather too little respect for their predecessors and the common reader). They are a good deal too sure of what they already knew before they came to Shakespeare (and which, for all I know, is very sound knowledge about its proper subject, whatever it may be). Hercules had to do some lowly work before he attained to glory. Being something of a jealous Hera (but jealous, I hope, on Shakespeare's account, not my own), I would set Bloom the task of compiling a full list of the explicit verbal references to Christianity in *Othello*, and Jaffa of making a thematic study of the word "nothing" in *Lear*. After a few such labors, perhaps they will be on the way to unbinding Prometheus.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 1958–1959: I

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There was one change in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1958 Term.[1] Justice Harold H. Burton of Ohio, who had been appointed by President Truman late in 1945, retired on October 13, 1958. For his place President Eisenhower selected 44-year-old Potter Stewart, a Cincinnati Republican whom he had appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1954.[2] A graduate of Yale College and the Yale Law School (1941), Justice Stewart was given a recess appointment on October 14, 1958, but it was not confirmed by the Senate until May 5, 1959. The vote was 70 to 17, all Senators voting against confirmation being Southern Democrats. This experience underscored once more, as in the case of Justice Brennan, the risks involved in recess appointments to the Court, since Justice Stewart sat there for most of the Term before confirmation was had. Whether this affected his votes on cases is a matter of sheer speculation, but the occasion for it is highly regrettable. A new Justice should be as independent as an old one, from the very beginning. his service.

Public controversy over the Court's recent decisions, particularly in the security field, continued during the 1958 Term.[3] Pressure for legislation designed to overturn specific Court decisions or to curb the Court's powers continued in the First Session of the 86th Congress, but was less intense than in the previous Congress.[4] An anti-preemption bill, H.R. 3, introduced by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, passed the House of Representatives on June 24, by a vote of 225 to 192, but it never reached the floor of the Senate. Representative Francis Walter of Pennsylvania sponsored a bill, H.R. 2369, aimed at the *Yates* decision.[5] It passed the House on March 2, but never got out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, although its Internal Security Subcommittee held hearings on the bill in April and May. A House bill, H.R. 1870, designed to set aside *Cole* v. *Young*[6] by extending the federal employee fidelity program to nonsensitive positions, was not reported out by the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. A bill, H.R. 9069, which would have vested power in the State Department found lacking in the 1958 passport decisions,[7] passed the House on September 8, 1959, by the substantial margin of 371 votes to 18; but it was still in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on adjournment day. Action on bills to set aside the decision in *Greene* v. *McElroy*,[8] dealing with the industrial security program, H.R. 8121 and S. 2416, was deferred when it became known that the President would soon announce an industrial security program of his own by Executive Order. A bill, H.R. 4957, to set aside the Court's ruling in the *Mallory* case,[9] that incriminating statements elicited from a defendant during a period of unlawful detention are inadmissible as evidence, even though not coerced, passed the House on July 7 by a vote of 262 to 138, but it was still in the hands of the Senate Judiciary Committee at the close of the session. Interestingly enough, the one case which actually led to the prompt enactment of remedial legislation was a decision in February, 1959, which upheld the power

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[1] On members of the Court, past and present, see: Hoyt L. Warner, *The Life of Mr. Justice Clarke* (Cleveland, 1959); Henry M. Christman, ed., *The Public Papers of Chief Justice Earl Warren* (New York, 1959); Vern Countryman, ed., *Douglas of the Supreme Court* (New York, 1959); James F. Byrnes, *All In One Lifetime* (New York, 1958); Paul A. Freund, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 26, pp. 205–216 (Winter, 1959); Albert M. Sachs, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter," *ibid.*, pp. 217–221; Eugene Gressman, "The Controversial Image of Mr. Justice Murphy," *Georgetown Law Journal*, Vol. 47, pp. 631–654 (Summer, 1959); Harry L. Wallace, "Mr. Justice Minton—Hoosier Justice on the Supreme Court," *Indiana Law Journal*, Vol. 34, pp. 145–205 (Winter, 1959), pp. 377–424 (Spring, 1959); Daniel M. Berman, "Mr. Justice Whittaker: A Preliminary Appraisal," *Missouri Law Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 1–15 (January, 1959); John R. Schmidhauser, "The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, pp. 1–57 (February, 1959).

[2] See J. Francis Paschal, "Mr. Justice Stewart on the Court of Appeals," *Duke Law Journal*, Vol. 1959, pp. 325–340 (Summer, 1959). See more generally: Loren P. Beth, "Judge into Justice: Should Supreme Court Appointees Have Judicial Experience?" *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 58, pp. 521–527 (Autumn, 1959).

[3] For recent evaluations of the Court see: John P. Frank, *Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in American Life* (New York, 1958); Alpheus T. Mason, *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren* (Baton Rouge, 1958); Symposium, "The Role of the Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 33, pp. 521–616 (August, 1959); Stanley F. Reed, "Observations on the Effect of Constitutional Interpretation on American Life," *Western Reserve Law Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 504–522 (September, 1959); C. Herman Pritchett, "The Supreme Court Today: Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint," *South Dakota Law Review*, Vol. 3, pp. 51–79 (Spring, 1958); Alpheus T. Mason, "The Supreme Court: Temple and Forum," *Yale Review*, Vol. 48, pp. 524–540 (Summer, 1959). For general surveys of American constitutional law see: C. Her-

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man Pritchett, *The American Constitution* (New York, 1959); Alpheus T. Mason and William M. Beaney, *The Supreme Court In a Free Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1959). During the period under review there was a veritable flowering of new casebooks in constitutional law: R. E. and R. F. Cushman, *Cases in Constitutional Law* (New York, 1958); Wallace Mendelson, *The Constitution and the Supreme Court* (New York, 1959); Rocco J. Tresolini, *American Constitutional Law* (New York, 1959); Fred V. Cahill, Jr. and Robert J. Steamer, *The Constitution: Cases and Comments* (New York, 1959). See also: Tom C. Clark, "Internal Operation of the United States Supreme Court," *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, Vol. 43, pp. 45–51 (August, 1959); Chester A. Newland, "Legal Periodicals and the United States Supreme Court," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, pp. 58–74 (February, 1959), reprinted in *University of Kansas Law Review*, Vol. 7, pp. 477–489 (May, 1959); Clement E. Vose, "Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity," *Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 319, pp. 20–31 (September, 1958); Henry J. Abraham, *Courts and Judges* (New York, 1959).

[4] See "The 86th Congress and Recent Decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court," *Congressional Digest*, Vol. 38, pp. 225–256 (October, 1959).

[5] Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957).

[6] 351 U.S. 536 (1956).

[7] Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). See this Review, Vol. 53, pp. 142–143 (March, 1959).

[8] 360 U.S. 474 (1959).

[9] Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).

of the states to tax the net income of interstate business activities.[10] This holding was softened by interim legislation designed to hold the whole question in abeyance pending further study by Congress.[11] Among those who voted for this curtailment of state power to tax interstate commerce were a number of erstwhile champions of state rights in the security field.

While, as always, the Court had its defenders,[12] the most newsworthy event during the period under review was the approval by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, on February 24, 1959, of a series of recommendations submitted to it by its Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives.[13] The report affirmed that the Supreme Court and the independent judiciary created by the Constitution "have been and are the ultimate guardians of the Bill of Rights and the protectors of our freedom," and rejected omnibus proposals to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction; but it went on to declare that "recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in cases involving National and State security, and with particular reference to Communist activities, have been severely criticized and deemed unsound by many responsible authorities," and urged Congress promptly to enact "sound amendments to existing laws," within its constitutional powers, to correct those decisions which involve "problems of safeguarding National and State security." Specifically, the A.B.A. report proposed that Congress enact legislation on federal preemption in the security field,[14] that it amend the Smith Act to set aside the Court's rulings in the *Yates* case,[15] that it compel all government employees, whether in sensitive positions or not, to testify before Congressional committees with regard to subversive activities relating to loyalty,[16] that it extend the Attorney General's power of surveillance over deportable aliens who remain here because no country will take them,[17] and that the Foreign Agents Registration Act be amended to require that publications from abroad be labeled as political propaganda. In addition, the report warmly praised the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. With an eye on the *Watkins* decision,[18] it proposed that the underlying Resolution creating the House Committee should be redrawn so as to spell out the Committee's authority with greater clarity and detail, which, incidentally, is precisely the point the Court made in the first place.

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[10] Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).

[11] Act of September 14, 1959, P.L. 86–272, 73 Stat. 555.

[12] See Joseph F. Menez, "A Brief in Support of the Supreme Court," *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 54, pp. 30–59 (March–April, 1959); Joseph O. Losos, "The Supreme Court and its Critics: Is the Court Moving Left?" *Review of Politics*, Vol. 20, pp. 495–510 (July, 1959).

[13] For the text of the recommendations see *New York Times*, February 25, 1959. The full report has been published separately by the American Bar Association, Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, *Resolution and Report* (Chicago, February, 1959).

[14] Setting aside Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).

[15] Above, note 5.

[16] Setting aside Cole v. Young, above, note 6.

[17] Setting aside United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).

[18] Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

As critics of this report were quick to point out,[19] it lists a series of Court decisions of which it disapproves without any critique from the point of view of legal precedent or principle. Furthermore, it neglects altogether to mention the many decisions of the Court in the security field which were favorable to the government.[20] In addition, at the very time that this report was adopted, the Association elected as President for 1960 Whitney North Seymour, an authority in the civil rights field who successfully argued Angelo Herndon's famous appeal in the 1930's at the request of the International Labor Defense.[21] Furthermore, the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association came out with a report of its own in August, 1959, which defended the Court, and arrived at this conclusion: "On balance, this committee is unable to see any indication that the security of the nation or of the states has been impaired by the Supreme Court of the United States."[22] At its August meeting in Miami Beach, the A.B.A. House of Delegates accepted this report with the understanding that it expressed only the views of the Committee and not those of the Association.[23] In addition, it awarded the A.B.A. Gold Medal for Service to Grenville Clark, founder of its Bill of Rights Committee and a long-time member of the National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union.

During the 1958 Term the Court disposed of 1763 cases with finality, only two less than in the previous Term. At the end of the Term there were 281 cases on the dockets as compared with 225 the year before. Cases decided on the merits numbered 276 (as compared with 319 a year ago), and of these, 131 were by full opinion, the others by memorandum order. There were in all 112 opinions of the Court, of which 14 were *per curiam*. Of the full opinions, 45 (or 40 per cent) were unanimous, as compared with 25 per cent the previous Term, and of the memorandum orders, 116 (or 84 per cent) were agreed to unanimously. During the 1958 Term 72 dissenting and 30 concurring opinions were filed in the full opinion cases.[24]

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[19] See: "A Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation" of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, *The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York*, Vol. 14, pp. 241–268 (June, 1959); "Report of the National Lawyers Guild on the Recommendations of the American Bar Association," *Lawyers Guild Review*, Vol. 19, pp. 30–35 (Spring, 1959). For American Civil Liberties Union criticisms see *New York Times*, April 19, 1959. For a defense of the A.B.A. report see: Roy M. Cohn and Thomas A. Bolan, "The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions," *Fordham Law Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 233–286 (Summer, 1959).

[20] Such as Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Wilson v. Loew's Incorporated, 355 U.S. 597 (1958).

[21] Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).

[22] See *New York Times*, August 13, 1959, p. 54. For the full text see American Bar Association, *Report of the Standing Committee on Bill of Rights*, August, 1959, Report No. 71.

[23] See *New York Times*, August 26, 1959, p. 30.

[24] See Karl M. ZoBell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. 44, pp. 186–214 (Winter, 1959); Albert P. Blaustein and Andrew H. Field, " 'Overruling' Opinions in the Supreme Court," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 151–194 (December, 1958).

Of all cases disposed of on the merits, three came up from the federal district courts by writ of certiorari (of which one was affirmed and two reversed), and 37 by appeal (of which 13 were affirmed, ten reversed, eight vacated, five dismissed and one remanded). Three cases came up from the Courts of Appeal by appeal (of which one was affirmed, one vacated and one dismissed), while 105 reached the Court by way of certiorari (of which 31 were affirmed, 51 reversed, 22 vacated and one remanded). Cases from the state courts numbered 126, of which 95 were by appeal (of which eleven were affirmed, one reversed and 83 dismissed), and 31 by certiorari (of which six were affirmed, 22 reversed and three vacated).

On the appellate docket the Court granted certiorari in 116 cases, or 15.3 per cent of all petitions, as compared with 14 per cent a year ago. On the miscellaneous docket certiorari was granted in 24 cases, or 3.2 per cent of all petitions, as compared with five per cent the previous Term.[25]

The work load of preparing opinions of the Court was very well distributed. Four Justices wrote ten each, two wrote eleven each, and three wrote twelve each. Justice Harlan led the Court with seven concurring opinions, and the Chief Justice wrote none at all. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter filed thirteen dissenting opinions, Justice Brennan twelve, Justice Douglas eleven, Justices Black and Harlan nine each, Justice Clark six, the others four each. In all dispositions, whether by opinion or memorandum order, 230 dissenting votes were cast, with Justice Douglas leading with 46. He also led the previous year with 42 dissenting votes.

I. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER

1. *Federal Rights*

Commission on Civil Rights. An important event of the period in the civil liberties field[26] was the publication in September, 1959, of the first general report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, which had been established for a two-year term by the Civil Rights Act of 1957.[27] This 668-page survey concluded with the recommendation of fourteen steps to combat racial discrimination in voting, school segregation and housing. The most important of these was that Congress authorize local federal officials to serve temporarily as registrars where necessary to protect the right of qualified Negroes to vote in federal elections. Just before adjournment, the First Session of the 86th Congress extended the life of the Commission for two more years.[28] This was the only civil rights statute passed in this session.

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[25] See John M. Harlan, "Manning the Dikes—Some Comments on the Statutory Certiorari Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Statement Practice of the Supreme Court of the United States," *The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York*, Vol. 13, pp. 541–561 (December, 1958); Stephen J. Ledet, Jr., "Requirement of Substantial Constitutional Question in Federal Three-Judge Court Cases," *Louisiana Law Review*, Vol. 19, pp. 813–830 (June, 1959).

[26] On civil rights topics see: Milton R. Konvitz and Clinton Rossiter, eds., *Aspects of Liberty: Essays Presented to Robert E. Cushman* (Ithaca, 1958); George W. Spicer, *The Supreme Court and Fundamental Freedoms* (New York, 1959); David Fellman, *The Limits of Freedom* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1959); Harold R. Medina, *The Anatomy of Freedom* (New York, 1959); Richard L. Perry, ed., *Sources of Our Liberties* (New York, 1959); Charles P. Curtis, "A Natural Law for Today and the Supreme Court as its Prophet," *Boston University Law Review*, Vol. 39, pp. 1–51 (Winter, 1959); O. John Rogge, " 'Concept of Ordered Liberty,' " *California Law Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 238–266 (May 1959); William M. Beaney, "Civil Liberties and Statutory Construction," *Journal of Public Law*, Vol. 8, pp. 66–80 (Spring, 1959); Harrop A. Freeman, "Civil Liberties—Acid Test of Democracy," *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 511–530 (January, 1959); Jack Wasserman, "The Universal Ideal of Justice and Our Immigration Laws," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 34, pp. 1–20 (December, 1958); Robert E. Goostree, "The Denaturalization

Congressional Investigations. Barenblatt was convicted under 2 U.S.C. §192 for contempt of Congress, as a consequence of his refusal to answer certain questions put to him by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities during the course of an inquiry concerning alleged Communist infiltration into the field of education. Though he had been an instructor in psychology at an eastern college from 1950 until shortly before he was subpoenaed to appear before the subcommittee, the inquiry related solely to the period 1947–1950, when Barenblatt had been a graduate student and teaching fellow at the University of Michigan. The Court considered only those counts relating to his refusal to answer whether he was then or had ever been a member of the Communist Party. Expressly disclaiming reliance upon the Fifth Amendment, Barenblatt argued that the Committee's statutory charter of authority was too vague, that he had not been properly apprised of the pertinency of the questions to the matter under inquiry, and that the putting of the questions violated the First Amendment. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court by a 5–4 vote.[29]

Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan reaffirmed the proposition that the Congressional power of inquiry is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power of Congress to legislate. At the same time, he also made it clear that the investigatory power is not unlimited, and specifically, that it cannot invade the province of the judicial or executive branches of the government nor violate

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Cases of 1958," *American University Law Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 87–99 (June, 1959); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., "Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Task of States and Nation," *George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 27, pp. 519–539 (April, 1959); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., "Civil Rights: Recent Variations on a Theme of Moderation," *ibid.*, pp. 540–556.

[27] 71 Stat. 634. *The Report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1959*, can be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents for $2.00. The Commission's abridgement of the full report, *sub nom. With Liberty and Justice for All*, is priced at sixty cents.

[28] Act of September 29, 1959, P.L. 86–383, 71 Stat. 635.

[29] Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See Ralph S. Fuchs, "The Barenblatt Decision of the Supreme Court and the Academic Profession," *AAUP Bulletin*, Vol. 45, pp. 333–338 (September, 1959); Robert K. Carr, "Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Professors, and the United States Supreme Court," *ibid.*, Vol. 45, pp. 5–24 (March, 1959); Clark Byse and Louis Joughin, *Tenure in American Higher Education* (Ithaca, 1959); Harold M. Hyman, *To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History* (Berkeley, 1959); Bernard Schwartz, "Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power," *California Law Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 3–50 (March, 1959).

the Bill of Rights. He also recognized that academic freedom, which he described as "teaching freedom" and "learning freedom," was so essential to the well-being of the country that the Court "will always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain." Nevertheless, he asserted that "this does not mean that the Congress is precluded from interrogating a witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls."

Coming to the specific issues, Justice Harlan held, first, that the subcommittee had authority to compel this testimony. He correctly pointed out that the *Watkins* decision[30] had not held that the statutory charter of authority of the Committee (Rule XI) was invalid because of vagueness; in addition to the Rule itself, vagueness also depends upon such additional factors as the remarks of the chairman or members of the Committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves. Thus, while the Rule itself may seem vague, it must be read in historical context, and thus read it is clear, said Justice Harlan, that from the beginning of its existence, and with full knowledge and approval of the House, the Committee has devoted a major part of its energies to the investigation of Communist activities; and he also concluded from an examination of legislative gloss that Congress never intended to exclude the field of education from the Committee's authority. Furthermore, Justice Harlan held that it had been made indisputably clear that the questions were pertinent since it had been announced at the beginning of the investigation that the subject matter of the inquiry was Communist infiltration into the field of education.

As for the major constitutional issue, Justice Harlan asserted that while the First Amendment limits Congressional investigations, when First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental inquiry the resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of competing private and public interests in the particular circumstances. In this context he concluded that the balance lay on the side of the public interest in the inquiry. The investigation was related to a valid legislative purpose, since it is hardly debatable that Congress has wide power to legislate in the field of Communist activity in this country. In exercising this power, which rests upon the right of self-preservation which any society has, Congress has enacted a wide variety of legislative measures. The justification for all this rests upon the long and widely accepted view that the tenets of the Communist Party include the ultimate overthrow of the American government by force and violence. Congress formally said as much in the Internal Security Act of 1950. This Court, said Justice Harlan, has consistently refused to view the Communist Party as an ordinary political party. To ask it to do otherwise "is to ask this Court to blind itself to world affairs which have determined the whole course of our national policy since the close of World War II. . . ." Furthermore, the Court ruled, the power of

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[30] Above, note 18; see this REVIEW, Vol. 52, pp. 146–148 (March, 1958).

Congress to investigate cannot be denied solely because the field of education is involved. It rejected Barenblatt's contention that this particular investigation was aimed not at revolutionary aspects but at the theoretical classroom discussion of Communism, for this was too restricted a view of the nature of the investigatory process. "An investigation of advocacy of or preparation for overthrow certainly embraces the right to identify a witness as a member of the Communist Party, . . . and to inquire into the various manifestations of the Party's tenets. The strict requirements of a prosecution under the Smith Act . . . are not the measure of the permissible scope of a congressional investigation into 'overthrow,' for of necessity the investigatory process must proceed step by step." The Court found that the record did not support the contention that this investigation was directed at controlling what is being taught at our universities rather than at overthrow of government. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that this investigation should not be deemed to have been in furtherance of a legislative purpose because the true objective of the Committee was exposure. Said Justice Harlan: "So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power."

Justice Black filed a vigorous dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurred. Justice Brennan also filed a dissenting opinion to stress the point that the only purpose of this investigation was exposure for the sake of exposure, and that this was therefore adjudication, which is outside the constitutional scope of Congressional inquiry. Justice Black's opinion ranged over the whole body of issues involved. He insisted that Rule XI was too broad to be meaningful, and therefore violated due process. He argued that the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and assembly were violated "through exposure, obloquy and public scorn." He asserted that laws directly abridging First Amendment rights cannot be justified by a Congressional or judicial balancing of interests, for this amounts to saying that the constitutional guaranty of free speech must be enforced unless the Court believes it is *reasonable* to limit it. But if the test of balancing is accepted, then Justice Black maintained that the Court had ignored the test completely, for what is at stake is not Barenblatt's right to refrain from revealing Communist affiliations, but the interest of the whole people in being able to join organizations, advocate causes and make political mistakes without penalty. This is especially important with regard to the universities, for we rely upon them for experimentation and the development of new ideas. Justice Black rejected the Court's argument regarding the right of government to preserve itself, for under the First Amendment "the only constitutional way our Government can preserve itself is to leave its people the fullest possible freedom to praise, criticize or discuss, as they see fit, all governmental policies and to suggest, if they desire, that even its most fundamental postulates are bad and should be changed." He also rejected the Court's argument that the Committee was only after Communists; he insisted that the Court had in effect outlawed the Communist Party, something which both Congress and the Court have said all along was not intended and would not be proper constitutionally. Finally, Justice Black declared that the program was one of stigmatizing and punishing by public identification and exposure individual witnesses considered by the Committee to be guilty of Communist affiliations. This, he insisted, is punishment of individuals, a function left by the Constitution to the courts. It is true that the punishment is humiliation and public shame, but this is one of the oldest forms of punishment. Thus he concluded that the bill-of-attainder clause of the Constitution had been violated.

Another and more technical interest was balanced against the investigatory function in *Flaxer* v. *United States*,[31] with opposite results. Flaxer was convicted by a jury of violating 2 U.S.C. §192, because of failure to produce, pursuant to a subpoena *duces tecum* issued by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, the records, including the membership lists, of a union of governmental employees of which he was the head. It was on October 5, 1951, that he refused to supply the information demanded of him, but on that day the Subcommittee gave him ten days in which to produce it. The indictment named October 5 as the date of Flaxer's wilful default, which was the punishable offense. By unanimous vote the Court reversed the conviction, holding that there had been no default on October 5, and it did not appear whether at the end of the ten-day period any additional steps were taken against him. A witness who was defiant on October 5 might have been meek and submissive on October 15. The *Watkins* decision, Justice Douglas noted, made it clear that in prosecutions for contempt defendants are entitled to all the rights of defendants in criminal cases generally. And, as held in the *Quinn* case,[32] "one of these guarantees is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the refusal of the witness was deliberate and intentional." Here the Court held that the Subcommittee's order was ambiguous as to the time of performance, since the witness could well have concluded that he had ten additional days to consider the matter. It is now well established that a witness must be given a fair appraisal of the Committee's ruling; he must not be forced to guess what the ruling is.

Federal Security Program. Greene, an aeronautical engineer and a very highly paid vice president and general manager of an engineering corporation producing goods for the armed services, having worked for the company since 1937, was discharged from his employment solely as a result of the revocation of his security clearance, which was needed because his job required access to classified information. After four different security clearances following World War II, in the best tradition of that perpetual jeopardy which has become one of the adornments of the Age of Anxiety, the Secretary of the Navy revoked Greene's clearance. This action was reviewed and upheld by a regional board and then by a central Industrial Personnel Security Review Board. Evidence given by unidentified confidential informants was considered by these boards. They were unknown both to Greene and to the boards, and were examined and cross-examined by neither. Eight Justices agreed in setting aside the lower court's ruling against Greene.[33] Chief Justice Warren first observed that the right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference was established within the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Having so satisfied his well-known taste for expressing views on constitutional questions not before him, he then said that the Court was not disposing of the case on the basis of constitutional interpretations, since it could be resolved on the narrower ground of "authorization"—the Department of Defense was authorized neither by a statute nor by an Executive Order of the President to create an independent security clearance program in which determinations leading to the loss of jobs and affecting ability to follow one's chosen profession are made in proceedings lacking "the traditional procedural safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination." These safeguards have "ancient roots," and they are especially important where the evidence is the testimony of individuals "whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy." This Court, said the Chief Justice, has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion, not only in criminal cases, but also in all types of cases involving administrative and regulatory action. Finally, the Court rejected the argument of implied ratification through acquiescence. The President and Congress cannot be assumed to have intended to permit procedures which conflict with long-accepted notions of fair procedure; if this is to be done, there must be a *specific* decision that such procedures are necessary. "Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under our system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide them." So wrote the Chief Justice. And he added: "Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process." In other words, he said, the Court has been concerned "that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication and without the most explicit action by the Nation's lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that the Constitution presents no inhibition." Thus, the Chief Justice clearly left open the question whether either Congress or the President can do what an executive department cannot do on its own authority.

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[31] 358 U.S. 147 (1958).

[32] Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).

Justice Frankfurter, speaking also for two other members of the Court, concurred on the ground of lack of authorization but emphasized that he was "intimating no views as to the validity of those procedures." Concurring separately, Justice Harlan protested that the opinion of the Court dealt unnecessarily with the very issue it disclaimed deciding. Justice Clark, to whom, in his own words, the case was "both clear and simple," said that surely no one has a constitutional right to have access to the government's military secrets, and that there was no support in precedent for the Court's statement that the right to private employment free from unreasonable governmental interference is protected by the Fifth Amendment. He then went on to argue that the Court was confusing administrative action with criminal trials, that the procedures were fair, and that the President and Congress had authorized them.

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[33] Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See Robert B. McKay, "The Right of Confrontation," *Washington University Law Quarterly*, Vol. 1959, pp. 122–167 (April, 1959).

An even narrower point regarding the federal loyalty program was involved in *Vitarelli* v. *Seaton.*[34] Vitarelli was appointed in 1952 by the Department of the Interior as an Education and Training Specialist in the Education Department of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. On March 30, 1954, the Secretary of the Interior suspended him without pay, assigning as grounds various charges of "sympathetic association" with Communist party members and publications. Vitarelli filed a written answer and appeared before a security hearing board. At the hearing the Department presented no evidence to support the charges, and no witness testified against him. On the other hand, Vitarelli testified at length and presented four witnesses, all of whom were extensively cross-examined by the security officer and members of the hearing board. In September, 1954, Vitarelli got his notice of dismissal which recited that he was discharged in the interest of national security for the reasons set out in the original letter of charges. When Vitarelli then brought suit in a federal court, and while the case was pending, he was given a new notice of dismissal, in 1956, dated back to September, 1954, reciting that it was a revision of the original notice; but this time the Department omitted any reference to any reason for the discharge. The original dismissal had been made pursuant to Executive Order 10450 and the Department Order. The Department's later action rested on the theory that as a "Schedule A" employee Vitarelli was at no time within the protection of the Civil Service Act, the Veteran's Preference Act, or any other act relating to the employment rights of governmental employees, and could therefore be discharged summarily by the Secretary at any time without giving any reason.

The Supreme Court held for Vitarelli, the Justices differing on the effect of the 1956 action. Without discussing any constitutional issues, the Court held that while federal legislation and the President's Executive Order did not alter the power of the Secretary to discharge an employee in Vitarelli's status without giving any reason, since the Secretary had gratuitously given a reason of national security, he was obligated to conform to the procedural standards he had formulated for the dismissal of employees on security grounds. The Department Order applied to *all* security discharges in the Department of Interior. Having chosen to proceed against Vitarelli on security grounds, the Secretary was bound by the regulations he had himself promulgated for dealing with such cases, even though he could have discharged the employee summarily without such regulations.[35] Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan pointed to reasons for insisting that departmental procedural safeguards be scrupulously observed: ordinary rules of evidence do not apply, confidential information is withheld, and counsel is under handicaps in handling the case. The Court then noted that several of Vitarelli's procedural rights under the Departmental Order had been violated. The statement of charges was not sufficiently specific. Many questions were asked about persons and organizations nowhere mentioned in the charges. The Order's requirement that hearings before security boards shall be "orderly" and that "reasonable restrictions shall be imposed as to relevancy, competency, and materiality of matters considered" was not observed. For example, Vitarelli was asked what he thought about racial equality and civil rights, and whether he was religious; this was "a wide-ranging inquisition into this man's educational, social, and political beliefs." The Order gives the employee the right to cross-examine any witness offered in support of the charges, and while this does not contemplate that the Department must call witnesses to support any and all charges, it was expected that the Department would call any informant not properly classifiable as confidential. In this case, at least once the security officer named a person who had given derogatory information, negating the possibility that he could be considered a confidential informant. Finally, the Court held that the new notification of dismissal could not be viewed as an exercise of the summary dismissal power of the Secretary; dated as it was, it was clearly designed as a revision of the 1954 notification.

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[34] 359 U.S. 535 (1959).

[35] This was the point established in Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).

Speaking for four members of the Court, Justice Frankfurter expressed complete agreement that Vitarelli's original dismissal had been in violation of the Departmental Order, to the standards of which the executive agency must be held rigorously. But he argued that since the second notice was based on valid authority to discharge summarily without reason, the prior unlawful discharge did not deprive the Secretary of the power to discharge the man prospectively.

Indictment by Grand Jury. The Fifth Amendment and Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a capital case can be prosecuted only by way of indictment, but that a noncapital case can be tried on information if indictment is waived. The Federal Kidnapping Act provides for the death penalty if the kidnapped person is not liberated unharmed; otherwise, the punishment is imprisonment for a term of years up to life. Having waived grand jury indictment, Smith was prosecuted on a bill of information which did not state whether the victim had been released harmed or unharmed. The Government took the position that the statute in effect created two offenses: kidnapping without harm, punishable by imprisonment for term of years, and kidnapping with harm, punishable by death. Since there was no allegation of harm in this instance, then indictment could be had by information. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute created the single offense of transporting a kidnapping victim across state lines, and that anyone charged with violating the statute *may* be punished by death.[36] Chief Justice Warren declared that "when the offense as charged is sufficiently broad to justify a capital verdict, the trial must proceed on that basis, even though the evidence later establishes that such a verdict cannot be sustained because the victim was released unharmed. It is neither procedurally correct nor practical to await the conclusion of the evidence to determine whether the accused is being prosecuted for a capital offense." The difficulty arises from the fact that the trial judge must make informed decisions prior to trial on a number of matters, such as the defendant's access to a list of veniremen and government witnesses, questions of venue, and the number of available challenges, depending upon the nature of the offense. The Chief Justice insisted that more than a mere technical or minor error was involved. The use of indictments in all cases warranting serious punishment was the rule at the common law, and the Fifth Amendment recognizes the intervention of the grand jury as a substantial safeguard against oppressive and arbitrary proceedings. Criminal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of defendants where substantial rights are involved. As for the argument that information is speedier, the Chief Justice observed that the essential ingredient of justice is not mere speed, but rather orderly expedition.

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[36] Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959). See Lewis P. Watts, Jr., "Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique?" *North Carolina Law Review*, Vol. 37, pp. 290–315 (April, 1959); Cornelius W. Wickersham, Jr., "The Supreme Court and Federal Criminal Procedure," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. 44, pp. 14–26 (Fall, 1958).

Speaking for three members of the Court, Justice Clark argued that when the government proceeded by information it waived its right to demand the death penalty, since under the statute no one can be prosecuted for a capital offense unless he is first charged with it. He thought that the Court's decision did a great wrong to the administration of justice, since the procedure allows the District Attorney to get an indictment for a capital offense without the grand jury's knowing what he is doing. But these three Justices voted to reverse on the ground that Smith's due process rights had been violated when the trial judge, before a plea of guilty was entered, and outside the presence of the accused, who was uncounseled, conferred with an FBI agent concerning the facts of the charge and the prior record of the accused. The Court majority did not reach this issue.

Trial by Jury. The Court held that where an anti-trust case presents both legal and equitable causes, the discretion of the trial judge to decide which cause should be tried first is a narrow one; because the right to jury trial is a constitutional one and the right to trial by the court is not, this discretion must be exercised, wherever possible, to preserve jury trial.[37] "Only under the most imperative circumstances," wrote Justice Black, "can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims."

Federal Habeas Corpus. It is a well-known rule today that a state prisoner may not apply to a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus until he has first exhausted his state remedies. The Court held that where the federal constitutional issue had been appealed to the state supreme court, and adjudicated there, the exhaustion rule has been complied with even though the state court could have based its decision on a state ground.[38]

[37] Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Three Justices dissented.

[38] Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959). Four Justices dissented on the ground that the Court misread the state supreme court's opinion. For an extraordinarily penetrating analysis of this case, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., "Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 73, pp. 84–125 (November, 1959).

The Jencks Act. The Jencks Act,[39] which Congress promptly adopted in response to a much-discussed decision of the Supreme Court in 1957,[40] was interpreted during the 1958 Term in several cases. In the course of a trial for income tax evasion, Palermo requested the government to produce an agent's memorandum of a conference at which an affidavit had been executed by a government witness. The memorandum was a short 600-word summary of a conference that lasted about three and a half hours. The trial judge ruled that the memorandum was not a "statement" of a government witness to a government agent within the meaning of the Jencks Act. The Supreme Court agreed, but Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the opinion, went out of his way to argue that the Jencks Act is the exclusive means of compelling the production for cross-examination purposes of all statements of a government witness to an agent of the government.[41] Thus he noted that all statements not specifically defined are barred, and therefore a statement made to an agent of the government which cannot be produced under the terms of the Jencks Act cannot be produced at all. Congress has constitutional power, he insisted, to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal courts, and has exercised this power from earliest days. The power of the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant act of Congress. Speaking for four members of the Court, Justice Brennan protested that the Court was not justified in ranging far afield from the necessities of the case to offer an *obiter* essay interpreting the statute generally. He thought it was unnecessary to say that the Jencks Act is the sole vehicle for the production of prior statements of government witnesses to government agents, and he maintained that there was nothing in the statute which justifies the Court's stripping the trial judge of all discretion to make nonqualifying reports available in proper cases. He said that the Court's interpretation raised the constitutional question of the right of confrontation, and pointed out that the statute does not forbid the production of statements not covered by the statutory definition.[42] A clarification of the statute by Congress seems clearly indicated.

Search and Seizure. Information had been given to a federal narcotics agent in Denver with 29 years' experience by a paid informer who over a period of six months had often given the agent reliable information that Draper was peddling narcotics. On September 3, 1956, the informer told the agent that Draper had gone to Chicago and was going to bring back some heroin on either the 8th or 9th day of the month. The informer also gave the agent a detailed description of Draper, including a description of his clothing, a tan zipper bag he would carry, and his habit of walking "real fast." After the police stood watch at the railroad station all day on the 8th, Draper arrived the next day and was arrested there. They then searched him and found evidence (drugs and a syringe) which was used at his trial, after the judge refused to suppress the evidence, finding that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant, and that the subsequent search and seizure were therefore incidental to a lawful arrest. The Narcotics Control Act of 1956 authorizes agents of the Bureau to make arrests without warrant for violations of the law "where the violation is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest or where such person has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such violation." The Supreme Court held that the knowledge available to the arresting police officer was "probable cause" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and that there had been "reasonable grounds" within the meaning of the statute.[43] Justice Whittaker pointed out that there is a difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest and search, citing the landmark *Brinegar* case.[44] So an arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence; otherwise, if officers were required to get the kind of evidence that is needed upon a trial, they could not possibly perform their duties. The Court stressed that the information came from a paid informer whose information had been reliable in the past, and that Draper had been accurately described. Dissenting alone, Justice Douglas insisted that arrest on the mere word of an informer violated both the spirit and the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and of the statute. In his judgment the arrest was made on mere suspicion since the officers had no evidence at all.

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[39] 18 U.S.C. §3500.

[40] Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).

[41] Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).

[42] In a companion case, Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367 (1959), the Court held that even though the exclusion of one particular document was contrary to the Jencks Act, it was harmless error, since the same information came out on cross-examination. Four dissenting Justices thought the error was prejudicial. In still another case decided at the same time, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959), the Court held that the Jencks rule had nothing to do with grand jury proceedings, and that the language of the Act was not intended to encompass grand jury minutes. Three Justices dissented, Justice Brennan arguing that the usual reasons given for grand jury secrecy do not apply here, and that since the government uses the grand jury minutes to further its own interests in litigation, the defense should have the same access to them that the Jencks Act secures for prior statements.

Double Jeopardy. The communications facilities of a telephone company were dynamited during a strike. Abbate and a confederate were convicted in an Illinois court, on a plea of guilty, of violating a state statute making it a crime to conspire to injure or destroy the property of another. Then they were indicted in a federal district court on the charge of violating the federal criminal statute which makes it a crime to conspire to destroy communications property which is part of a system of communication operated and controlled by the United States. The very same acts which were the basis of the Illinois convictions were the basis of a subsequent federal conviction. In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brennan rejected the argument that this constituted double jeopardy, with the observation that he was not writing on a clean slate.[45] This question had been thoroughly considered in a number of very early decisions,[46] which reached their culmination in the *Lanza* case,[47] where the Court unanimously held that in such a situation two different sovereignties were acting, each in its own domain. The *Lanza* rule is firmly established and has often been applied, and it would hinder federal law enforcement, Justice Brennan asserted, if a state trial barred a federal prosecution. He then did the unusual thing of filing an additional separate opinion in which he discussed the alternative argument of the government, that there could be no double jeopardy in this case because the federal statute protected a different interest than that protected by the state law, for which additional evidence was needed. What troubled Justice Brennan was that this argument could also be advanced to sustain successive federal prosecutions. Justice Black filed a dissenting opinion with which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas registered agreement. Criticizing the *Lanza* decision, he said: "The legal logic used to prove one thing to be two is too subtle for me to grasp." Replying to the argument that states could interfere with federal policy by imposing light sentences, Justice Black argued that Congress has the power to protect the national interest in the crimes it is concerned with; it can either take exclusive jurisdiction or define the minimum penalties for state courts if they are given concurrent jurisdiction. But he was not convinced that a state and the nation can be considered two wholly separate sovereignties for the purpose of allowing them to do together what neither can do separately. The Bill of Rights, he insisted, establishes a broad national policy that federal courts should not punish a man a second time after acquittal or conviction in any court. "It is just as much an affront to human dignity and just as dangerous to human freedom for a man to be punished twice for the same offense, once by a State and once by the United States, as it would be for one of these two Governments to throw him in prison twice for the offense."

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[43] Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

[44] Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).

[45] Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). Attorney General Rogers promptly announced that "the mere existence of the power, of course, does not mean that it should necessarily be exercised." He declared the policy of the Department of Justice to be against a federal trial after a state prosecution for the same act or acts "unless the reasons

Self-Incrimination. Several witnesses before a state grand jury investigating the bribery of policemen by gamblers refused to answer any questions put to them, even though they had a grant of full statutory immunity from state prosecution, on the basis of their claim to the federal privilege against self-incrimination. Dividing 6–3, the Court, in a one-sentence opinion, affirmed the conviction for contempt,[48] on the authority of its 1958 decision in *Knapp* v. *Schweitzer*.[49] This case held that one who has been given immunity under state

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are compelling;" and not then unless the District Attorney first clears with the appropriate Assistant Attorney General and the Attorney General. For the text of his statement see *New York Times*, April 6, 1959, p. 19.

[46] Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847); United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560 (1850); Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13 (1852).

[47] United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).

[48] Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959). See: Lewis Mayers, *Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment?* (New York, 1959); John A. Kemp, "The Background of the Fifth Amendment in English Law: A Study of its Historical Implications," *William and Mary Law Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 247–286 (No. 2, 1958).

[49] 357 U.S. 371 (1958). See this REVIEW, Vol. 53, pp. 168–169 (March, 1959).

law cannot refuse to answer questions put to him by a state grand jury on the ground that it might expose him to a prosecution under a federal law—though Justice Frankfurter, who spoke for the Court there, went on to say that the federal government cannot take advantage of this recognition of the state's autonomy in order to evade the Bill of Rights: if a federal officer should be a party to the compulsion of testimony by state agencies, the Fifth Amendment would apply. It was on this theory that in the *Mills* case Chief Justice Warren filed a dissenting opinion which Justices Black and Douglas concurred in. He thought there was evidence in the record of collaboration between state officials, on the one hand, and the federal district attorney and the Internal Revenue Service, on the other. The Court's position means, the Chief Justice pointed out, that a person can be convicted of a federal crime on the basis of testimony which he is compelled to give in a state investigation; this creates vast opportunities for calculated efforts by state and federal officers working together to force disclosure in a state proceeding, and then to convict on the basis of that disclosure in a federal proceeding. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion to argue that the *Feldman* case,[50] which held that evidence obtained in a state proceeding can be used in a federal prosecution, ought to be overruled.

The Court divided 5–4 in another case involving the privilege, where a man refused to testify before a federal grand jury which was investigating possible violations of the Motor Carrier Act on the ground of self-incrimination, in the face of the district attorney's insistence that the statute gave the witness full immunity.[51] When the witness refused to answer the grand jury's questions, put to him again by the judge, the judge sentenced him under the summary contempt provisions of Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court held that the statute, in unambiguous language, gave the witness immunity coextensive with his constitutional privilege, a point regarded as settled since *Brown* v. *Walker*.[52] Five Justices also agreed that the summary procedure under Rule 42(a) was proper, since the contempt was not in any sense personal to the judge, and rejected the argument that as soon as the witness first disobeyed the court's order in the grand jury room the judge had no choice but to start contempt proceedings under Rule 42(b), which includes notice and a hearing. They thought that when the witness first refused to answer the grand jury's questions, he was guilty of no contempt; he may refuse to answer until the court orders him to do so, and therefore, since the disobedience took place in the presence of the court, it was clearly proper for the judge to proceed under Rule 42(a). Speaking in behalf of the four dissenters, Chief Justice Warren argued that summary procedure in this case was improper, that Rule 42(b) is usually followed, and that 42(a) is reserved only for exceptional circumstances. He could see no reason for all the haste.

Disbarment and Freedom of Speech. The extent of a lawyer's freedom to speak publicly about a case in which he was serving as counsel was explored in *In re*

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[50] Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).

[51] Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).

[52] 161 U.S. 591 (1896).

Sawyer.[53] Beginning late in 1952, Sawyer, a member of the Territorial bar of Hawaii since 1941, served as one of defense counsel in a Smith Act trial in Honolulu. About six weeks after the trial began, she made a speech to a lay audience in a village some 182 miles from Honolulu. She said that "horrible and shocking" things were occurring at the trial; that a fair trial was impossible; that the government was ready, if necessary, to scrap the rules of evidence; that unless the trial were stopped, new crimes would be created, such as knowing what is in books; and that this will lead to "dark ages of thought control." The Committee on Legal Ethics of the Bar Association of the Territory concluded that the speech reflected adversely upon the impartiality and fairness of the trial judge and impugned his integrity. The Supreme Court of Hawaii agreed, and suspended Sawyer from the practice of law for one year. Dividing 5–4, the Supreme Court reversed, but without reaching any constitutional question, merely holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conclusion. Speaking for four members of the Court, Justice Brennan saw no support for any factual inference other than that Sawyer was voicing strong criticism of Smith Act cases and the government's manner of proving them; her references to the trial then going on at Honolulu were designed to illustrate this, and were not a reflection in any way on the trial judge personally or on the way he conducted the trial. The Court, he argued, must start with the proposition "that lawyers are free to criticise the state of the law." Many lawyers, he noted, criticize the rules of evidence, particularly in conspiracy cases; and many lawyers, including Justices of the Supreme Court, have said that a Smith Act trial is apt to become a trial of ideas. Surely, he added, permissible criticism may be made to a lay audience as well as to a professional one, for the law is often modified through popular criticism. Furthermore, he said that a lawyer may criticize law-enforcement agencies of the government, and the prosecution, even to the extent of suggesting wrong-doing, without thereby impugning the judiciary. In addition, a lawyer may say that a judge is wrong in his law; "appellate courts and law reviews say that of judges daily, and it imputes no disgrace. Dissenting opinions in our reports are apt to make petitioner's speech look like tame stuff indeed." Justice Brennan stressed the fact that Sawyer did not say that the trial judge was corrupt, venal, stupid, or incompetent. Finally, he rejected the argument, heavily relied upon below, that it is wrong for a counsel of record to say such things during a pending case. In fact, he noted, a lawyer does not acquire license to say these things by not being engaged in the case. The charges, if true, are equally serious whether the lawyer is engaged in litigation or not. So far as a lawyer engaged in a case is concerned, only an obstruction to the administration of justice would matter, and such obstruction was not even alleged in Sawyer's case.

Justice Black concurred separately to note that he should not be understood as agreeing that if Hawaii had a specific statute of some kind authorizing this disbarment, it would be valid. Justice Stewart, in a separate concurrence in the opposite direction, stated that if the principal opinion intimates that a lawyer can invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immunize himself from even-handed discipline for proven unethical conduct, it is an intimation in which he does not join. Speaking for the four dissenters, Justice Frankfurter argued that this decision seriously impairs the responsibility of the bar, and especially of criminal lawyers, by encouraging the trial of cases on the hustings and in the press instead of in the courtroom. He also invoked the two-court rule, arguing that the Court should not set aside factual findings of the Supreme Court of Hawaii and the Court of Appeals.[54] He thought that Sawyer's speech was clearly an attack on the conduct of a particular trial presided over by a particular judge, involving particular defendants represented by her professionally. The speech, he insisted, was not an abstract dissertation, and most of the remarks were related directly to this trial.

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[53] 360 U.S. 622 (1959).

Defamation. Several cases during the 1958 Term dealt with the law of defamation, and while constitutional issues were not directly involved, they did explore problems touching upon the communication of ideas. In one case the Court finally ruled on the implications of §315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which provides that if any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office, "*Provided*, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section." The Court held, though dividing 5–4, that under these circumstances the station is not liable for defamation, since §315 is in effect a grant of immunity from liability for defamatory statements made by the speaker.[55] Many state courts and the Federal Communications Commission have held that the prohibition of censorship forbids the station to delete anything, a view which is also supported by legislative history. To permit censorship would defeat one of the basic purposes of the statute, "full and unrestricted discussion of political issues by legally qualified candidates." It would also impose a heavy burden on the station if it had to decide, on the spur of the moment, what is libelous discussion. Stations would likely become over-cautious, and might force candidates to avoid controversial issues. Thus, the stations cannot censor, and it would therefore be unconscionable, the Court ruled, to permit liability for conduct which the statute demands of the licensee. Speaking for the four dissenters, Justice Frankfurter pointed out that a provision which would have specifically granted stations this immunity was taken out of the Radio Act in 1927, and that repeated attempts to put it in have failed in Congress. He insisted that it is wholly improper for an administrative agency to determine the constitutional issue whether a federal law had displaced state law, and he emphatically rejected the notion that an inference of Congressional acquiescence should be drawn from the inaction of Congress; any supersession of state law should be based upon an explicit and clear declaration of Congress.

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[54] It is worth noting, however, that the vote of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 4–3. 260 F.2d 189.

[55] Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). See Jack H. Friedenthal and Richard J. Medalie, "The Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 72, pp. 445–493 (January, 1959).

Another issue regarding the law of defamation was decided by another 5–4 vote of the Court in *Barr* v. *Matteo*.[56] Following vigorous criticism of certain events in the Office of Rent Stabilization, Barr, Acting Director of the agency, suspended two employees and issued a press release which expressed criticism of them for having been responsible for a plan which allowed some employees to take their accumulated annual leave in cash. In a suit for defamation, the trial court held that Barr was not protected either by absolute or qualified privilege, and the jury found that the press release was defamatory. The Supreme Court reversed. Speaking for four members of the Court, Justice Harlan held that the statements in the press release were absolutely privileged. He argued that officials of the government should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits; that such suits would consume time and energies which should be devoted to governmental service; and that liability would inhibit "the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government." Justice Harlan ruled that the privilege cannot be limited to executive officers of cabinet rank, for it is not "a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government." Modern government requires the delegation and redelegation of authority, and it cannot be said that the functions of government become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of lower rank in the hierarchy of authority. It is not the title of the office but its duties which supplies the guide to decision. The Court ruled that Barr's act was an appropriate exercise of discretion. Justice Black concurred, pointing out that Barr's press release was not forbidden by any statute or governmental rule, and that its subject matter was germane to the proper functioning of his agency.

The Chief Justice protested that the opinion of the Court set no standard to guide executive conduct, and placed an impossible burden of proof on a plaintiff who seeks to avoid the defense of absolute privilege. Noting that absolute privilege for executive officials is a very recent judicial creation, he would accept it for internal reports, or with regard to the actions of a cabinet officer, or perhaps other officials appointed by the President and responsible directly to him in policy matters, but he would not extend the privilege to lesser officials. At best, the Chief Justice argued, a public critic of the government has a qualified privilege, and yet here the Court has given some amorphous group of officials an absolute privilege. It will take a brave man, he said, to criticize governmental officials who may libel him in reply. The Court's rule "will sanctify the powerful and silence debate." Justice Brennan also filed a dissenting opinion in which he insisted that at best only a qualified privilege is either necessary or justified, and Justice Stewart, in a third dissenting opinion, argued that Barr's press release had not been action in line of duty, but was rather a mere personally-motivated effort to disassociate himself from a bit of alleged chicanery.

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[56] 260 U.S. 564 (1959).

A companion case dealt with a memorandum which the Navy Captain who was Commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard sent to two Navy superiors and to the members of the Massachusetts Congressional delegation when he withdrew official recognition of the Federal Employees Veterans Association as the employees' representative group. The memorandum made animadversions regarding two officers of the Association who were also civilian employees of the Shipyard. These two employees sued for defamation in the federal diversity jurisdiction. The District Court and the reviewing Court of Appeals agreed that the Captain had an absolute privilege to send the report to superior officers; but as for sending it to the Congressmen, while the District Court held that this too was absolutely privileged, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was only a qualified privilege. The Supreme Court, dividing 6–3, agreed with the District Court.[57] Holding that where a federal officer acting in the course of his duties claims privilege against civil liability for allegedly defamatory statements, federal courts are not bound to follow state law (since the effective functioning of the federal government is involved), the Court ruled that the sending of copies of the report to the Massachusetts Congressmen was part of the Captain's official duties, since he was acting in accordance with a memorandum of instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy. The three dissenting Justices were not convinced that the Captain had been acting in line of duty, and thought that at best he had only a qualified privilege.

Freedom of Speech. Cammarano v. *United States*[58] brought to the Court a rather unusual free speech issue. Pursuant to statute and Treasury Regulations, the Collector of Internal Revenue denied deduction, as "ordinary and business" expenses, of sums spent by the taxpayer in furtherance of publicity programs designed to help secure the defeat of initiative measures then pending before the voters of two states which would have affected adversely the taxpayer's business. On the free speech issue the taxpayer relied on the *Speiser* case,[59] which had held unconstitutional a California statute requiring the taking of a loyalty oath as a condition of property tax exemption. A unanimous Court held that *Speiser* was not relevant. Cammarano was not denied a tax exemption because he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, but was simply required to pay for this activity out of his own pocket, as everyone else engaging in similar activities must do under the tax code. The nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross incomes of sums spent to promote or defeat legislation is plainly not aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas. In a separate concurring opinion Justice Douglas noted that while the taxpayer was exercising a First Amendment right, Congress did not undertake to penalize taxpayers for certain types of advocacy, but has merely allowed some, but not all, expenses as deductions. Deductions are a matter of grace, not right. He rejected the notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the state.

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[57] Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).

[58] 358 U.S. 498 (1959).

[59] Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). See this REVIEW, Vol. 53, pp. 162–164 (March, 1959).

Due Process and Retroactive Legislation. In 1949 a mortgagor secured mortgage insurance from FHA under the National Housing Act as amended by the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946, to build an apartment house in Charleston. While the statute was not clear on the point, FHA construed it as barring the construction of housing for transients. In 1954, Congress amended the statute to make this interpretation clear. In an action for a declaratory judgment, a three-judge federal district court held that since the insurance was obtained before 1954, due process forbade applying the later amendment to this particular mortgagor, and that Congress did not intend in the original statute to exclude housing for transients. Dividing 5–3, the Supreme Court reversed.[60] It held that the statute was correctly construed by the administrative body, and that there had been no denial of due process rights, since the mortgagor was not penalized for anything he did in the past. The new 1954 act applied only prospectively. One does not gain immunity from federal regulation through forehanded contracts, Justice Douglas declared, and so there was no interference with any contract right: "The Constitution is concerned with practical, substantial rights, not with those that are unclear and gain hold by subtle and involved reasoning. Congress by the 1954 Act was doing no more than protecting the regulatory system which it had designed. Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end. . . . Invocation of the Due Process Clause to protect the rights asserted here would make the ghost of *Lochner* v. *New York,* 198 U. S. 45, walk again." The three dissenters argued that the application of the 1954 legislation to this mortgagor was an unconstitutional impairment of vested rights previously acquired.

2. *The Federal Commerce Power*

Door County, Wisconsin, hired a contractor to build an addition to the County Courthouse. The successful bid for the plumbing subcontract went to an employer of nonunion labor, and when he refused to sign a union agreement, the union assigned a picket to walk around the courthouse. Though the picketing was peaceful, all work stopped since union members employed by the other contractors refused to cross the picket line. On the theory that interstate commerce was not affected by this dispute, the local circuit court granted an injunction, rejecting the union's argument that the state courts lacked jurisdiction because this controversy was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The highest court of Wisconsin affirmed, but on the theory that even if the dispute did affect interstate commerce, NLRB lacked jurisdiction because one party was a governmental subdivision. By unanimous vote, the Supreme Court reversed, holding, first of all, that a local government fell within the meaning of the "persons" who are covered by the federal statute, and secondly, that there was sufficient connection with interstate commerce to give NLRB jurisdiction:[61] in a project having a total cost of about $450,000, about half this sum represented the cost of materials brought in from outside Wisconsin. Furthermore, it was indicated that this is the sort of dispute over which the NLRB normally has jurisdiction and exclusive power.

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[60] Federal Housing Authority v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958).

Another commerce issue was presented in a case where the Secretary of Labor brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act to restrain an architectural and consulting engineering firm from violating the record-keeping and overtime provisions of the statute.[62] With offices in Washington, D. C., and Norfolk, Virginia, the firm employs about seventy people, designs public, industrial and residential projects, and prepares plans for their construction. It does a great deal of work for the armed services and local governments, and has projects and clients in many states. Its projects include the widening of streets, the extension of airplane runways, work on sewerage systems, alteration of hangar facilities, relocation of radio and television facilities, improvement of state highways, repair of buildings at shipyards, and such private projects as commerical buildings, bus terminals, shopping centers, etc. In the course of its operations, many employees travel across state lines. The issue before the Court related to the coverage of draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks and stenographers. The Court by a 7–2 vote set aside the holding in the lower federal courts that this firm was not within the coverage of the statute.

There were, as usual, several FELA cases. In one, an action had been brought in a Texas state court to recover for the death of a man who had been struck by a train while working on the railroad's roadbed. The trial court gave judgment for the railroad on the ground that as a matter of law the decedent was not an employee of the railroad at the time of his death within the meaning of FELA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to submit this issue to the jury, on the ground that the question of employment, like that of fault or causation, contains factual elements which make it one for the jury.[63] In another case, the jury in a state court found the employer negligent where a railroad employee had been injured while pulling a handcart along a railroad station platform. The highest state court reversed, but the Supreme Court reversed it in turn,[64] holding that the evidence justified the jury's conclusion. As is usual in FELA cases, these appeals involved the question of the place of the jury in the trial of such cases rather than commerce issues. And, as is now the custom, Justice Frankfurter favored dismissing the writs, in the first case because he thought that it was unique and of no precedential value, and in the second because he thought certiorari had been granted improvidently.

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[61] Plumbers, Steamfitters, Refrigeration, Petroleum Fitters, and Apprentices of Local 298 v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959).

[62] Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959).

[63] Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U.S. 227 (1959).

[64] Moore v. Terminal Railroad Assoc., 358 U.S. 31 (1958).

3. *Federal Judicial Power*

Supreme Court Practice. The Supreme Court of Ohio held constitutional an ordinance which authorized a housing inspector, upon showing proper identification, to enter, examine and survey all dwellings at reasonable hours, and which required the owner or occupant to give the inspector free access to the dwelling at any reasonable hour for purposes of inspection. Four Justices noted probable jurisdiction, but four members of the Court not only voted the other way, but also filed a statement declaring that this case was controlled by a decision made just two weeks prior to the filing of this application.[65] Speaking for the dissident Justices (Justice Stewart did not participate), Justice Frankfurter argued that it was contrary to the Court's own processes to create an opportunity to overrule a case decided only a fortnight previously after thorough discussion. Justice Clark also filed a memorandum making the same point. To all this Justice Brennan made reply, pointing out that the Rule of Four which applies to certiorari practice also applies to noting probable jurisdiction on appeal. He protested that he could find no precedent for disagreeing Justices making a public notation of their position when an order setting an appeal for argument is entered. He also asserted that it was wrong for Justices to express public views on a case before it is argued.

Who May Sue. A Negro resident of Memphis brought a class action in a three-judge federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment as to his claimed constitutional right, and that of others similarly situated, to travel on buses in the city without being subjected to the racial segregation requirements of a state statute. After the hearing, the district court, without reaching the merits, dismissed the action on the ground that there was no "actual controversy" within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Since it had been shown that the plaintiff had ridden the bus in Memphis on only one occasion and had boarded it then for the purpose of instituting this litigation, it was held that he was not a representative of a class of colored citizens in the city who use the buses. By unanimous vote the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial on the merits,[66] finding the elements of a justiciable controversy present here. The plaintiff got on a bus; he was told to move to the rear; he refused; and then two policemen boarded the bus and ordered him to go the rear, get off the bus, or be arrested. The plaintiff left the bus. In addition, the record showed that the city intended to go on enforcing the law until it was finally held unconstitutional in adjudication. The Court declared that it was not necessary for the plaintiff, in order to have standing to sue, to go on riding the buses at the risk of arrest unless he sat in the rear. A resident of the city has "a substantial, immediate, and real interest" in the validity of a statute which imposes the sort of disability at issue here, and it was not significant that the plaintiff may have boarded this particular bus in order to institute this litigation.

Diversity Jurisdiction. A suit to recover double indemnity under two life in-

[65] Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959).

[66] Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).

surance policies insuring against accidental death was filed in a North Dakota state court and then removed on grounds of diversity to the federal district court. The policies denied double indemnity for a suicide, and in this case the death of the insured had been due to wounds caused by the discharge of his shotgun. On the verdict of the jury the district court gave judgment for the plaintiff, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the evidence could not sustain any reasonable theory of accident. Under North Dakota law the presumption is that death was accidental, and the burden of proving suicide is on the insurer. Dividing 6–2, the Supreme Court reversed, holding in effect that the insurer had failed to overcome the presumption created by state law.[67] Under the *Erie* rule,[68] questions of presumptions and the burden of proof are substantive, and therefore state holdings supply the rule of decision in diversity cases. Justice Frankfurter filed a dissenting opinion to argue that certiorari should never have been granted. The courts of appeals were established to relieve the Supreme Court of cases which are important only to the litigants; the Court should not review cases where the only issue is the sufficiency of evidence for submission to the jury; the courts of appeals are far better equipped to decide such evidential questions. Not only is it imperative, he thought, to limit the Court's docket to the really important cases, but laxity in granting certiorari merely encourages lawyers to file petitions in hopeless cases.

In a contrary direction, the Court had ruled in 1958 that where, in a diversity action turning on the construction of a state compensation act, the main issue was whether the injured plaintiff had been a statutory employee of the defendant, the federal court was not bound by the state rule of practice which made this issue one for decision by the judge alone.[69] The Court there sustained the strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in federal courts, and invoked the Seventh Amendment. In the spring of 1959 the Court reaffirmed this position by holding that the question of employee status should have been submitted by the federal district judge to the jury, notwithstanding that under applicable state law the question was for the court to decide.[70] Speaking for three dissenters, Justice Frankfurter argued that the application of law to facts is not a jury function.

Eleventh Amendment. A man who ran a ferry boat operated by the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission was killed as the result of a collision. The widow brought suit in a federal district court under the Jones Act, charging the Commission with negligence. The Commission was created by an interstate compact approved by Congress which included a "to-sue-and-be-sued" clause, and also a proviso reserving to the federal courts their jurisdiction over navigable waters and over foreign and interstate commerce. The district court nevertheless held that the Commission was the agency of two states, and therefore immune from this suit. The court of appeals affirmed, relying upon Missouri and Tennessee decisions which construed a to-sue-and-be-sued clause as not authorizing a suit for negligence against a public corporation. Dividing 6–3, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the construction of a compact sanctioned by Congress to be a federal question on which it has the last word.[71] Whether a state has by compact waived its immunity from suit is itself a question of federal law for the Court to decide. The Court then read this clause to permit the suit, pointing out that when the compact was entered into in 1949, Court doctrine did not look with favor at claims of immunity from suit advanced by corporations performing governmental functions.[72] Three Justices concurred with the understanding that the Court was not reaching the constitutional question under the Eleventh Amendment and the compact clause of the Constitution. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted that both states denied authorizing suits against the Commission in a federal court by reason of the to-sue-and-be-sued clause; and while he conceded that a compact created by an act of Congress gives rise to a federal question, he argued that a federal question does not require a federal answer in the form of a blanket, nationwide substantive doctrine where essentially local interests are at stake. Since these two states were free to waive or refuse to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, he thought the language they employed in the compact should be limited to the legal significance they chose to place on it. He conceded that Congress could have insisted upon a provision waiving immunity from suit in the federal courts, but wanted a clear indication that Congress had exacted such a waiver. As for the proviso in the statute, he argued that the Commission could not have been sued in the federal courts on that ground alone, because of the Eleventh Amendment.

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[67] Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).

[68] Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Alfred Hill, "The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution," *Northwestern University Law Review,* Vol. 53, pp. 427–456 (September–October, 1958), pp. 541–609 (November–December, 1958).

[69] Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Co-op, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).

[70] Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, 360 U.S. 273 (1959).

Federal Courts, State Law and the Doctrine of Abstention. Whether it is proper for a federal court which otherwise has jurisdiction to abstain from reaching a decision because the case involves state law questions not yet ruled upon by the state courts, was before the Supreme Court during the 1958 Term in several different forms. The doctrine of abstention pending prior state interpretation of state questions received a rather thorough going over, for in all but one case the Justices were divided. Rather early in the Term the Court was unanimous on these facts: a telephone company had brought a suit for a declaratory judgment in a federal district court in which it asked the court to hold a Mississippi statute imposing a charge for the use of public streets to be violative of both the federal and state constitutions. The district court so held, and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court vacated judgment, and remanded the case to the district court with directions to hold it until the parties went to a state tribunal for an authoritative declaration of applicable state law.[73] Unsettled questions of state law should be decided in state courts before a federal court considers federal questions; perhaps the state court's ruling may make it unnecessary for the federal court to consider the federal constitutional question.

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[71] Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).

[72] The Court cited Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381 (1939), as illustrating the new and prevailing climate of opinion.

[73] City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959).

The Court took the same position in another case where an action was brought in a federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief against three registration and barratry statutes which the Virginia legislature had adopted to discourage litigation, as part of its general plan of "massive resistance" to school integration.[74] These were new and very detailed statutes, not yet construed by the state courts. Dividing 6–3, the Supreme Court ruled that the district court should have abstained from deciding the merits until the Virginia courts had a reasonable opportunity to construe the laws. This well-established procedure, Justice Harlan said, is designed to avoid unnecessary interference by the Federal courts with proper state concerns. Abstention is not the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise. Justice Douglas protested that this amounted to deference to a state policy which seeks to undermine paramount federal law. The reason for showing deference to local institutions vanishes, he argued, where there has plainly been state defiance of the constitutional rights of citizens.

The doctrine of abstention was also applied in three cases involving the enforcement of state eminent domain statutes. In one of them the Court ruled, 6–3, that a federal district court had acted properly in refusing to rule on the merits of a case which had been removed to it from a state court, and which involved the interpretation of a new statute.[75] Justice Frankfurter said that only the state courts could speak definitively about the meaning of the disputed state statute, and that all a federal judge could do is make a dubious and tentative forecast. He emphasized that the case involved a peculiarly local issue, the apportionment of governmental powers between the city and the state, and the desirability of avoiding needless friction between state and federal authorities. He dismissed as unworthy the suggestion that the doctrine of abstention will tempt federal judges to avoid their responsibilities: "procedures for effective judicial administration presuppose a federal judiciary composed of judges well-equipped and of sturdy character," in whom a wide range of judicial discretion may safely be vested. Dissenting at great length, Justice Brennan insisted that at most the doctrine of abstention is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of the federal courts to give proper justice in diversity cases. Its principal purposes are to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question where a state ruling might put the case in a different posture or to avoid needless friction with the states. Since no federal constitutional question lurked in the background of this case, and all the federal court was asked to do was to apply state law, and since the city itself urged the federal court to decide the case, he could see no special reason why it should abdicate its responsibility. He warned that it would wreak havoc with federal jurisdiction if its exercise becomes a matter for the *ad hoc* discretion of the district court in each case. He insisted that the mere fact that a case involves difficult questions of state law does not justify running away from the task of adjudication, for such issues arise every day in federal courts throughout the country. He also declared that distaste for diversity jurisdiction cannot be a very good reason to license the federal district judges to retreat from their responsibility. He warned that the Court's decision would encourage inefficiency in the administration of the federal courts, and lead to unnecessary delay, waste and added expense for the parties.

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[74] Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). See Walter F. Murphy, "The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12, pp. 371–390 (June, 1959).

[75] Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).

Writing next in behalf of a bare majority of the Court, Justice Brennan reviewed the whole question of abstention very systematically in *County of Allegheny* v. *Frank Mashuda Co.*[76] Here the prescribed local administrative procedure had been completed for the assessment of damages for a taking, but while an appeal was pending in a state court, and after the county had taken possession, the property owner brought suit in a federal district court for a judgment of ouster and damages, on the ground that the taking was for a private business use contrary to the settled substantive law of the state. Though the district court recognized that its diversity jurisdiction had been properly invoked, it dismissed the suit as an interference with the administration of the affairs of a county acting under color of state law in a condemnation proceeding. Five Justices joined in ruling that the district court should have taken jurisdiction, since it found that there was no possibility of a premature and perhaps unnecessary decision of a serious federal constitutional question, there was no hazard of unsettling some delicate balance in the area of federal-state relationships, and a decision would not require the district court to guess at the resolution of uncertain and difficult issues of state law. Justice Brennan noted that the state law which the district court was asked to apply was clear and certain, involving the purely factual question of the nature of the taking, in the decision of which the district court would be acting as a state court might in applying the facts to the settled law of the state. To permit the district court to abstain would merely require the property owner to start another lawsuit, with consequent delay, expense and possible prolongation of the unlawful denial of possession of the property. This amounts to penalizing severely the citizen who tries to exercise the right of access to the federal courts which Congress has granted to him. The four dissenting Justices argued that there had been no clear abuse of discretion on the part of the district court, and that the federal suit split the state suit, with the result that the county had two law suits on its hands. Contrary to the majority's view they insisted that the federal suit would result in added delay and expense, and they urged that all the issues could be settled in the state court in a single suit. The majority's answer to this last point was that the two issues, of the validity of a taking and of damages, are triable separately under state law.

Finally, in another case coming up from Pennsylvania, a property owner brought suit in a federal district court under a state Limited Access Highways Act, adopted in 1945 and not yet construed by the state courts.[77] The district court stayed proceedings until the parties could secure a determination of their rights in the state courts. After the state courts held that the state statute provided a complete procedure to guard all of the property owner's rights at all times, the federal district court proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the controversy over the question of compensation for loss of access to the highway, on the ground that the property owner might be irreparably harmed during the period required to determine this particular right in the state courts. It went on to hold that the legislature did not intend to compensate abutting landowners for the loss of the right of access, and ruled that for this reason the statute violated due process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it had to be assumed that the state courts meant what they said in stating that landowners would be afforded a procedure through which the full measure of their rights under the Constitution would be preserved. The Court could find no circumstances which should impel a federal court to block state officials in their appropriate functions. Dissenting alone, Justice Douglas took the position that while the federal district court had improperly enjoined enforcement of the statute, the property owner was entitled to a declaratory judgment determining whether access to a highway is a compensable property right under the Due Process Clause. Such a ruling, he maintained, would not halt the highway program and might be of value to the local authorities. And he went on to deplore the hostility which has developed in recent times to the exercise by the federal courts of their power to declare the rights of a citizen under local law in diversity cases. He expressed the view that the federal courts "are today a haven where rights can sometimes be adjudicated even more dispassionately than in state tribunals."

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[76] 360 U.S. 185 (1959).

[77] Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).

Court-Martial Jurisdiction. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, effective in 1950, Article of War 92 governed court-martial trials for murder or rape, but it had this proviso: "that no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in time of peace." While serving with the Army in France, Lee was convicted by a court-martial, dishonorably discharged and sentenced to twenty years in prison. While serving that sentence in the custody of the Army at a camp in California, he was convicted by a court-martial of conspiracy to commit murder there; the offense occurred on June 10, 1949. War with Germany was formally terminated by a Joint Resolution of Congress on October 19, 1951, and the war with Japan was terminated by a formal proclamation of the President, made pursuant to statute, on April 28, 1952. The question Lee raised in a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal district court was whether June 10, 1949, was "in time of peace."

The Supreme Court disagreed with the two lower courts, holding that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction over the offense.[78] Justice Douglas maintained for the Court that whether we are at peace or war depends upon "a more particularized and discriminating analysis," for Congress may decide, in drafting statutes, that we are at war for one purpose and at peace for another. Hence in one context the term may be used broadly, while in another a narrower meaning may be more appropriate. Distinguishing away certain precedents, the Court held that the phrase "in time of peace" must be read in the setting of a grant of power to military tribunals to try people for capital offenses. Since a free society like ours is reluctant to give military tribunals authority to try people for nonmilitary offenses, in the light of history this authority must be construed strictly.[79] The army was not given the power to try soldiers for the capital crimes of murder and rape until 1863, and it was then restricted to time of war or rebellion on the theory that the civil courts, being open, were wholly qualified to handle these cases. In fact, Justice Douglas added that civil courts were better qualified than military tribunals to try nonmilitary offenses, since "they have a more deeply engrained judicial attitude, a more thorough indoctrination in the procedural safeguards necessary for a fair trial," and use trial by jury, "one of the most important safeguards against tyranny which our law has designed." Thus the Court concluded that statutory language should be construed to conform as much as possible to traditional guarantees of citizens' rights, since such a purpose should be attributed to Congress. Two dissenting Justices, Harlan and Clark, argued that the relevant precedents were the other way, and that the Court was already committed to the proposition that "in time of peace" means "peace in the complete sense, officially declared."[80] They feared that the Court's decision would cast a cloud on all federal legislation the impact of which depends upon the existence of "war" and "peace."

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[78] Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959). See Frederick Bernays Wiener, "Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice," *Harvard Law Review,* Vol. 72, pp. 1–49 (November, 1958), pp. 266–304 (December, 1958).

Admiralty Jurisdiction. A Spanish seaman serving as a member of the crew of a ship belonging to a Spanish corporation was injured while the vessel was in harbor at Hoboken. The question was: does a federal district court have jurisdiction on its law side under 28 USC §1331, the general federal jurisdiction statute of 1875, which gives the district courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions "wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States"? Obviously jurisdiction could not be rested on diversity of citizenship in this case between one Spanish citizen and another. The district court held that §1331 did not confer jurisdiction on the federal law courts over claims rooted in general maritime law. Dividing 5–4, the Supreme Court agreed.[81] Writing in great detail, Justice Frankfurter ruled that parties have access to the law side of the federal district courts in admiralty cases only where there is diversity, but otherwise in admiralty, where the judge sits without a jury. He stressed that Article III of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on federal courts both in admiralty and maritime cases, *and* also in cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. This Court and all legal writers on federal jurisdiction have considered these two classes of cases to be separate, and have assumed that cases in admiralty are not therefore cases arising under federal law. Furthermore, he argued that to treat them as cases arising under federal law would have undesirable consequences: such cases would be removable, as admiralty cases are not; it would make inroads into the present harmonious system which leaves to the states a wide scope to apply their law in the maritime field, as with regard to liens, remedies for wrongful death, partition suits, and the specific performance of arbitration agreements; jurisdiction could be asserted only if there were initial proof that the claim arises under federal law; and venue rules would be affected.

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[79] As in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and U. S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).

[80] Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 10 (1921).

[81] Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).

Speaking in dissent, Justice Black declared that the issue was neither "complex or earth-shaking," that the real controversy was whether a few more seamen could have their suits for damages passed on by federal juries instead of by judges, that a jury trial under §1331 was proper, and that the statute was "perfectly understandable in ordinary English." In another dissenting opinion Justice Brennan argued that the seaman's action to recover damages for a maritime tort was founded on substantive federal maritime law since court-made rules are law in the full sense of the term. He refused to believe that there is federal jurisdiction at common law over federally-defined causes of action only if there is diversity of citizenship among the parties.

It is an established principle of maritime law that in the absence of a statute there can be no action for wrongful death.[82] The Jones Act applies only to cases involving the death of seamen, and the Death on the High Seas Act applies only where the wrongful death occurred on the high seas beyond a maritime league from shore. What if the decedent was not a seaman and the accident occurred in port? The Court held that in such a case the federal admiralty court must apply the state wrongful death statute.[83] But the Court also made it clear that when an admiralty court undertakes to protect rights rooted in state law, the issues must be determined in accordance with the substantive law of the state, for any other view would defeat the intent of Congress to preserve state sovereignty over deaths caused by maritime torts within the state's territorial waters. If the state may create a right of action for death, it would be an anomaly to say that it may not determine the circumstances under which that right exists. Four Justices dissented in part, arguing that since the duty to maintain a vessel in seaworthy condition is imposed by federal law, the federal maritime law looks to the state law only for a remedy. But since every state now has a wrongful death statute, the wrongful death remedy is universal, and thus they maintained that it was unwarrantedly destructive of the uniformity of the federal maritime law to make the applicability of a remedy for the breach of a federally-defined duty dependent on a determination of the intent of the various state legislatures, or upon exegesis of each state's statute.

On the other hand, where a man was injured while making a purely personal social visit on board a ship berthed at a New York pier, the Court ruled unanimously that the governing law was wholly federal.[84] It was held that the federal district judge had erred in applying a lower standard of care, as defined by state law, upon the shipowner, than that imposed by the maritime law. More specifically, the Court decided that admiralty does not recognize the distinctions between an invitee and a licensee which are found in the common law of New York; that these distinctions of the common law were inherited from a culture deeply rooted in the land; and that to import them into the admiralty law would be foreign to its "traditions of simplicity and practicality."

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[82] The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).

[83] The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).

[84] Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).

The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine. In 1954 NBC by contract exchanged certain television stations with Westinghouse, and the following year the Federal Communications Commission approved the exchange. When the government then brought suit on the theory that this was in furtherance of a conspiracy to monopolize the largest market areas in the country, the district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that FCC had authority to pass on the antitrust question, that the Communications Act had so displaced the Sherman Act that FCC had primary jurisdiction to license the exchange tranaction, and that the only way open to the government was to intervene in the FCC proceedings. For good measure the trial judge found that there had been collateral estoppel, *res judicata* and laches to support dismissal of the government's petition. By unanimous vote the Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither statutory language nor legislative history supported the view that FCC was intended to have any authority to pass on alleged antitrust violations as such.[85] The Chief Justice pointed out that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was based on the necessity for administrative uniformity and on the desirability of utilizing administrative expertise in handling intricate facts. Thus the Court has applied the doctrine when questions arose as to transactions alleged to be contrary to antitrust laws which involved regulated industries whose members were forced by some appropriate administrative agency to charge only reasonable rates. In cases involving common carriers by rail and water, which can charge only the published tariff found by the appropriate agency to have been reasonable, the Court's concern has been that the responsible expert administrative agency should be given the opportunity to determine questions within its special statutory competence and experience. But while the television industry is a regulated industry, it is regulated in a different way. Broadcasters are not within the definition of common carriers, and they are free to determine their own advertising rates. Thus, since there is no pervasive regulatory scheme, and no rate structure to throw out of balance, sporadic action by the federal courts can work no mischief. In this case, the Chief Justice ruled, the approval by FCC of the exchange of stations was limited to the federal standard of "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Thus in every real sense the parties were animated merely by business judgment as opposed to regulatory coercion. Finally, there was no collateral estoppel or *res judicata* here, since the issue in controversy before FCC was whether the exchange would serve the public interest, not whether Section 1 of the Sherman Act had been violated.

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[85] United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).

Nor could there be laches on the part of the government, for, since FCC had no power to decide the antitrust issue, the government had no duty to enter the FCC proceedings to seek review of the license grant.

On the other hand, where the National Railroad Adjustment Board has exclusive primary jurisdiction of employees' claims for extra compensation based on a collective bargaining agreement, the Board's interpretations are final and preclude a later suit on the same issue in a court, even though the claimant had retired from railroad service.[86] The Court held that this is a specialized technical problem calling for expert knowledge administered in a uniform way by a single administrative agency. Three dissenting Justices protested that the Railway Labor Act does not require retired railroad employees to submit their back-pay claims to the Board, and that since the railroads can have court trials for wage claims brought against them, employees are denied the equal protection of the laws.

Similarly, the Court ruled that an adverse determination by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, of a claim of a railroad employee that his discharge for failure to obey instructions of his superior was in violation of the procedure required by a provision of the collective labor contract, precludes the employee from pursuing the common-law remedy of a suit for damages.[87] The Railway Labor Act makes an exception of "money award" from the provision that all awards of the Board shall be final, but the Court held that the term "money award" did not include a refusal to award a money payment. Otherwise, it was pointed out, the Board would merely be giving advisory opinions, and this was not the intent of Congress. Three dissenting Justices thought that an award of no damages was a "money award," and that the Court's decision runs contrary to the recent tendency for more judicial review as against the claim of administrative finality. It was pointed out that under the Court's ruling, if an employee asserting a money claim loses, he cannot get any court review, but if he wins the employer can. They refused to believe that Congress intended to approve such a lopsided, preferential system, and they argued that this raises a serious constitutional question of due process.

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[86] Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959).

[87] Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959). See Robert Kramer, "The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process," *Fordham Law Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 1–95 (Spring, 1959); Kenneth Culp Davis, *Administrative Law Treatise* (4 vols., St. Paul, 1958).

COMMUNICATION

A COMMENT ON METHODS

> The development of politics as a discipline . . . is not so well advanced that one can say with strong assurance that there is general agreement upon either the basic concepts of the subject or upon the methodology according to which they should be manipulated and employed. Until the arrival of a systematic theory which relates to each other the current miscellany of metaphysics, ethics, juristic systems, institutional descriptions, and small-group experimentation, the student of political behavior may be permitted to explore the material that interests him. . . .

This prefatory remark from Earl Latham's recently published *The Politics of Railroad Coordination: 1933–1936* sharply articulates a vague, though widespread mood. The defensive tone of what is a mere aside merits attention insofar as it is likely (1) to give sustenance to the kind of research which today requires no sustenance, (2) to inhibit the use of methods—such as Professor Latham's own—appropriate to the study of politics in a free society, and (3) to discourage research in fields which those who share a concern for a free society should actually be encouraged to explore.

Latham's work invites the reader to appreciate—in an arena so rigorously delimited that matters of political style can emerge as significant—the administration of transportation policy. It is apparent that he seeks to enhance the range of the reader's sensitivity to political phenomena, that he is concerned not so much with adding to the body of manipulative knowledge as with enlarging our political understanding. Just how admirably he succeeds, readers who still care more about political action than "social behavior" may discover for themselves.

The only reason I wish to take note of his real interests is to highlight his introductory disclaimer. If it is not irony, it is surely touched by pathos, for the very methodology which, to his regret, is still in its infancy does not propose to deal with persons who engage in purposive political action but rather with "individuals" and "social units." These it sees as functional components of a system, and hence as properly the subject of a behavioral science because they so truly behave.

Of course, such a science may yet become wholly applicable to our society. Should our political leaders ever conform automatically to the dictates of the social system, the only relevant approach to understanding will obviously be furnished by the still immature natural science of social behavior. But as long as statesmen operate with ingenuity, as long as they cope with emergencies in partially idealistic terms, as long as a sense of purpose—or, more accurately, a genuine purpose—helps give energy to their art, they can be significant for us only when we are alert to their ambiguous motives and aims, treating these respectfully as beyond final analysis by any methodology, even a sophisticated one.

Indeed, the more sophisticated the method becomes, the more removed it will be from the very stuff of politics which, if our experience as citizens does not deceive us, still characterizes the American scene. That it is possible for Latham to remain in sympathetic touch with historical experience speaks well not only for American politics—suggesting, as it does, that men earnestly pursue the public interest in the public arena—but also for his choice of methods. Why then apologize for a historical approach? It has oriented works such as V. O. Key's *Southern Politics,* Oliver Garceau's *The Political Life of the American Medical Association,* and Grant McConnell's *The Decline of Agrarian Democracy.* All these are written with a sustained interest in events and persons. All are concerned with saving the uniqueness of phenomena. As long as we seek to understand human actors in a free society, the methods these works employ are not second best.

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BOOK REVIEWS, NOTES, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Editors herewith apologize to La Senhora Leda Boechat Rodrigues for the error of reference to her, on page 560 of the June issue.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought. By Arnold Brecht. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. Pp. viii, 603. $12.00.)

The principal theme of this work is that of the scientific handling of "goals" and "values" as a problem for all students of politics and political theorists who desire to be truly scientific. What can science do regarding the choice of political goals? This is an important theme in view of the quest by many scholars and other persons for a "higher law" and for "absolute" moral standards. The concentration of the book upon this theme means, of course, that the title, *Political Theory*, is far too broad. Another volume has been announced to cover the origin and nature of the state and the other topics that are usually discussed in books and courses on political theory.

To follow the author's development of his major theme, one needs to know at least a little of his background and his careers on two continents. Born in Lübeck in 1884 to a family well represented in business, government, and the ministry, he studied law at Bonn, Göttingen, and Leipzig, becoming a *Doctor Juris Utriusque* (of both Roman and Canon Law) at the latter in 1906. Even in his student days he appears to have become deeply involved both in conscience and in intellect with the problems of religion, philosophy, justice, morals, and values. He carried this concern into his active career, which happened to be at a time of great intellectual and political ferment. It is evident that he followed closely two of the great German intellectual controversies of his time, namely, that over the problem of justice in connection with the codification of German law, and that over the rising new scientific attitude or "scientism," which was tending to undermine religious faith and the belief in absolutes. Both these controversies, and also the later revolt against "scientism," are discussed in the book.

Following the conferment of his law degree, Dr. Brecht served in various judicial and administrative posts, advancing from minor and local ones up to high civil positions in the Reich ministries and later in the more democratic ministries of Prussia at Berlin. He did a prodigious amount of legal and administrative work and a great deal of writing. His struggles for democratic principles against von Papen and Hitler proved to be in vain, and this failure brought an end to his administrative and political career.

At this point, in 1933, he was called to a new career as holder of a chair in the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York, an institution that he served with distinction until his retirement in 1954. He taught political theory, constitutional history, comparative government, comparative public administration, and other subjects; and wrote numerous articles and monographs. His bibliography is long and impressive.

The main theme of the book is what he calls "scientific value relativism" or "scientific value alternativism." This position is one that he accepts. It is, he says, the prevailing opinion of scientists and of the philosophers of science today that scientific methods do "not enable a scientist to determine the superiority of any [moral] ends or purposes over any other ends or purposes in 'absolute' terms. He [can] only examine their 'relative' superiority as means in the pursuit of other, ulterior or ultimate, purposes or ends." (Pages 5–6.) The political theorist who wishes to be scientific must accept this limitation, which is also a limitation upon science itself. He cannot as a scientist decide what is absolutely just or unjust, right or wrong. There is no evidence that is intersubjectively transmissible, as scientific evidence must be, to prove or disprove the absolute. There is also no logical bridge between "is" and "ought." Those who yearn for the absolute and the immutable in human affairs must go to other sources for their convictions and beliefs, to divine revelation, or to personal intuition, or some other possible source, and not to science, for science cannot help him, except by pointing to consequences and risks.

In reviewing, as he does, many of the important published materials on this subject, Dr. Brecht considers the metaphysical problems of God and revelation, conscience and intuition, the logical gulf between "is" and "ought," the methods and standards of present day science, problems of possibility and impossibility, and other questions. He summarizes succinctly some of the important principles of scientific method as related to the study of politics. He examines from several viewpoints the problem of absolute and invariable standards of value, and does not ridicule those who seek other roads than science to the knowledge that satisfies them. But having cast his lot on the side of science, with its demand for intersubjectively transmissible knowledge and evidence for the proof of any theory or proposition, he hews close to the line even at the cost of some hurt to his private wishes or beliefs. (See page 284 where he aligns his "personal convictions" with those of Hallowell and Hocking, but also page 485 where he holds the "calamity" that science cannot "establish ultimate principles of justice," to be more apparent than real.) I do not recall ever having seen another scientific work in which the author so copiously and logically examines the authorities on both or all sides of the question, and so thoroughly demolishes the position that science can demonstrate the superiority of values, except for inquiries into consequences, risks, and the like, which he considers legitimate.

In discussing the largely German controversy of the early part of this century over scientism and relativism, the author raises the question why this issue was so late in affecting the thought of American political scientists. My memory is undoubtedly imperfect, but in a negative way it confirms the fact to which he refers. I do not recall a single teacher of mine in political science, economics, or sociology, at Minnesota (1909–1913) or Harvard (1913–1916) who even mentioned the issue. Whether under the influence of British empiricism or American pragmatism, my professors did not seem to consider the question of the relativism of values even worth mentioning. In the 1930s and 1940s the issue of value-relativism arose in American political science, but Dr. Brecht's own round table, in 1946, "Beyond Relativism in Political Theory," provided the first general discussion of the issue that I can recall before the American Political Science Association. (See this REVIEW, vol. 41, pp. 470–488. June, 1947.)

By that time there was, of course, at least some mild interest in the issue among younger American political scientists, but in the earlier period not so. Political science teachers of that time were trained mainly in liberal arts, history, and public law; they were being organized into separate departments in liberal arts colleges; they were responsible mainly for undergraduate instruction; and they taught subjects that were presumably of some practical value to the citizen-voter and the future public official. They gave separate courses in American government, state and local government, principles of the Constitution, European government, international law, and the *history* of political theories. The emphasis was mainly upon history and description. Moral issues of a practical nature, such as were presented by municipal corruption, vote buying, and the Congressional "pork barrel" were discussed, but there was little preaching and hardly any attempt to probe to the roots of morality. In Germany at the same time the situation was considerably different. There were no political science departments in the universities, but mainly faculties of law, philosophy, theology, and medicine, and in the first three the instruction tended to be more advanced, theoretical, and dogmatic. The consideration of absolutes was certainly not excluded. Out of such instruction and their own reading and discussions men like Dr. Brecht had to make up their own political science.

If, then, in effect, Dr. Brecht discusses issues and tries to answer questions that have seemed relatively unimportant in American political science until recently, it is not at all surprising, and it does not, to me at least, diminish the importance of his contribution. The questions he raises are latent wherever men are both believers and potential scientists. They will probably arise again and again to confuse or clarify men's thinking about politics. A major work that so thoroughly analyzes the problem, that clears it of certain misconceptions, and that provides alternative modes of analysis, makes a contribution to the advancement of clearer thinking in political science. Dr. Brecht has, I believe, made such a contribution, and a significant and impressive one.

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The Structure of Nations and Empires. BY REINHOLD NIEBUHR. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1959. Pp. xi, 306. $5.00.)

According to the publisher "this is perhaps Dr. Niebuhr's most ambitious and most important book to date." It is at least ambitious, for the eminent theologian here attempts to draw from a vast sweep of history insights into the permanent and contingent in political life. He begins by assuming that political societies are of two types: empires, which claim to be based upon universal values and seek in consequence universal dominion; and nations, or parochial communities, which are more limited in scope. Although the distinction would seem to be fundamental to his presentation and analysis Niebuhr is far from able to make it hold up throughout the work. He insists, for example, that motives to imperialism are always mixed (p. 215), with the result that one can hardly use the categories to anticipate the behavior of any particular political regime. It is difficult to imagine of what use the categories might be except that by relating the parochial community to the empire much as the individual person is related to the political system of which he is a part the device helps Dr. Niebuhr present once again and quite forcefully his long established views on political life and some very perceptive comments on the present international situation.

The work is thus valuable as a relatively concise and comprehensible statement of one important and intelligent attitude toward political order, and is probably preferable to the political scientist today to most of Niebuhr's earlier books because the explicitly theological argument is limited. The author's well-known theological position underlies all, of course, but there are few references to sin (the term does not even appear in the index). Instead Niebuhr contents himself with references to pride, lust for power, the moral ambiguity and contradictions of freedom, and so forth. And in trying to remain faithful to his early (p. 3) admonition that we must be empirical in attempting to distinguish the contingent from the permanent in history, he addresses himself more to the consequences and expressions than to the sources of these facets of human life.

Only a caricature of Niebuhr's thought could result from an attempt to summarize it in a few lines, and it would take pages to note the many interesting and delicate appreciations of political phenomena contained in this book. The reader may wonder, however, if these appreciations, judgments concerning particular situations and acts, follow with any necessity from the author's basic ideas. If history is an inscrutable blend of permanent, or universal, and contingent elements what criteria of validity and value can we have? Niebuhr both exhorts us to recognize the value and significance of the traditional and organic in human life and warns us not to confuse that which is with that which either must or ought to be. The advice is ambiguous on both the epistemological and ethical levels.

In the end what Niebuhr finds enduring in political life is only that it is filled with pretension, and yet that pretension is an inevitable manifestation of an inevitable human freedom. Confronted with this paradox he can only recommend that humility is a virtue, and observe that the only ultimate political judgment is that despotism is always dangerous. Worthy sentiments, indeed, but they support and define no particular form of political action or organization and in his own terms they can never dominate social life. The book is stimulating and should receive a wide audience, even though in many sections the materials are so inadequately developed that the flavor is of John Gunther. In sum it can only be said that once again Dr. Niebuhr's brilliant presentation is no more than a call to witness the human tragedy.

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The Cult of Authority: The Political Philosophy of the Saint-Simonians, A Chapter in the Intellectual History of Totalitarianism. By Georg G. Iggers. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1958. Pp. 210. 14.25 guilders.)

Professor Iggers' work is a significant summary of the views of the Saint-Simonians on all aspects of the state and society. He has drawn from the second exposition of the *Doctrine de Saint-Simon* as well as the first, which he translated in 1958, from the Saint-Simonian periodicals, and from their pamphlets and sermons to present a detailed study on their attitudes toward law, property, economic organization, art, individual rights. The book is far more concerned with theory than is the standard French general study by Sébastien Charléty, the *Histoire du Saint-Simonisme,* which sometimes tends to become too anecdotal.

Saint-Simonism may be viewed historically as the experiences of a group of brilliant young men and women in the late eighteen twenties and early eighteen thirties whose presentation of the emotional crises of the times won a widespread response among artists, musicians, and littérateurs because theirs was a profoundly true rendering of contemporary feeling even when it dramatized and exaggerated. The annals of the cult, their extraordinarily complex personal relationships, their imitations of a church, their schisms, their search for the Female Messiah, their trial and final dispersal is the historical drama of a generation. It has not yet been narrated with any insight into its full potentialities. The manuscript material in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal has by no means been seriously exploited. This aspect of the Saint-Simonian history does not concern Mr. Iggers significantly. Nor has he followed the diffusion of Saint-Simonism as the ideology of nineteenth-century expansive industrial capitalism in many parts of Europe and Latin America. His rather copious bibliography does not, for example, include Johann Plenge's classical study on the Pereires and the Crédit Mobilier, nor Professor Gerschenkron's brilliant essay on the Saint-Simonians. Iggers also refuses to see the Saint-Simonians in their traditional garb as one of the pre-Marxist socialist sects, though many of their slogans, slightly altered, have penetrated the language of international socialism.

Instead he has come forward with a new thesis: these followers of Saint-Simon are among the early totalitarians. Assuming that most of Iggers' summaries of Saint-Simonian thought are accurate—and many details could be debated—we may still raise a fundamental theoretical question about his use of the concept of "totalitarianism" and "the cult of authority" in defining their thought. The idea of an intellectual history of totalitarianism has been growing in the seemingly disparate works of Popper, Talmon, Hayek, and Hannah Arendt. Iggers is therefore in rather eminent company. In this quest for the foul ancestors all manner of men—Plato, Rousseau, Enfantin—are identified by isolating doctrines from the actual political and social situation in which they were created and by relating them to the monster states of Hitler and Stalin.

True, the Saint-Simonian political formulae emphasize emotion rather than reason, the hierarchy, the élite, the organic—and in this respect they do bear some superficial resemblance to the lucubrations of twentieth-century Fascism. However, the ecclesiastical nonsense of the Saint-Simonian cult should not obscure the fact that these men posed some of the fundamental moral problems of the modern world—the idea of alienation, the crisis of love and affection, the waste of talent and capacity. Their image of society was founded first and foremost upon the idea that there would be an upsurge of Eros in the world, that men were becoming more loving—a rather dubious assumption, to be sure, though one that is not to be laughed out of court.

The totalitarians, and sometimes nominal democracies, have operated against opposition with an apparatus of terror. The Saint-Simonian society was to be founded upon relations of love among members of a hierarchy. This may be ridiculous, unfeasible, non-rational humbug—but it is totalitarian only in the sense that love may be. The Saint-Simonians were totally committed to the winning of converts through preaching and persuasion. And their final goal was not order, as Iggers maintains, but the full actualization of individual capacities. To relate all the images of "authoritarianism" and "totalitarianism" to these tender failures of the eighteen thirties seems unhistorical in a study labeled intellectual history.

This work may well set the tone for later references to the Saint-Simonians in English, because it is by far the most extensive treatment of their theory. It is for this reason that a serious demurrer must be entered. Before the Saint-Simonians are thrown into liberal hell let them be read first in their historical context. Father Enfantin and his disciples emoted about the love of humanity, not about *Deutschland über Alles.* They never spilled a drop of blood in their lives and in middle age they became respectable bourgeois. There was something unique about the German experience of the thirties and forties. Let us not dilute the remembrance of it by finding antecedents that are of a qualitatively different character.

FRANK E. MANUEL.

Brandeis University.

Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict. BY JOAN V. BONDURANT. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1958. Pp. xv, 269. $5.00.)

Now that political science is paying more and more attention to the processes of human conflict, cooperation, disruption and integration, it is fortunate that Dr. Bondurant has contributed this analysis of the Gandhian concept of *satyagraha* or truth-force and its implications for the possible conquest of violence.

In the past a great deal of nonsense has been written about the Gandhian technique by both Easterners and Westerners. Dr. Bondurant, who has had the distinct advantage of observing Gandhi in action, strips off this useless and distorting sentimentality in order to describe *satyagraha* as a calculated instrument of struggle for positive objectives and for fundamental social and political change.

One doubts that *satyagraha* in its Indian form will ever appeal to the West, but underneath the surface manifestations, which are largely cultural, Dr. Bondurant uncovers basic philosophical assumptions (particularly those about the means—end relationship) and psychological techniques which unquestionably have universal human significance.

Traditionally the liberal West has wavered between compromise and force as instruments of self-protection and for the furthering of national interest. But it is doubtful, today, that either of these instruments will serve us longer. Communism, as a dialectic philosophy, is not susceptible to compromise, while nuclear weapons have all but removed large-scale force, in the traditional sense, as a feasible instrument of policy.

Dr. Bondurant notes similarities between the Gandhian and Quaker approaches, but whereas a patient "love" and a "sense of the meeting" technique imply a certain passivity which may or may not be effective against a highly organized and ruthless opponent, *satyagraha* emerges, in contrast, as a powerful and aggressive weapon in the hands of those who, stripped of self-righteousness, stand on truth and fight for it. No power on earth can make a man do a thing against his will, according to Gandhi. The bond of the slave is snapped the moment he considers himself to be a free being and is not afraid to die for it. With this confidence, the fighter for truth can go further: he can use *satyagraha* to alter the perceptions of his opponent. . .to modify the behavior of the enemy by transforming fact and value images that shape his hostile behavior. This is the great, subtle power of *satyagraha* as an instrument of change, and Dr. Bondurant shows how it has been used successfully even by the Pathans, who are Muslims and warlike by tradition and training.

The scholarship behind this book is sound, and it will go a long way toward establishing a suitable place for the Gandhian philosophy in our histories of political thought. It is regrettable, I think, that Dr. Bondurant did not take the further step of relating *satyagraha* to the kind of contemporary work that is being undertaken by the Tavistock Institute in London, by Arne Naess of Oslo, by the Mental Health Institute at the University of Michigan, by Stanford and Northwestern Universities and others in this country and abroad who are experimenting with concepts and methodologies of conflict and of conflict resolution. Despite this relatively minor criticism, however, the book is an excellent treatment of a subject that is seldom approached objectively.

ROBERT C. NORTH.

Stanford University.

Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion. BY MICHAEL CLARK. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1959. Pp. xiii, 466. $6.00.)

On November 1, 1954 numerous attacks were made upon French posts throughout Algeria. Seven persons were killed and four wounded in these widespread actions, but the threat to French rule was far more serious than might have been indicated by the light casualty figures. The Aurès was virtually in a state of insurrection. The Algerian people were exhorted by the newly formed National Liberation Front (FLN) to join in the struggle for independence.

The uprising caught the French Army unawares. Reinforcements were rushed in, and within a short time the bulk of the French armed forces were assigned to Algeria. Yet the rebellion defied these military measures, and gathered strength. After considerable study and debate, influential French officers concluded that they were engaged in a "revolutionary war" requiring bold new tactics and political responsibilities on the part of the Army. The Algerian rebellion and the Army's political activities added to the strains operating upon an already fragile political system. Mendès-France's government was overthrown in February 1955, largely on the North African question. In less than four years the regime itself became a victim of the conflict.

Michael Clark, who served as New York *Times* correspondent in North and West Africa, attempts in this book to analyze the historical causes and trace the development of the Algerian nationalist movement. His sympathies are clearly with the European settlers in Algeria. The rebellion, Clark claims, is a "moral fraud," falsely presenting itself as an expression of a popular aspiration. Any concessions to Arab nationalism, he continues, would only lead to independence, that is, "beggary and starvation." He bitterly criticizes past French policy in North Africa—for *weakness* in dealing with the Arab nationalists. Tunisia at all costs should have been preserved as a bi-national state. Mendès-France's Tunisian policy is characterized as "in essence, an abject surrender to the agitation of men with nothing to offer but sterile nationalism." He complains that Frenchmen are too concerned about the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity, when the crying need is security from rebel terror. The rebellion, he says, ought to be equated with ordinary lawlessness and repressed ruthlessly.

In commenting on the postwar elections held in Algeria, Clark admits that the French had to resort to shameful electoral practices in order to prevent Moslem nationalists from winning. He argues that in any case elections and parliamentary government are without meaning for Moslems since they lack democratic traditions. Yet, many other observers (Ivo Rens, for example) point out that the rigged elections in Algeria had disastrous consequences. Moslem nationalists tended to win seats because they expressed the profound desires of the Moslem community; French repressive measures cast even the moderate nationalists out of the political system, giving them no alternative but to work for their goal by revolutionary means.

Clark's interpretation of the events of May 1958 reflects the outlook of the French nationalists of Algeria. Pflimlin is described as "clinging to power with remarkable obstinacy," while President Coty is praised for his "leadership" in ending the crisis. The appearance of the Moslems in the Forum was the "psychological shock" making possible genuine pacification. The referendum in September offered the Algerians a "clear-cut" choice between France and the rebels. The rebel failure was complete because, "the French Army stood pledged to the defense of French Algeria. Its leaders had given their word of honor as soldiers, not politicians. . . . The Moslems requited protection with fidelity." There is only one cloud on the horizon: the author fears that General de Gaulle is being led astray by the illusion of a moderate Algerian nationalism. Clark takes de Gaulle to task for having promised amnesty to rebel leaders, thereby elevating criminal acts to the level of heroism. He is also fearful that the assertion of civilian over military authority in Algeria will "undo" the Revolution of May 13!

Michael Clark emerges as an eloquent friend and defender of the much maligned French settlers. He expresses and justifies their restiveness over the policies of General de Gaulle, their desire to achieve once and for all the integration of Algeria with France. But he fails to prove their main contention: that the Algerian problem can be resolved primarily by military means.

BERNARD E. BROWN.

Vanderbilt University.

Germany Rejoins the Powers. BY K. DEUTSCH AND L. J. EDINGER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1959. Pp. xvi, 320. $6.50.)

This is a very perceptive and thorough study of the foreign relations of the West German Federal Republic. The authors with becoming modesty call their book "an exploration," "a prelude," and "a sample" which attempts to do two things: "to give a brief summary of some of the main background conditions of German foreign policy making" and second, to test some of the newer methods of research and analysis now in vogue in political science. Germany was selected as a test case not merely because of its "growing interest to students of world politics" but also because it provides "a fairly large amount of published data."

Some sections of the present study have appeared in an earlier book, *Foreign Policy in World Politics,* and the chapter on rearmament is based on materials used in Edinger's *West German Armament.* The authors also utilize Speier's earlier books on German foreign policy as well as the various German public opinion polls. They have not only used polls but they have also tried to cross-examine them, and having done so they have been led to think "that truth is found not in one poll but at best in many, and that ordinarily it is not found even in many poll results but in the relationships between them."

Actually, the polling data are used as a good springboard for sound and balanced judgments which in many cases disagree with the polls. In other words, the polls are used for what they are worth and no more, and the measurable data helps the authors to demonstrate their keen knowledge of the background and the setting. The book is therefore more valuable for its well based judgments and opinions than for its utilization of the extensive German polling data, or the foreign policy elite data. This is said without any reflection on the valuable data itself.

So far as elites are concerned, the authors view their role "only as one factor among others in the making of German foreign policy" and perhaps even of less weight. But the extensive tabular presentation of elite data, as in the case of polling data, enables the writers to draw realistic and on the whole more accurate and sound conclusions than would otherwise be possible for them to do. They are always aware of the limitations of the data and its presentation does not unduly detract from the development of the subject.

After a brief but very adequate review of the German foreign policy setting, the authors make their largest contribution in Part II where they describe the institutions and elites which deal with foreign policy. In outlining the formal governmental institutions, they are not always accurate or complete (pp. 52–57) especially in overlooking or underestimating the role of the Bundesrat and the Cabinet in foreign policy matters. But their excellent analysis of the key decisive groups involved in the foreign policy process leaves little to be desired, and carries out their main concern which "is with the role of interest groups and elites in the broader context of popular political opinion and participation." Twice as much space is devoted to institutions and elites as to the system in operation, but this adequate attention and identification of individuals, groups, and elites results in a sharper and more precise picture than we have heretofore had of this basically important area of politics.

Part III contains a first-class study of a few actual cases of policy decisions dealing with the Coal and Steel Community, Rearmament, Reparations to Israel, and negotiations with the Soviets. This is followed by Part IV which deals with prospects and perspectives. Here we are treated to the unique conditions of German foreign policy, to the changing patterns of influence in the German foreign policy process, and to Germany's policy choices and their implications. "With a partly unacceptable past and an officially provisional present," write the authors, "the future of the German political consensus may well seem less than certain." But the present pattern of influence seems clear: "the most influential single actor appears to have been the Chancellor, followed at a small distance by the cabinet and the leadership group of the CDU and at another distance by the diplomatic elite." One might comment that we did not need an elite study to demonstrate this point, but certainly the authors have strengthened the basis of their judgment and added to its accuracy and preciseness by their laborious analyses.

The book is concluded with a rather eloquent discussion of Germany's future and of the possible choices open to it. Here as throughout the book the authors exhibit both their deep knowledge and understanding of the subject and the country they are writing about. This is more important than any methodological expertness, and it is usually the difference between a good book and a bad one. This book is clearly a most thoughtful and informing study which demonstrates not only mastery of the subject matter but competence and originality in the approach to it.

There are four useful Appendices containing fourteen tables, in addition to the twenty-four tables which are found in the text. A good bibliography and index are also included.

James K. Pollock.

University of Michigan.

Peaceful Co-Existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy. By Wladyslaw W. Kulski. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1959. Pp. xxi, 662. $12.50.)

In this imposing work combining an acute theoretical analysis of communism with a systematic ordering of a wealth of Soviet historical material, Dr. Kulski warns of the dangers inherent in peaceful co-existence.

To the non-Communist world this term implies acceptance of the status quo in the world order, with allowances for political adjustments through peaceful change, and a willingnesss to abide by a live-let-live philosophy. Soviet doctrine maintains that only a Communist-imposed world order is ultimately acceptable since belief in the class struggle allows no alternative. The Soviet Union is committed by doctrine to propagate communism and is wedded historically to traditional notions of Russian imperialism. Leninist relativist morality, permitting tactical devices and strategical maneuvers cynically expedient and contrary to normal Western usage in international relations, guides Soviet conduct.

The root of Dr. Kulski's distrust of peaceful co-existence is the general proposition that the Communist and non-Communist world outlooks are fundamentally incompatible and that the Soviets are unqualifiedly bent on fashioning the world order to their image. He supports his case with sound documentation, and with great skill lays open for public scrutiny the record of past Soviet performance and asks for a critical comparison with present policy assertions.

According to Dr. Kulski, the main battlefield today lies in the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa. Lenin preached that the colonial areas were the weakest link in world capitalism, and he applied this doctrine to practical revolutionary tactics. Stalin never understood the dimensions of Soviet potentialities in these areas. He rejected Lenin's concept of the broad revolutionary front of anti-colonial groups preferring instead a policy that relied solely on indigeneous Communists. Stalin's successors revived the Leninist concept and have undertaken a concerted effort to penetrate Asia, Africa and even Latin America. They are guided by the belief that Europe offers no immediate field for expansion and that the success of the Chinese Communists was proof that Lenin's calculations were correct. Current Soviet policy is allegedly based on *Pancha Shila* which promises mutually: 1.) respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2.) non-aggression; 3.) non-interference in internal affairs; 4.) equality and mutual benefits; and 5.) peaceful co-existence.

Dr. Kulski tests these eminently desirable principles against past Soviet performance and demonstrates that the Soviet Union is today the greatest colonial and imperial power in the world. With almost clinical objectivity he examines Soviet policy and conduct in domestic and international relations. He exposes the severity of Soviet policy towards the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet state. Turning his microscope upon the Soviet "protectorates" in Eastern Europe, he reveals the harsh lines of Soviet control and analyzes the anti-colonial character of the Polish and Hungarian crises and of Yugoslavia's resistance to Soviet imperial demands.

This is a work of imposing erudition, remarkable in detail and instructive in generalization. It is based largely on Soviet sources which Dr. Kulski quotes abundantly. This practice makes for heavy reading. However, serious scholars will be grateful for the rich array of raw material. In this respect a more detailed subject index would have enhanced its utility.

This book impressively portrays the dimension and depth of Soviet Russia's role in world affairs today and brings under closer scrutiny the nature of the problem that now faces the American people. It is timely since peaceful coexistence seems to be emerging as a national political issue. Those who are inclined to give credence to the current Soviet policy line will find little comfort in what Dr. Kulski has to say. Those who are skeptical will find here much to support their convictions.

JOSEPH G. WHELAN.

Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. BY MERLE FAINSOD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. x, 383. $8.50.)

The Smolensk Archive, captured by the Nazis in 1941 and liberated by American troops at the end of the war, consists of some 530 files containing about 200,000 pages of documents. The happy coincidence which brought the Archive into the possession of the free world, and the even happier coincidence which set Professor Fainsod to work on its analysis, have provided for the first time a study from the inside of the way in which the Communist Party and the Soviet government operate at the regional and local levels—as the late Charles E. Merriam might have put it, a more intimate view of Russian politics.

Professor Fainsod's book is in the classical tradition of political science. He is concerned with political processes. His emphasis is on the organization of political authority, on the way in which governmental controls operate, and on the impact of controls at the cutting edge of the public administration. To this bold and piquant reassertion of traditional forms and values we owe not only the most fascinating volume in the field of comparative government which has appeared in several decades, but also the vocational rehabilitation of some dozens or perhaps hundreds of political scientists who have latterly been intellectually under-employed by reason of their failure to dominate the behavioristic orientation and vernacular.

Following a succinct introduction to the nature and significance of the Smolensk Archive, and a description of the land, people and history of the Smolensk region, the book goes directly into the organization of political power in the Oblast. Professor Fainsod traces the Party organization from its feeble beginnings in 1917 through the "starving period" of the early 1920's, the dislocations produced by the New Economic Program, the corruption and scandals in Party management which eventually erupted in 1928, the reorganization of the Oblast in 1929, and the purges which began in 1933 and led to the liquidation of the top Party leadership in Smolensk in 1937. He describes in some detail the organization of the Party secretariat at the oblast level, and the way in which the oblast machinery was controlled from Moscow and in turn implemented directives in the districts, the collective farms, the factories and the villages. A special chapter is devoted to the role of the raion, or district, in the Soviet control system, and another chapter provides a case study of Party organization and governmental operation in the Belyi raion. The Archive also yields extensive data on the functioning of the village soviets in the Smolensk region.

Permeating the machinery of geographical decentralization are, of course, the organs of state security. Principal among these are the dread Cheka, or the Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage, the OGPU, or Unified State Political Administration, and the NKVD, or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Mitigating or aggravating, as Party leadership dictates, the operations of the geographical machinery and the organs of state security, are the Procuracy and the courts. The Procuracy, it must be noted, not only exercises the functions of state's attorneys, but also supervises the legality of all organs exercising public authority, is charged with protesting all orders and decrees which raise legal doubts, and with inspecting all agencies of criminal investigation and detention. But looking at the record Professor Fainsod comes to a pessimistic evaluation of the judicial machinery: "The norms which the legal organs enforce operate from time to time as restraints on arbitrary action by administrative subordinates, but they do not restrict the Party leadership itself. The ultimate reality is one of servility and subservience rather than of an independent legal system binding rulers and ruled alike."

The third part of the book is addressed to the impact of political authority. In a series of brilliantly written chapters Professor Fainsod organizes the vibrant story of the Archive around such topics as crime in Smolensk, purges and the lives they ruined, collectivization and the liquidation of the kulaks, life on the kolkholzes, the control and management of the state farms, the grievances of industrial workers, the Party and the armed forces, censorship, the right of petition, the Young Communist League, and religious life in the oblast. A chapter on the machine tractor stations is a tremendously exciting essay depicting the use of controlled technological change to consolidate political authority. The data dealing with Party controls and higher education reveal a certain number of points of similarity between the Smolensk Archive and the descriptive materials in the reports of Committee A of the AAUP, but they do not suggest that the Party operates at perceptibly higher levels of objectivity than capitalistic boards of trustees.

The analysis closes on a prophetic note: "The Smolensk Archive provides a record in miniature of . . . profound social and political changes. It registers the gradual consolidation of Communist power in a region where the underlying disposition of economic forces offered formidable barriers to Communist control. It reveals the capacity of the regime to manipulate and discipline the new social forces which its grandiose experiment in social engineering released. But it also lays bare the vast human costs and bitter resentments which Communist rule entailed. The Archive may serve to remind us, if reminder is needed, that the totalitarian façade concealed a host of inner contradictions, that the yoke which Communism imposed left its legacy of smoldering grievances, and that the suppressed aspirations of yesterday may yet become the seedbed of tomorrow's fierce debates."

Professor Fainsod's book responds with full adequacy to the fabulous richness of the documentation which he had at hand. I do not know how to accord it higher praise.

ROWLAND EGGER.

The University of Virginia.

The Fourth Branch of Government. BY DOUGLASS CATER. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1959. Pp. viii, 194. $3.50.)

Four decades ago Walter Lippmann in *Liberty and The News* first raised troubled doubts about the efficacy of the press in providing the truth necessary for forming wise public opinion. He included a plea for political scientists to study more fully the greatly enlarged, informal role of "government by the newspapers." Now comes Douglass Cater raising the same fears, citing the same need for understanding, and still calling for the yet undone study of the political responsibility of the press. Not content with gently approaching political scientists for having neglected the problem, he here offers his own valuable effort from an inside, if somewhat peripheral position as Washington editor of the biweekly *Reporter* magazine.

His book is in part an historical and functional analysis of the Washington press corps, a subject on which Leo Rosten's *Washington Correspondents* of two decades ago broke ground. Both Rosten and Cater reveal how the New Deal, elsewhere shaping new programs and structures, turned the corps from casual generalists into harried specialists on the many facets which government now turns to the world. Cater shows concisely the tasks of these specialists in catching the gleams reflected and generated by those facets. Each element of the corps reveals the same trend—growth in numbers, specialization, and structure. The swelling volume and gnarled complexity of the news has made the reporter more than just the mere "writer of the first draft of history." As Cater seeks to demonstrate, the reporter has become a part of the government, a "Fourth Branch of Government." But in our check and balance system, his restraints are ill-defined.

It is Cater's troubled concern about the press's political role which makes his book important. For his concern is the central problem of democracy—how to make power responsible to those over whom it is being exercised. Illustrating from current Washington affairs, Cater deals with the twofold power relationship of the press. In totalitarian systems the question is, who eats whom; in democracies, it is, who influences whom? The press influences by spotlighting men and issues, but it is itself influenced by officials. In both relationships, only a sketchy framework of responsibility exists.

Crucial in this exercise of power is the focus of the press upon showy and dramatic issues and the shading of certain viewpoints to the exclusion of others. The image-maker, although selling his wares to a wide public, also may accidentally sell an image to a policy-maker who, in a "reflexive cycle," strives to fit into it; Senator Arthur Vandenburg's shift to internationalism after his 1945 speech is cited as an example. However, as influencer, the reporter is not merely a sculptor; nor, in Executive-Congressional struggles and interagency imperial wars, is the reporter merely a battle historian. He maneuvers, often actively and partisanly, for those ideas and officials he believes right. Cater makes a strong showing that on this battlefield the Executive is a poor second to Congress in publicity fire-power; the latter's colorful personalities, vocal skirmishes, and superior physical facilities capture the reporter's loyalties and skills.

This exercise of power, the press as influencer, is better known than that in which the press is manipulated itself so as to forward the policy or personal interests of some segment of government. Cater shows in a "Disquisition on Leaking" the use of off-the-record conferences to launch trial balloons anonymously, the press thereby becoming a weapon for an official in the pressure matrix of policy making; the sudden "threat" of war in the Formosa Straits a few years back illustrates the possibilities of agitating the nation. No one is responsible here, neither "informed circles" nor reporters. More subtle use of the press is what James Reston terms "managing the news," so that the news source paints for the reporters only one "picture of reality on which men can act"; McCarthy's operations and the 1955 Geneva Convention publicity are illustrative. The press's lack of responsibility inherent in the practices of leaking and selective emphasis is compounded by the reporter's partisan attachment to persons and programs.

Such are the imbalances created by the press in "government by publicity." How to restore the equilibrium? Cater is wary of governmental action to this end; such action too easily becomes official horn-tooting from the walls of secrecy. His remedy looks to actions by the profession itself through the erection of internal standards of responsibility. Herein lies the major weakness of the work. As was true with the prescription of Lippmann and others, the patient sometimes refuses what is good for him. Given a profession reacting to different audiences and different ownership structures, little hope of such formal action of internal reform seems possible.

The desirability and sufficiency of such reform are questionable, as is any use of the Platonic control of the power-holder by binding him to "right" value norms. Is agreement possible on the norms? Cater at places reveals his colleagues themselves are divided on this. Even though agreement were possible, is this sufficient to control the press when its interpretation of norms conflict with community interpretations?

Cater's work is strongly recommended, however, not merely for what he says on the press's operations in the interstices of government, but for what questions it leaves unanswered. The preceding question of standards of responsibility is one. For the political behaviorist, there is ample scope for research delineating more clearly the power relationships which Cater sketches so broadly. What is the decision-maker's concept of the press? Does he manipulate it or it him? On major policy conflicts in government, does the press play the distinctive role Cater urges or does it lose significance by the cancelling-out process of press competition? More study is needed here. "It is clear", Lippmann wrote, "that in a society where public opinion has become decisive, nothing that counts in the formation of it can really be a matter of indifference." Forty years later, with even greater urgency Cater writes; "In America, with increasing frequency as our world responsibilities have mounted, the public dialogue seems to grow distorted and unreal." His analysis of the scriptwriting of that dialogue alone justifies this book. The danger of the distortion justifies our further inquiry.

FREDERICK M. WIRT.

Denison University.

The President's Cabinet. BY RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 327. $5.50.)

This book undertakes a political analysis of the American Cabinet, particularly for the period since the Wilson administration. It could well be read by future Presidents and Cabinet members as a part of their pre-entry training.

The book begins with a chapter of historical perspectives and an excellent chapter on the appointment process through which Cabinet members gain office. It then turns to the meetings at the White House that give the Cabinet its name and its institutional identity. The author finds that these meetings contribute to three major functions: (1) advice to the President; (2) coordination; (3) administrative coherence. Successes and failures in the performance of the first two functions are discussed with a wealth of historical illustration, and result in a balanced treatment of well-known themes. The third function, identified as administrative coherence, is the author's own attempt at nomenclature. His discussion of what administrative coherence consists, and how periodic Cabinet meetings can contribute to it, is probably the most original and creative part of the book. The passages indexed under "Coherence, administrative" deserve attention as an exploratory contribution to the study of group dynamics in politics and administration through the use of historical materials.

The major portion of the discussion of Cabinet meetings is based on the experience from Wilson to Truman. The Eisenhower reforms—a Cabinet Secretariat, prepared agendas, follow-up machinery—are discussed as an exception to the main line of historical development. The description and assessment of the new procedures is nevertheless one of the most important features of the book. The author finds that the reforms have left many characteristic features of Cabinet behavior unchanged and thinks the claims made for the changes are excessive, while noting some specific outstanding successes. He believes that the innovations have contributed most of all to an unusually high level of administrative coherence, and says this result was unexpected even by those most responsible for the changes. The fears expressed in private by those who successfully advised against similar proposals in the Truman administration have found little justification in the actual experience. The author declines to predict whether future Presidents will continue the new Eisenhower procedures and on the whole indicates scepticism. No doubt he is correct in believing that they could not have been introduced successfully in the absence of Eisenhower's own working habits. But it is also relevant that Eisenhower reflects skills that have come to be accepted as essential for success in large-scale administration; and he also reflects the ongoing culture of the world of the organization man. Future Presidents, faced with the relative success of the new procedures, may find them difficult to abandon entirely even when they seem irksome, as they undoubtedly will at times.

The second half of the book, organized under the title "The Cabinet and Politics," deals successively with the relationships of the Cabinet to the President's roles as Chief Representative of the Nation, Chief of Party, Chief Legislator, and Chief Executive. Thumbnail case studies of five Cabinet members—Andrew Mellon, Cordell Hull, Harry Daugherty, William Jennings Bryan, and Jesse Jones—are used to illuminate the discussion. Throughout, the treatment focuses on possibilities and limitations in regard to the usefulness of the Cabinet, with an emphasis predominantly on the latter. This treatment leads naturally into a final chapter in which many reform proposals involving the Cabinet are effectively debunked as either impractical or likely to produce results quite different from those intended.

Despite the excellence of the diagnosis, the author offers no prescriptions of his own. He finds that the two most important limitations on Cabinet performance, referred to repeatedly throughout the book, are the lack of a recognized supply of public men who are qualified and available for Cabinet office, and the divisive departmentalism within the government that finds its support in the inherent pluralism of the larger political system. He appears to assume that no change is occurring in either factor and that both factors are probably beyond change.

It must be admitted that it requires considerable hardihood to attack either of these assumptions, but unless they can be attacked, the chances for any noteworthy improvement in governmental performance at the Cabinet level are minimal. The author makes no reference to the proposals of the second Hoover Commission for improving the supply of qualified political executives; he does not take note of whatever possibilities may be inherent in such institutional innovations as the recently constituted Democratic Advisory Council; in his catalog of reform proposals he makes no reference to the discussions of the last ten years on how to achieve greater centralization within the party system or to the various signs suggesting that some modest increase in the strength of central forces may be occurring. Yet the drift in the direction of a more competitive party system would seem strong enough to have in time its own consequences even for the Cabinet.

The book tends to treat of the federal government of the present day as though it were the same as that of Woodrow Wilson, Calvin Coolidge, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's first two administrations. In many senses, of course it is; but a ten-fold expansion in the peace-time scale of activity has consequences with which the book does not fully come to grips. The book is essential reading, nonetheless, and most of all for those who feel strongly that something must be done to help the creaking machinery to work a little better in the future.

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The Congressional Party. BY DAVID B. TRUMAN. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1959. Pp. xii, 336. $7.50.)

This admirable study displays many of the virtues of both the institutional and behavioral approaches to the study of politics. It explores questions (e.g., what is the structure of the party system in Congress, and how does it relate to other elements in the governing process?) that are surely significant for understanding our politico-governmental process, and thereby avoids the triviality of some behavioral studies. In the main it seeks answers by looking at "hard" data and analyzing them with conceptual clarity, rigorous technique, and careful logic, and thereby avoids the looseness and inadequacy of some institutional studies. For reasons noted below, however, its full contribution cannot be realized until it is replicated.

Truman's method has several noteworthy features. It is a case study of a single Congress, the 81st (1949–50). Its data are taken almost entirely from the formal record. Most of its conclusions are based upon the analysis of selected roll call votes by a technique invented by Stuart Rice and refined by Herman Beyle: on selected roll calls, some with high cohesion and some with low cohesion in each party, the number of agreements between each congressman and every other member of his house is counted, and the high-agreement pairs are then distributed among various "blocs." The resulting bloc structure is then related to such other matters as the majority or minority status of the parties, the issue position and influence of the elective leaders and seniority leaders, and the cohesion of state party delegations.

Truman pays a price for using this approach, but, with one notable exception, he pays it knowingly and argues convincingly that it is worth paying. That one exception appears to be the series of unwarranted inferential leaps involved in his identification of particular groups of mutually associating and consulting congressmen. He observes a number of clusters of similar behavior by certain congressmen on the selected roll calls: e.g., general party cohesion on certain issues, the presence of a number of stable cohesive subparty blocs on other issues with low general party cohesion, and the tendency for the cohesion of state party delegations to rise as general party cohesion declines. In each instance he asserts, as in the case of the blocs, that these clusters "were based on patterns of consultation and association and probably were not merely groupings produced by the mode of analysis" (p. 63). Now there undoubtedly are many associative-consultative primary groups among congressmen, but Truman's evidence can only indirectly suggest that they correspond to the particular roll call behavior clusters he finds; it certainly cannot directly demonstrate any such correspondence. For the identification and analysis of such groups we need evidence of the kind produced by his interviews with congressmen, which are infrequently referred to and never used as the basis for the study's generalizations.

Yet this minor stumble over an avoidable hazard is insignificant compared with Truman's achievement in seeing and avoiding the major dangers involved in his approach. For example, he recognizes the obligation to derive from his single-case study something more than an isolated description of a unique situation. His concluding chapter, in which he states a number of hypotheses about the general nature of the parties' role in Congress, is a model of creative theorizing and scrupulous regard for how far his study permits him to generalize about all Congresses.

The full value of Truman's study cannot be realized, however, until subsequent replicative studies test his hypotheses in other Congresses marked by certain other characteristics. This is particularly true of his major hypothesis that majority status tends to increase a party's general cohesion and stabilize its subparty blocs. His evidence demonstrates convincingly that these traits accompanied the Democrats' majority position in the 81st Congress. But, as he correctly points out, the general validity of this notion can be established only by replicative studies of at least the 83rd Congress, when the Democrats were in the minority, and of one of the Congresses since 1954, in which the Democrats have been the "truncated majority" (Truman's term for their status of controlling Congress but not the Presidency).

Here, then, we have a single-case study which asks sharp questions of general significance, answers them with scientifically respectable and viable techniques, and suggests important hypotheses testable by other studies using similar methods. Even if no such studies are made, it must still be said that Truman has greatly advanced our understanding of this important aspect of our political system. But while we are about it, why not get the full benefit from Truman's study by continuing the work thus far so nobly advanced?

AUSTIN RANNEY.

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The Study of Politics: The Present State of American Political Science. BY CHARLES S. HYNEMAN. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 232. $4.50.)

As its subtitle informs, this book deals with "the present state of American political science," and the graduate students to whom it is addressed will undoubtedly be able to make good use of the author's accumulated wisdom about the state of the profession. For Charles Hyneman has diligently assembled the arguments, pro and con, of those who had occupied themselves with discussing the "scope and method" of political science. I can only admire his dispassionate and disinterested account of the issues that divide political scientists into warring camps.

Intellectual stock-taking for its own sake has its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are quite evident here: this is, indeed, a conscientious inventory of the preoccupations of American political scientists, the various types of their scholarly output, and the intellectual conflicts in the profession. Without insisting that his classification is clear-cut, Hyneman categorizes the scholarly concerns of political scientists into description of legal government, examination of ideas, construction of a science, and normative doctrine or proposals for social action. He reviews the substantive aspects of these efforts and examines some of the methodological problems involved in different types of discourse, and he illustrates his observations by way of selected bibliographical references. He then retraces the same ground presenting the arguments, counter-arguments and cross-arguments of the intellectual warriors—descriptive empiricists, empirical theorists, historians of ideas, value analysts, political reformers, policy scientists, and so on. There are passages where one might wish to clarify, modify or amplify Hyneman's interpretations, but his intention to guide graduate students through the professional jungle has been executed with considerable success.

Intellectual stock-taking has its price. I doubt very much that an inventory, even of potentially exciting topics, will make the graduate student see the study of government and politics as an intellectual adventure. David Easton's book of some years ago, *The Political System*, which was also an inquiry into the state of the discipline, but which admittedly was less exhaustive, less impartial and perhaps less "useful" as a pedagogic device, did just that: the youthful reader could come to the conclusion that political science is a hopeless enterprise; or he could conclude that it was up to him to venture onto new paths and make the discipline over. Hyneman self-consciously eschews judgments. Yet, he is concerned with the direction in which the political science profession is moving. It would be gratifying to know which of alternate strategies, in Hyneman's judgment, are most likely to advance the whole enterprise. But Hyneman succumbs to a public "failure of nerve" at just this critical junction.

In part this is due to the kind of book he set out to write, and one must honor his intention. But in part it is due, I think, to the theoretical and methodological malaise of political science. As Hyneman quite rightly recognizes, a discipline which aspires to disciplined status must have a subject-matter; it must have a conception of the kind of knowledge it seeks; and it must have methods for getting this knowledge. But political scientists, Hyneman points out, are tied together by a common subject-matter alone, not by a common position on the other two requisites of a discipline. One can easily quarrel with Hyneman over his specification of the subject-matter of political science—"legal government," as he calls it. But this, it seems to me, would be a fruitless quarrel. For I believe that the issue facing the profession is not what to study but how to study it. The fact that some of us may share an interest in government and politics with the political engineers and the political doctrinaires, or even with the political journalists, is hardly conducive to disciplined discourse. Clearly, a common terrain, as Hyneman puts it, is not sufficient to make out of the miscellaneous membership of the American Political Science Association a "profession."

It is for this reason that one should expect Hyneman to commit himself in the matters of epistemology and methodology. If today sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists have successfully invaded the subject-matter which political scientists have claimed as their own, it is due to the fact that in the other social sciences the debate over what kind of knowledge is desirable has been replaced by sophisticated conceptions which advance the frontiers of knowledge, political or otherwise. Not that there is no epistemological and methodological disagreement in the other social sciences. But whether such theoretical formulations as input-output analysis, communication theory, action analysis, reference group theory or role analysis are more appropriate depends, in the end, on the pay-off in the crucible of research.

All of this leads me to doubt the autonomy of political science as a "discipline." Yet, if Hyneman's book has any objective other than to instruct the graduate student, it is the search for disciplinary boundaries. It seems to me to be a hopeless enterprise. The study of politics is no longer the exclusive territorial domain of political scientists, and sooner or later political scientists will have to work within the framework of theoretical formulations and methodological approaches that are generic to all the social sciences. Here, I believe, lies the challenge to the profession, not in the fruitless arguments between those who prefer the philosophical easy chair and those who prefer to run an IBM machine.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

An Introduction to Electronic Data Processing. By Roger Nett and Stanley A. Hetzler (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1959. P. 287. $6.75.)

In the *Meno*, Socrates explains at length how solutions to complex problems simply represent complicated combinations of elementary operations. The Nett and Hetzler bibliography makes no mention of Plato but their book reflects both the wisdom of Socrates and the substantial strides that have been made in the technology of political theory since the fourth century B.C. The general purpose digital computer and its special purpose counterparts have both simplified and complicated the life of the political theorist. On the one hand, the computer opens the way for effective treatment of a host of problems that can not be solved by pre-1945 methods. On the other hand, the existence of the electronic computer makes it difficult for the political theorist to operate solely within the familiar framework of classical mathematics.

The Nett and Hetzler book will be welcomed by the novice in electronic data processing. It describes in simple language the rudiments of computer technology. There are brief, but good, discussions of the electronic hardware involved and of techniques for programming the computer. No prior knowledge is assumed (e.g., the binary number system is explained in some detail) and no attempt is made to bring the reader to a level of knowledge that would permit him actually to use any of the standard computers. But it serves the purpose of a brief introduction well. It is best in the discussion of the technology and in its brief descriptions of a handful of the better known computers; it is weakest in the discussion of applications and "personnel organization." On applications, the interested person would be better advised to consult a detailed description of a particular application.—James G. March, *Carnegie Institute of Technology.*

The Democratic and the Authoritarian State. Essays in Political and Legal Theory. By Franz Neumann. Edited by Herbert Marcuse. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1957. Pp. x, 303. $6.00.)

One of the unwritten chapters in the history of American political science is the impact registered by the brilliant group of refugee-scholars driven to this country by totalitarianism. When the account is written, a safe guess is that the name of the late Franz Neumann will occupy an honorable place. It is fitting that these essays, four of which are presented in print for the first time, have been collected and made available in convenient form. Except for the fine historical study of Montesquieu, the essays naturally fall into three main categories. Five essays center around the interrelated themes of power, law, freedom, and obligation: "Approaches to the Study of Political Power," "The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society," "Types of Natural Law," "The Concept of Political Freedom," "Intellectual and Political Freedom," and "On the Limits of Justifiable Disobedience." A second group includes two theoretical studies of political institutions: "On the Theory of the Federal State" and "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship." The last item was unfinished and one wishes that the editor had used his discretion to omit it. Finally, two previously unpublished essays explore the twilight area where political and non-political factors merge: "Economics and Politics in the Twentieth Century" and "Anxiety and Politics." The volume also contains a selected bibliography of Neumann's published writings.

It is impossible to read these essays without gaining renewed respect for the power of Neumann's intellect: assertive, even dogmatic, yet with an unrivalled talent for analysis and generalization. Any attempt to summarize the contents of this volume would only caricature the rich insights and the cumulative power of each argument. Instead I should like to remark briefly on what these essays tell us about Neumann and his conception of political theory. All of the essays are stamped by two convictions: that historical doctrines can be usefully employed to analyze contemporary issues and that the function of the political theorist is to contribute in some way to improving the political condition. Admittedly Neumann paid a price for these views. Whenever he disliked a particular theory, he was apt to be careless in writing about it. His contempt for Locke led to bald statements such as: "Like all liberal theorists [Locke] conceived of man as being good in the state of nature . . . he thought of the state of nature as a paradise" (p. 23). Calvin is characterized as a thorough-going anti-rationalist (p. 84) who advocated a form of Caesarism (pp. 281–282), while the nominalists are said to have "represented specifically bourgeois interests" (p. 27). There are other slips, such as the allegation that Marsilius was a forerunner of contract theories (p. 78), and that "natural law doctrines begin by asserting the existence of a state of nature . . . " (p. 70). At a more serious level, this strongly ideological approach tends to create the impression that older political ideas have the value of an arsenal which can be freely ransacked to provide ammunition for contemporary debates. Thus to discover what is "valuable" in the natural law tradition is declared a matter of searching for "the common traits which can be spoken of as progressive elements of modern society" (p. 69). Accordingly, natural law theories are divided into two types, the progressive and the non-progressive, the one containing intimations of modern society, the other not. To take another example, it is stated that the "truth" with which political theory should be concerned is "freedom." Since no political system ever achieves in practice a full realization of freedom, the conclusion is drawn that "political theory must be critical" and that "a conformist political theory is no theory" (p. 162).

The fascination of this volume lies in the clues it affords into Neumann's intellectual development. These essays cannot be read as a series of commentaries informed by a consistent viewpoint. Rather they should be read as one would a voyager's log. The earliest essay (1937) is strongly Marxist in orientation: law is largely defined in terms of class rule (see p. 39). In later discussions, however, almost all of the Marxist elements have been discarded. Thus a distinction is asserted between "ideology" and "idea," that is, between doctrines which merely rationalize "egoistic-particular demands" and those which "may really defend national interests or those of humanity" (pp. 160–161). Elsewhere it is said that the "moral function" of the legal system "transcends both the economic and political contexts within which it operates" (p. 170). These changes suggest that towards the end the Hegelian elements in Neumann's thought were beginning to extrude the Marxian (see pp. 162, 202). These and other modifications might be interpreted as part of an intellectual development whereby Neumann surrendered certain illusions about Marxism and became increasingly more sympathetic towards liberal democracy. But to shed illusions is to court disillusionment and this seems the case in the last essay, "Anxiety and Politics" (1954). There is less certainty about the role of the political theorist. Now the notion is advanced that political science possesses no distinctive method but "only a focus, namely, the dialectical relation between domination and freedom." The political scientist should be content to work at synthesizing the researches of other disciplines, buoyed by the hope that "perhaps" he may contribute "a felicitous hypothesis" (p. 270). This essay also reveals how deeply disturbed Neumann was by the phenomenon of mass democracy and its tendency towards "caesaristic" forms of leadership. Relying upon concepts drawn from psychoanalysis he denounced the close identification of mass and leader as "regressive" because it denied man's "progressive individualization" (p. 277). As an alternative he proposed "a libido-free (non-affective)" form of identification such as that experienced within small groups or in an "organization" (p. 278). Most readers, however, are probably sufficiently acquainted with the techniques of organizational manipulation, such as those eulogized by Simon and Selznick, to be somewhat disenchanted with this solution. Nevertheless, one senses that Neumann was groping for more satisfactory forms of explanation and hence one feels all the poorer in the knowledge that we shall be without his powerful stimulus.—Sheldon S. Wolin, *University of California (Berkeley).*

Crisis of the House Divided. By Harry V. Jaffa. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1959. Pp. 451. $6.50.)

Recent historiography has dealt harshly with Lincoln. The principles of this historiography are essentially identical with that revisionism which differs both from the popular and the scholarly traditions concerning the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates. Rather than looking upon the debates as a moral and intellectual contest of the highest order that democratic politics allows, revisionism renders severe judgment upon the merits and quality of the debates and debunks the belief that

Lincoln had opposed Douglas on a great issue and for the sake of a noble cause.

Professor Jaffa, a noted authority on Lincoln, turns in a brilliant and inspiring refutation of the revisionist thesis. In opposition to revisionism, Professor Jaffa shows good cause for regarding the Lincoln-Douglas debates not only as the greatest in American history, but as constituting in a more fundamental sense a unique episode in the history of free government. In developing his argument he renders a scholarly account of Lincoln's political philosophy which should prove a valuable contribution to the ever-growing body of Lincolniana.

The volume is the first of a projected two-part study of Lincoln's political philosophy—the companion volume is to be a discussion of the issues of Lincoln's presidency. Although it belongs to a larger whole, the author succeeds in giving the volume a unity of its own. In format, the book falls into four parts. Part I is introductory. Part II attempts to set forth as fully as possible the ideas and policies of Lincoln's doughty antagonist. This is necessary since Lincoln's political philosophy emerges, in considerable measure, in dialectical fashion out of the context of his debate with Douglas. Although an admitted Lincolnophile, Professor Jaffa treats Douglas with dignity and sympathy and he seeks the highest possible ground from which to survey the political horizon of the Little Giant.

Part III interprets the great speeches of Lincoln during his early Whig period. Here, Professor Jaffa tacitly rejects the prevailing belief of Lincoln's slow growth to political maturity. It is his conviction that Lincoln was extraordinarily precocious and that the ideas crystallized in 1863 had been pondered and matured in the Lyceum speech of 1838 and the Temperance address of 1842. Despite its brevity, Part III is in many respects the most interesting. Of particular interest are the analogies suggested between Lincoln and Aristotle. This may seem paradoxical in view of the reputation of Douglas as the great defender of slavery and Lincoln as the Great Emancipator. Yet the paradox, as Professor Jaffa maintains, lies more in the contrasting reputations of these two men than in the truth.

Part IV may be considered the core of the book. It involves a thorough explication of some of the more fundamental ideas of Lincoln as they emerge in the debate with Douglas. Included are Lincoln's views concerning the morality of slavery, the meaning of the Declaration of Independence, the nature of free government, the form and substance of political freedom and the meaning of equality. Two appendices put in concise form important historical facts upon which the study rests and which are not fully explained in the text; and include some interesting notes on the Dred Scott decision.

Throughout Professor Jaffa convincingly demonstrates the hollowness and inconsistency in the revisionist condemnation of Lincoln. A timely reappraisal of the debates, the book is judicious in temper, well researched, and a welcome addition to the contemporary debate concerning the meaning of the Lincoln-Douglas debate.—George S. Parthemos, *University of Georgia.*

Nehru and Democracy: The Political Thought of an Asian Democrat. By Donald E. Smith. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Inc. 1959. Pp. xiv, 194. $5.25.)

Professor Smith has attempted to review and summarize in this book the multifaceted views on political and economic democracy of India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. He presents these ideas in a well-organized and systematic manner under such chapter headings as "The Meaning of Democracy; Fundamental Rights in the Indian Crucible; Economic Democracy; India as a Secular State, and Nehru As Interpreter." Students of political science will be particularly interested in the discussion of the meaning of democracy which skillfully draws together Nehru's controversial views on such fundamental issues as popular sovereignty, responsible political parties, and political leadership.

Wissenschaft, Politik und Gnosis. By Eric Voegelin. (Kösel-Verlag, München, 1959. 93 pp.)

Professor Voegelin's book is an expansion of his inaugural lecture in the chair of Max Weber at the University of Munich. It attempts to develop a scientific or theoretical instrument for the understanding of modern mass movements. Such an understanding has been lacking because positivistic political science during the nineteenth and twentieth century lacked the moral or philosophic sensitivity to judge the truth or error of political thinkers. It was hence unable to take a stand on the great issues of our times—Christianity versus ideology as well as the derivative disputes concerning the proper organization of industrial society. Professor Voegelin makes his attempt not only for the sake of theory but also in order to present a model of thought according to which men can free themselves from the apparently overwhelming force of the popular doctrines.

The problem involved in this task is mainly one of proper classification of doctrines, a classification which involves seeing the hidden sense of the individual doctrines. Professor Voegelin asserts that all the major modern thinkers are spiritual descendants of the Gnostic heretics. The kernel of the thought of this sect was that man is cast into a hostile and meaningless world from which he can liberate himself only by knowledge. This view is broadly contrasted with that of the Greek founders of political science who grounded their learning in an investigation of a hierarchical order of beings which has its source in a transcendent being. On this basis they were able to provide a standard for actions and laws here on earth. This thought resulted in the conception of a cosmos, an ordered world in which man can be at home. Christianity, although it has altered much of the content of Greek political science, has not changed its form or its goal.

Modern Gnostic thinkers added a new and most dangerous element to traditional Gnostic doctrine. They attempted to use the authority of science to forbid the asking of the humanizing question of the source of our being. They wished to deny all transcendance and make the present reality all that exists, this in order to make it feasible to conquer the world. Professor Voegelin tries to show that this was the goal of these theorists by an analysis of Marx and Nietzsche whom he vigorously characterizes as "swindlers" (39, 43–45). They were swindlers because they were aware that any questioning as to the origins of man would cause their systems to fall. To avoid this consequence, they made it a part of their systems that such questions should not be asked. In this refusal to pose the human questions Professor Voegelin sees the direct ancestry of the commandant of Auschwitz's refusal to question the orders given him. The modern Gnostics want to create a "second reality" and forget the true one. Hegel's systematic philosophy is a good example of this desire. It substitutes the impression of a completed wisdom, one which violates nature in order to complete itself, for the love of wisdom based on the recognition of man's limited possibilities.

The source of this unreasonableness is a pathological desire to destroy God and put man in his place. The dissatisfactions of unhappy men are the causes of this great movement which, in attempting to murder God, must murder men and which issues finally in Communism, Fascism and Nazism.—ALLAN BLOOM, *University of Chicago.*

Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist. BY PETER GAY. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 417. $6.00.)

This book is not only a distinguished "contribution to the debate on Voltaire" but also to the re-examination of the ideas of the Enlightenment, which seems to be characteristic of the present time when neo-Conservatism has been in such vogue. But in spite of the old and new detractors of the Enlightenment, it is increasingly being recognized in the words of Isaiah Berlin that "the intellectual power, honesty, lucidity, courage, and disinterested love of truth of the most gifted thinkers of the eighteenth century remain to this day without parallel. Their age is one of the best and most hopeful episodes in the life of mankind." This volume is also a brilliant "defense of the Enlightenment" but the author maintains that "Voltaire and the Enlightenment need no apology"; instead "they need only to be understood." Mr. Gay has advanced that understanding and at the same time he has succeeded in writing an "objective historical study."

The author's book is, of course, mainly about Voltaire but in the comprehensive sense that the whole Eighteenth Century has been called the Age of Voltaire. In it he has "sought to establish the central thesis that Voltaire was a realist, a practical hard-headed political man, and to document this thesis by anchoring his political writings firmly in the ground of his society, his experience, and the writings of his century." Contrary to Emile Faguet, who once described Voltaire's thought as a "chaos of clear ideas," the author has taken Voltaire seriously as a political thinker. He shows the injustice of the Voltaire legend, dating especially from Alexis de Tocqueville, who painted his politics as abstract, Utopian, or simply literary and he explodes the cliché about Voltaire's fanatical faith in reason, his optimism, and his belief in progress and perfection. Finally, he analyzes critically Voltaire's political reputation as a radical, conservative, liberal, authoritarian, constitutionalist, and admirer of Enlightened Despotism.

The author gives a chronological interpretation of Voltaire's thought, showing how the famous *Lettres Philosophiques*, was in the words of Gustave Lanson, the "first bomb thrown at the Old Regime" and how the *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, published thirty years later, was a "major event in the intellectual history of Europe." He gives an interesting account of his royal friendship with Frederick of Prussia and Catherine of Russia. And he proves that Voltaire was a *littérateur engagé*, when it came to matters like the famous Calas case in particular or legal reform in general.

So far as forms of government are concerned, "it is precisely the point of this book to show Voltaire as a relativist, but his relativism cannot be fairly epitomized as enlightened despotism," not even for France. In fact, as Mr. Gay indicated, the *philosophes* in general did not agree on a clear cut definition of enlightened despotism. Was it to be equated in the Eighteenth Century with *la thèse royale* which Voltaire certainly did espouse in view of his opposition to the aristocracy and the clergy?

In discussing the opposite theory, *la thèse nobiliaire*, the author does not elaborate on the doctrine of the separation of powers as much as he might have nor does he seem too sympathetic with the whole notion of intermediate powers in the Eighteenth Century. But he rightly points out that too much has been made of Voltaire's disagreement with Montesquieu and not enough of his admiration for him. At any rate, as Mr. Gay suggests, Voltaire's support of toleration, the rule of law, and free expression, which he saw in operation in England, is incompatible with naked despotism or authoritarianism. To Voltaire, it was not the form of government that was significant, but its substance. Distinguishing absolutism from arbitrariness, he supported constitutional absolutism for France, in the tradition extending from Bodin to the Abbé Dubos and D'Argenson. And in his last years in Geneva Voltaire did not "become a convinced democrat" but, "he learned to respect the political capacities of ordinary people," for, in the end, he "wanted to try to enlighten every one."

Following Lanson Mr. Gay concludes that "in his age and in his regime Voltaire was a radical" and that "it is unhistorical to interpret his moderation as conservatism or as bourgeois ideology." Furthermore, he was "modern in his empiricism, his secularism, his humanitarianism, and his hedonism." A slightly sharper focus could have been achieved if the author had given a more detailed picture of the anti-revolutionary attitude toward Voltaire from Chateaubriand to Taine and from Maistre and Bonald to Faguet.

This thorough and provocative study is crowned by a long critical bibliographical essay, which is not only valuable but indicative of the exhaustive research upon which the whole work is based.—GUY H. DODGE, *Brown University*.

The Correspondence of Edmund Burke: Volume I, April 1744–June 1768. EDITED BY THOMAS W. COPELAND. (Cambridge: At the University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. xxv, 376. $8.00.)

The first volume of a projected series of ten (the volumes are to appear at yearly intervals), contains letters written by Burke as well as selected letters written to Burke and on Burke's behalf. The edition is based upon a comprehensive survey of printed and manuscript sources, and utilizes the important Fitzwilliam manuscript collection. In the first volume, for example, 24 letters by Burke are printed for the first time; moreover, the 1844 edition of Burke's correspondence contained 27 letters by Burke during the 1744–1768 period, while the present volume contains 197 letters.

The edition aims, first of all, at presenting all extant letters by Burke, excepting for pamphlets in letter form which were printed or intended to be printed during his lifetime. It will present abstracts of missing letters when these are full enough to be useful. It will contain, wholly or in part, letters to Burke, provided that they are important themselves or necessary to an understanding of Burke's letters. Letters written for Burke will be included, but may be excerpted, with only materials relevant to Burke's concerns printed. The edition, sponsored by the University of Chicago, is guided by a distinguished editorial board and advisory committee, and that the format and explanatory notes of the first volume reflect this guidance.

The Legal Realism of Jerome N. Frank: A Study of Fact-Skepticism and the Judicial Process. BY JULIUS PAUL. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1959. Pp. xx, 177. $4.75.)

Jerome Frank's contributions to American jurisprudence are striking and well-known. In this book Professor Paul analyzes major elements in Frank's legal thinking as reflected in his books and essays. His many opinions as a high federal judge are virtually ignored. Most of the material has appeared previously in the form of law review articles. Since these articles are reprinted here without major modification, the book teems with long quotations both in the text and in the numerous footnotes. This is not so disastrous as it might seem, for the quotations are used as a vehicle to present *in extenso* not only what Frank had to say, but also the evaluation by his leading critics. For those largely unfamiliar with Judge Frank's important commentaries on law and the judicial process, this volume provides an excellent place to make their acquaintance.—Joseph Tanenhaus, *New York University.*

American Minds: A History of Ideas. By Stow Persons. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1958. Pp. xii, 467. $5.00.)

Professor Persons aims to present an introduction to the history of American thought by describing the "principal focal concentrations of ideas, or 'minds,' that have determined the profile of American intellectual life during its historical development." There have, he declares, been five "social minds" in America; a social mind "is the cluster of ideas and attitudes that gives to a society whatever uniqueness or individuality it may have as an epoch in the history of thought." Since the social mind "furnishes a generation of thinkers with a common set of assumptions," Professor Person "illustrates" the leading characteristics of the successive social minds (The Colonial Religious Mind, The American Enlightenment Mind, The Nineteenth-Century Democratic Mind, The Naturalistic Mind, The Contemporary Neodemocratic Mind) by discussing "representative thinkers and movements."

Political Thought in America. By Andrew M. Scott. (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc. 1959. Pp. xiii. 668. $8.50.)

A solid, freshly-selected compendium set off with illuminating introductory essays, this volume inevitably invites comparison with Alpheus T. Mason's anthology. Shorter, it runs by design to fewer "minor" thinkers. Thus, for the Revolutionary theme, we have Adams and Paine but not the variations of Otis or Dickinson—though Boucher's mordant Tory comments, missing in Mason, are here. For the gospel of "root, hog" and get-rich, we have Sumner and Carnegie, but lose representative overtones in the omission of Conwell's diamond-studded acres or the thought-from-the-bench Mason invariably, if sometimes tediously, presents. Thoughts about the bench and the role of law, however, are well represented by Holmes, Pound, Brandeis or Hand.

There is a new emphasis in many of Professor Scott's selections. Alongside such exotics as a semi-literate fulmination from Huey P. Long, we find unusual provender from intellectuals who may or may not have had an influence in politics. Beginning with Tocqueville, the fare grows richer in the later chapters—portions from Wilson's academic treatises as well as from his New Freedom addresses; a near-symposium on groups and party government presenting Schattschneider, Bentley, David B. Truman and Ranney; and selections from John Dewey, *The Organization Man* and Niebuhr. Professor Scott wants, he says, to counter a tendency to treat post-Civil War thought too much in terms of *issues* rather than *processes*. One may ask—the answer depends on the approach a teacher may adopt—whether political thought should be viewed as an element *in* the arena of conflict, or as academic reflection *about* politics as well. Certainly, however, the seminar selections provide richer meat than students would get in, let us say, the Percy Committee report for the Republicans.

Despite a partially fulfilled publisher's claim of "longer selections" due to omitting lesser figures, some are strikingly brief. Thus Franklin Roosevelt gets only seven double-column pages, from 1933, which scarcely represent the unfolding New Deals, while Norman Thomas, whose importance was surely not in such ratio, gets four. Quite impartially Hoover (who had something to say in his *genre*) gets the same space Thomas does. One also finds distressing brevity in the Jackson materials.

The fifteen chapter introductions—and here Professor Scott scores cleanly over Mason—are lucid and genuinely useful, often incisive and provocative and should help the student toward a rounded sense of the materials.—William Nisbet Chambers, *Washington University (St. Louis).*

Methodology of the Social Sciences. By Felix Kaufman. (New York: The Humanities Press. 1958. Pp. viii, 272. $6.00.)

This is an offprint of the original edition, published in 1944, which itself is a free translation of *Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften* (Vienna, 1936). After more than twenty years, this book seems dated, if not outdated. This actually speaks in its favor, as many of its conclusions, controversial at the time, have meanwhile become well established textbook truths. However, most of the topics in the book do not deal with the methodological problems which would be of primary interest to social scientists today. These are covered by more recent books on methodology such as those reviewed in the September 1959 issue of *PROD* (p. 27).

Political Socialization. By HERBERT HYMAN. (Glencoe: The Free Press. 1959. Pp. 175. $4.00.)

Professor Hyman's work can be seen as a limited portion of the program of an interdisciplinary group at Columbia engaged on an "inventory of knowledge about political behavior." After a discussion of the manifold difficulties of the larger inventory, and after identifying and rejecting some important perspectives of research into that no-man's-land where psychology and politics intersect (such as the study of Elites, Deviant Groups, and Social Movements), he selects his own perspective: "to systematize studies in psychology and political behavior in terms of a conception of learning; i.e., socialization." This preliminary inventory is further narrowed by concentration on only three dimensions of socialization: 1) participation or involvement in politics; 2) political orientation (ideology); and 3) authoritarian-democratic tendencies.

We have then essentially a book about the learning of politics by the young. Chapters are devoted to such topics as "Sub-Group Differentiations in Pre-Adult Life," "Processes Underlying the Establishment of Particular Socialization Patterns," "Agencies of Socialization into Politics" and "Political Stability or Change and the Role of the Other Agencies of Socialization." The jacket describes the contents as "comprehensive" and the scope as "enormous." The book is only 170 pages despite the quantity of materials summarized in approximately two dozen tables, but even so my reaction to the findings of a goodly portion of this compendium is one of shocked disbelief. For, except for some interesting methodological discussion in chapter one, the net result of almost 100 of the 170 pages may be evaluated as follows: "For the area of political orientation and the specific aspect, party affiliation, we have demonstrated the *great* (italics are Professor Hyman's) influence of the family on the child's behavior."

The author not only summarizes; he also evaluates and criticizes. The implicit basis of such evaluations reveals a degree of naivete about the nature of American political parties, both on the part of the evaluator and the research analyzed, which would be disturbing were it the possession of a political scientist. What political scientist does not know that American parties are not "issue-oriented"? Yet one finds this statement: "Socialization into the party, however, provides another organizing principle for handling the new issues on which specific socialization has not been possible. Since political parties themselves express stands on many issues, the individual simply by being socialized into a party loyalty can adopt its stand on the issues." "Simply," indeed! *Which* Democratic Party's stands—the Party of Paul Butler and the Democratic Advisory Council, or the Party of Lyndon Johnson, "Mr. Sam," or Senator Eastland? Which Republican Party's stands—that of McCarthy or Eisenhower or the Percy Committee? In spite of these shortcomings, the book will be welcomed not only by other political researchers, but by teachers of methodology and political sociology.—ALEX GOTTFRIED, *University of Washington*.

Individual Behavior and Group Achievement, A Theory: The Experimental Evidence. By RALPH M. STOGDILL. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 352. $5.00.)

In this contribution to the extensive literature of group dynamics Ralph M. Stogdill, one of the most assiduous researchers in that corner of the vineyard, attempts a theory of organizational achievement intended to be both parsimonious and powerful within the limits set for it. In form the theory is of the input-output variety. The input variables, attributes of individual members, are "performances" (responses identifying the actor as a participant), "interactions," and "expectations." Stogdill thus assumes the existence of individual variations and the impact of social environment, but he does not attempt to incorporate them explicitly in the system. In this respect, therefore, the theory is narrower than the looser but, in this reviewer's judgment, more valuable formulations of

March and Simon in *Organizations*. In Stogdill's model these input variables both are "transformed" into and are mediated by group structure and operations. The outputs or principal end effects of these mediated variables are displayed in group achievement, although the system allows for various feed-back effects.

Perhaps the freshest element in the book is Stogdill's multidimensional conception of group achievement. Following the leads indicated by, for example, Arrow's work on the theory of the firm, he proposes as the essential, but presumably not exclusive, dimensions of organizational achievement, not merely productivity but also group integration and group morale, the last quasi-operationally defined as "degree of freedom from restraint in action toward a goal." He reports but does not present considerable experimentation with a variety of more conventional models before he felt obliged to drop integration and morale as intervening variables and treated them in the output segment of his scheme. One may suspect that in some respects he has been overpersuaded. Thus, even assuming constant inputs, it does not seem necessary that any increase in productivity, integration, or morale must occur at the expense of one or both of the other factors. Nevertheless his position is a clean and promising break with a tradition dominated by the older management literature, in which achievement is uni-dimensional (productivity) and a high, positive relation is assumed between morale and productivity.

Despite this and other challenging features of the exposition, the book as such is disappointing. The chief reason for this lies in its organization. Stogdill tries not only to develop a theory but also to explore its ability to account for findings in the existing literature. In attempting the latter he chose to divide each of his five major chapters into a section on his own model and a section on existing research. These reviews are highly condensed, to the point of being merely allusive, since the reference items at the end of the book total nearly eight hundred, and their connections with his own theoretical arguments are frequently lost from sight. The sections surveying the literature are long, amounting to more than forty percent of the book's text pages. As a result the book will yield its values only to the most persistent reader and perhaps only to the fully initiated.—David B. Truman, *Columbia University.*

A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences. Edited by Bert. F. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1959. Pp. 256. Paper, $2.95; library edition. $6.00.)

Not a bibliography in the ordinary sense, this book is designed to present "a general introduction to the literature of the social sciences that would deal with differences in the literary output in the major disciplines and the nature of available tools, in the form of books, journals, pamphlets, and reference works, that are consulted and used by social scientists in their research and teaching." Along with its identification of the classics in each field and its characterization of types of works to be found in each, it encompasses a brief history and contemporary survey of each discipline, including history and geography.

Although its authors hope that the book will be useful to the general reader as well as to the social scientists and librarians, the very combination of brevity, comprehensiveness, and sophistication that makes the book appealing to social scientists will frustrate many general readers. Particularly in the chapters on economics, sociology and psychology, such technical terms as marginal analysis, the Guttman scale, and latent attribute analysis are prominent but unexplained.

The individual studies of the respective disciplines are well done; and, with the exception of the one on economics, are parallel to each other in approach. The span of Hoselitz's chapter on economics—and to some extent of his chapter on history—is especially wide with respect to both time and place. He is conspicuously attentive to economic writing before Adam Smith and to a variety of approaches to economics outside its main tradition in the United States, so much so that his survey of the contemporary discipline is limited, as the other chapters are not, to the identification of only a few present cleavages, directions and frontiers.

In an introductory chapter on the social sciences in the last two hundred years, it is said that the emergence of a new specialized discipline in any field of science is related, *inter alia,* "to the existence and recognition of a set of new problems which attract the attention of several investigators." I am impressed, all the more so after reading the book, with how loosely the term "new problems" has to be read to make such a statement true. As specialized formal disciplines the social sciences seem to have emerged in quite varied ways: history from habit, economics from relative ease with which certain processes lent themselves to theory, political science from preoccupation with an institution called government, sociology from the attempt to apply social science to whatever subjects had not been appropriated by other disciplines; anthropology from an appreciation of the provincialism of man's view of himself and his world, and psychology from an extension of natural science.

Not being prepared to defend these rough characterizations, I suggest them to call attention to the exceedingly complex and untidy process by which, for many and varied reasons, disciplines crystallize not necessarily around problems but around methods, points of view, or such subtleties of scholarly orientation, as are displayed in this book in the geographer's uncertainty about his discipline, or in discrepancies between the sociologist's and anthropologist's picture of their respective disciplines. Sociologists and anthropologists do not differ necessarily in the problems they attack; sometimes they differ from each other only in a slight shift in point of view, as in their different approaches to community studies.

If this book is used as its authors intend, political scientists will turn to it to familiarize themselves with developments in the other social sciences. Heinz Eulau's chapter on political science is extremely well done, and graduate students and old professionals alike should find it worth reading.—Charles E. Lindblom, *Yale University*.

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Smith College

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Race Relations and American Law. By Jack Greenberg. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. Pp. viii, 481. $10.00.)

American law governing race relations has been turned up-side-down in the years since 1940 when Charles S. Mangum's *The Legal Status of the Negro* was published. Here Jack Greenberg shows that the transition from legal approval of racial distinctions to their condemnation by law has been expressed in various ways. By using "legislation" in its broadest sense Greenberg marvelously illustrates the simple fact that all governmental institutions govern and the work of all must be canvassed to determine the public policy on any subject. Greenberg states that there is "legislation in the form of statutes, ordinance, executive orders, administrative edicts, and so forth, but in addition, the principle declared in a lawsuit is legislative in nature for non-parties; it affects them as does a statute and is directly enforceable in approximately the same way—by further litigation" (p. 6). The book then proceeds to show that hundreds, indeed thousands, of decisions by all parts of the American government have transformed the standing of Negroes in public accommodations and services, interstate travel, elections, earning a living, education, housing and real property law, criminal law, domestic relations law and the armed services.

This account is supported by appendixes of state segregation and anti-discrimination statutes, all NAACP cases decided by the Supreme Court, Southern school desegregation developments, and correspondence from Legal Aid Societies in many cities throughout the country on local practice in jury selection and sentencing for crime. The select bibliography is limited primarily to legal, sociological and official sources; its neglect of political science journals is probably attributable to the parochial nature of the different periodical indexes, a matter that deserves attention.

Greenberg's writing is relaxed and interpretative and his position as Assistant Counsel to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund give his views a special interest. An optimist, he believes race relations law to be "fairly well settled" (p. vii) and is confident that "the legal momentum against racial bias will accumulate and intensify" (p. 371). There is a short account of the role of the NAACP and a balanced exposition of the many factors affecting race relations which provides a good basis for further analysis. His treatment of the possibility of further expansion of "state action" is thoughtful. While questioning the limits set in the *Civil Rights Cases* Greenberg estimates that the Supreme Court's refusal to broaden the doctrine in the *Girard College* case signifies judicial withdrawal where Negroes are able to defend themselves in the political arena. Opinions like this make the book an important commentary as well as a useful compendium on the current state of law governing race relations in America.—Clement E. Vose, *Wesleyan University*.

The American Constitution. By C. Herman Pritchett. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1959. Pp. xiv, 719. $7.95.)

Modern constitutional scholars have shown little inclination to prepare complete treatises on the Constitution in the manner of their predecessors. In part this has been due to the ever-increasing complexity and difficulty of the subject matter, and the depressing prospect that any published work is out-dated relatively soon after publication. Another contributing factor has been the large scale adoption of the case method of teaching constitutional law at the professional and college levels, so that would-be author-editors find publishers more interested in the casebook than in any projected full length treatise.

As a result it has become increasingly difficult to direct students to a work that both analyzes the role of the Supreme Court in dealing with the wide range of complex issues that concern the Court today, and furnishes sufficient historical background to show the evolution of doctrines through the interplay of *stare decisis* and conscious judicial policy-making. For those who require a full historical treatment the excellent studies of Carl Brent Swisher and Kelly and Harbison have been available. And Professor E. S. Corwin's monumental annotated *Constitution* and his *The Constitution and What It Means Today*, now in its 12th edition, provide valuable reference works that lead one to cases and holdings concerning specific clauses of the Constitution. But for those requiring a sustained and detailed analytical account of the work of the modern Supreme Court covering all important facets of the Court's role, this new work of C. Herman Pritchett should prove most satisfactory.

Although this is one of the McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science, it should not be treated as simply another text. Those familiar with the careful studies of Professor Pritchett in recent years will find the same clarity of expression, careful balancing of arguments, and thoughtful conclusions in this more comprehensive work. Unlike some texts, this has a point of view, although it is not obtrusive. Essentially Professor Pritchett would agree that the Court should not assert a primary role in determining policy, but rather should accept most of the handiwork of legislative bodies. What he does claim for the Court is its position as "one of the vital balances in the governmental system, with unique qualifications for defining and defending the basic liberating principles of the American Constitution." (p. 671).

The increasingly important role of the Court in protecting individual rights and minority claims and in insuring that officialdom employ fair procedures is the concern of about half the book. Earlier sections deal with the background, adoption and amendment of the Constitution, the structure and function of national and state institutions. As a whole, the book, in its 671 pages of text, selected references, Table of Cases, and well-prepared index is a valuable contribution to the literature, whether used as text, basic reference work or as an eminently readable introduction to the work of a major political institution.—William Beaney, *Princeton University*.

Government and Public Administration. By John D. Millett. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1959. Pp. xii, 484. $7.95.)

This volume completes a two-part study which opened with Millett's *Management in the Public Service; the Quest for Effective Performance* (McGraw-Hill, 1954). The first volume looked at life within the administrative department. The second one deals with "the politics of public administration." In both books attention is fixed mainly on the national government of the United States.

The goal of "the politics of public administration" is viewed as the subjection of administrative agencies to "popular direction and restraint." Our principal dependence for effective popular direction and restraint is a constitutional structure which differentiates three coordinate branches and charges each of them with a substantial authority over the organizations that carry on the work of government. Administrative organizations, Millett insists, are not an extension of the chief executive; it is an error to speak of an executive-administrative branch. The chief executive, in the American national government at least, does not stand between the administrative organizations and the legislative and judicial branches. Legislative and judicial addresses to administrative officials do not channel through the chief executive; they go direct. There is, therefore, an effective separation of powers in the direction and restraint of administration. It is this fact of separateness—the fact that the three constitutionally created branches speak separately and independently to the administrative officials—that subjects bureaucracies to external control and pegs them down to their proper place in the governmental system. This, I believe, fairly presents the position which Millett identifies as "a major and a supplemental thesis" of the book (p. viii).

The bulk of *Government and Public Administration* is an explication of how the three constitutionally recognized branches of government direct and restrain the administrative organizations. The contribution of the legislative department is examined in nine chapters (190 pages), that of the executive department in eight chapters (145 pages), and that of the judicial department in four chapters (70 pages). The conception of what is relevant and significant for official direction and restraint seems to me to be sound. There is a wealth of illustration drawn from all periods in American history. Analysis and argument come out in clear statement. This job ought to satisfy anyone who accepts the premises on which it was based.

Millett's inquiry from start to finish is institutionally oriented. The citations of evidence, in the main, are references to constitutional language, statutory enactments, judicial opinions and orders, enduring rather than transient relationships among men in official positions. There is very little talk about how attachment to political party glues together two branches of government that were declared to be separate; about how differences in personal commitments and personal capacities expand and contract the field of force for men placed in official positions; about the network that carries messages to and fro among legislators, judges, high executives, bureaucrats big and little, and the unexplored jungles called publics.

I do not understand that Millett marks down the importance of the relationships that are commonly called informal. Rather, he believes the informal relations take a character forced on them by the officially-provided-for structure and therefore that the former can best be studied after the official structure and legalized relationships are fully mapped. On this basic point he will of course get a big argument, for many thoughtful students will insist that the formal institutions and legally prescribed behaviors are adjusted, shaped, and transformed by the transient, subtle, and diffused relationships that have been dubbed the informal. Perhaps both parties to the argument are entirely right—that you cannot understand the informal until you have the formal clear in mind, and you cannot confidently appraise the formal until you have encased it with the informal. If Millett agrees with this I think he will also agree that a third volume dealing with the informal is a necessity for the full treatment of administrative organizations which he initiated five years ago. I do not suggest that Millett has an obligation to write the third book and be President of Miami University too. There are a number of good talkers in the profession who have not yet put their fine ideas into print.—Charles S. Hyneman, *Indiana University.*

The American Federal Government. By Max Beloff. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 213. $4.50.)

This is an excellent, brief, interpretive study of the American national government. The author restricts his attention to those institutions which are immediately pertinent to American foreign policy—Constitution, Presidency, Administration, Congress, and political parties. Moreover, the study is designed to aid citizens of foreign states, and especially of Great Britain, to understand the intricate mechanism behind the foreign policy of the strong power of the Free World concert. Not the least attractive feature of the work is the happy capacity of the author to draw comparisons between the institutions of the American national government and those of Great Britain and to a lesser extent of France.

The overwhelming importance of foreign policy in the present era tends to destroy an observer's perspective on American governmental institutions. Survival is important alike to organisms and institutions. The spectacular development of the past twenty years is that of the rise of the military concerns in governmental and citizen interest in the United States. Military and foreign policy are so interwoven as to be indistinguishable. And economic policy is secondary only to the military program as a support for foreign policy. It is extremely difficult to analyze and evaluate the motivating factors behind any change in foreign policy. Mr. Beloff hazards no conclusions as to whether the military tail wags the foreign policy dog, or vice-versa. And he almost completely ignores the economic interests in foreign policy formulation. But he does a magnificent job in discussing the different institutional viewpoints of Presidency and Congress. I would, however, not endorse his observation on "the essentially civilian bias of American government." (P. 201.) As a matter of fact, "civilian" and "military" have quite different meanings in our time than in those of Mr. Jefferson's era. Is the five-star general any more a representative of the military than is the nuclear scientist? Even the old distinction between professional and citizen armies has lost most of its power to generate political differences in our times. This is only another evidence of the tenacity with which we cling to old labels long after they have lost the capacity to reveal the ingredients of a concoction.

I would also disagree in part with the author's characterization of the American party system's being in charge of professionals. (P. 161.) Most of us would admit that parties are led by those who have strong interests in them. But does one become a professional merely through being converted to the belief that his holding public office is indispensable to the future peace and prosperity of the country? The real facts of party control in the American member-states are not consistent. In some urban centers, professionalization among the organization's staff is very pronounced. In many rural areas, party organization is extremely informal. In the new suburbia, the professional workers appear to be declining in numbers and in importance. There is, also, an apparent decline in the number of job seekers who serve as voluntary campaign workers for gubernatorial and congressional candidates, as national and state civil services and job offerings in the business community serve to reduce the army of potential electioneers. In neither of the major American parties does professionalization in organization approach the degree which one, for instance, finds in the British Labour Party, with its almost solid phalanx of trade union secretaries.

Mr. Beloff offers some excellent observations upon the basic unity of the American citizenry. Despite all the emphasis upon sectionalism and special interests, great public decisions are essentially the product of the whole country. The Jewish vote is not the important factor in American foreign policy toward Israel. Religious or racial influences are decisive only "on relatively marginal issues." (P. 143.) This same quiet perspicacity is revealed also in his contention that, with all the emphasis upon the changed character of the federalism and the alleged reduction in the role of the member-states, it should be remembered "that the United States government is still one of limited powers, and of powers defined by a court of law." (P. 185.) Even the harshest critics of the New Federalism are protected in their rights of speech and press. It is indeed doubtful if any like period in our national history has produced a more pronounced judicial extension of the constitutional protection of civil liberties than that of the past two decades. Mr. Beloff's keen insight has produced a very wise study on American politics.—CORTEZ A. M. EWING, *University of Oklahoma.*

MAASS, A., ED., *Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government.* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1959. Pp. 224. $5.00.)

This volume is composed of a set of essays that share a common concern with the interrelations of the functional separation with the geographical division of powers. Professor Maass' introductory essay contends that while there has been considerable concern in the literature with the capital division of powers (the functional separation of powers) there has been insufficient attention to the areal division of powers and the relation of the areal to the capital division of powers. Professor Maass believes that there are measurably determinate consequences of particular combinations of a capital division of powers with an areal distribution of powers for the realization of the democratic values of liberty, equality and welfare. His confidence in the precision of these relationships extends to an excursion into the metaphorical use of mathematics in their depiction. Unfortunately, space or other limitations deny the reader the benefit of any testable hypotheses.

After Professor Maass sets the scene Mr. Paul Ylvisaker essays the task of developing "Some Criteria for a 'Proper' Areal Division of Governmental Powers." He suggests a set of maxims that comfortably approximate our existing arrangements. If we are to realize the values of liberty, equality and welfare, "the areal division of powers should be concerned basically with what is meant by the phrase 'the power to govern.' The assignment of powers to component areas should in each case be a general one, covering the whole range of governmental functions, rather than a partial one related only to particular functions." A second maxim states that "the optimum number of levels among which to share the power to govern would seem to be three." A third maxim reads: "The component areas should be constituted of a sufficient diversity of interests to ensure effective debate within each component and transcending communities of interest among the several components." In the brief confines of this essay it is impossible for Ylvisaker to translate his maxims into a series of testable, "if . . . then" propositions. Presumably if the goals of liberty, equality and welfare can be made operational Ylvisaker's maxims could be restated as asserting if you want such and such, do such and such. This would have been a real assist in the advancement of the empirical theory of politics. In the alternative, Ylvisaker's model should be given precision by mathematical statement. One hopes that Professor Maass will accept the burden of following through on the suggestion.

Three essays by Robert Wood, York Willbern and Stefan Dupre comprise Part II of the volume, devoted to "Applied Areal Analysis." Professor Wood discusses "A Division of Powers in Metropolitan Areas." He finds that students of local government have violated the Ylvisaker maxims by an exclusive concern with functions and a neglect of "the power to govern." As a consequence they have failed both to protect the citizen and to implement basic values in their governmental plans.

York Willbern discusses "The States in an Areal Division of Power." He forcefully raises the problem of community and its relation to a meaningful areal division of powers. The theorists' game with the algebraic symbols "cdp" (capital division of powers) and "adp" (areal division of powers) runs up against the stubborn facts of the historically-developed political community. Willbern's essay compels us to face the basic questions: What are the requisites of the self-governing community? How flexible are these communities once they have a history?

Dupre's essay on Canada adds some new dimensions to the perspectives of those who are confined to the parochial views of American federalism. Apparently the problems of the middle tier of government and the future of municipalities offer instructive comparisons.

Part Three of the book is devoted to the "Areal Division of Powers in Political Thought." It contains two valuable essays by Stanley Hoffman on "The Areal Division of Powers in the Writings of French Political Thinkers" and by Samuel Huntington on the "Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers." Hoffman traces the development of thinking about the areal division of powers from Bodin through Montesquieu, Rousseau, de Tocqueville, Taine and Proudhon through modern times. This analysis is particularly useful for the American student who despite the civil war largely accepts a political community without serious rifts. The French writers show a concern with class, region and elite that is largely foreign to American thinking. The seeming perverse antipathy to areal decentralization in French democratic thought makes sense in a problematic society where the republican ideal fights for survival under attack from left and right.

Huntington's concluding essay on John Adams, Jefferson and Madison develops the contrasts between Adams' stubborn insistence on the European model with its insistence on the balance of classes through government as the key to liberty, Jefferson's Utopian conception of the grass-roots, ward republics of yeoman farmers resting upon a harmonious will of the people, and Madison's realist view of the inevitable conflict of interests and the areal division of powers as a device for moderating the excesses of faction. Madison emerges as the theorist of the areal division of powers as the instrument by which, along with representation the republican principle is enabled to triumph over the turbulent anarchy of the city-state or the partisan, overbearing majority.

Professor Maass is to be congratulated in getting these essays into print. The enrichment of the field of local government by serious theoretical work is timely. Both normative and empirical political theory have much to give and receive from their application to the neglected political laboratory in our own backyard.—Norton E. Long, *Northwestern University*.

The Politics of Railroad Coordination, 1933–1936. By Earl Latham. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. x, 338. $6.50.)

Amherst's Joseph B. Eastman Professor of Political Science, assisted by the Joseph B. Eastman Foundation, comes to bury Eastman, not to praise him. (Lest Latham be accused of bad manners, let it be added that he pays rich and proper tribute to Eastman's universally recognized, but nonpolitical, virtues and skills.)

At a time when the American Bar Association again mounts an offensive to "judicialize" regulatory agencies, completing the work once believed to have been finished by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Latham's study draws the moral that we need more "politicizing" of regulatory administration. What leads to this conclusion is a careful study of New Deal efforts to improve the operation of the nation's railroads. It focuses on Eastman, first as a major shaper of the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, and then as Federal Coordinator of Transportation, directed by that Act to encourage or require the railroads to reduce waste.

A vigorous use of power analysis characterizes the whole study and gives a meaningful shape to the events described and to Eastman's previously unpublished letters and memoranda. The stress is on the political groupings conditioning this instance of public administration. The analysis is sophisticated and yet simple, convincing and yet not overbearing. As one expects of Latham, the presentation is lucid, and an occasional impish phrase prances out when the subject matter might otherwise be prosaic or tedious.

Deriving from his political approach to administration and his pluralistic approach to political power, his thesis is simple: "Top administrators often have to organize and concentrate the power which they administer." American "political parties do not accumulate and organize sufficient power to permit the administrator to concentrate upon the professional aspects of his work. . . . An agency goes forward with a program when its power base is strong and firm."

Eastman was denied this power base. Consequently, his attempts to "coordinate," or to rationalize, railroad operations was an utter failure. While the 1933 legislation vested him with complete *authority* to order coordination, he lacked the *power* to make orders effective. His program required the active cooperation of railroad groups, whose "nonaction . . . could veto the program," and this they did, leaving "the coordinator's organization . . . somewhat like a well-designed automobile without an engine. He could sit in it but he could not drive." His was a political failure, for "coordination . . . involves that most central of the problems of politics, the distribution of power among a collectivity of groups, and problems of coordination are most realistically understood as struggles for power." When Eastman finally did "set out to wield authority as though it were power" by preparing to issue orders, the affected groups speedily persuaded Congress to deny a renewal of Eastman's authority and office. Powerless to order coordination, Eastman sought to further it through the publication of many academically valuable studies, but succeeded only in demonstrating "the difficulty if not the futility of administration by study and report."

Why was Eastman unable to muster support for his program? The historical reasons for the industry's peculiar intransigeance Latham only lightly touches upon, nor does he consider the special problems involved in redistributing a declining industry's shrinking pie. Instead, he emphasizes the general apathy about the 1933 Act, Eastman's policy vacillations, his self-imposed isolation from the White House and other executive power clusters, and his belief that neither the time nor policy studies were ripe for a strong program.

Eastman was fatally handicapped by his fundamental assumption of a distinct, broad gulf between politics and administration. Could a more politically sensitive and gifted administrator have accomplished more? Latham apparently answers both "No" and "Yes." He cites the veto power of the affected groups and comments that "if the railroads [and unions] were prepared and able to counteract the mild attempts at coordination of an Eastman, it is extremely unlikely that they would have accepted the stronger actions of a more aggressive functionary." Yet after stressing how much Eastman had been incapacitated for flexible political leadership by his "judgelike style" and his long service in the austere decorum and rigidly adversary procedures of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Latham insists that the regulatory process is inevitably a political one and concludes that "what is at work in this administrative stream is the embolism of offsetting groups. The mentality which disdains 'politics' and strives for a neutral and technical perfection rejects the very solvents that would reduce the obstructions."

A measure of the book's worth is that it impels the reader to compare and correlate. This determinedly political analysis of an area already explored by many economic and some legal-administrative studies makes such a unique contribution as to suggest the need for similar studies of other policies. Some might also combine political and administrative analyses with an examination of the substance of policy. How much is actual policy determined by its group environment and how much by technological and economic developments and by the means chosen to define and pursue it? For example, does the bankruptcy of our transportation policies result from the cramping effects of making policy by adversary procedures ill-adapted to explore policy alternatives and to broaden and arouse public interest?—JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., *Wesleyan University.*

The Decline of American Communism. BY DAVID A. SHANNON. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1959. Pp. xii, 425. $7.50.)

This book is a painstaking, thorough and conscientious chronicle of the post-war history of the American Communist Party. It ably describes the downhill path of the party from the fall of Earl Browder and the initiation of a new "tough" line, to the fiasco of the Progressive Party—from the expulsion of the C.P. dominated unions from the C.I.O., the Smith Act convictions, the Rosenberg case, to the disillusion and turmoil after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and the revelations of Khrushchev, and the final decline to a tiny political sect of just a few thousand over-aged diehards.

Yet while the book informs exhaustively about the How it adds comparatively little to our knowledge of the Why of the events described. The author has relied primarily on the party press and on a series of interviews with former Communist leaders, especially Earl Browder and John Gates. One wonders whether, given the resources of the *Fund for the Republic* which sponsored the *Communism in American Life* series of which this volume forms a part, and given the fact that the author does not seem close to his subject, it would not have been possible to interview a much wider group of second-string leaders and rank-and-file members. Perhaps this would have allowed the author to suggest more graphically what is meant to be a party member; it would perhaps have allowed us to understand where we can now only learn a series of facts. Let me suggest what I have in mind by a few examples:

Shannon reports that when Robert Thompson, a key party leader who had earned the Distinguished Service Cross in New Guinea during the war, was asked whether he found it distasteful to engage in the campaign against the fallen party leader, Earl Browder and other former comrades, replied that he did not find it difficult at all; it was, he said, "just like killing Japs." What is the quality of mind and character that can lead a man to equate comrades of many years' standing to "Japs"? We are given no clue. How can one explain that Earl Browder, thrown out of the party after an almost unprecedented campaign of vilification, still humiliated himself several years later by asking his enemies to reinstate him to membership? Why did Anna Louise Strong who, after a life time of Communist service, was arrested by the Russians as a spy in 1949 and deported to the United States, yet reiterate her devotion to the American, Chinese, and Russian Communist parties seven years later? What was the impact of the revelations of Stalin's antisemitic horrors on the average Jewish party member?

Though Shannon attempts in a few cases to give a motivational and social psychological explanation, notably in his discussion of the motives of those who supported William Foster to the bitter end, such instances are distressingly rare. For the most part one is left with the bare bones of detailed narrative where one thirsts for interpretation and understanding. Now that the publicly available facts are in, one would want to read an analysis of the schemes of motivation and judgment, the rationalizations, feelings and emotions which moved the various actors in the drama of American Communism.—LEWIS A. COSER, *Brandeis University.*

When Negroes March. BY HERBERT GARFINKEL. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959. Pp. 224. $4.00.)

According to many observers of American Negro affairs, the threat of a mass pilgrimage sponsored by the March-on-Washington-Movement, originated and led by A. Philip Randolph, was largely responsible for President Roosevelt's executive order in June 1941 prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, creed or national origin as a matter of a national policy in defense industries. It was in some measure an antecedent of President Truman's 1948 order desegregating the armed forces. Also, the postwar establishment of fair employment practice commissions in several states had its origin in activities growing out of the March.

Mr. Garfinkel's report of the short-lived rise and fall of MOWM is largely a case study in the politics of protest. However, in analyzing the interaction of opinion-climate and organized pressure group activity he attempts interstitially to provide the basis for generalizing insights. The narrative recalls parallels in the labor movement, the movement for women's suffrage, and the evolution and decline of veterans' organizations.

Among other things, the study throws light on the reasons why a protest movement, born in militancy and embracing widespread intellectual and grass roots support, may dissolve into established reform channels. The March on Washington Committee achieved an objective which heretofore had been unobtainable by "respectable" Negro organizations. The drive to secure fair treatment for Negroes in defense industries was given lukewarm support by the white liberal and radical organizations and guarded support by the established, "professional" Negro reformers. Despite its achievement the March organization was never able to crystallize as a large scale reform organization. The momentum of activity was arrested and the initiative and machinery for Negro reform passed to the Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

The threatened March did not materialize, being canceled after its objective of a satisfactory FEPC order had been drafted, approved, and issued. In perspective some call it "a magnificent bluff, played with superb skill and timing." Later efforts to revive militant Negro action failed and the March became an important historical relic. The point to remember, as Garfinkel suggests, is that while the MOWM provides a positive precedent for using mass action to achieve pressure-group objectives, neither the case nor the case study provides an example of a mass movement "capturing" the leadership of Negro protest.

While the author largely succeeds in recapturing the intellectual climate surrounding the movement, his style of presentation is rather difficult. In the reviewer's opinion the story could better be told in one or two articles than in a book. Continuity of reader attention is marred by elaborate footnotes (placed in the back of the book) containing material that should have been omitted or incorporated into the text.—NATHAN HAKMAN, *University of Denver.*

The Ineffective Soldier: Lessons for Management and the Nation. Vol. I, The Lost Divisions; Vol. II, Breakdown and Recovery; Vol. III, Patterns of Performance. BY ELI GINZBERG WITH JAMES K. ANDERSON, SOL. W. GINZBERG, AND JOHN L. HERMA. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. Pp. xx, 225; xvii, 284; xix, 340. $6.00 per volume.)

The Ineffective Soldier is an exhaustive study of the records of the men who were either rejected by the Army during the second world war or separated from the service for mental or emotional defects. They were the men who, from the Army's view, could not stand up to the rigors of war and thus could not perform their duties effectively. The result is an invaluable source of data and analysis on the staffing and personnel operations of large scale organizations. The three volumes also emphasize how little we knew about the human quality of the nation before the war and, one suspects, how little we still know.

Despite the precautions taken, three quarters of a million men who were selected for service were discharged for mental or emotional defects during the war. To a certain extent, the authors attribute this loss (and indeed the loss of men who were rejected initially but might have performed effectively had they served) to the inadequacy of the Army screening process. Not only were psychiatric methods of doubtful value in predicting performance patterns, but Army psychiatrists were also handicapped by the lack of time they had to examine large numbers of men, a lack of knowledge about the kind of situation each man might have to face, and the lack of complete case histories that would have indicated how individuals had tended to react under stress in civilian life. A number of unfit were bound to slip through the screen.

Yet the authors of *The Ineffective Soldier* continually emphasize that effective performance is the consequence of the dynamic interplay of the individual, the work situation, and the organization. Even if the screening process had been more successful, they conclude that many men were lost because the Army gave too little weight to the importance of *situation* and *organization* in determining performance. A man who broke down because of separation from his family, for example, might have performed effectively in any number of situations closer to home. At the same time, many cases of breakdown could in great measure, be attributed to fluctuating manpower policies, poor leadership, or some other aspect of the organizational milieu which led soldiers to lose confidence in the Army, in the goals of the war effort, or in the needs for their own contribution. While there was little the Army could do to change the individual soldier's psychological makeup, it is nevertheless clear that the situational and organizational factors were never as wholly exploited as they might have been in an effort to overcome individual failings and thus increase the possibility of effective performance.

The authors of *The Ineffective Soldier* did not underrate the complexity of the task they mapped out for themselves. For one thing they are constantly aware of the difficulty of accepting a single definition of ineffectiveness and applying it to the wide variety of cases under examination. The criterion they chose was discharge from military service for mental or emotional defects. Yet they ask themselves whether a man who was discharged for emotional defect can be termed "ineffective" when he had previously completed fifty combat missions? And whether some men were "ineffective" simply because they were discharged when they might have served effectively under different environmental conditions or under more understanding leaders? Certainly there is serious reason for thinking that many of these men might have done well since almost seven out of every ten who failed in the Army recovered after their return to civilian life.

The authors are also frank to admit the limitations of a study of human behavior conducted on such a large scale. Their findings are based on a larger sample than any group of social scientists have previously analyzed and are illustrated by case studies that make up the major part of the second volume and are used widely in Volume III. "Illustrations," however, are hardly "proof," as the authors point out. Time and time again they repeat their principal themes, question their generalizations, and painstakingly discuss the myriad of complications that must necessarily be involved in trying to draw meaningful conclusions from several hundred thousand cases of human behavior. Perhaps because their analysis is so rigorous, much needless repetition results. A single integrated volume might have been published with the specialized data made available in separate monographs for the expert in manpower problems.

The value of *The Ineffective Soldier* is nevertheless high indeed. The authors point out that their primary interest was not the success or failure of military manpower policies. Their central concern was to take advantage of the "mine of information" found in the personnel data of World War II so as "to broaden knowledge about the nation's human resources in order to provide a sounder foundation for actions aimed at the better development and utilization of this most valuable resource." The manpower problems of the second world war are not likely to be repeated in the foreseeable future. A non-nuclear general war requiring mass mobilization is but one, and not the most probable of military situations that could erupt if the policy of deterrence fails. The United States nevertheless faces a range of challenges that include the competition to open tremendous new frontiers in science and technology and the drive for industrialization and higher standards in Asia and Africa, as well as the new military problem of manning a force of two and a half million professionals. All of these issues are making impressive demands on the democratic process. Clearly they set a premium on the development of talent and skill to cope with the complexities involved.

The authors observe that in a pluralistic society, "no single institution . . . can exert more than a limited influence on the performance of individuals and groups." It is a task for private organizations, government, and society as a whole. Nevertheless they call for an increasingly active part for government, and particularly the federal government, in developing the capacity of the American people. They argue that our ability to realize the full potential of our human resources may well depend on the character of governmental programs in the fields of education, medical care, mental health, full employment, and civil liberties, and it must be increasingly obvious that they are right. At its base, the development of a national manpower policy is a political problem of dramatic proportions and the lessons of *The Ineffective Soldier* are of considerable concern to political scientists.—Gene M. Lyons, *Dartmouth College.*

Shared Government in Employment Security: A Study of Advisory Councils. By Joseph M. Becker, S.J. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. Pp. xiii, 501. $6.50.)

Over many years, the traditionalists have inveighed against the use of advisory committees in public administration. Such committees, they have maintained, become a distracting force by diluting not only the power but also the responsibility of the public officer.

Father Becker, who is Associate Director of Social Order at St. Louis University, takes issue with this theme. He does it in two ways. The first is by considering the theory of the advisory body in its relationship to governing institutions. The second is by examining, by case study, a number of advisory councils which have functioned over a period of years.

His analysis leaves no doubt either of where he stands, or where he considers the advisory council to stand "The general concern of this book," he writes, "is the problem to how to maintain popular control over modern—which means big and growing—government." He sees twentieth century American society as a managerial society with two principal sets of managers, governmental and non-governmental. "From these two proceed opposite dangers—too much centralization and too much decentralization, tyranny and anarchy, the danger of the dictatorial state and the danger of the dispersive state. . . . The chief virtue of the advisory council is that it moderates both dangers simultaneously." This is, of course, why his study bears the title of "Shared Government . . ."

Most of the state advisory councils of Father Becker's study resulted either from the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 or the Social Security Act of 1935. Their creators saw them as a means of obtaining both technical guidance and political support from knowledgeable, and also influential, sectors of the economy in matters relating to employment services and unemployment compensation. No two of the states which have councils seem to have followed precisely the same processes; and no two have experienced the same results. But the author's examination of fifteen of these, plus the Federal Advisory Council, which are reported in this book, leads him to conclude conservatively enough that "it cannot properly be claimed for any advisory council that it was strictly necessary, [but] it can safely be said of nearly all of them they were worthwhile."

Conservatively, also, one can state that this book is a worthwhile addition to the literature of both policy formulation and administration. Father Becker has undertaken thoughtful investigation which goes beyond the mere paper record. He has sought out those who have been associated with the work of the councils and attempted to learn as fully as possible their effects. The book is eminently fair in examining the pros and cons. This is testified to by the space that is given to some of the less successful councils, as well as to the commentary on the disadvantages of councils in general.

Whether one agrees with Father Becker's conclusions or not, the book provides useful information for those attempting to understand the nature of societal change.—DAVID S. BROWN, *School of Government, George Washington University.*

The Great Farm Problem. BY WILLIAM H. PETERSON. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1959. Pp. xix, 235. $5.00.)

The Brannan Plan. BY REO M. CHRISTENSON. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1959. Pp. 207. $5.00.)

Considered together, these two books fall into a pattern that has become familiar in farm policy: they start from different assumptions, handle evidence in different ways, and come to contradictory conclusions.

Peterson's book will be best understood if read in reverse. The epilogue more closely resembles the mysticism of an Egyptian sun worshiper than an economic analysis: "The Iowa farmer deposits a kernel of corn . . . into the womb of Mother Earth. The elixir of life begins . . . locked in the harvested ears of corn is the life-giving energy of the sun, transmitted at a level no human eye will ever see . . . life sustaining life, in strict accord with the laws of Nature. Do such laws regulate the affairs of men?" The answer is yes, and every attempt of man to improve his economic lot by way of government is wrong and doomed to failure.

The economic model implied in the "Analysis" chapter is also primitive: a broad X, one arm labelled supply and the other demand, floating free in a timeless world devoid of frictions. "The price system in free markets, whether agricultural or nonagricultural, is self-regulating; it *constantly* and *strongly* tends to hold supply and demand in equilibrium. The price system is *highly* responsive: changes in supply and demand are *quickly* adjusted in terms of quantities and prices . . . " (Italics mine.) This is an act of faith not subjected to reason, observation, or econometric analysis. Wholly ignored is competent evidence showing that supply and demand elasticities in agriculture, especially of aggregates, are low. When extended to factor as well as product markets, the model denies the possiblity of the existence of any economic problem, farm or industrial.

Aware of these credos, the reader will understand why the historical review that comprises the first two-thirds of the book reveals an uninterrupted series of blunders as a morally weak government yields to the demands of the rapacious agrarians. There are, of course, plenty of sitting ducks for the author to hit, but he fires indiscriminately at ducks, crows, eagles and laying hens. Readers of the author's faith will find material here to inspire and sustain them; readers seeking an understanding of the complex economic and political processes at work in farm policy should turn to Christenson's book instead.

The Brannan Plan is an admirably temperate and objective study of the most controversial and in some ways the most significant farm policy proposal put forth to date. The plan played an important part in producing the bitter antagonisms now afflicting farm policy, and an analysis of it touches upon nearly all economic aspects of the farm problem. Christenson gives a clear account of how Brannan developed his plan, its presentation, the publicity activities of the Department of Agriculture, and the defeat of the proposal in Congress. The analysis neither shields the Secretary from exposure of sophistries employed in his sales pitch nor plays down the merits of the proposal. Implications regarding the proper role of a government agency in formulating policy and the need for greater party responsibility are developed and discussed.

Christenson concludes that "The possible advantages to the consumer, the farmer, and the harrassed USDA under some variation of the Brannan Plan formula are simply too great for the nation to ignore any longer." Even one who does not accept this is likely to agree that *The Brannan Plan* is a fair, well-written and instructive book about the economics and politics of American agriculture.—G. E. BRANDOW, *The Pennsylvania State University.*

Candidates 1960. BY ERIC SEVAREID. (New York: Basic Books. 1959. Pp. viii, 369. $4.95.)

In his foreword to this book, Robert G. Spivack says "This book is an attempt to alert the intelligent voter, before the political publicists have, subtly or overtly, been able to color his judgment." The closest approach to this lofty objective is made in Mr. Sevareid's introductory essay, where an attempt is made to describe the ideal candidate. Mr. Sevareid is worried about the decline in presidential leadership, and he does not conceal his view that President Eisenhower has been less than ideal. Although the book fails to live up to its billing, it is well written, entertaining, and may be especially recommended for political managers who are recruiting writers of campaign biography.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Sevareid did not write the rest of the book, thus giving the reader a systematic evaluation of each candidate, based on the author's conception of the demands of the office. Instead, we emerge from Sevareid's quiet lecture on the presidency to find ourselves on a midway occupied by hard-selling barkers for each of the major candidates. Some of the chapters descend to the level of the "man who" nominating speech. We learn, for example, that Lyndon Johnson has "piled political miracle on top of political miracle," that the Texan is equipped with "unbelievable energy," "unrelenting will to accomplish" and an "overpowering personality." On top of that, he is the very front and head of American liberalism. Johnson emerges as a peculiar combination of the Lone Ranger, Svengali, and Eleanor Roosevelt.

The other chapters are generally more restrained, but each major candidate is presented in such a favorable light that Mr. Sevareid's fears about the future of the republic are made to seem unfounded. Neither the conventions nor the electorate can possibly fail to provide us with the leadership he desires, if his collaborators are to be believed. The only cloud on this sunny horizon was evidently caused by the restricted number of Republican candidates and the desire to impart a bipartisan balance. This may account for the fact that two chapters are devoted to Vice President Nixon, in which he is alternately presented as Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.—JOHN P. WHITE, *University of Michigan.*

The Life of Mr. Justice Clarke. BY HOYT LANDON WARNER. (Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 232. $5.00)

Professor Warner's appreciative biography of John Hessin Clarke is premised upon the conviction that the Justice's career "brilliantly characterizes the role of liberal dissent in America since the Civil War." The author meticulously documents his tribute to a fellow native of Ohio in covering Clarke's thirty-six years of law practice, eight years' service as Federal district judge and Supreme Court

Justice, and unflagging activity as an official of the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association after his resignation from the Court in 1922. Much attention is given to the life-long bachelor's concern with state, national and international politics, primarily as a liberal or progressive Democrat but as a deviationist to the Gold Democrats in 1896. Sidelights are cast on friendly or working relations between Clarke and such fellow Democrats as Tom L. Johnson, Newton D. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, who named him twice to judicial office, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose "court-packing" proposal the retired justice supported on constitutional grounds. It is noted that Clarke and Bryan came together, in part, in later years on the issue of anti-imperialism. Kansas Republicans and Nebraska Democrats might object to the author's incidental error of classing Bryan as a "Kansan" (p. 50).

This study, with about 180 pages of text, hardly justifies the jacket claim of "full-length biography" of a man whose years passed four score and seven. It emphasizes Clarke's role as constructive citizen and publicist. Of the ten chapters, only two deal directly with judicial service. These are chapters five, "Sociological Jurist," and six, "Opinions on the Bench." One might wish for more on this stage of a long career, in view of judicial things to come, even with less on controversial politics from the agrarian crusade to the New Deal and after. There might be more of the Warner observation that Clarke as a new appointee "was closer to Brandeis than to any of the other justices." Clarke's juristic attitude is suggested by a quotation from a letter to Baker, stating that Holmes was "a 'great liberal' when dealing with the Constitution, but a great conservative when dealing with modifications of social conditions . . . " Clarke is portrayed as a strong defender of judicial review but a strong critic of the Court majority's improper interference with social and economic legislation. The latter chapters deal with ardent labors in post-Wilsonian causes and Clarke's wholesome final years, with wide travel, reading and acquaintance with his own soul.—H. C. NIXON, *Alderson-Broaddus College.*

The Human Side of Urban Renewal: A Study of the Attitude Changes Produced by Neighborhood Rehabilitation. BY MARTIN MILLSPAUGH AND GURNEY BRECKENFELD. EDITED BY MILES L. COLEAN. (Baltimore: The Barton-Gillet Co. 1959. Pp. viii, 233. $3.50.)

This work contains case studies of attempts at urban renewal in sections of Baltimore, Chicago, Miami, and New Orleans. The focus is less upon physical changes as such than upon the "attitudes, values and behavior" which contribute to neighborhood deterioration. The book results from collaboration between the Fund for Adult Education and Fight-Blight Inc., a Baltimore organization. It was inspired by lessons learned in the effort to rehabilitate a Baltimore slum between 1951 and 1953. The book contains much useful information on the attitudes and actions of business and real estate interests, and demonstrates the connection between urban deterioration and the racial problem. The author's conclusions are not optimistic, but political scientists should find in their reports much stimulus to research and reflection.—GEORGE K. ROMOSER, *The Ohio State University.*

Southern Schools: Progress and Problems. EDITED BY PATRICK MCCAULEY AND EDWARD D. BALL. (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting Service. 1959. Pp. viii, 174. $4.75.)

This volume is a detailed report on Southern schools in seventeen states during a five year period immediately before and after the Supreme Court's decision outlawing segregation in the public schools. In accordance with its sponsoring organization's policy of serving as "an objective fact-finding agency . . . providing accurate unbiased information . . . ," the nine chapters and 77 tables deal with enrollment, finance, buildings, personnel and transportation. What emerges from these facts is that the South has made a "great leap forward" in educational effort and achievement during 1952–1957 and that the gap between schools in this region and the rest of the United States has been narrowed. While only 684 of the 3,684 bi-racial school districts had a measure of desegregation by June, 1957, the trend toward equalization of white and Negro schools was general, "whether the states were pointing toward desegregation or seeking to defer or prevent it."

Although widespread concern about the South's desegregation problems is the reason for the book's publication, there is little attention specifically directed to these problems. Thus, the book's greatest value for political scientists may be that it provides a detailed study on a regional basis of the most important function of state and local government.—WILDER CRANE, JR., *Vanderbilt University*.

The Michigan Township Board. BY JAMES AND MARILYN BLAWIE. (East Lansing: Governmental Bureau. 1957. Pp. 96. $1.00.)

A handbook designed to assist and guide local public officials in performing their official duties should possess, in the opinion of many, certain fundamental features. It should be written in English simple enough to be readily understood by all. This means that the language and intent of all statutes discussed should also be written plainly. It should be well organized by topic, with each subject receiving sufficient discussion to permit the reader to understand fully his duties regarding said topic. A comprehensive table of contents or index is, of course, a necessity. Above all, the manuscript should have undergone intensive scrutiny by several persons active in local government affairs. The present work easily exceeds these criteria. The authors' work has been thoroughly seasoned by the judgment of numerous Michigan public officials. It contains no index, but the table of contents is well ordered and detailed. They have set the tone with a brief historical introduction and have even included a useful section on parliamentary procedure. The reader is cautioned to use this work primarily as a reference and to rely upon the statutes (it is adequately footnoted) and legal counsel for more complete guidance.—EDWIN A. GERE, JR., *University of Massachusetts*.

A City Finds Itself. BY JOSEPH D. CRUMLISH. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1959. Pp. 105. $2.50.)

After decades of inefficient and corrupt municipal administration, Philadelphia's citizens in 1951 won for themselves a sound victory by approving a new home rule charter and other reform measures, culminating a struggle dating from 1947. In so doing they accomplished one of the most complete, far-reaching improvements yet seen in municipal government history. The vast program of action underlying this movement was extremely complex. Endless amounts of coordination, patience and determination were needed for success. Writing from personal experience gained during the charter campaign, the author draws an impartial, yet colorful picture of the overall movement. In concentrating on the campaign itself he occasionally lapses into heavy detail, thus slowing his otherwise brisk accounting of events. As a case study in the local political process this book provides a candid observation of those forces which, when sufficiently aroused, can take decisive action against intrenched, indifferent government.—EDWIN A. GERE, JR. *University, of Massachusetts*.

The County Board of Supervisors. BUREAU OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESEARCH. (East Lansing: Michigan State University 1959. Pp. viii, 152).

This is an ably written work of the so-called handbook type which local public officials find so useful in their daily performance of duty. It contains abundant references to the statutes, "classifies and describes briefly the powers and duties of county boards," and includes a chapter on parliamentary procedure.—EDWIN A. GERE, JR., *University of Massachusetts*.

The San Francisco Bay Area, A Metropolis in Perspective. BY MEL SCOTT. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 331. $12.50.)

This unique book on the San Franciso Bay Area's heritage—physical, social, economic, and political—should be of great interest and usefulness to readers from several disciplines, and to metropolitan citizens generally. From start to finish its focus is on the common thread of an evolving metropolitan community through some 190 years of growth. The book is made physically attractive and its history is enlivened by an abundance of pictures and maps. The author shows unusual versatility in presenting the interrelationships of earthquakes, fires, railroad monopolies, port rivalries, intercity welfare, and heartbreaking efforts to achieve a regional approach to governmental problems. In attempting to make a regional story complete he leaves few stones unturned, from the geological origins of the Bay Area to a 1959 critique of San Francisco's sluggish urban renewal program.

The book's bias in favor of regional planning is made explicit and without apology, and its purpose is thus essentially a crusading one. Readers who have wrestled with the frustrations of making the metropolitan community more liveable will find no fault with this purpose. Many will welcome the conclusion that regional planning is feasible only after achieving some kind of regional government of which planning would be a part. Those in search of well defined generalization about metropolitan community decision making will not find their work already done in this book, but they will find a wealth of material to assist such studies of their own. The book is a solid contribution to the growing body of knowledge about metropolitan area government and politics. It is to be hoped that it is the forerunner of many more in other areas.—DANIEL R. GRANT, *Vanderbilt University.*

Readings in Urban Geography. EDITED BY HAROLD M. MAYER AND CLYDE F. KOHN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1959. Pp. vii, 625. $8.50.)

As in the case of urban government and politics, studies of urban geography vary considerably between emphasis on a scientific discipline and emphasis on a body of applied knowledge. This book is primarily concerned with the relation of geographic concepts, principles, and generalizations to urban functions, structure, distribution, and growth. The selections are organized under the following topics: Approaches to the Study of Urban Geography; Some Basic Definitions; The Rise and Growth of Cities; The Economic Base of Cities; Classification of Cities; Urban Population Studies; Cities as Central Places; Size and Spacing of Cities; Urban Land-Use Survey and Mapping Techniques; General Nature of City Structure; Transportation; Ports; Commercial Structure of Cities; Industrial Structure of Cities; The Urban Fringe; The City's Water Supply; Blight and Renewal.

Although most of the articles in this book were written by geographers, a few come from sociology, economics, planning, marketing, and real estate. The editors acknowledge that significant contributions are also being made by political scientists and many others, but examples of their work are omitted because of limitations of space and format. Among the subjects admittedly neglected by the editors are the areal fragmentation of the political organization of metropolitan areas, urbanization in underdeveloped areas, the impact of highway improvements on the structure and growth of cities, and the defense aspects of urban structure and distribution. Even so, the book contains much that will interest the student of local government.—DANIEL R. GRANT, *Vanderbilt University.*

American Constitutional Law. BY ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON AND WILLIAM M. BEANEY. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1959. Pp. iii–ix, 726. $7.75.)

This text is presented as a "revised and enlarged" edition (p. iii). Actually, it is little of either. The first nine chapters are identical with the first edition, published in 1954. As one might expect, failure in these chapters to consider new cases and materials of the last five years results in a few errors [e.g., the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases is now $10,000, not $3000 as printed (p. 15).] and omissions [e.g., the issue of federal preemption as illustrated by *Pennsylvania v. Nelson* and other recent cases is omitted from Chapter Three], which detract from an otherwise excellent text.

Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve have been revised. The essays and suggested readings have been modernized and nine new cases have been added. The new cases selected are appropriate, although the categorization of the *Nelson*, *Watkins* and *Trop* cases as First Amendment cases is questionable. Chapter Thirteen is an addition. While professing to be an essay assessing the role of the Supreme Court in American politics, it is more of a defense of the Warren Court, judicial legislation and the "preferred freedoms" doctrine. This naturally introduces controversy over political values into what purports to be a textbook in constitutional law.

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, the lucid and perceptive writing and the excellent selection and editing of cases make this book "tops" in its field for a one-semester undergraduate course.—RICHARD K. BURKE, *University of Arizona.*

The American System of Government. BY JOHN H. FERGUSON AND DEAN E. MCHENRY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 5th ed. 1959. Pp. vii, 780. $7.50.)

This fifth edition brings up to date a text which was first published in 1947 and last revised in 1956. The basic structure has been retained, but new material has been added on recent developments such as the admission of Alaska and Hawaii. For those preferring a text confined to the national government, a separate volume has been simultaneously published as *The American Federal Government.* A more condensed version is available under the title *Elements of American Government.*

American Government Annual, 1959–1960. EDITED BY JACK W. PELTASON. (New York: Henry Holt. 1959. Pp. 120. $1.50.)

This publication is the second volume of what has now been clearly launched as an annual supplementary reading series for American government classes. Its five chapters by five capable political scientists relate the events of the year to the subjects presented in most American government courses: the Supreme Court, Congress, the Administration, presidential elections, and foreign policy. It should find wide and constructive use in relating the introductory material in basic American government courses with current political developments

Montana State Documents, a Preliminary Bibliography. By Lucile Speer. (Missoula, Mont., Bureau of Government Research, Montana State University. 1958. Pp. 56. Publication No. 1. $1.00.)

The work is mainly limited to documents issued after 1950, and has been prepared by the documents librarian at Montana State University for many years, and is an attempt to meet "immediately pressing needs of governmental and administrative research." The arrangement is alphabetical by government agency, gives frequently some note as to the organization. Under each agency is listed the publications from 1950 to date with a few earlier where particularly currently pertinent and with information as to availability. It is planned to have annual or frequent supplements. Ultimate comprehensive bibliography of Montana state documents is envisioned. The present work represents a type of control that would be useful for the publication of every state government.—(JBC)

Science and Public Policy. By Dael Wolfle. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1959. Pp. 81. $1.50.)

This useful paperback consists of three popularly-styled, extraordinarily relevant lectures by the Executive Officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. They deal with (1) problems and significance of public policies in support of basic scientific research, (2) the development of the federal government's role in the promotion of science from 1787 (Article I of the Constitution) to the 1958 Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee, (3) the responsibility of the nation for preparing its citizens, through education, to meet the problems presented by the 20th century revolution in science and technology.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Government By Constitution. By H. J. Spiro. (New York: Random House. 1959. Pp. xv, 496. $6.75.)

Professor Spiro has, obviously, put much thought, and even more work, into this uncommonly interesting tome. He has written one of the very few truly comparative (as opposed to country-by-country expository) books on the market. Moreover, his approach is often unique. The author's coverage and range can only be termed prodigious, indeed enormous—and there lies one of sundry problems presented by this ambitious text.

Lengthy, often encyclopedic, and discursive, *Government by Constitution* is divided into seven parts, 26 chapters, bibliography (somewhat strangely conceived), and index. It contains 197 major subheadings—an indication of its range, discounted by compactness. Professor Spiro writes well, and he writes easily; yet one frequently has the feeling of attending a lecture in an undergraduate classroom, as it were. The pages are marked by recurring illustrations of the kind of "cuteness" and "popularization" to which many of us, admittedly, resort in classes now and then, but which had better be eschewed in a scholarly work. For example: An entirely gratuitous paragraph (p. 17) on "paradise," which serves no good purpose; repeated voicing of variations on the favorite American theme of "go to hell" (pp. 41, 110, 411)—the former being the author's own coinage (" . . . we prefer to see people go to hell under their own steam . . . "), the latter two comprising a similar comment by Justice Holmes, twice quoted by Professor Spiro with much relish and in identical form.

The book is also marred by inaccuracies and questionable assertions; e.g. p. 95: " . . . Hitler lost both the support of the German people and the war." The latter yes—but certainly not the former until the loss of the war was all but a *fait accompli*. P. 118: The alleged "degree of similarity" between the functions of the British Lord Chancellor and America's Vice-President is as questionable as it is tortured. P. 146: The 21st Amendment of the U. S. Constitution was ratified by conventions in ¾ of the States (the author mentions only the other method of ratifying). P. 117: The last British Government to fall on a vote of confidence was that of Baldwin in 1923.

But Professor Spiro has made a definite contribution to the study of comparative government. Arranged in reverse order of presumed reader familiarity with them, he describes briefly in Part II (after carefully explaining his methodology in Part I) the general pattern of constitutional development in his eight chosen countries: Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, West Germany, France, Britain, Canada, the United States (why not a more "unusual" one, viz. India?) under the following five headings: "Constitutional History"; "Constitutional Structure"; "Problems" (classified as "cultural," "external," "economic," and "constitutional"); "Issues and Politics"; and "Success." The criteria developed by the author for evaluating the performance of constitutional systems are: "stability over time, adaptability to changes in environment, efficiency in dealing with problems, and effectiveness in gaining acceptance for policies from the population." In Part III, "Political Style," he analyzes in great detail differences in the treatment given to similar "problems" in the politics of the eight lands (e.g. "Purposive Interest"; "Violence"; "Ideology"; "Law"; etc.); and in Part IV he examines the institutions and procedures designed to solve the "problems." Part V is a comparative analysis of "Representation," including political parties and interest groups. In Part VI, Professor Spiro undertakes an evaluation of the central question of Political Science, "how can politics succeed?"; and in Part VII he ventures to apply "lessons for constitution-makers in general, drawn from the experiences of these eight constitutional democracies." This is quite a task! In any event, whether or not he has succeeded, the author deserves to be commended for a pioneering study.—HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Village Japan. BY RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY, JOHN W. HALL, AND ROBERT E. WARD. (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 1959. Pp. 498. Illus. $8.75.)

Village Japan fills two needs in the academic world. There can be little disagreement with Edwin Reischauer's encomium found on the dust jacket: "The best and most detached study of a Japanese social microcosm that has ever been produced in a Western language." One wonders only why Reischauer qualified his statement, for surely nothing equals it in the Japanese language, and nothing in any other language comes to mind. Second, *Village Japan* demonstrates that an interdisciplinary task force can produce a volume that is not only a comprehensive report on the subject studied, but also is a smoothly integrated document. The techniques of the study are those of the cultural anthropologist; the results prove that these techniques may be utilized equally well by the political scientist, historian, geographer, economist, sociologist, psychologist, and by specialists in literature and linguistics. The volume justifies the original concept of multi-disciplinary research: the fragmentation of knowledge by the individual discipline that loses sight of the totality of man can be overcome by the cooperative efforts of the many disciplines.

The project of studying a Japanese agrarian community was undertaken by the University of Michigan's Center for Japanese Studies, through the establishment of a field station in Okayama City. The *buraku* of Niiike, 14 kilometers from the field station, became the community studied. The major part of the data was secured by continual observation from April 1950 to July 1954. As the book began to take form, Niiike was re-visited up to the spring of 1957, to check data and to up-date the information. Richard Beardsley, anthropologist, held the primary responsibility for the book. He and the two other authors, John Hall, historian, and Robert Ward, political scientist, undertook the initial and primary research, directed and checked the field research at various other stages of the project, and wrote the sections concerned with their disciplines. Many other specialists worked out of the Okayama City field station from time to time, contributing their data to the common file. However, their observations in note form were placed into manuscript form by the three authors functioning as a team. The organizational methods utilized to write this book may well be studied by other interdisciplinary groups to avoid the lack of integration and the dominance of one discipline to the detriment of the others that have so often characterized interdisciplinary written reports.

A study of this kind raises a central question. How does a minute, seven year study of a community in all of the phases of the behavior of its 130 inhabitants, its 24 households, justify itself as a study of *Village Japan?* The authors meet this question squarely and fairly. They disclaim any belief that their book "will unlock of the secrets of Japanese 'national character.' " However, Niiike was chosen most carefully to prevent its being atypical. It was observed meticulously in the belief that Japan's agrarian life is relatively uniform, stable, and represents the conservative, traditional element of Japan's culture. More than this, the authors do not claim. This is a study of Niiike and there are no other Niiike's. But there are some fifty thousand other farming communities and if one knows Niiike, as we now do, one would find much in those other villages that is familiar, little that is not.—PAUL S. DULL, *University of Oregon.*

Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia. EDITED BY GEORGE MCTURNAN KAHIN. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 531, $6.50.)

Ten years ago Professor Lennox A. Mills edited the volume *The New World of Southeast Asia* which remained for some time the most valuable survey of that complex area. The authors of the country studies had, with few exceptions, extensive prewar experience in the respective country, often as government officials. It is to the credit of both the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell University and the Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Program that a new volume on Southeast Asia could be published in which each chapter is written by a young scholar trained as an area specialist within the last decade, yet sufficiently experienced and mature to give balanced and reliable treatment to the complex problems of one Southeast Asian country.

Although several other survey volumes on Southeast Asia have been published recently, none can be placed in the same category with the two mentioned above as deserving to be considered, at least for teaching purposes, the standard text of its day. For several years those of us who taught undergraduate courses on Southeast Asia had to develop reading lists based primarily on monographic and article material too lengthy, complex and specialized for the purpose to which it had to be put. The volume edited by Professor Kahin fills a gap that was obvious to all political scientists interested in Southeast Asia.

The volume lacks a comparative, generalizing chapter. It is interesting to note that this was the result of Professor Kahin's considerate opinion. He writes in the preface:

> There is now rather widespread agreement that the study of government and politics of Western states has reached a level making possible an appreciable amount of scholarly comparison and some generalizations based thereon. Although there are those who are impatient to do the same with such countries as are covered in this book, we have come to the conclusion in preparing the volume that, because of insufficient fundamental monographic material, an attempt at this stage to form broad generalizations about the political systems of the states of Southeast Asia would be premature.

Professor Kahin, Professor Lucian W. Pye and the present reviewer were associated for several years in a collective effort to further the comparative study of government and politics in non-Western countries, under the auspices of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. The fact that opposed conclusions have been reached about the central question of whether comparison is possible in an area such as Southeast Asia is significant. Professor Pye has written an excellent comparative essay on Southeast Asia for a volume to be published this spring. The present reviewer has tried broad generalizations in a study of "United States Foreign Policy in Asia" written for the

United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, treating the area as a whole in examining policy issues. Can this methodological divergence be reconciled by the sheer accumulation of additional monographic research, or will this have to wait until major theoretical breakthroughs take place, compelling to all of us?

The six studies assembled in this book prove nevertheless that substantial advances are taking place in the study of politics in non-Western countries. Most of the authors have done intensive field work in the country on which they write, after receiving graduate training in modern political science. The leaven of the inter-disciplinary approach which has increasingly gained acceptance in recent years shows results in these studies, sensitive to cultural, social, and economic factors. History as a determinant of the present is given its due. Primary sources are utilized extensively, including—which is most heartening—sources in the vernacular of the respective country. The authors did not only compile data, but created data through direct observations. As all the authors have been Professor Kahin's students it is difficult to decide to what extent the clarity of the text reflects their individual merits as authors or that of their teacher and editor. The same consideration applies even more to the judicious and balanced interpretation of events and situations. There is little in the treatment given to the various countries with which an informed person can take exception. The only noticeable dissonance is perhaps found in the treatment of South Vietnam, which conveys an impression of irritation with developments in that country that might be justified but, if so, would be equally warranted with regard to other countries which are discussed with greater equanimity.

Heresies of detail are almost completely absent and the list of suggested reading appended to each country study reliable and up-to-date. Among the younger generation of Southeast Asia area experts David A. Wilson, as author of the study on Thailand, Joseph Silverstein, who wrote the part on Burma, Herbert Feith, with his excellent treatment of Indonesia, J. Norman Palmer, contributing the study on Malaya, Wells C. Klein and Marjorie Weiner, jointly responsible for the part on Vietnam and David Wurfel, whose study of the Philippines goes further than the others in providing some comparative perspective, are scholars from whom one can expect in the future important contributions, judging by the standards of the present volume.

There is of course some uneveness in analytic depth as well as in style. The authors vary also in their treatment of the most challenging part of their studies, that of political process in the respective country. In some cases the unique characteristics of the respective country's political process have been grasped by the author and effectively communicated to the reader. In some other instances that part of the study does not go much beyond the more traditional description of the institutional framework of politics, in which constitutional provisions were given more attention than the way the process operates in reality. But on balance the volume is certainly more sophisticated than the one edited by Professor Mills ten years ago. While *Government and Politics of Southeast Asia* is not likely to sell as many copies as *The Ugly American* and Professor Kahin is not likely to be approached concerning movie rights, those interested in Southeast Asia will find it more profitable reading.—GUY J. PAUKER, *University of California, Berkeley.*

European Politics in Southern Rhodesia. BY COLIN LEYS. Oxford University Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 323.

In the rapidly changing pattern of Africa, developments within the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland may well play a decisive role. If racial partnership were genuinely established, the Federation might form the nucleus of a "third force" between white-dominated South Africa and African-run West Africa. If partnership remains merely a term with little or no concrete realization, white- and black-dominated states will ultimately confront each other in southern Africa.

Of more than local importance, therefore, is Colin Leys' excellent analysis of European politics in Southern Rhodesia, the key area within the Federation. Skilfully he describes the insulated character of European life, protected by law and convention against challenge by the majority Africans, and the relative homogeneity of the European community, which has spared it the racial and political divisions so obvious in South Africa. Out of these factors has arise a unique political situation which Mr. Leys calls a type of one-party system since the government and the opposition party have always displayed the same characteristics regardless of changing designations and personnel. Genuine alternation of parties in office has not taken place, he points out, because the white settler group with its *de facto* monopoly of political power has common economic interests, while the real opposition, the Africans, has had no effective influence within the constitutional system.

Two factors which might affect the strikingly stable political pattern of the past are economic expansion, stimulated by the development of electrical power at the Kariba dam, and the growth of African nationalism. So far the latter has been contained, in part by force as with the banning of the African National Congress early in 1959 under Emergency regulations. But Garfield Todd's Central African Party, with its open appeal for African support, provides a new factor which might crack the established political order in Southern Rhodesia, particularly if broadening economic opportunities lessen the pressures for European security which arose from limited resources and created the protective apparatus managing Rhodesian life.

Whatever happens in Rhodesia, Mr. Leys' book will remain essential reading. No one else has dealt so comprehensively with the Rhodesian scene, or exhibited so much insight into its basic characteristics. While the first part of the work sometimes appears overloaded with facts and statistics, often presented in the form of graphs, they underpin the absorbing sections on politics which follow. Though one may disagree with some of Mr. Leys' personal judgments on Rhodesian attitudes and future trends, his penetrating analysis of a highly complicated situation is significant not only for those interested in Africa but also for all students of the political process.—GWENDOLEN M. CARTER, *Smith College.*

The State and Economic Growth. Papers on a Conference held on October 11–13, 1956, under the auspices of the Committee on Economic Growth. EDITED BY HUGH G. AITKEN (Social Science Research Council, New York 1959. Pp. x, 389. $3.75.)

This is a symposium consisting of thirteen research monographs edited by Hugh J. Aitken, who also contributed an article on the Canadian experience. Approximately a dozen countries were selected for special study on the basis of a schema previously devised by another contributor to the present volume, Bert F. Hoselitz. The schema was outlined to the various athors who were asked to consider it as a selective and organizing device in preparing their material. In this way the Committee hoped to secure some unity of treatment while allowing adequate scope for comparative analysis. The characteristics of the schema used are briefly stated in the study:

> . . . the countries dealt with were classified in terms of three criteria: whether economic growth had been principally *expansionist*, through exploitation of unutilized resources, or *intrinsic*, through more intensive utilization of resources already in use; whether the economy was essentially self-contained and hence *dominant*, or highly dependent on foreign markets and resources and hence *nondominant* or *satellitic;* and whether economic growth was *autonomous* as a result of decisions by private agencies in pursuit of private goals, or *induced* as a result of decisions by the same agencies that made political decisions. It was further assumed that a country's position on any one of the three continua was independent of its position on each of the other two, so that eight types of growth were possible: (1) expansionist, dominant, autonomous; (2) expansionist, dominant, induced; (3) expansionist, nondominant, autonomous; (4) expansionist, nondominant, induced; (5) intrinsic, dominant, autonomous; (6) intrinsic, dominant, induced; (7) intrinsic, nondominant, autonomous; (8) intrinsic, nondominant, induced.

It is impossible here to discuss the selection of case examples of economic development, to comment adequately on individual papers, or to consider the factors which appear and reappear in growth situations. Each paper is a scholarly contribution by a person obviously well informed about a particular country. The material is ably summarized in an interpretative chapter prepared by Joseph J. Spengler. Equally as interesting as the material itself is the use of the schema previously described in the coordinated group research effort. On the whole the schema probably added something to the usefulness of the collected papers, and its employment here seems to mark progress toward understanding the causes of and obstacles to economic growth. Nevertheless, as the Chairman of the Committee on Economic Growth says in the Foreword, the contents of the volume make it clear that an adequate basis for empirical study of the influence of the state on economic growth is not yet established.—LAWRENCE L. DURISCH, *Tennessee Valley Authority.*

Socialism in Southern Asia. BY SAUL ROSE. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. 278. $4.50.)

The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia. BY T. H. SILCOCK. (Durham: University of North Carolina Press. 1959. Pp. xvii, 259. $4.00.)

Two Englishmen, an economist and a political scientist, examine the area of former

British rule in Asia and arrive at certain conclusions based upon their professional, national, and personal predilections. Both of them see unifying factors in South and Southeast Asia as well as the outstanding differences. The impact of British colonial rule is analyzed. Most importantly, both agree on the inadequacy of Western ideologies and institutions, capitalist or socialist in the Asian cultural context. Indigenous ideals and solutions are needed for Asia's problems.

However, here the similarity ends. Rose examines socialism as an ideology, and organized political force in Southern Asia, pointing out that at least six national governments in the region describe themselves as "socialist" in countries embracing the majority population of the region and the real problem is to distinguish between competing socialist parties. By South Asia, he means South and Southeast Asia from Pakistan to Indonesia. Silcock, on the other hand, confines his study to the Southeast Asia areas of Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sarawak, Brunai and North Borneo, with great emphasis on the first. Unlike Rose he tends to emphasize regional dissimilarity rather than affinity. But this is, perhaps, due to the fact that he is examining the actual framework of economic institutions in close relationship to historic social and political realities. Rose treats the socialist parties and ideologies of the area on a descriptive, country-by-country basis, whereas Silcock is more interpretative and analytical, following a functional rather than a country approach to his subject.

Rose tends to underestimate the forces of traditionalism and creative innovation at work in this area and therefore is able to conclude that the differences between Asian and Western Socialism can be reduced to mere questions of "tempo" over such questions as the rate of colonial liberation and industrialization and that the former has greatly moved in the direction of Western socialism. This conclusion however, must seem doubtful even to the author, for in a latter part of the book he indicates the primary importance of the charismatic leader to Asian socialism, points to the acute problem of peasantry, and reveals recent Asian socialist doubts about the all important role of the State as a means, and their new found appreciation of the need for decentralization and local autonomy. Moreover, he is willing to acknowledge the force of the challenge made by the Indian Socialist leader, Jayaprahash Narayan, for Asian socialists to adapt egalitarian Western socialist principles to Asian realities, through abandonment of class conflict, urban-oriented industrialization and the struggle for future control of State power (either by violent or parliamentary means) in favor of a morally-motivated, rural-directed mass movement aimed at "human reconstruction" in the living present.

Silcock is consistently doubtful concerning the utility of British colonial institutions for economic and social development. He rejects most of these as obstacles to future economic and political growth. In some telling paragraphs, he sharply criticizes British colonial rule for sacrificing Southeast Asian economic development to maintain obsolete irrelevant political superstructures and for ignoring the advantages of indigenous techniques of trade, credit, and capital formation, such as those developed by Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia. He believes the primary obstacle to economic development in Malaya and surrounding areas are non-economic in character. For example, he tellingly points to the too limited range, quantity and unsatisfactory quality of education for Asians, and points out that the British *ad hoc* political development envisaged training Asians for colonial type jobs performed by Europeans when they should have been searching for more suitable methods of training Asians to operate modern business and political institutions in an Asian cultural setting. He attacks existing economic institutions as inappropriate to local economies, and concludes that the character of the State and economy will be considerably modified as Asians take over from Europeans.—THOMAS A. RUSCH, *Los Angeles State College.*

Government and Politics in Pakistan. BY MUSHTAQ AHMAD. (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House. 1959. Pp. x, 265. $5.00.)

The Deputy Commissioner: A Study in Public Administration. BY A. H. ASLAM. (Lahore: Panjab University Press, 1957. Pp. vi, 58. $1.50.)

These two books by Pakistani scholars go a long way in helping to understand their country's politics and administration. Ahmad's work is not a treatise on constitution and government, but a critical review and interpretation of the political events in Pakistan since independence. Although the author deals with the roles of the heads of the State, the Prime Ministers and the Cabinets, the activities of the parliament and the political parties, the corruption in the civil service, the description lacks background information. For example, it is unclear when and why authority passed from one hand to the other, parliamentary control over the executive slackened, elections did not take place or were ignored. The primary purpose of the author is to bring to the fore the factors responsible for mismanagement, and to expose the ineptness of the past leaders in handling the affairs of the State. Ahmad's analysis shows that leadership being on the wane, government incessantly became unstable and corrupt. Civil servants, both at the center and the districts, became the catspaw of the ruling political groups and party leaders, serving the interests of the upper classes and ignoring the lot of the common man. Political parties emerged as a result of dissensions between personalities rather than on ideological grounds. The last chapter deals with the new administion which came into power in October 1958. Ahmad considers that the new regime of General Ayub Khan, in a short period, has shown exemplary restraint in the exercise of state power, and initiated various economic and social reforms. This government, unlike its predecessors, has the germs in which democracy will have "much better prospects of success."

While Ahmad deals with personalities and politics at the center, A. H. Aslam's pamphlet *The Deputy Commissioner* is of a more fundamental nature, a brief study of the administrative problems of a district. Since there is no parallel of the office of the Deputy Commissioner in the United States, whose unique position may bewilder any outsider unacquainted with the system of administration prevalent in Pakistan (as well as India) on the local level, it may be in order to briefly explain the nature and importance of this office.

The unit of administration in Pakistan is a district (division of a province or state), whose administrative head is a Deputy Commissioner. A district is divided into more than two tehsils, each tehsil compromising about a hundred villages, including towns and townships. A Deputy Commissioner is assisted by the heads of tehsils, the tehsildars, who are entrusted with similar but lesser powers; and touring officials (sub-divisional officers), and non-touring executive assistants. (In certain parts of India where the tehsildars have more power than in Pakistan, perhaps it would be more appropriate to call the tehsil rather than the district as the unit of administration.) The duties of the Deputy Commissioner are varied and numerous. He is the head of the executive and the judiciary; the collector of revenues; the chief of municipality; the custodian of government and public property; the co-ordinator of the diversified branches of government, e.g., agriculture, medicine, public works; and, the one official solely responsible for the maintenance of peace and prosperity of the district.

Aslam offers a critical survey of the office of the Deputy Commissioner, with useful suggestions for improvement. The author also briefly describes the origin and evolution of this office. Aslam, like Ahmad, is unhappy over the present role of the Pakistan Civil Service: "The common man in some instances has the feeling that the official is his tyrant rather than his benefactor." (p. 37). He is of the opinion that administration has slackened since partition: office work has increased; politicians are exerting undue pressures upon civil servants to gain favors; the feeling of insecurity has undermined the local influence of the Deputy Commissioner; and the salaries are so meagre as to create a temptation for corruption. The pamphlet is an important study in public administration but by no means the last word on the office of the Deputy Commissioner. It does not describe the practical aspects of district administration, e.g., problems concerning land tenure, collection of revenues, organization of tehsils. Some of the suggestions, e.g., touring of every village by the Deputy Commissioner (which should fall more in the realm of the tehsildar), may be disputable. Nevertheless, the publication is an excellent introduction to a unique system of administration successfully practised in the Indian sub-continent for centuries, and should be read with interest not only in Pakistan but in other countries of South Asia.

Both publications give a deep insight into the administrative and political problems faced by Pakistan, and offer an objective criticism of the governmental machinery. Both are nearly harmonious in their conclusions on administrative problems. Each is a valuable contribution in its own right, and should be useful to specialists in Asian politics and government.—K. D. Mathur, *The George Washington University.*

Die Ratebewegung in Russland 1905–1921. Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas, No. 5. By Oskar Anweiler. (Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1958. Pp. ix, 344.)

Political scientists who wrestle with the problem of seeing the ideals of democracy institutionalized in a practical form of government tend to accept constitutional government as we know it in the Western world as that form which comes closest to fulfilling the ideals. Occasionally, however, some have asserted that our century, if not preceding ones, has developed an alternative to constitutional government which is equally if not more true to democratic principles. That alternative is given by the institution of the *soviet*, or council.

Claims of this sort are made not only by the ideologists of the bolshevik regime, but also by some of its stanchest opponents. To be sure, Lenin claimed in 1917 that government by soviets was a higher and better form of democracy; that it was the first form of government which was truly of the people, by the people, and for the people. Contrary to present-day Soviet doctrine, the bolshevik leader did not always think so highly of the institution of soviets. His attitude prior to 1917 was marked by attitudes ranging from blazing hostitility to grudging acceptance of the workers' councils as temporary useful tools of the Party. Nor did Lenin's enthusiasm for the soviet form of government last much longer than the months of revolution. On the contrary, soon after the bolshevik seizure of power a conflict developed between the Communist Party and the soviets, which found dramatic expression in the Kronstadt revolt of 1921.

At Kronstadt, soviet government came to be seen as a democratic alternative to bolshevik dictatorship; and the experience of Kronstadt thus serves to support the belief in this form of government. While the author of the volume under the review refrains from discussing the problem of fitting the soviets into pre-socialist political theories, a task which might have yielded interesting information, he does refer to those historians who regard revolutionary councils as a recurrent form that has played its role in many previous revolutions—French, American, English, Swiss, and even Roman. Most recently, the spontaneous formation of revolutionary workers' councils in the anti-communist revolts of Poland and Hungary has revived such theorizing. Among others Hannah Arendt, in an article on the Hungarian events, has identified herself with the view that workers' councils constitute a meaningful alternative to constitutional government for communist countries seeking to incorporate democratic ideals.

Anweiler's scholarly study puts such theories into their proper perspective by giving a careful and, as much as possible, exhaustive history of Russian soviets, their actual formation, their influence on the theories of all the revolutionary leaders, and the role they played in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Some of the conclusion his book yields might be summarized as follows:

1. The soviets were not easily compatible with Lenist ideas. On the contrary, in a number of ways they were antithetical to them. They were therefore absorbed and adapted only after a good deal of resistance, and even afterwards there was no lack of ambiguity in the bolshevik position. There were, on the one hand, Lenin's glowing visions of the soviet state which was to fulfill the dubious promises which he and Marx had attributed to the Paris Commune of 1871. On the other hand, this was modified by a strictly pragmatic view which saw in the soviets no more than an expedient means for seizing power.
2. Anweiler shows the peculiar circumstances which gave rise to the Russian soviets and made them popular. Those who expect other revolutions to develop this form of organization or who think they can discover it in bygone revolutions should be aware of these peculiarities, which include not only traditions of cooperation such as prevailed among the Russian peasantry, but also the absence of any organizational structure in Russian society, especially among the working class, where trade unions, political parties, or other organizations hardly existed at the time the first soviets were formed.
3. Most important, the author demonstrates the unsuitability of soviets as organizations of stable democratic government, at least in societies marked by social differentation and group conflict. In Russia, for one thing, the soviets, despite their undeniable democratic traits, proved in effect to be convenient pathbreakers for bolshevik rule. The Russian soviets thus destroyed themselves, in all but formal fashion, and it seems unlikely that they could have done otherwise.

Anweiler's study is based on an impressive knowledge of Soviet and Western sources. It is carefully annotated and will inspire further research in this highly interesting field. It is a valuable addition to the growing literature dealing with the history of Soviet political institutions in a thoroughly scholarly fashion.—ALFRED G. MEYER, *Michigan State University.*

Elections and Party Management. BY HAROLD JOHN HANHAM. (New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1959. 125 galleys. $12.00.)

This excellent study is neither a "how to do it" manual, nor does it apply to the United States. It covers a phase of British party history from 1867 through 1885, a period during which British parties took on many of the characteristics by which we know them today. For the political scientist, Professor Hanham's work will prove most useful. It represents a tremendous amount of research, is well organized and written, and is spiced throughout with illustrative problems of the ordinary and extraordinary politicians of the time.

The first part deals with the different types of constituencies, and the early stages of evolution of the Conservative and Liberal parties. This is followed by a section on campaigning, registration and canvassing techniques, campaign finance, and corruption. Part III traces the development of the central party organizations and party finance.

Some of the significant themes which are dealt with are: (1) rise of the big industrial towns with masses of working-class electors in contrast to the old political world of counties and small towns; (2) emergence of the outlines of a two-party system with the first clear-cut appeals to electors to put one party or the other in power; (3) emergence of the party agent as a professional to gradually start to replace solicitors who had been generally identified with paid canvassing, corrupt practices, high fees, and "indifferent service"; and (4) considerable purification of elections through corrupt practices and ballot legislation, and disfranchisement of corrupt constituencies.

In a sense, it might be said that Mr. Hanham is trying to do for a 20-year period in British political parties what the late Leonard White did in his studies of earlier periods of public administration in the United States. Though the difficulties in this type of research are many, certainly one of the major ones is to find and utilize materials from the earlier period in such a way that light is thrown on what we today regard as the important and meaningful problems in the field. This Mr. Hanham does very well, from the way he goes about analyzing campaign and party finance to the manner in which constituencies are classified and compared.

The reviewer's major criticism of the book is its abrupt ending—abrupt, perhaps, because it still seemed that there was another function which could be performed and here was the place where the author might have been expected to do it. Throughout, the book gives the reader historical insights which help improve his understanding of contemporary British political parties. Some of these things are specifically pointed out, and others are there at least by implication. But nowhere are the major and minor themes all pulled together and systematically related to one another and to the present. For the American audience, an additional chapter might well have served a useful purpose.—IVAN HINDERAKER, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study. BY JOHN T. MARCUS. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1958. Pp. 207. $4.50.)

Professor Marcus calls this well documented little book a "case-study." It is, however, much more than that; it is at least a partial analysis of the twilight world of French national consciousness. Completed before the events of May 13 in Algiers and General de Gaulle's subsequent accession to power, this volume helps to explain the ready acquiesence of the French public to the "new experiment," and its rapid adjustment to changed conditions.

The author uses the defeat of the EDC proposal by the National Assembly in 1954 as the turning point in the development of a neutralist-nationalist ethic in France. He quite correctly describes the pressures (largely journalistic), which had been building before that time, as more anti-American than pro-Soviet. It was precisely this aspect of neutralism which made possible the alliance between non-Communist of the left and traditional nationalists of the right. The evolution of "Gaullism" as a complex of attitudes synthesizing the disparate, *Résistance*-inspired yearnings for internal social and economic reforms with cloudy visions of a France restored to international grandeur is sketched in an absorbing chapter. Professor Marcus happily does not fail to recognize that the break-up of the original Gaullist movement, the RPF, made possible the establishment of a truer Gaullism with a strong popular base by eliminating the excess baggage of political opportunism.

In his treatment of Gaullism the author has shed some light on this little understood phenomenon: why it is more a *mystique* than a movement; why its present institutional form, the UNR, contains too many internal contradictions to be assured a long life. The UNR, (as did the *Ralliement*), draws its inspiration from what Professor Marcus calls a "national sentiment which feels itself under no obligation to meet civic responsibilities that are identified not with the nation, but with the regime." It will be interesting to observe whether those who did so much to discredit and destroy the existing regime in May 1958 can long endure partnership with the traditional but more moderate rightists constituting the bulk of the UNR's cadres, and whether the most recent form of Gaullism will eventually come increasingly to lean on its small left-wing elements—as did the RPF in its post schism period.

The thesis of this volume, that a nationalist imperative to loosen France from its subsidiary role under United States tutelage meshed with a corresponding urge for reforms of the French social and economic system, is both useful and probably accurate. What is not fully explained here, however, is the diminished role of effective neutralism in the ultimate symbiosis. The happy dream of early proponents of neutralism was that France, beholden to neither camp in the Cold War, should serve as a "bridge" between East and West. Today this remains the theme only of those few who have stood apart from—and to the left of—the "new experiment." The pro-Western position of de Gaulle, if not his pro-Americanism, is unassailably firm. When all is said and done, however, this is not a serious weakness in the book. Perhaps one day Mr. Marcus will consider the point if he undertakes, (as I hope he will) a study of the second coming of de Gaulle.

One indication of where the author may turn in the interim is contained in an all together too short final chapter which suggests the development of parallel neutralist-nationalist ethics in Britain and West Germany. The evidence offered is tantalizing but hardly decisive. Mr. Marcus should be encouraged to exploit these openings further. As it is, he has written a book which certainly is essential reading for anyone who seeks insights to the political neurosis and the probable behaviour of present day France.—E. D. Godfrey, *Washington, D. C.*

Le Front Populaire et Les Elections de 1936. By Georges Dupeux. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1959. Pp. 183.)

This study of the last election of the Third Republic, by Georges Dupeux, of the University of Bordeaux, follows in the tradition established by the late André Siegfried and developed by François Goguel. In the first part of the book, which contains a particularly valuable account of the chronology of the depression in France, its incidence on various social groups, and the lag between the recovery (before the election) and public awareness of the recovery, M. Dupeux describes the background of the election and the formation of the Popular Front. In the second part, he discusses the campaign and analyzes the results of the two ballots. Clarity is enhanced by the use of four scatter-diagrams which, along with six of the dozen maps the book contains, are of large format and come in a separate envelope. Lastly, with the aid of maps, the author tests correlations between electoral and social geography. M. Dupeux is aware of the limitations of this method of determining the composition of the parties' electorates and he indicates his preference for the opinion survey, but no such data is available for 1936.

The book's most interesting finding concerns the shift in votes for the Popular Front between the first and second ballots. In the districts where the poorly placed Popular Front candidates withdrew in favor of the leading one, the Popular Front lost 250,000 votes, the loss being greatest where the leading candidate was a Communist, least where he was a Radical. M. Dupeux deduces the hypothesis that some Radical voters became frightened at the extent of the Popular Front's success on the first ballot and deserted it at the second, even where the leading candidate was a Radical. On this hypothesis, he argues that the behavior of the Radical voters at the second ballot presaged from the start the withdrawal of the Radical party from the Popular Front majority. I wish that M. Dupeux had probed this question further. Was the loss of votes for each kind of Popular Front candidate generalized or localized? Did the Radicals who won on diminished totals later behave any differently from those who held the first-ballot vote? I wish also that M. Dupeux had told us more about the situation of the Radicals who opposed the Popular Front. The Radicals are still a great unknown, and we need all the information about them that we can get.—ROY PIERCE, *University of Michigan.*

The Italian Socialist Movement: Origins (1860–1882). BY RICHARD HOSTETTER. (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1958. Pp. xii, 444. $6.50.)

This is the first installment of a projected three-volume history of Italian socialism. The present volume deals with the confused beginnings of the socialist movement during the the first twenty years of Italy's existence as a unified nation. Attention is focused on the ideological battles between Mazzini, Bakunin, and Marx-Engels. An excellent account is given of the gradual waning of Mazzini's influence over the Italian left. The centerpiece of the book is concerned with the perennially fascinating subject of Bakunin in Italy. Dr. Hostetter describes how the incredible Russian, at times a shrewd propagandist, managed to gain control of the Italian section of the First International, only to lose it by sponsoring ill-conceived attempts at violent social revolution. During the decade of the 1880's Italian socialism began to abandon the Bakuninist program in favor of the more modest but less hazardous path of piecemeal social reform via constitutional means. But the movement emerged from its formative period in a state of acute ideological confusion, "saddled . . . with a schizoid program" formulated by Andrea Costa, who could not make up his mind on the issue of revolution or evolution. The author concludes that the seeds of the schisms which were subsequently to be so disastrous for Italian socialism were sown in its early history.

This work is written with care and in a style noteworthy for its forcefulness and clarity, but, despite its mammoth size, it should not be mistaken for a definitive treatment of its subject. By his own admission, the author has relied mainly on secondary sources, supplementing published monographs only where they do not exist or where they "differ appreciably in their conclusions." There is no evidence in his research apparatus that he has worked with available unpublished records and documents. In this respect, the book suffers in comparison with Professor Aldo Romano's *Storia del movimento socialista in Italia* (three volumes published in 1954, six additional ones planned), which is likely to remain the definitive study of Italian socialism for some time to come. With these facts in mind, it seems difficult to justify the kind of multi-volumed work which Dr. Hostetter is engaged in producing.

This reviewer cannot help but believe that, in the interest of the economy of scholarly resources, Dr. Hostetter might have more profitably employed his considerable talents by engaging in research in an area less intensively cultivated by able Italian historians. Romano, it is true, needs some correcting, for he sees his history too much through the glasses of Karl Marx. And yet, taken *cum grano salis*, his history is still reliable, as Mr. Hostetter himself attests by the countless occasions on which he cites the Italian as his principal, or even sole, authority. Furthermore, Mr. Hostetter himself is not without his presuppositions. As Hegel would remind us: "Even the . . . historian who perhaps believes . . . that he is merely receptive, merely surrendering himself to his data, is not passive in his thinking. He brings his categories with him and sees his data through them." It is, therefore, regrettable that, while calling into question Romano's "canons of historiography," our author remains so inarticulate about his own.—DANTE GERMINO, *Wellesley College.*

The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice. BY W. W. KULSKI (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1959. Pp. 524. $8.00 Trade, $6.00 Text.)

This is the third, somewhat abridged edition of a work that originally appeared in 1954. Professor Kulski hopes that knowledge of Russian reality "provides the answer to those who hesitate between political democracy and the Soviet regime." The younger generation in particular, he comments, "should avoid the pitfall of believing that a better world is being built in the Soviet Union." The author makes extensive use of Soviet materials in drawing up a comprehensive indictment of the Communist system. The detailed criticism is trenchant and persuasive. However, the reader may well wonder whether the Soviet regime viewed as a whole might not have certain advantages or attractions, unmentioned in this book, which account for its place of prominence in the world. In a final chapter Profesor Kulski concedes that several reforms have taken place since Stalin's death, but concludes that the regime is basically the same.

Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich: Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und Die Freien Gewerkschaften 1890–1900. By Gerhard A. Ritter (Berlin-Dahlem: Colloquium Verlag. 1959. Pp. 256. 18 DM.)

This careful, scholarly, somewhat partisan study of the German workers' movement in the last decade of the 19th century brings to the reader much interesting material. It was in this ten year span that the Socialist Party moved from its position as something of a State within a State to a position fitted into the cultural and political pattern of the German nation. Dr. Ritter gives credit to the Socialist representatives in the various Landtages for being ahead of their colleagues in the Reichstag in understanding that reform and not utopianism was the best road to practical political success. In some regions, of course, the Socialists couldn't get much of a toehold (Überall dringt Bildung durch, nur noch nicht in Mecklenburg!) and the author intelligently points up the problems faced in trying to win over the peasants and make significant inroads into the Catholic trade unions. All in all, however, Dr. Ritter has done a good job in documenting and analyzing a lively period in the history of German Socialism.—Milton Colvin.

Recht und Organisation der Parlamente. Hrsg. im Auftrage der Interparlamentarischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft. Comp. by W. Burhenne. (Bielefeld, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1958. One vol., looseleaf.)

The West German Interparliamentary Working Group, with headquarters at Bonn, representing the collective interests of the Federal Parliament and of the State Parliaments, has been publishing since October, 1957, the weekly *Parlamentsspiegel*, and has now prepared a basic handbook covering these parlaiments in one volume. It includes the constitutions of the Federal Republic and of the States, the rules of procedure for each parliament, the electoral laws for each jurisdiction, the membership of each body, the political party representation in each body, etc. The statutes and rules of the Working Group are also included. There is provision for various additional sections, to include among other things a section on the history of each body. The handbook is concluded by a considerable bibliography pertinent to the points covered. —(J.B.C.)

Islamic Law in the Modern World. By J. N. D. Anderson. (New York: New York University Press. 1959. Pp. xx, 100. $2.75.)

This slender volume makes available to a wider audience the lectures by J. N. D. Anderson at the School of Law of New York University in 1958. The author, a professor of Oriental Law at the University of London, is primarily concerned with the way in which a theoretically divine and immutable law governing the whole range of human conduct has been adapted to changing social conditions. He describes some of the "ingenious devices" by means of which large parts of the Shari'a (classical Muslim law) have been replaced by more advanced Western codes. The slow process of modernization is pungently illustrated by separate chapters on the Islamic law of marriage and divorce, and inheritance. In justifying the new Tunisian Law of Personal Statute, President Bourguiba went further than most Muslim leaders in stating frankly that, "ideas which were valid in the past, today offend the human spirit—such as polygamy, divorce as the law now stands, and all the problems to which these give rise in modern life." The modifications introduced in Tunisia (1957) and Morocco (1958) show the extent to which Muslim nationalists will sponsor Western-inspired reforms after the elimination of Western political rule.

"There can be little doubt," concludes Professor Anderson, "that the secularization of the law (in large part at least) is here to stay, since lawyers, judges and legislators are all increasingly drawn from the ranks of those who received a Western and secular education." In addition, he continues, the dogma that legislation deriving from popular sovereignty must be enforced, inevitably weakens the hold of classical law. This book is all too brief, and somewhat repetitive because of the lecture format. Fortunately, it contains a useful select list of books and articles on Islamic law in English and French. In sum, Professor Anderson's lectures are a felicitous introduction to the subject.—Bernard E. Brown, *Vanderbilt University*.

Iraq: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. By George L. Harris, *et al.* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc. 1958. Pp. 350. $7.00)

This attractively published volume is a welcome addition to the *Survey of World Cultures* series of the Human Relations Area Files affiliated with Yale University. Competently edited and carefully written by six research associates of HRAF, it is a distinct contribution to the growing body of Middle Eastern publications presently available in the United States. The book is divided into 22 chapters, broadly ranging from the historical and geographic setting through social organization and political behavior to such topics as the financial, industrial system, family, values and patterns of living. As in the case of most symposia, the chapters are often quite uneven, some probing into many technical details and minor ramifications while others offering a "once-over" treatment with a quick brush stroke. There is one other notable difficulty, namely, that some topics are now quite out-of-date as a result of the violent revolution of July 1958, (especially the chapters dealingwith foreign trade, Westernization or prevailing national attitudes), while others have maintained a level of generality and accuracy marred by recent political developments.

Congress Rule in Bombay: 1952 to 1956. By Aloos J. Dastur and Usha Mehta. (Bombay: Popular Book Depot. 1958. Pp. xiv, 205. Rs 7.50.)

Its title notwithstanding, this book deals only obliquely with the Congress administration in Bombay state. The first half is a description and analysis of the behavior of the "Opposition" in the Bombay state legislature during a period of overwhelming Congress strength. Included is an analysis of Opposition members' attitudes on the Opposition's function and on the conduct of the majority. The second half consists of an opinion survey (based on an elaborate questionnaire) among select literate, middle-class publics with respect to the Congress' handling of seven major public policy problems. These reports are the fruits of studies conducted by the Department of Civics and Politics of the University of Bombay. The second of these studies is left to speak for itself; the first is made to sustain a rather dismal prognosis on the chances for the emergence of a unified, responsible Opposition.—Frank O. Miller, *Ohio State University.*

Political Tendencies in Japanese Small Enterprises, with special reference to the Social Democratic Party. By Allan B. Cole. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1959. Pp. 155. mimeo. $3.00.)

Our knowledge of practical politics in Japan has long been seriously handicapped by an almost complete absence of scholarly writing by either Japanese or foreign investigators on the subject of interest groups. Professor Cole is to be congratulated for this pioneering reconnaissance of a particular segment of this rich and promising field. He is concerned primarily with the recent emergence in Japan of politically conscious and active organizations representing the interests of small and medium enterprises and with the national and local relationships between these and the Japanese Socialist Party.

Neither the Japanese nor Professor Cole have solved very satisfactorily the problem of defining or distinguishing small and medium enterprises, but in general they tend to restrict these to firms with less than 200 employees. These are said to constitute 99.8 per cent of the total number of Japanese business establishments—a somewhat gross category—and to supply a livelihood for 15 to 20 million people. Historically, such firms have been traditionally organized, highly fragmented, and conservatively disposed. Yet, if the Socialist Party is to achieve any real parity with the Conservative Party, it must capture a sizable portion of their vote. Professor Cole explains how they have already made significant advances in this direction and how they hope to improve upon these.—Robert E. Ward, *University of Michigan.*

Journal officiel de la Communauté. Recueil des actes et informations. Vol. 1, No. 1, February 15, 1959. (Paris: Direction des Journaux Officiels. Irregular, at least once a month. 1,000 fr. a yr.)

Under the French Constitution of 1958, the French Republic and the Overseas Territories accepting it as republics constitute the French Community. The competence of the Community extends over foreign relations, defense, money, economic and financial common policy as well as policy of strategic materials, also except by especial agreements, control of justice, higher education, and general and common organization of foreign transport and communications. The President of the French Republic presides over and represents the French Community. The Conseil Executif, the Sénat, and the Cour arbitral constitute the special agencies of the Community. The republics of Senegal, Central Africa, Congo, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Madagascar, Niger, Soudan, Chad are the overseas members of the Community, and the constitution of each is reproduced in No. 5 dated June 15, 1959.

The Sénat of 284 members was convoked in the first of its semiannual sessions in July, 1959, and its debates (*Compte rendu* integral des séances) are printed as a separate series of the *Journal officiel de la Communauté.*—(J. B. C.)

Digesto constitucional americano. Compilación actualizada de los 23 Estatutos que rigen la existencia de las Naciones que integran las Américas. BY ANTONIO ZAMORA. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad. 1958. Pp. 985. $100.00 m/n/.)

The Spanish text is given for the constitutions of all the American countries including even Canada and Puerto Rico and the Charter of the Organization of the American States. The compiler has included the Argentine Constitution of 1853 with the amendments of 1957, and the Venezuelan Constitution of 1953.—(J.B.C.)

Manual de la organizacion del gobierno de Chile. 1959. BY THE DEPARTAMENTO DE ESTUDIOS FINANCIEROS, MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA. (Santiago: Chile, Depto. de Estudios Financieros. 1959. Pp. 318.)

This is one of the very few up-to-date detailed manuals of the organization of the government in the other American republics. The volume is about 45 pages larger than the edition for 1958, and is printed in a larger and more legible type. The present edition, which is the third, is supplemented by a two-volume *Manual de la administración pública de Chile, 1959,* containing a general statement about government planning, budget and personnel, as well as a compilation of the basic laws, regulations and schedules.—(J.B.C.)

Liberia's past and present. BY NATHANIEL R. RICHARDSON. (London: Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co. 1959. Pp. 348. $8.00.)

The author, who is the Superintendent of Public Printing of Liberia, gives a description of many present-day aspects of the Government of Liberia that are nowhere else to be found available. There is a biographical section, including particularly the members of Congress and government officials.—(J.B.C.)

Nigerian official publications, 1869–1959: a guide. BY HELEN F. CONOVER. (Washington, D. C.: General Reference and Bibliography Division, Library of Congress. 1959. Pp. xii, 153.)

In view of the impending independence of Nigeria in 1960, this first systematic attempt to bring together the record of the previous official publications of Nigeria under British rule and guidance seems particularly pertinent. The work has been divided into three parts in the reverse chronological order: 1. 1947–1959, 2. 1923–1946, and 3. 1861–1922.—(J.B.C.)

Directory of the Republic of the Sudan, 1959, including trade index and biographical section. (London: The Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co. 1959. Pp. 180. 25 s.)

This is the second edition taking into account the changes that have occurred following the peaceful Coup d'Etat of November 17, 1958, when the Constitution was suspended, Parliament dissolved, and political parties abolished. There is a full directory of the diplomatic corps in Khartoum as well as one of the Sudan diplomatic and consular missions abroad.—(J.B.C.)

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
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Washington, D. C.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW, ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS

Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age. By Arthur N. Holcombe. (New York: New York University Press. 1959. Pp. xvii, 245. $3.75.)

Can the United Nations be made stronger and more effective without at the same time ending the cold war? The usual negative answer to this question has inhibited attempts to strengthen the United Nations, but the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace takes a positive approach in its Eleventh Report.

Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, the Chairman of the Commission, posits that it is in the interest of the nuclear powers to end the cold war. He asserts, in one of the three supporting studies included in this volume, that an agreement to end the cold war is not only possible but more likely than the irrational and suicidal alternative of a hot war with nuclear weapons. Up to now the United Nations has been used more as a forum for cold war propaganda than as an agency for the promotion of international peace and security. When it is generally understood that the nuclear powers are unlikely to survive long in the nuclear age without an agreement to end the cold war, however, "the desirable improvement of the international lawmaking process and the concomitant expansion of the role of politics in the organization of peace will be matters of no insuperable difficulty." And in the expansion of the role of politics in the organization of peace, says Professor Holcombe, lies the solution to the problem of keeping the peace in the nuclear age.

Among the measures proposed for the improvement of the international lawmaking process and the encouragement of rational politics is the achievement of universality of membership in the United Nations as quickly as possible and an expansion of the membership of the Security Council to make it a more representative body. Especially is it deemed desirable to strengthen the influence in the Security Council of those middle powers that are large contributors to the purposes of the Organization. This would facilitate international legislation by the method of consensus and would contribute to an expansion of the useful role of politics in the organization of peace.

Professor Holcombe sees in the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency a striking example of a creative act of international legislation. The story of the establishment of the IAEA is presented as a case study in international legislation in a supplementary paper by John G. Stoessinger. The third supplementary paper is a statement on "The Role of Law" by Professor Quincy Wright.

The Commission's Report, which precedes these supporting papers, consists of two parts: ten recommendations concerning law and politics and eight recommendations concerning the atom. While the second part deals with the specific problem of investing the UN with more power to deal with the use of atomic energy, it is seen as pointing the way in which international machinery could be utilized to promote, harmonize, and regulate international interest, thereby strengthening the legal fabric of world order. Other recommendations to this end include a broadened interpretation of the Charter, an expanding role for the Secretary-General as well as for the International Court of Justice in the settlement of international disputes, the withdrawal by the United States of its reservation of unilateral competence to determine which matters fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, the creation of new international service agencies within the framework of the United Nations, an increasing use of quasi-legislative procedures, the achievement of universality of membership, and the enlargement of the Security Council.

There would be general agreement by students of international organization on the desirability of implementing the Commission's recommendations, though some would join with the several members of the Commission who entered a reservation making clear their opposition to the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China under present conditions, and some might join Professor Chamberlin in questioning whether an enlargement of the Security Council would assure "a more realistic and equitable distribution" of seats. Perhaps the great value of the Commission's Report is in presenting to the public what is in effect a consensus of the opinion of scholars on how the United Nations might be strengthened. There is probably no such general agreement, however, on the *possibility* of implementing the Commission's recommendations.—Charles D. Hounshell, *Emory University.*

A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940–1945. By Ruth B. Russell. Assisted by Jeannette E. Muther. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1958. Pp. xviii, 1140. $10.00.)

It is now fourteen years since the weary delegates at the San Francisco Conference affixed their signatures to the international document that brought the United Nations into being. Detailed accounts of the genesis and drafting of the Charter have been slow in appearing. Perhaps the principal reason for the delay was the widespread knowledge that the job was being undertaken by the late Leo Pasvolsky, the one man in the United States best qualified by training and governmental experience to prepare such a historical account. He had guided the research activities of the Department of State in all problems of the post-war settlements, and he had been a top-level participant in both the Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco meetings. His personal influence upon the structure and functions of the United Nations was not exceeded by that of any other man in or out of the Government. Dr. Pasvolsky's untimely death made it necessary for his devoted and able staff at the Brookings Institution to re-organize their activities. Though a large group continued to collaborate on the research, the actual drafting of the manuscript was assigned to Miss Ruth Russell, who had been Dr. Pasvolsky's confidential assistant in the State Department and who had accompanied him when he left the Government to join Brookings. To this formidable task, she has devoted most of her time for the past five years and more. The result fully justifies the effort. The book is long and detailed, but the complex story of the evolution of the Charter could not have been effectively told in a shorter compass without sacrificing the utility of the volume to present and future scholars. Indeed, the necessity of compression has been such that much of the color and drama of that turbulent time will have to be sought elsewhere. This is a book by and for scholars and, as such, it is brilliantly successful.

To this reviewer, who like many others had the opportunity to watch developments from inside the State Department, the most extraordinary feature of Miss Russell's book is the way in which the complicated threads of the narrative are woven together into a coherent and understandable whole. Though she and her associates have examined a formidable documentation—much of it in still unpublished State Department records which were made available for examination—the author was never overwhelmed by her material.

The long and complex story of the Security Council voting arrangements is set forth from the beginning until the climactic moment when Soviet opposition yielded rather than wreck the Conference and the future international organization. Nowhere else is this part of the birth of the United Nations told with as much detail or as much sensible balance in interpretation. It should be read—though it will not be—by all who believe that the Great Power veto in the Security Council was a diabolic Russian invention to hamstring the United Nations in its efforts to maintain the peace.

Equally lucid is the analysis of war-time American attitudes concerning the prospects of Great-Power cooperation in the post-war period. Miss Russell agrees that higher American officials generally took an optimistic view, particularly after the Moscow Conference of 1943, but she does point out that this optimism was neither universally held nor uncritically accepted even by those who had decided that they would use it as a working hypothesis. Actually, wartime emotions tend to foster strange myopic judgments about the future. Allied leaders were so concerned over what they saw as the main problem of future peace, i.e., preventing the rearmament of Japan and Germany, that their thinking seldom broke out of this limited pattern. The scent of faded roses hovers over such solemn judgments as that represented by Roosevelt's effort to persuade Churchill to help strengthen China as a Great Power because China would be "a very useful power in the Far East to help police Japan."

But even if the world of less than two decades later is far removed from the world anticipated by the war-time statesmen, the fact remains that there was established, for the first time in history, an international organization in which all great powers were members, to help keep the peace. Miss Russell's book is the definitive record of the way in which this came about. It is a magnificent work.—Grayson Kirk, *Columbia University.*

The United Nations As a Political Institution. By H. G. Nicholas. (London: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. 222. $3.40.)

Politics in the United Nations: A Study of

United States Influence in the General Assembly. By Robert E. Riggs. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1958. Pp. vi, 208. $4.50.)

In the slowly accumulating literature about the United Nations, three *genres* can be discerned. One contains the often rigorous but sometimes irrelevant exercises in exegesis which view the Organization and its Charter as a species of positive law. Another—perhaps the most numerous and, alas for the scholar, usually the most widely read—furnishes general background for the layman in a journalistic or polemical vein, often including pleas for action on the part of the policy maker. The third category is primarily descriptive, seeing the UN as a political phenomenon to be studied and, if possible, understood.

The latter category includes the textbooks, the studies of national attitudes toward the UN, and the examinations by doctoral candidates of sometimes obscure aspects of the institutional life of the world organization. Increasingly political scientists are coming to look at the UN as a going concern, characterized by phenomena and stigmata reminiscent of other forms of political life, in particular the legislative process familiar at every level from village to nation. As the years pass and experience accumulates, the art of comparative politics becomes more and more applicable to studies of the UN.

Both of these books are written on the assumption that the United Nations lends itself to analysis traditionally concerning itself with pressure groups, blocs, legislative tactics, and other paraphernalia of parliament or Congress. Both approach the UN as a political institution rather than as an ideology or as a problem in constitutionalism.

There are other similarities. Both authors find themselves somewhere near the middle of the political road, concerned for the success of the UN but disclaiming excessive idealism or unrealistic expectation. Both are in agreement that, lacking a genuine consensus relating to primary political values, the UN must be taken for what it is—a voluntary association of sovereign states, not a government. And neither would press the legislative analogy very far beyond where it can presently be located.

Here the similarities cease. Mr. Nicholas, Nuffield Reader in the Comparative Study of Institutions at Oxford, has written for the sophisticated layman who knows little or nothing about the UN. He devotes the first 62 pages to a summary history of the organization and its origins, then deals with each broad sector of its institutional life: the Security Council, Assembly, ECOSOC, and Trusteeship Council, and the role of the Secretariat. Rather then asking once more if the UN is "a good thing," he takes it as a given and asks what it is like and how it works.

But there is nothing banal about these half-descriptive, half-analytical essays. The commentary is intelligent, balanced, and often imaginative. When Mr. Nicholas articulates common criticisms or suggests possibly extravagant conclusions, he balances these with offsetting common sense. The UN, he seems to be saying throughout, should be approached pragmatically. Each major aspect of its work (with the possible exception of the ECOSOC institutional complex and the Human Rights program) contributes something useful and constructive, albeit imperfect, to the cause of international peace and political well-being.

Mr. Nicholas has neglected to supply footnotes, no particular hardship except where a reference remains tantalizingly unpursuable. His book is written with grace and sometimes wit, qualities frequently in short supply when footnotes are the most copious. The ubiquitous French and Latin tags doubtless offer no challenge to the Oxford audience.

Mr. Riggs' book not only has footnotes but also is written primarily for the serious student of the subject. To develop his inquiry into American influence in the General Assembly, the author is necessarily more focussed and explicit than Mr. Nicholas. His paramount questions are: To what extent do American policies prevail in the Assembly? and How is this degree of influence achieved? His method is to examine first the techniques of influence, and then its extent. At the end he presents analyses of voting patterns reflecting the American relationship to the UN majority on selected issues. His major conclusion is that the United States has done very well indeed, never having failed to have its way on matters it deemed of major importance.

That American policy-makers are no longer so certain of their parliamentary potency underscores the fact that much of the research for this book was done in 1955; the voting statistics actually end with 1954. The overall picture has not changed as drastically since as some would have us believe, but some things have altered. The membership is now 82 and still growing. Suez and Hungary in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958 represented issues of a rather new order of magnitude. The majority-minority profile of the organization has undergone further changes reflecting both the still-growing Afro-Asian-(Communist) voting strength, and on the other hand the unanimous resolutions which more often reflect innocuity than genuine consensus. Some official participants would doubtless quarrel with details of Mr. Riggs' examples of American pressure tactics. Some of the crucial data about the handling of the Palestine issue, which he emphasizes as a case in point, necessarily remain unavailable to the scholarly world. I was not happy to see the American defense against the Communist germ warfare charge subsumed under the heading of "United States Propaganda." And American tactics in seeking the condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor in Korea need to be examined not only in the light of diplomatic and parliamentary amenities but also in the context of a nation—and an international organization—at war.

Yet, in the main, Mr. Riggs' approach seems to me fair and balanced, and his book is a constructive contribution to the literature. His chief recommendation is that we add to our diplomatic arsenal the capacity to lose voting tests gracefully. Projections into the next decade make this advice something more than academic.—LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958. EDITED BY PAUL E. ZINNER. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1959. Pp. xxiv, 568. $6.95.)

The United States in World Affairs, 1958. BY RICHARD P. STEBBINS. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1959. Pp. x, 479. $6.00.)

Even by cold war standards 1958 was a year of acute political crises. First there were the events in the Middle East which led to military intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom in Lebanon and Jordan; then, the renewed hostilities in the Taiwan Strait; and finally, the ominous Soviet moves concerning West Berlin. In addition, during 1958: Nikita Khrushchev became Chairman of the U.S.S.R.'s Council of Ministers; the fourth Republic fell and Charles de Gaulle was elected President of France's new regime; military officers assumed power in several South and Southeast Asian states; Vice President Nixon received less than hospitable treatment in Latin America; the liquidation of colonialism in Africa quickened; the economic, military and scientific race between East and West was intensified; and, negotiations were inaugurated concerning the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The meaning of these and other significant events of 1958 is perceptively examined, and United States policy with regard to them carefully chronicled, documented and analyzed in the Council on Foreign Relations' annual series. Both volumes maintain the high standards of scholarship which have made these publications invaluable sources for students of international affairs.

Mr. Zinner exercised excellent judgement in selecting documents which both illuminate the year's events and are of lasting importance. The voluminous correspondence between Chairman Bulganin and later Chairman Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, a prominent feature of 1958, sets forth in detail the positions of East and West on a wide range of world issues. Despite its obvious propaganda content, this correspondence clearly delineates the central issues in competitive coexistence. Letters to the President from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations illustrate the domestic controversy surrounding certain aspects of United States foreign policy. Perhaps the only important document not included is General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) which provided for the establishment of the United Nations Special Fund an occurrence clearly attributable to United States policy. It would be helpful if future volumes of the *Documents* consistently included the nature of the divisions on UN resolutions, or at least the United States position. The present volume does this occasionally, but does not indicate, for example, that the United States failed to vote with the major colonial powers (as France would have desired) on the draft resolution on Algeria, an important departure from previous policy.

Mr. Stebbins' analyses in *The United States in World Affairs* are thoughtful, lucid and well written. With the exception of the negotiations concerning the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, which are discussed without reference to their strategic implications, he probes the motivations behind the various diplomatic moves and explores their meaning, as well as one can at such an early date. When necessary, earlier events are brought in, and new interpretations such as those Walter Lippmann derived from his interview with Mr. Khrushchev are skillfully integrated into the basically chronological text.

Both volumes convey the disquiet that gripped the United States in early 1958 when the repercussions of the Soviet earth satellites were still felt, and later with each successive crisis. But while this disquiet produced ample expression of the need for new policies, few significant changes were actually made. Whether more radical revisions were necessary will emerge only in future volumes of the Council's series.—Harold Karan Jacobson, *University of Michigan.*

Alliance Policy in the Cold War. By Arnold Wolfers, editor. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1959. Pp. lx, 314. $6.00.)

The intrigues, frustrations, and successes of coalition warfare have claimed a proper share of the attention of historians and political scientists. Coalition peacefare has been less thoroughly chronicled and less closely analyzed. From an American point of view the neglect is especially unfortunate, for, as Hans Morgenthau writes in the volume at hand, "while once we were, on principle, against all 'entangling alliances,' now we are, again on principle, in favor of all alliances" (210–211). Have we gone unwisely from one extreme to another? How do the various parts of what Arnold Wolfers calls our alignment system fit together? How well does that system serve our proximate aims in various parts of the world? It is enough to concern ourselves with security in the present, or should we, as Paul Nitze urges, strive to build as well a new world order? With how much or how little skill have we adapted the instruments available to the types of states we must deal with? How well or how badly have we combined the idea of collective security and the practice of collective defense? What shifts in method and aim are required by the political and technological changes of the present and future? What needs and what assumptions have guided the Soviet Union in its own alliance policies?

This catalogue of questions, though by no means complete, indicates the scope of the book. It is a merit merely to raise the right questions, the important and difficult ones. It is a greater merit still to put forth answers of cogency that face difficulties squarely. This the ten contributors to the present volume have done. The cogency is gained from a tendency that runs through the different essays, namely: to write in a way that enables the reader to know immediately not only how the authors look upon the past and the present but also what they think the implications of their analyses are for the future. Thus in different ways Arnold Wolfers and Erich Hula examine our attitudes toward collective security, the effects of our actions upon our interests and upon the structure and functioning of the United Nations, and the extent to which we have been led astray by erroneous principle, by inadvertence, and by circumstance. They conclude, in agreement, that the course of future wisdom lies in moving from attempts to secure enforcement action through the United Nations to emphasis upon the United Nations as an instrument of conciliation and mediation. Thus James King, Jr., and Roger Hilsman, in separate essays, mark the point in our military and alliance strategies to which policy and technology have brought us, note what possibilities are open to us for the future, and urge upon us those that we should actively pursue. Thus Robert Good explains not merely how we have deported ourselves when faced with the conflict between colonialism and our anti-colonial sentiments and interests but also suggests the attitudes and actions appropriate to a postcolonial era.

The separate essays are, in short, characterized by their practical relevance as well as by clarity of analysis and sufficiency of data. Taken together they gain by a principle of cumulation. What is struck a glancing blow by one author is taken up in detail by another. What is looked at from one perspective in a particular essay is examined from a different angle in another place. The book possesses a coherence that is seldom found in the product of a collective effort.—Kenneth N. Waltz, *Swarthmore College.*

NATO and American Security. Edited by Klaus Knorr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. vii, 342. $6.00.)

For years, American military policy has been based largely on deterrence. Fairly certain that the sheer madness of mutual suicide would prevent the Soviet Union from any too-provocative step, few of us have found it necessary to look beyond this concept. Increasingly, however, it has become clear that with the remarkable advances of Soviet strength, deterrence may no longer be viable, but may instead be a flight from policy. Last summer, for example, when the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy inquired into the consequences of a hypothetical "limited" nuclear attack on the United States, it found that the likely effects would be 50 million Americans dead and 20 million wounded. Europeans in particular have been tempted to ask, with carnage of this magnitude in mind: Would the United States in fact carry out its deterrent threat if Soviet aggression were directed at territories other than the United States itself?

And most recently, as an approaching "missile gap" has been conceded, another question has arisen: Is the time imminent when the margin of Soviet missile superiority will be so wide that the Kremlin will feel emboldened to take extremely provocative steps with relative impunity? These two questions—of American willingness, and then of ability, to use its might in the defense of Europe—have led to a crisis in NATO. It is, as Professor Knorr writes at the outset of this book, a crisis of confidence, and the alliance is under severe strain as a result. For the first time, each of the NATO allies may have to ask itself whether it may need its own nuclear deterrent, and beyond that, whether membership in the alliance is even worth the risk. In order to explore these questions, and the context in which decisions may be made, Professor Knorr has sought the views of eleven distinguished contributors (Roger Hilsman, Cyril Black and Frederick J. Yeager, George W. Rathjens, Jr., Malcolm W. Hoag, Morton A. Kaplan, A. L. Burns, Thomas C. Shelling, Denis Healey, Gordon A. Craig, and Paul H. Nitze).

The book is a symposium rather then a composite of their views. Each of the "chapters" might stand alone, and there is some repetition. The tendency to refer the reader to other books when the precise point under discussion has been made authoritatively a few pages earlier by a collaborating author is particularly annoying. This lack of coordination extends to the separate discussions of policy, where not surprisingly, several of the contributors disagree.

While there is substantial agreement that "independent" nuclear deterrents would be a dangerous and costly course, and that a joint arrangement would be preferable though difficult, such consensus exists on few other issues.

Thus Malcolm Hoag points out that NATO members have done little with civil defense, which he regards as an alternative form of protection with potentially "sizeable payoffs," since to the degree that a hardened target requires a greater attacking force, civil defense becomes an important aspect of deterrence. Rathjens, on the other hand, without reference to Hoag's argument, asserts that former Secretary Acheson and the RAND Corporation are "unduly optimistic" on the value of a civil defense program. Rathjens offers no evidence for this view; he simply concludes that "there may be nothing in defense, active or passive."

Similarly, Denis Healey's explanation of British hopes for "passive deterrence" seems undermined by much else in this book. A "passive deterrent" in Healey's usage consists of nuclear forces so protected, so dispersed, and so large, that his distinction between "passive" and "active" deterrents sounds much like American distinctions between a "first" and "second-strike" force. If this is so, then expectations that the "passive deterrent" is simpler to achieve than the "active deterrent" may prove disappointing. Morton Kaplan makes this point, and Paul Nitze concludes that "to provide nuclear systems which could survive an initial Soviet strike is no easy or cheap task, particularly with limited geographic resources."

The broad-gauged chapters by Knorr, Hilsman, and Nitze achieve their purpose of laying out the lines along which discussion of NATO's military problems must proceed, and are the most satisfying parts of the book. Other sections are like ore that must be worked very carefully—they do not constitute a pure vein.
—BERNARD K. GORDON, *Vanderbilt University.*

Crisis Diplomacy. BY D. A. GRABER (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1959. 402 pages. $6.75.)

Intelligent understanding of American foreign policy has been deepened by a number of studies in recent years that endeavor to bring longstanding (and often outdated) theory into harmony with practice. This book joins these studies as a provocative analysis of the sacred American principle of "non-intervention" in the internal affairs of other countries.

Mrs. Graber traces the evolution and application of the non-intervention principle from early 1800 to 1958. By demonstrating how the meaning and use of the principle has varied to fit America's "national interest," she has penetrated the shell of cant and self-delusion often surrounding American foreign policy. She contends that the capabilities, desires, and obligations of the United States in world affairs have usually determined when and how the principle would be invoked and would dictate prevailing conceptions of the rightness and wrongness of its use in specific cases. Her findings indicate that a re-formulation of the non-intervention principle in the light of diplomatic experiences is long overdue.

The reader may not agree fully with Mrs. Graber's assessment, nor may he altogether avoid the judgment that she leaves a number of implications of the problem inadequately explored. Moreover, there is some straining of historical evidence to fit the writer's basic thesis. Occasionally, terminology is loose and distinctions between closely-related ideas like "intervention," "interference" in the affairs of other countries, "pseudo-intervention," and—above all—ordinary diplomatic techniques are not as sharply drawn as seems desirable in many cases, and is mandatory in a few cases. Now and again Mrs. Graber appears to stray somewhat from her carefully-drawn definition of "intervention," especially as her development progresses to the modern period.

With a number of other studies seeking to impart greater "realism" to American foreign policy, this book exhibits two tendencies that weaken the force of its arguments. One is an entirely too uncritical acceptance of the concept of "national interest." Mrs. Graber's account suggests that the national interest is far clearer than it is and implies that foreign policy officials face a choice between an easily-discernible "national interest" and unrealistic policies animated by a foggy "idealism." Second, there is reflection of an all too common belief that the national interest and moral-ethical conduct are forever at antipodes. Mrs. Graber does not really analyze the role of moral principle in her inquiry into foreign policy. In effect, she evades the question.

Crisis Diplomacy is the kind of book that makes the intellectual sparks fly. The reader will challenge some of the findings. Once in a while he will think the writer is dead wrong. But his comprehension of American foreign policy will have been sharpened appreciably by the honing this study provides.—Cecil V. Crabb, *Vassar College.*

The Failure of Atomic Strategy: And a New Proposal for the Defence of the West. By F. O. Miksche. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1959. Pp. 224. $4.50.)

This book deserves attention not so much for its castigation of atomic strategy as for the insight it gives into the European military mind. Published critiques have advanced a variety of reasons for the shortcomings of American strategy, but none have been so purely continental, none so militaristic, in approach. Almost everyone concedes that atomic weapons are impractical instruments for solving political problems, but Colonel Miksche has rather startling views about what the key political problem is and what kind of strategy should be employed to meet it.

Since the current population explosion will soon give the colored races overwhelming numerical predominance, new types of military tasks confront us. We must begin immediately to prevent future "intercontinental racial wars" by making certain that Europe dominates the Afro-Asian world. Why? Because victory between the East and West will go to the side which controls the colored people. The West, in other words, must be prepared to use force, or the threat of force, to keep Africa and the rest of Asia from swinging toward communism.

This cannot now be done for two reasons. In the first place, Americans mistakenly believe that if the young and underdeveloped nations are helped to become viable states, they will be swayed away from communism. As a result, the United States is cutting the ground out from under Europeans who know only too well that the USSR will step into the vacuum being created by European withdrawal. In the second place, even if Americans could be made to realize that "preventive intervention" is the only way to keep the newly independent Afro-Asian states from serving the Communist cause, their nuclear armaments policy would not permit them to follow such a course.

This rather nostalgic view of future political developments, in which Europe will once again dominate great overseas areas by the use of force, does not, however, give the true measure of the book. It is mainly concerned with matters purely military where Miksche is on much firmer ground. Here his premises are more realistic, his analysis more perceptive, and his conclusions worthy of debate. The West, he believes, can create a military system which will provide greater security at less cost, and the main task of his book is to prove it.

The real problem of European defense is how to create along the Iron Curtain a cover under the protection of which Europeans can prevent the Soviets from outflanking them by revolutionary tactics and guerrilla warfare in the Middle East and North Africa. To do this a European school of military thinking is needed to replace America's rigid atomic strategy. Such a school would deemphasize air defense which is both ineffective and expensive. It would demand a small European strategic air force as a deterrent, and it would replace America's "absurd" reliance on atomic weapons and a few skilled technicians with larger numbers of tough-minded fighting men.

Finally, as an emergency measure, because Europe cannot yet afford a mobile strategy, a fortified zone should be established extending from the Baltic to the Adriatic, in order to free sufficient manpower to strike when necessary in the Middle East. Such a static defense, as Miksche admits, is too rigid militarily to be an ideal solution, and he will be attacked for proposing it, but it does permit a certain political flexibility and is probably all that the European economy can bear at the present time.—GORDON B. TURNER, *American Council of Learned Societies.*

Toynbee's Approach to World Politics. BY HENRY L. MASON. (New Orleans: Tulane University. 1959. Pp. x, 153. $2.00.)

When reviewing books which deal with somebody else's work one is often torn between one's duty to say something about the criticism and one's urge to comment upon the critic's object, or victim. Faced with a volume on Toynbee, should one deal with Toynbee or with the exegesis? The book under review relieves one of much of the dilemma: Concerned with a less theoretical portion of Toynbee's work, it does not lure one into a discussion of that most alluring part of Toynbeeanism, his philosophy of history. Failing to provide a coherent and consistent critical analysis of its chosen portion of Toynbee, it does not furnish a basis for a more fundamental criticism of what it offers. The book purports to be "a description of Toynbee's approach to world politics" as well as "a survey of the critical reaction provoked by this approach" (vi). It does contain a rather mechanical juxtaposition of description and (others') criticism. The description is based primarily on the four more recently published volumes (volumes 7–10) of the *Study of History;* it lists Toynbee's ideas on the East-West struggle, on the problem of war in our times, on the West and its relation to the Asian-African world, and Toynbee's suggested religious solution (in addition, the book contains a chapter on Toynbee's general methodology which falls somewhat outside its frame of reference). Adequately to cover the chief emphases of Toynbee's ideas on world affairs would have required a much more comprehensive examination of Toynbee's other writings in this field, including the *Survey of International Affairs.* Or, the author might have confined himself to his own critical analysis of Toynbee's major theses as contained in those four volumes. In the absence of such analysis of his own, the book might yet have presented a valuable digest of Toynbee criticism. But the vast array of authors and their criticisms which the book supplies remains undigested. Mason's procedure is to mention one of Toynbee's ideas and then, by selecting a piece from Morgenthau or Mumford here, and a quote from Coulborn or Schuman there, to record that they "agree" or "disagree" with Toynbee in the respective detail. Had he, instead, discussed certain critical analyses of Toynbee's approach to world politics in their entirety—for instance, Kenneth Thompson's thesis according to which Toynbee, in the field of international politics, has travelled the road from political idealism to political realism—his book might have added something to the discussion of Toynbee and/or that of world political problems. Such as it is, it can serve as a provisional reference to some Toynbeeana for a student in a hurry.—JOHN H. HERZ, *The City College of New York.*

The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and The Korean War. BY JOHN W. SPANIER. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 311. $6.50.)

Mr. Spanier's purposes in this study are twofold: to examine the Truman-MacArthur controversy by analyzing the major decisions made by American policy-makers during the Korean War, and to use this particular historical case as a basis for considering the more general problem of civil-military relations in a limited war situation.

In a very good introductory chapter, the author puts the Truman-MacArthur controversy into the broader framework of civil-military relations, posing the question of whether the conduct of limited warfare—now being urged upon us by some writers in the field of military strategy as a more appropriate use of force in contemporary international politics than all-out thermonuclear war—is compatible with continuing civilian supremacy over the military. Actually, as Mr. Spanier suggests at a later point, this is not the crucial question, either in terms of the Korean War or possible limited wars of the future. Rather it is, as this study clearly demonstrates, the capacity of American society and its governmental system, as presently constituted, to tolerate the particular burdens of this kind of warfare for any extended period of time.

The career of General MacArthur and the Truman-MacArthur controversy provide considerable data for the student of the role of the military in American society, but Mr. Spanier does disappointingly little with these. His study shows how "the separation of powers between the President and Congress draws military leaders into political conflict," but little or no elaboration of the problems is provided.

The author has apparently examined the relevant published materials with care. He discusses the major questions of fact and interpretation. His evaluations are on the whole balanced though at times overly cautious. He makes clear the nature of the domestic political setting within which the relationship between "the General and the President" developed and which helps explain so much of it. Nevertheless, the presentation is limited by some basic weaknesses.

The author is not noticeably selective in his presentation of events and problems. Secondary questions are treated and analyzed almost as extensively as fundamental ones. The result is often rather tedious reading, which is surprising in view of the subject matter. (The study was originally prepared as a doctoral dissertation.) Mr. Spanier also seems to have been trapped by the chronological framework in which he has placed his study. The book does not lack analytic discussion, but it is widely dispersed. In many chapters, several major events and decisions are discussed, and then analyzed, in sequential fashion. The effect is to dilute the impact and to sacrifice depth of analysis. For example, there is no one point at which a systematic effort is made to analyze General MacArthur's motivations, which are treated by the way at a number of points.

There is no indication that efforts were made to interview any of the major participants. While it might have been difficult to gain access to either Mr. Truman or General MacArthur, some of the other major figures involved would probably have been available. Such interviews might have eliminated some of the book's academic, remote-from-events tone. The book is marred by occasional judgments that do not seem to follow clearly from premises stated and also by broad generalizations about American, and even British, public opinion that Mr. Spanier makes no effort to substantiate by means of public opinion or any other data.—Burton M. Sapin, *The Brookings Institution.*

U. N. Trusteeship Council. *Official Records: Twenty-fourth Session.* (2 June–6 August, 1959). Supplement No. 2. "Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of Western Samoa, 1959." (N. Y., 1959). Pp. 35. $.30.

Despite its appearance in the usual green cover, this is not the normal type of report submitted by comparable U. N. missions. In view of the possibility that the Trusteeship Agreement for Western Samoa will be terminated within the next few years, at the express suggestion of the New Zealand Government the Mission undertook its assignment with special terms of reference, rather than those of the ordinary periodic visiting mission.

New Zealand may well have requested such a special assignment for it has had a bear by the tail, desiring to terminate the trusteeship but fearful of the consequences. From the original Samoan petition for self-government in 1947, through the Samoan Constitutional Convention of 1954, to the Working Committee on Self Government currently drafting a constitution for Western Samoa there have been shaping up major problems yet unsolved. Is a parliamentary system feasible without political parties and in an area where agreement traditionally is reached by consensus and not majority vote? How can New Zealand accede to the adamant insistence of the Western Samoans for a joint head of state, the two *Fautua?* Can it countenance the passing of political power to a *matais* (titled persons) group consisting of but one-seventh of the total adult population? These and many other comparable problems are those facing New Zealand, and with which the U. N. Mission dealt.

In the three and a half weeks it was in Western Samoa in the Spring of 1959 and its two exchanges of views with New Zealand officials bracketing the Samoan visit, the Visiting Mission gave most of its attention to political matters and relatively less to economic and social progress. Not that its report fails to contain sections on economic conditions, medical and health services, and education, but most of it is concerned with the movement in the near future to self-government or independence. In this emphasis upon political matters the report thus becomes an interesting example of an attempt to treat in a political context cultural difficulties which refuse to be so constrained.

Several related examples may suffice to indicate the inadequacy of a purely political approach. The Visiting Mission discusses well, and in detail, the present electoral system for Samoans with its restriction to *matais* of the privilege to register as electors and to stand as candidates, summing it up with the observation that in some ways it has no parallel in any other modern electoral system. The Mission is also concerned with the status of "Europeans" (partially a legal and partially an ethnic classification), their limited direct suffrage at present, and their uncertain status under Samoan self-government. The sympathy of the Mission appears directed toward universal suffrage and protection of the "European" through equal political participation and constitutional safeguards against discrimination. However, the whole Samoan culture presently turns around the extended family and the place of the *matai*, as head of the family, in family decisions including assignment on sufferance tenure of family lands. With an expanding population—one of the fastest growing in the world—it is questionable that the exploitation of Western Samoa's resources can long stand the deterrent to capital improvement which the *matai* system now raises. The initiative of the educated, emancipated Samoan also appears essential to such development. But to the *matai*, emancipation of the untitled man strikes deeply at family ties and the *matai's* status position and power. Many of the Western Samoan *matais* regard American Samoa's universal suffrage for the latter's advisory House of Representatives as but the prelude to the end of *Fa'a Samoa* ways. The "European" in his midst only serves to symbolize both such emancipation and individual enterprise outside the ken of *matai* control. Thus universal suffrage and movement to single status of "Europeans" and Samoans, which the Mission treats as political questions, are in reality but surface treatment of basic cultural cleavages.

For political scientists the U. N. Mission report is extremely instructive. Beside providing an excellent survey of current political conditions in Western Samoa, it bears witness to the part such a mission may have in helping to shape, through question and suggestion, the emerging structure of a new state. The report itself publishes the detailed calendar of steps leading to self-government or independence, tentative only as to the length of time necessary for compliance. It fails to discuss the potential danger of continuing to exclude Mata'afa, one of the highest titles in Samoa, from being a member of the proposed plural head of state, or what might occur should he be chosen to lead the cabinet (as has happened). Negative attitudes toward seconded New Zealand officers who hold many of the key posts in Western Samoa, evidenced in debates of the Legislative Assembly, also go unmentioned. However, these omissions are understandable in terms of the nature of its assignment and the limits of its report. A little more difficult to grasp is the failure of the Mission to recognize it was dealing with Samoans, probably the astutest politicians in the whole Pacific Island Area, and that when in diplomatic language it writes, "the Mission is *confident* [emphasis added] that the Samoan people will take steps to eliminate racial distinction in their electoral arrangements, a matter on which the Trusteeship Council has previously commented," this is neither a command nor even a covert direction, but constitutes merely a hope.—NORMAN MELLER, *University of Hawaii.*

Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland. BY EDWARD J. ROZEK. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, London: Chapman and Hall. 1958. Pp. xvii, 481. $6.95.)

Warsaw in Chains. BY STEFAN KORBONSKI. Translated by Norbert Guterman. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1959. Pp. ix, 319. $6.00.)

Reflecting entirely different chronological phases and ideological aspects of the fantastically complex Polish national problem, these two books are welcome contributions to the mushrooming literature on recent Eastern European politics. Of the two works that of Professor Rozek is by far the more readable and more centrally relevant to the main preoccupations of the Anglo-American public with this particular sector of East-Central European developments. Korbonski's politically lively book suffers from two different, and yet equally serious, shortcomings. On the one hand, it is an extremely uneven and frequently poor translation of the original Polish, while on the other it is cast in the halting, staccato-like mold of a day-by-day diary. This format renders the reading of the book an awkward and often boring task since the climactic events reported by Stefan Korbonski can seldom be compressed into diary entries on a dull, daily basis.

Dr. Rozek has an exceptionally fine feel for the long-range sweep of European history. His all-too-brief treatment of the strategy and tactics of Soviet policy is followed by two exceedingly useful accounts, one on the historical background of Soviet-Polish relations from 1917 to 1939, and the other on the fourth partition of Poland. Both of these are helpful in setting the dramatic stage for the principal part of the narrative which covers the incredible transformation of the Soviet-picked and wholly Communist-dominated Lublin Committee first into a provisional government, and subsequently into the government of "National Unity." His account of the questionable Yalta and Potsdam Conferences which helped to legitimize the insidious Communist clique as the "government of Poland," obviously at the expense of *the* Polish government, ranks among the very best in the English language, indeed it is a worthy companion piece of Herbert Feis' brilliant analysis in his *Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin*. Rozek employs excellent original, first-hand sources throughout his book. The reviewer's only possible misgiving is that the myriad of technical details offered by the author occasionally gets too cumbersome and prevents the forming of an overall perspective. This is particularly true of Chapter Six, devoting a complicated 142 pages to a minute analysis of the emergence of the Provisional Government of Poland.

Within the above-mentioned limitations, Korbonski's book presents some fascinating inside stories culled from the truly heroic pages of the Polish Underground. In effect *Warsaw in Chains* is not only a worthy sequel of the same author's *Fighting Warsaw*, but it also graphically portrays the story of an underground movement *in transition*. In its compressed diary form it traces the revival of the movement after the total collapse of the Nazi regime and over the prostrate body of a destroyed Warsaw; it then reports on the early interruption of a Polish "national melody" by the Communist Party and finally climaxes the narrative with a highly dramatic escape story which brought the author and his loyal wife across the Iron Curtain and into the Free World.

The greatest value of *Warsaw in Chains* is not the retelling of a well-known, if utterly disastrous, chapter in Polish history. Rather, it offers certain insights, human details and political observations which are of importance to the interested reader. This reviewer was particularly impressed by Korbonski's moving account of a visit to "A Nazi Slaughter House" (pp. 139–142), and his ingenious reporting of the manifold "alarm bells" (pp. 239–250) which were set off by the country's new Communist masters to intimidate and drive into exile the remaining members of an anti-communist underground and the heroes of its lengthy resistance movement.

These two books are distinct assets and signal contributions both to the all-too-broad field of Soviet diplomacy and to the much more specialized area of the politics of Danubian Europe.—ANDREW GYORGY, *Boston University*.

The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938–1948. BY JOSEF KORBEL. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 258. $5.00.)

The Frozen Revolution. BY FRANK GIBNEY. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy. 1959. Pp. xiv, 269. $4.75.)

For Western liberals the tragic case of Czechoslovakia is both a source of guilt and uneasiness. Why did the most flourishing and liberal Central European democracy succumb so easily to Communist subversion, and of all the satellites remain so firmly in Moscow's grasp after Stalin's death? Was it because of betrayal by the West beginning at Munich, a basic weakness in the structure of liberal democracy before Communist subversion, or some factor peculiar to Czechoslovakia? Josef Korbel, former head of Jan Masaryk's cabinet in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has sought to answer these questions as they revealed themselves in Czechoslovakia's fateful decade 1938–1948. Based on memoirs, interviews and letters from participants, and his own experiences Professor Korbel has put together a documentary study which traces the growth of Communist influence beginning well before 1938. While before 1938 the democratic government of Czechoslovakia was able to tolerate the Communist Party and at the same time contain it and reduce its influence, after Munich the Communists took advantage of the German occupation and collaborated with it as the first step in their take over. At the time of liberation the Communists, aided by Soviet sponsorship and the reluctance of the democratic elements to alienate the U.S.S.R. and actively oppose Communism, completed the process of subversion. Professor Korbel spreads the net of guilt widely, beginning with the democratic betrayal at Munich and the failure of the West to counteract Soviet influence during the period of liberation, the collaboration tendencies of the working classes, the compromising, unorganized anti-Communist opposition, and ending with the deceit of Stalin and the treason of the Communists. Even President Beneš, beloved as the democratic and patriotic heir of Thomas Masaryk, is held responsible for his mistaken judgments and decisions.

Professor Korbel's analysis is well documented but it leaves the crucial questions still unanswered. Why were the Czechs with their background of democracy and experience of Nazi occupation so easily deceived? Why in the 1946 elections did almost forty per cent of the voters support the Communists while in Hungary the socialists and Communists only received seventeen per cent of the vote? Why did only the students of Prague in the crucial days of February 1948 come out in mass against the Communists? Was the absence of mass and organized action by the non-Communists in Czechoslovakia similar to the failure in 1933–1934 of the Social Democratic Party in Germany to fight against Nazi subversion? Could Czechoslovakia with a vigorous anti-Communist policy internally have followed the pattern of Finland or had Stalin in 1947 already decreed against such a possibility? These questions point to the need of a careful and unprejudiced *comparative* analysis of the process of subversion, looking for the particular techniques, moments of crisis, political organization, social and economic conditions which are crucial for success. With the threat of Communist activity looming imminently over Africa, Asia and South America the comparative technique could not be better used.

Frozen Revolution by Frank Gibney is a journalist's account of recent events in Poland. Mr. Gibney's style is to use an abundance of glib and often meaningless metaphors, and he often becomes confused by his own imagery. The book lacks the inciteful analysis of a good piece of journalism.—DAVID T. CATTELL, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

American Foreign Relations: Permanent Problems and Changing Policies. BY JOHN GANGE. (New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1959. Pp. ix, 593. $6.75.)

This comprehensive and well written volume is a distinct contribution to the ever-growing literature of American foreign policy and its role in the contemporary world. Dr. John Gange performed a most useful, and in many respects pioneering task within the framework of this large-scale book of truly monumental proportions. American Foreign Relations is logically divided into three major parts: The Setting; The Basic Problems; and The Process of Policy Making. Of these, the most detailed and most descriptive is Part II dealing with such problems as alliances with other nations, cooperation through international organization, problems of peace, American security, trade with other countries, and the fascinating intangibles of "the advancement of American prestige abroad."

The book has two outstanding assets. It abounds in excellent, up-to-date political, diplomatic and economic illustrations of the individual crises, conflicts or issues involved and subjected to scholarly analysis. It also reflects the author's broad and comprehensive knowledge of the many more-or-less successful facets of international agencies, missions, and organizations of all types. Although he correctly observes that: ". . .our policy-makers and our operating officials are often confused by the maze of international bodies which are potential claimants for some particular problem, program or idea needing attention," he himself does not seem to suffer from this common ailment. Dr. Gange's book is warmly recommended to interested students and observers of both American foreign relations and of the complex field of international organization.

Radio Free Europe. BY ROBERT T. HOLT. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1958. Pp. xii, 249. $5.00.)

This work is a detailed and useful study of the history, organization, policies, and operations of a "nonofficial instrument of foreign policy."

Many readers will be interested in Professor Holt's evaluation of the role of Radio Free Europe in encouraging, or even fomenting, the uprisings in Eastern Europe. A study of the scripts does not support the assertion that Radio Free Europe incited the Hungarian revolt, and promised western armed intervention when it began. But the difficulty of securing data on the effect of radio broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain does not permit one to sharply distinguish the impact of specific broadcasts from the impact of the mere fact "that the West was broadcasting to the captive peoples." The author contends that the policy analysts of RFE have been more aware of developments in Eastern Europe, more skilled in analysis, and more diligent in the development of strategies than those individuals responsible for official American policy. The United States had talked openly of liberation, but had no policy to exploit possibilities of nonmilitary action during the Hungarian uprising. Despite his sympathy for RFE, Professor Holt emphasizes that RFE is a private organization, and is not held responsible by institutional lines of control.

Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945: The Third Reich: First Phase. Volume III. June 14, 1934–March 31, 1935. Department of State Publication 6848 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1959. Pp. 1121. $4.25.)

The documents in this thick volume cover many of the problems faced by the German Foreign Office in trying to orient German Foreign Policy to the plannings of Hitler. It is a goldmine for the research historian or political scientist. Some of the documents have been footnoted to help the reader identify personalities and stay on the chronological track, but there is no attempt at interpretation. All documents have been translated into English.

The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics. By Eugene M. Emme. (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company. 1959. Pp. vii, 914. $12.50.)

Skilfully edited by Dr. Eugene Emme, former Professor of International Politics at the Air University, this comprehensive book of readings attempts to survey the whole vast panorama of national security problems, as related to the impact of air power. As most books of readings, this symposium is rather uneven in its coverage and in the scope of its basic selections. Some sections, notably the geopolitically oriented Chapter II on *The New Mobility,* are first-rate while others, for example Chapter X on *Air Power in Europe and Asia,* are primarily new combinations of widely used and familiar excerpts from the writings of leading political and military figures.

On the whole, *The Impact of Air Power* succeeds in presenting a broad and accurate picture of the key problems of modern warfare. Each chapter is preceded by a careful editorial introduction which places the selections into their proper perspective. The book is a useful guide to students of national strategy and related military developments.

Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy, 1897–1947. By Alan R. Taylor. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1959. Pp. viii, 136. $4.75.)

Dr. Taylor presents in this brief study an admirably objective historical survey of fifty years of Zionist diplomacy. Since both pro and anti-Zionist readers will find this panoramic survey of the record of Zionism satisfactory and historically acceptable, the author has rendered a signal service to the American student interested in Middle Eastern politics. His book will be conveniently suitable for introductory courses in that field as it successfully studies a most complicated set of diplomatic developments without simplifying or distorting the many abstruse technical details involved. Chapter IX on "The Making of Modern Israel" and the Epilogue on "The Remaining Task for Political Zionism" are particulary significant sections of this work.

The United Nations. By Leland M. Goodrich. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1959. Pp. vi, 417. $5.60.)

Although the author correctly observes in the preface of his work that "this is primarily a book on the United Nations," the reader will be immensely pleased with the broad historic scope of this volume. Chapters I and III are particularly useful in setting the background-stage so badly needed for a fuller appreciation of the workings of the United Nations. These chapters deal with "International Organization in the Modern World" and with "Dream and Reality: The Postwar World," and successfully cover such controversial topics as "Bi-polarity and the Atomic Bomb" or "Nationalism in Africa and Asia."

Of the balance of the book the more analytical discussions devoted to the structure of power and influence within the U. N., to the multi-faceted problems of peaceful settlement and adjustment and to the "dependent peoples'" problems seem to be the most significant to this reviewer. The objective and well-balanced treatment of these issues will make this book a major contribution to courses dealing with international organization in general, and with the United Nations in more specific terms.

Legal Problems of International Trade. Edited by Paul O. Proehl. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 453 pp. $5.60.)

The publication of the twenty-four original papers contained in this volume is intended to celebrate the opening of the new, deep draft St. Lawrence Seaway. Apart from its obvious regional interest, it also has a wider appeal and some of the papers should provide political scientists and economists with an insight into the many varied problems encountered in foreign trade the world over. Students of policy formation will find "The Legal Framework of the St. Lawrence Seaway," an interesting historical account of the vacillations in U.S. policy towards the Seaway and of the various forces shaping policy formation with respect to it. "A Critique of the United States Foreign Economic Policy" is not only àpropos, seething and provocative but also suggestive of new points of departure. Similarly, those interested in international banking, international monetary policy, and regionalism will find other well documented articles dealing with those subjects.

Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. By Peter S. H. Tang. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 1959. Pp. xx, 494. $10.00.)

The two parts of this study of the 1911–1931 period are of very unequal value: that on Manchuria is useful, that on Outer Mongolia adds essentially nothing to the similar but much better study by Gerard Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position,* published in 1949. Even the Manchurian section lacks depth and is no more than a traditional international relations study, relying heavily on documents and legalistic interpretations which allow the realities to slip through almost unnoticed and unmarked. It is mainly a study of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and not of Manchuria generally. Throughout the book Tang presents the Chinese as peaceful, exploited, and aggrieved, a much put-upon race in no way responsible for its own difficulties. The author dates his preface September 1959, and claims to have consulted most of the important materials bearing on his subject, but the lacunae are many, especially such recently published works of real value as Malozemov's, *Russian Far Eastern Policy (1881–1901),* which would have greatly strengthened Tang's historical section; Morley's, *The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918;* and the two recent Russian document-collections, *Russko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1689–1916* and *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917–1957.* He did not consult the critically important Russian-language journals published in Ulan Bator in the 1920's and 1930's: *Khozyaistvo Mongolii* and *Sovremennaya Mongoliya.* Tang's use of Chinese sources adds little to his work's value; no Japanese sources are employed, and certainly a work on Manchuria and Mongolia which did so would be of exceptional importance.

Serious deficiencies include the failure to handle Chang Tso-lin adequately, and the general failure to assess Japanese moves and policy. However, chronological citing of *some* of the relevant facts does take place.

Most disturbing is the unattributed direct or slightly modified quotation of Friters in the Mongolian section. A whole series of examples can be adduced here: p. 292 comes from Friters, p. 57; pp. 297–298 (Friters, pp. 58–60); pp. 303–304 (Friters, pp. 60–61); pp. 324–325 (Friters, pp. 70, 64, 68); p. 328 (Friters, p. 66); p. 338 (Friters, p. 84); pp. 349–350 (Friters, pp. 89–90); p. 353 (Friters, 94); p. 417 (Friters, p. 131).

An appendix on the "Construction and Economic Operations of the Chinese Eastern Railway" presents many statistics, and maps of Manchuria (good) and Outer Mongolia (poor) also appear. Many minor errors of transcription and inconsistent citing of names mar the presentation. Handled with care, the Manchurian portion of the book can be useful and constitutes a contribution; the Outer Mongolian section is a less complete, less accurate, and less good version of Friters.—Robert A. Rupen, *University of North Carolina.*

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NEWS AND NOTES

The National Office of the Association has arranged with TWA for a charter flight to Europe this summer, to leave New York on June 17 and return from Paris on August 29. The cost will be substantially below the regular fares and participation is open to all members of the Association and their immediate families. Notices have gone out to all members of the Association. The plane can take 74 passengers and reservations are being accepted in order they are received. If the program is successful, it will be continued and expanded in future years.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The International Political Science Association, at the invitation of APSA, will hold its next annual Round Table at Ann Arbor, Michigan in September 1960. The main topic will be: "The Contribution of Political Behavior Studies to Political Science." V. O. Key has agreed to serve as general rapporteur. Two sessions will also be devoted to the problems of polyethnic societies. The fifth World Congress of Political Science is to be held in Paris in September 1961. The program is being formulated and the Secretariat will welcome suggestions.

The third annual meeting of the Missouri Political Science Association was held at the University of Missouri, Columbia, on October 30, 1959. Sessions were devoted to "The Political Scientist and the Public Service," "Recent Developments in the Missouri Mental Health Program," "Political Prospects in Underdeveloped Areas," and "Criminal Justice in Missouri." Jerry Hauptmann of Park College was elected president for the coming year. The association now comprises eighty members.

The District of Columbia Political Science Association held its annual business meeting on 3 December, 1959. During the year the District Association heard Samuel Lubell, Harold Lasswell, Taylor Cole, Paul Nitze, and Earl Mazo. The officers elected at the December meeting were: Vincent Browne, Howard University, President; Schuyler Foster, Department of State, First Vice President; Eugene Hedberg, Department of Defense, Second Vice President; and H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Brookings Institution, member of the Exeutive Council. Holdover Council members are Mrs. Helen Hill Miller and William Prendergast. Retiring officers of the Association were: Howard Penniman, Georgetown University, President; Vincent Browne, First Vice President; Nathan Pelcovits, Department of State, Second Vice President; and Lyle Belsley, member of the Executive Council. Chester B. Earle, The American University, was selected by the Executive Council in 1959 for a two-year term as Secretary-Treasurer.

The Kansas City Assembly on the United States and Africa, sponsored by the International Relations Council and The American Assembly, was held at the Pembroke Country Day School in Kansas City, Missouri, October 30–November 1, 1959. Africa south of the Sahara and north of the Union of South Africa was the area considered by the participants, who were from the fields of business, medicine, education, labor, religion, military affairs, government and civic affairs. The director of the Assembly was Eliot S. Berkley, dean of administration, Kansas City Art Institute and School of Design and executive director of the International Relations Council. Alhaji Umaru Gwandu, Speaker of the House Assembly, Northern Region, Nigeria, addressed the Assembly on the subject, "The

Aspirations of the Peoples of Africa"; Mr. C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., Director, Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs, Department of State, spoke on "The United States and Africa"; and Sir Andrew Cohen, United Kingdom Representative on the Trusteeship Council, The United Nations, discussed "Africa and the Western World." Panel leaders were Dr. Ted Brannen, Vice-Chancellor, University of Kansas City; Dr. Clifford P. Ketzel, Assistant Professor of Political Science, The University of Kansas; and Dr. Ernest Manheim, Professor of Sociology, University of Kansas City.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The National Office and the Executive Committee of the Association have been investigating the possibility of offering term life insurance on a group basis to members of the Association. As a non-profit professional organization, it appears feasible for us to establish a group plan that will provide term insurance with a nationally known and reputable company at a low rate to supplement insurance already carried by members. If details can be worked out satisfactorily, a plan should be ready to present to members at the Annual Meeting of the Association in New York this September. Further information will be carried in future issues of the REVIEW.

This past fall the Association received a number of grants in aid: For the Congressional Fellowship Program, $717,000.00 from the Ford Foundation, $3,000.00 from the Poynter Fund, $11,280.00 from the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation, $500.00 from Time, Inc., $500.00 from the New York Times Foundation, $500.00 from the Shinner Foundation, $250.00 from the Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Foundation, $500.00 from Cyrus Eaton, and $2,840.00 from the Helen Dwight Reid Foundation. For the Regional Seminars, $120,000.00 from the Ford Foundation. For the Public Affairs Reporting Awards, $150,000.00 from the Ford Foundation and $1,000 from the Poynter Fund. For a membership recruitment campaign, $3,500.00 from the Alexander Freeman Foundation. For holding the Round Table and Executive Committee meetings of IPSA in the United States in 1960, $25,000.00 from the American Council of Learned Societies, up to $1,500.00 from IPSA, and assistance from the University of Michigan. For the Asian Congressional Fellowship Program, $30,000.00 from the Asia Foundation. The larger grants are applicable over terms of years. Grants received during the fall for these special programs totalled $1,067,370. The Association wishes to express its appreciation to all the donors.

A Department of Political Science has been established recently at Montana State University as a result of the separation of the Department of History and Political Science.

In observance of the Fiftieth Anniversary of its founding, the Department of Political Science of the University of Michigan is planning to hold a conference-seminar at Ann Arbor on April 8–9, 1960. The general topic will be "The Present Status and Prospects of Political Science as a Discipline."

The Murray Seasongood Good Government Fund for the past three years has been sending Visitors to interested colleges and Universities in southwestern Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky, with a view to interesting students in local government both as a career and as citizen-participants. Some sixteen institutions have received Visitors during this period, usually under the auspices of the Political Science Department. The program has met with such an enthusiastic response that it is planned to continue it in the future. Information concerning it can be secured by writing Mr. Robert Goldman, Seasongood Good Government Fund, Union Central Building, Cincinnati 2, Ohio.

Northern Illinois University has recently established an Institute for social research with the purpose of encouraging and promoting research by faculty members in the social sciences and related fields. Merlin D. Gustafson will represent the political science field on the policy board for the Institute.

A community research center has been established at Valparaiso University under the direction of Victor Hoffman and Donald Mundinger.

The second U.C.L.A.-Colombia Universities Project conducted jointly by the Institute of International and Foreign Studies and the Latin American Studies Center will be held January 4–29. Fifteen Colombian students and a faculty advisor will participate in special seminars in Comparative Government and American History and Culture. The project is supported by a grant from the International Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State.

A newly created Bureau of Public Affairs Research has begun operations at the University of Idaho this year. Its first study concerns municipal finance in Idaho and specific future studies are now under consideration. The Bureau is under the direction of Robert J. Huckshorn, assistant professor of political science.

The American Political Science Associationl as an affiliate member of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, sponsored a panel on "Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy-making," at the 1959 meeting of the AAAS. The chairman of the panel was James A. Robinson, department of political science, Northwestern University. Papers were given by Richard L. Meier, department of city and regional planning, Harvard University; H. Burr Steinbach, chairman of the department of zoology, University of Chicago; Eugene Rabinowitch, research professor of biophysics, University of Illinois and editor of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*. Discussants included: Marbury B. Ogle, Jr., professor of political science, Purdue University; Duncan MacRae, Jr., professor of political science, University of Chicago; and Harold D. Lasswell, professor of law and political science, Yale University.

The Massachusetts Assembly on State Government, sponsored in cooperation with the American Assembly of Columbia University, was held at Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, April 2–4, 1959. The Final Report together with Background Papers and the Proceedings, have been edited by Professor Robert R. Robbins, chairman of the government department at Tufts, and published (October 1959) by the Tufts Civic Education Center under the title: *State Government and Public Responsibility: New Horizons for the Commonweatlh of Massachusetts.*

In the second annual report of the *Institut fuer Politische Wissenschaft* at Heidelberg University, the Director, Professor Carl J. Friedrich, notes the growing student interest in political science and the work of the Institute since its founding in April, 1958. This is reflected by the range of instruction offered during the 1958–59 academic year. Lecture courses and seminars were given on the following subjects, among others: American government, introductory political science, methodology, totalitarianism, the parliamentary opposition, problems of representation, and political philosophy. Research at the Institute has also been progressing in various fields, particularly in the study of parliamentarianism in West Germany. Among many works already completed or in preparation are studies of the *Bundesrat* and of the relationship of governmental authority and monetary policy. The Institute has also been actively engaged in organizing a library of political science materials. The courses and seminars given by six staff members were supplemented during 1958–59 by a series of lectures by visiting scholars. The Institute has recently received a five-year grant from the Ford Foundation to add to the support given it by German and other American sources.

M. Glenn Abernathy, associate professor of political science at the University of South Carolina, is on leave for 1959–60 and is visiting associate professor at the University of Wisconsin.

James D. Atkinson, associate professor of government at Georgetown University, who was elected president of the American Military Institute in February, 1959, read a paper on the subject "The Relationship between Foreign Policy and Military Strategy" at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama on 16 November, 1959.

Richard W. Barron, of the University of Virgina, is serving for 1959–60 as visiting professor at the University of South Carolina.

Ernest R. Bartley of the University of Florida will be visiting professor of political science and planning at the Portland State University, Oregon, during the summer session of 1960.

During the summer of 1959, Aaron Bell was the consultant on the foreign policy of the United States at the International Seminar on "Relaxation of International Tension" held under the auspices of the American Friends Service Committee at Kahlenberg, Austria. Mr. Bell is on the faculty of the School of Politics, New School for Social Research, and in the Fall, 1959 was appointed to the New York University General Education division.

Leonard Binder has been granted sabbatical leave from the department of political science at U.C.L.A. to accept a Rockefeller grant for research work in Egypt. His work will focus upon contemporary Egyptian political ideologies.

Kenneth O. Bjork of St. Olaf College is in Oslo, Norway on a Fulbright fellowship.

Herbert W. Briggs of Cornell University attended the session of the Institut de Droit International at Neuchâtel, Switzerland in September, and participated in discussions of resolutions dealing with increased resort to ICJ.

Peter Bromhead of the political science staff of the University of Durham, England, was visiting lecturer of political science at the University of Florida for the fall semester, 1959.

Elbert M. Byrd, of the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, has been granted a research award by the General Research Board of the University for the summer of 1960 to undertake a study of The Judicial Process in Maryland.

David T. Cattell has been named Acting Director of the Slavic Studies Center, U.C.L.A.

Taylor Cole is on leave from Duke University to undertake research on bureaucracy in the Commonwealth states of Africa. He is presently at the University College of Nigeria in Ibadan.

Robert H. Connery is on leave from Duke University to serve as visiting professor at Columbia University.

On Tuesday, September 15, 1959, at the State Department in Washington, Professor Marshall E. Dimock gave the opening address to an in-service training program of the United States Foreign Service. His subject: "The Executive in International Affairs."

Jovan Djordjevic of the University of Belgrade is visiting professor of government at the Claremont Graduate School, spring semester, 1960.

Reuben Frodin of the department of political science, University of California, Los Angeles was the American member of a four-man international commission headed by vice-principal K. O. Dike of the University College, Ibadan, to review the entire educational system of Eastern Nigeria. The commision's report was submitted to Premier Nnaddi Azikiwe after three months of intensive fieldwork and hearings covering economic, political and educational phases of the problems of a newly emergent self-governing state.

George Ginsburgs has received his doctora degree from the University of California, Los Angeles and has been appointed an acting instructor in political science for the fall term, 1959–60.

Merrill R. Goodall of the Claremont Graduate School is serving as Chairman of Government.

William Griffin, assistant professor of government at the State University of South Dakota, has been granted leave of absence the first semester of 1959–60 to serve as a special consultant to the Citizens Tax Study Committee established by legislative act to survey the South Dakota tax system.

Hugh M. Hall is on sabbatical leave from Duke University during the 1959–60 academic year and is serving on the staff of the Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight.

John H. Hallowell is on research leave from Duke University, spring semester, 1960.

Earl T. Hanson, of Duke University, is on sabbatical leave for this academic year.

Ronald F. Howell of the Department of Political Science, Emory University, was appointed a member of the Fulbright National Selection Committee for travel grants.

Frederick C. Irion, of the University of New Mexico, is serving as a visiting professor of government at the University of Texas for the fall semester 1959–60.

Otto Kirchheimer is on leave of absence from the graduate faculty of The New School under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

James R. Klonoski of St. Olaf College is in Washington, D. C. this year on leave on a Congressional Fellowship.

David W. Knepper has been named to one of the three "citizen" posts on the newly organized Texas Commission on City and County Government and was also named Secretary of the Commission at its organizational meeting. The Commission is charged with studying the overlapping and duplication of city and county services in Texas and charged with making recommendations for remedial action to the 1961 legislative session.

Ruth C. Lawson, professor of political science and chairman of the department at Mount Holyoke College, spent the summer in Paris and other NATO capitals as holder of a NATO fellowship for work on her study of postwar European security.

Herbert Marcuse of Brandeis University is the recipient of a Rockefeller grant to pursue his studies in political theory.

John Brown Mason, professor of government, Georgetown University, delivered a lecture on Germany on 20 October, 1959 at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, as part of the College's Strategy Series.

Henry B. Mayo, head of the department of political science, University of South Carolina, will be on leave for the spring semester, 1960, and will serve as visiting professor at Duke University.

Herbert Maza, Director of the Institute for American Universities at Aix-en-Provence, France will lecture at the Faculté de Droit at the University of Aix-Marseille on international relations. The political science section of the Faculté has recently added a section on North African Studies.

John H. McDonough, associate professor of government, Georgetown University, served as rapporteur for the International Organizations Section of the Seventh National Conference of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO, held in Denver, Colorado, 29 September through 2 October, 1959. William Manger, also of the Department of Government at Georgetown University, was Chairman of the section. This year's conference topic was "Culture of the Americas."

Charles A. Micaud, professor in the Woodrow Wilson department of foreign affairs, University of Virginia is on leave this year, on an appointment by the Department of State.

Ralph M. Miwa of the University of Missouri was visiting professor at the University of Nebraska for the 1959 summer session, working also in the Far Eastern Institue there.

John D. Montgomery, formerly with the Michigan State University Viet Nam Project and former chairman, department of government and law at Babson Institute, is now at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Raymond A. Moore, Jr., of the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina, spent the summer in Great Britain studying British foreign policy on a Faculty Research Grant.

Steven Muller of Cornell University was given a Ford Public Affairs Research Grant and spent two weeks in England observing the British General Election.

Frank Munk, on leave from Reed College as advisor on intellectual cooperation to Radio Free Europe, has been appointed to the steering committee of the Atlantic Institute, founded by the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to facilitate intellectual interchange within the Atlantic Community.

Fred Warner Neal of the Claremont Graduate School is completing studies on Yugoslavian affairs under a grant from the Twentieth Century Fund.

Dalmas Nelson, formerly of the University of Nebraska, is visiting assistant professor of political science at Duke University during the academic year 1959–60.

D. P. O'Connell, professor of International Law at the University of Adelaide in Australia, author of the leading monograph on state succession and other works in the field of international law and jurisprudence, has received a grant from Georgetown University to do research in Washington, D. C., from February, 1960 to August, 1960. During this period Professor O'Connell will conduct seminars on selected topics in international law and jurisprudence in the Department of Government, graduate School, and in the Law School of Georgetown University.

Saul K. Padover is going to the Imperial University in Tokyo, Japan as a Fulbright research professor in Spring, 1960 and to the University of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur as a professor under the Smith-Mundt Act in Autum 1960.

C. Northcote Parkinson delivered the Dillon Lectures in law and government at the State University of South Dakota in the fall of 1959.

Howard Penniman, professor of government and chairman of the department of government at Georgetown University and Karl Cerny, associate professor of government at Georgetown, served as Director and assistant director respectively of a seminar on "Education for Public Responsibility" conducted for AMVETS during the week of October 25–31, 1959 by Georgetown University with a grant from the Fund for Adult Education. Seminar speakers included Ralph K. Huitt, Department of Government, University of Wisconsin; Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, American Political Science Association; Don Pearlberg, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs; Bryce Harlow, Deputy Assistant to the President; Josef Solterer and Cyril Zebot, Department of Economics, Georgetown University; Cornelius Cotter, Executive Director, Republican Committee on Program and Progress; Bernard Hennessey, Citizenship Clearing House Faculty Fellow, Democratic National Committee; Robert Estabrook, Editor of the Editorial Page, The Washington *Post;* Harlan Cleveland, Dean, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University; Howland Sargeant, President, American Committee for Liberation; The Honorable John C. Wiley, former Ambassador to Iran, Panama, Colombia, and Portugal; John J. Anderson, Administrator, Arlington, Virginia Hospital; Martin Schwartz, Chairman of the Americanism Council, AMVETS; and Harold T. Berc, National Commander of AMVETS.

Percy Partridge of the Australian National University of Canberra, served as visiting professor of political science at Duke University during the fall semester.

Robert J. Pitchell of Indiana University has been appointed director of a national study of the extent of corporate contributions to state colleges and universities through state tax payments. The study will be done for the Joint Office of Institutional Research which is the research arm of the State Universities Association and the Association of Land Grant Colleges and State Universities. The study hopes to answer the question raised by corporate officers who have reduced or denied contributions to public institutions of higher education on the ground that corporations make substantial contributions through their state taxes. A report on a pilot study of five or six states is expected to be completed by next spring.

The department of public law and government, Columbia University, has invited Mrs. Dorothy Pickles, who lectures for the University of London, to give a lecture course and seminar during the Spring term.

Warren A. Roberts was granted leave from Wabash College for the fall semester, 1959, for research on foreign policy in Washington and at Harvard University.

Eleanor Roosevelt has been appointed lecturer in the department of politics at Brandeis University.

R. N. Rosecrance of the University of California, Los Angeles has been appointed a member of the National Screening Committee for Fulbright Scholarships, Asia and the Pacific Division, of the Institute of International Education.

Elmer R. Rusco is serving as visiting instructor in political science at the University of Idaho during the current academic year.

Milton I. Sacks of Brandeis University is a visiting member of the Haverford College faculty for 1959–60.

Wallace S. Sayre this year occupies the Ford rotating research professorship in governmental affairs in the Department of Public Law at Columbia.

E. E. Schattschneider will be visiting professor of politics at Hollins College during the academic session of 1960–61.

Victoria Schuck, professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College is a member of the Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts and a public member of the Commission on Interstate Cooperation of Massachusetts.

George Shepherd of St. Olaf College is acting head of the Department of Political Science.

Foster H. Sherwood of U.C.L.A. has been appointed a member of the Western States Commission on Higher Education by Governor Edmund G. Brown.

Dwight J. Simpson, assistant professor of political science at Williams College, has been granted leave of absence for the second semester of the current academic year. On a grant by the Department of State, he will lecture on American Foreign Policy during a six month tour of Greece, Lebanon, Iran and India.

J. David Singer will serve as academic consultant in International Relations to the Naval War College, Newport, R. I. during the first semester of 1960–61.

Elmer E. Smead of Dartmouth has been appointed a columnist for *Variety Magazine* to cover topics related to government regulation of the mass communications media.

Oscar Svarlien is traveling in Europe during the academic year 1959–60 on leave from the University of Florida on a Rockefeller grant to study the legal claims to the Arctic. He is visiting Polar institutes in Norway, Denmark, England and the U.S.S.R.

Richard N. Swift, associate professor of government, New York University, is on sabbatical leave during 1959–60 and with the aid of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, is pursuing studies in theoretical problems relating to international relations.

Loren E. Tesdell, assistant professor, has been granted a leave from Temple University during the spring semester, 1959–60 to undertake an exploratory mission in Jordan for the American Friends Service Committee's Social and Technical Assistance Program, and continue research and writing on the administration of United States and United Nations technical assistance programs in Jordan and Iraq.

Ellis Waldron, professor of political science and dean of the graduate school at Montana State University, is also serving as acting director of the bureau of government research.

George E. Wolff of the University of Florida was visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Durham, England, during the fall semester of this academic year.

Bryce Wood of the Social Science Research Council is visiting professor of international relations in the School of International Affairs at Columbia.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Minoo Adenwalla, formerly of the University of Missouri has been appointed assistant professor of history and government at Lawrence College.

Robert J. Alperin of Northwestern University has been appointed instructor in government and politics, University of Maryland.

Eliot S. Berkley has been appointed dean of administration at the Kansas City Art Institute and School of Design.

Walter F. Berns, Jr., formerly of the Yale department of political science, was appointed associate professor, July, 1959 at Cornell.

Bernard C. Borning, associate professor of political science at the University of Idaho was promoted to the chairmanship of political science at that institution as of the beginning of the 1959–60 academic year.

Ralph J. Braibanti has been promoted to professor of political science at Duke.

J. Cudd Brown, formerly assistant professor of international relations at San Franciso State College and curator of the African collection and research associate in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, has been appointed associate professor under the Chevalier program and fund on Diplomacy and World Affairs at Occidental College.

Robert E. Clute has been appointed assistant professor of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

James S. Coleman has accepted an appointment as director of the African Studies Center at the University of California, Los Angeles.

George Andrews Condon, a graduate of the University of Michigan and the University of Tennessee, has been appointed instructor in government at Texas Technological College for 1959–60.

Joanne Coyle has been named instructor in political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Melvin Crain, after nine years service with the federal government, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of politics at San Diego State College.

John Crampton, formerly at the University of California at Santa Barbara has become an assistant professor at Lewis and Clark College.

Clifford I. Dobler was promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of Idaho as of the beginning of the 1959–60 academic year.

Jean M. Driscoll, formerly of the political science staff at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, has joined the staff of North Park College.

Donovan F. Emch of Toledo University has been appointed by the mayor of Toledo to the city's Publicity and Efficiency Commission.

Eugene M. Emme has accepted the new position of historian of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D. C., effective immediately.

Ivo Feierabend, formerly of Washington University, St. Louis, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor, San Diego State College.

Jason Finkle, formerly of the faculty of the University of Florida at Gainesville, has also joined the Vietnam Project of Michigan State University as academic advisor.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon has been appointed director of the Latin American Studies Center of the University of California, Los Angeles.

Peter J. Fliess has been promoted to professor of government at Louisiana State University.

Charles Robert Foster, formerly of the College of William and Mary, has been appointed assistant professor of political science and public administration at Cornell College.

Lawrence H. Fuchs, returning from Hawaii where he directed research on a Social Science Research Council grant, was appointed chairman of the department of politics at Brandeis University. Dr. Fuchs resigned as director of the Summer School.

Edward Goerner will move from Yale to the faculty at Notre Dame beginning the school year 1960–61, as assistant professor.

Edward M. Goldberg, formerly instructor in political science at the University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of New Mexico.

Donald Habbe has resigned as a Foreign Service Officer and accepted a position as assistant professor of government at the State University of South Dakota.

Guy B. Hathorn has been promoted to associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Murray C. Havens has accepted an appointment as assistant professor at Duke.

Eduard Heimann became an emeritus professor of the New School for Social Research in June 1958. He continues to teach at both the New School and Union Theological Seminary. He lectured widely throughout Japan in summer 1958 and was a visiting professor in the University of California (Berkeley) in the fall semester 1958–59.

E. Allen Helms has succeeded Harvey C. Mansfield as chairman at the Ohio State University, effective January 1.

John H. Herz of The City College has been promoted to a full professorship. He lectured on international politics at the German *Hochschule fuer Politik* during the summer of 1959, was visiting professor at the University of California (Berkeley) in October 1959, and will be a Fulbright lecturer in international politics at the Free University of Berlin during the summer of 1960.

Robert J. Huckshorn was promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Idaho as of the beginning of the 1959–60 academic year.

Judith Jamison, formerly of the Bureau of Governmental Research U.C.L.A., has become community research consultant of the Tuberculosis and Health Association of Los Angeles County.

Whittle Johnston has been appointed assistant professor in the School of International Service of the American University. He also was awarded the Sumner Prize at Harvard University for 1958–59 for "the best dissertation . . . dealing with . . . the prevention of war and the establishment of universal peace."

John Kennedy has joined the faculty of the University of Virginia as acting associate professor in the Woodrow Wilson department of foreign affairs. He was formerly at the University of Notre Dame.

Josef Korbel, professor of international relations and staff member of the Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, has been appointed director of the Social Science Foundation and chairman of the department of international relations.

Donald J. Kreitzer, formerly of St. Thomas College, St. Paul, Minnesota, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

Ladis K. D. Kristof, lecturer in the University of Chicago College in 1958–59, has been appointed associate director of the Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, with an office in New York.

Luke T. Lee has joined the faculty of the State University College of Education, New Paltz, New York as associate professor of political science. Dr. Lee was formerly on the faculty of Pennsylvania State University.

Edgar Litt has been appointed jointly by Mount Holyoke and Amherst colleges as instructor of political science.

Theodore J. Lowi was appointed instructor, July 1959 at Cornell University.

James H. McCrocklin, professor of government and chairman of the department of government, Texas College of Arts and Industries, has been elected first vice-president of the Texas Municipal League at its annual convention. He is also Mayor of Kingsville, Texas.

John D. Molloy, who recently received his Ph.D. at the University of Cincinnati, was appointed instructor of political science at Marquette University.

Lloyd Musolf, formerly chairman of the Vassar department of political science, has joined the staff of the Michigan State University Advisory Group to the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon, as advisor to the public administration division. He is also on the regular staff of Michigan State University.

John Norman, professor of government at Fairfield University, has been appointed member of the Fairfield, Conn. Charter Revision Commission. He was previously elected to the Fairfield Board of Finance in November, at which time he also served as his party's campaign manager in the town.

Karl O'Lessker has joined the faculty of Wabash College as assistant professor of political science.

Franklin K. Patterson, Lincoln Filene Professor of civic education and director, Tufts Civic Education Center, has become a member of the staff of the government department.

Thomas Payne, who has been associate professor of political science at Montana State University has been promoted to the rank of professor and Chairman of the newly established department of political science.

Anthony J. Pearce, formerly a member of the political science department of San Jose State College in California, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Edward L. Pinney of the University of North Carolina has been appointed instructor in government at Louisiana State University beginning in September 1959.

James K. Pollock, Murfin Professor of political science and chairman of the department of political science of The University of Michigan, has been awarded the Knight Commander Cross of the Order of Merit by the government of the German Federal Republic. In 1956 he was awarded the Grand Cross of the same Order. He has also recently been appointed by President Eisenhower to be vice-chairman of the new permanent Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Ralph E. Purcell has been appointed professor and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Delaware. During the past year Professor Purcell was in India under a Social Science Research Council grant studying the "Indian Administrative Service."

Leo C. Riethmayer has succeeded Curtis W. Martin as chairman of the department of political science at the University of Colorado. He continues to serve as Director of the Graduate Program in Public Administration.

James S. Roberts has been promoted from assistant to associate professor of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

John Roche has been appointed dean of the faculty at Brandeis University.

Jack W. Rodgers has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Nebraska.

Donald S. Rothchild, who received his doctorate at Johns Hopkins University in June 1958, has been promoted to assistant professor of government at Colby College.

Manfred Schmidt, formerly associated with the University of Michigan, has been appointed an assistant professor of government at the State University of South Dakota.

Allan P. Sindler, formerly of Yale University, has accepted an appointment as associate professor of political science at Duke.

Richard C. Spencer has retired from the chairmanship of the department of political science at Coe College. He has been succeeded by Richard W. Taylor. Dr. Spencer continues as professor of political science and will teach a full schedule.

Robert J. Steamer was recently promoted to associate professor of government at Louisiana State University.

Richard Steele, formerly of West State Texas College, has been appointed an assistant professor at Marshall College, replacing Professor Carl Leiden, who has resigned to teach at American University at Cairo, Egypt.

C. Charles Stephano, formerly legislative assistant to Senator H. Alexander Smith, has taken a position as senior research assistant with the Law Revision and Legislative Services Commission of New Jersey.

Albert C. Stillson, who recently received a Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University, and served as an analyst in National Defense for the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at Montana State University.

John O. Stitely became director of the bureau of government research established at the University of Rhode Island, February 1, 1959.

Sterling Takeuchi has been appointed Reader's Digest visiting professor of international relations at Macalester College.

David B. Truman has replaced Schuyler C. Wallace as chairman of the department of public law and government at Columbia.

Gordon Tullock, formerly a Thomas Jefferson fellow in political economy at the University of Virginia, has become an assistant professor in the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina.

Richard L. Walker, head of the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina, was recently appointed the first James F. Byrnes professor of international relations, a newly created chair there.

Richard A. Watson has been appointed associate director of the bureau of government research and assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri, effective September 1, 1959.

Charles B. Weasmer, of the University of Virginia, has been appointed an instructor at the university of South Carolina.

Philip S. Wilder, Jr. has been named chairman of the Wabash College department of political science and director of the college's Institute of Politics, which has been given financial support by the Falk Foundation.

A. B. Winter has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Nebraska.

At the beginning of the spring semester Robert Woetzel joined Fordham University's Political Philosophy faculty.

Leon O. Wolcott, formerly of the University of New Mexico, is serving as advisor on policy and administration to the Prime Minister of Iran under an ICA contract.

Fred R. Yoder, formerly of Washington State University has been appointed chairman of the division of social sciences of Campbellsville College, Kentucky.

Raphael Zariski has been made an assistant professor at the University of Nebraska.

IN MEMORIAM

The work of the American Bar Association's "World Peace Through World Law" program suffered a severe blow when Edgar Turlington died on September 27, 1959. At the time of his death he was on leave of absence from Georgetown University, where he was a Professorial Lecturer in International Law and Constitutional Law. He had interrupted his teaching to devote himself exclusively to the ABA's efforts to advance respect for international law throughout the world.

Edgar Turlington was an extremely modest man, and he would not approve of an "In Memoriam" notice abounding in detailed accounts of his achievements. Moreover, it is fair to say that he was so well known among scholars and practitioners in the fields of international and public law that anything more than a résumé of his career would be superfluous. He was a Rhodes Scholar, an Assistant Solicitor of the Department of State, a member of several claims commissions, a practicing lawyer, author of several monographs and many articles, and a beloved and respected teacher. In his last years, with typical energy, he went to Ethiopia for a term of service as Legal and Political Advisor. All of these experiences combined with his great knowledge and unusual personal qualities to produce a man who was ever an inspiration to students and younger colleagues.

William V. O'Brien
Georgetown University

James Hart, Professor of Political Science at the University of Virginia, died in Charlottesville on September 14th after a very brief and wholly unexpected illness.

He was born in Albemarle County, Virginia, on October 26, 1896. He received his B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Virginia in 1918 and 1919, respectively, and the Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins in 1923. He began his teaching career as a tutor at Harvard in 1921, joined the faculty of the University of Michigan in 1922 and returned to Johns Hopkins in 1926, where he remained until he was appointed Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Virginia in 1936.

Characteristically, James Hart served not only the University to which he was so long attached by ties of sentiment and service, but also his professional associates and the public at large. He was a member of the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association, a vice president of that body and a member of the Board of Editors of the American Political Science Review. He was also President of the Southern Political Science Association in 1946. In 1937, he served as a member of the research staff of President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management and was author of "The Exercise of Rule-making Power," one of the special studies prepared by that staff.

He was the author of numerous scholarly

works, especially several dealing with the Presidency and administrative law. His *Introduction to Administrative Law* and *The American Presidency in Action, 1789* were but two of his solid and scholarly works which earned him well merited respect. At the time of his death he was engaged in the final stages of preparing yet another work on the Presidency.

Those who had the good fortune to know James Hart as a friend, colleague or teacher are aware that with characteristic modesty and genuine humility he would deprecate any eulogy on his behalf. And yet, it is little enough to say that combined in him were a rare gentility of manner, unyielding devotion to principle, the scholar's commitment to the search for truth according to his best lights and a conviction that teaching is a calling which places the highest demands on the energy and intellect of those who follow it. James Hart stood squarely in the full stream of what Coventry Patmore called Traditions of Civility. He was, in the complete sixteenth century sense, the Scholar-Gentleman.—Robert K. Gooch.

GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association has received from The Asia Foundation a grant of $2,500 for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a three-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review.*

(Membership in the Association for three years and subscription to the *Review* will be only $1.00. Applicants should write directly to The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Payment may be made in UNESCO coupons or in any way convenient and acceptable under the exchange regulations of the country concerned. The privilege is extended to graduate students as well as to established political scientists.)

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, which have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

(The cost of a three-year institutional subscription will be $2.00, payable as above.)

3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 8–10, 1960, in the Statler Hilton Hotel, New York City.

(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any Asian country from Afghanistan eastward. Applications should be sent to The American Political Science Association, 1726 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. In his request the applicant should give his regular academic position, the nature of his study or visit in the United States, and the sum necessary for travel to and from the meeting.)

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

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

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
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

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

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